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Limited research is available which directly investigates the lived experience of counsellors-in-
training, and how it shapes both what it means to become a counsellor, and counsellor education. 
Conceptualisations of this process and related counsellor education are mainly limited to 
psychological and humanistic models of professional development. As a counsellor educator on a 
Master of Counselling programme, espousing a social constructionist approach to counselling, I 
was interested to both study the lived experience of counsellors-in-training and explore the 
possibilities of theorizing this process beyond the limits of available conceptual frameworks for 
counsellor education.  
  
This thesis performs ethico-onto-epistemological shifts in relation with the matter, time and space 
of this project, from primarily post-structural to posthumanist ways of conceptualising the research 
process and the (post)human subject, along with considering implications of reconfiguring the 
counsellor-in-training subject for counsellor education. With a focus on mapping and theorizing 
the experiences of a small, diverse group of counsellors-in-training, I draw on data generated over 
the period of one year, primarily through the post-structurally informed methodology of collective 
biography. A shift to a posthumanist analytic focus enabled a move beyond the discursive to a 
mapping of the multiple, entangled material, affective and discursive force relations enacting the 
agential possibilities for counsellors-in-training. Engaging in a diffractive, rather than reflexive, 
process of data analysis, which marks a decentring of the individual subject of inquiry, and instead 
requires an opening up to the intra-active flows, matter, and material-discursive practices, I 
document how tears came to matter, both as an object of analysis, and for counsellors-in-training, 
in relation to the multiple forces enacting them.  
 
Counsellor-in-training (and counsellor-researcher) tears, as both present and ghostly, are 
conceptualised in Karen Barad’s agential realist terms as material-discursive practices or 
phenomena (Barad, 2007). Data analysis entails a detailed mapping of tears as phenomena, which 
makes visible the multiple intra-active forces and encounters enacting them. Such analysis shows 
not just the complex and intra-active material-discursive forces at work in the materialisation of 
tears, but through tears, the forces at work then, also in the ongoing and iterative (re)(con)figuring 
of a counsellor-in-training as posthuman subject. In this way, a counsellor-in-training educative 
subject is re-imagined as an ethical, vital, moving embodiment of multiple affective-material-





within” (Braidotti, 2016, p. 26). Such a re-imagining of this posthuman, educative subject 
necessarily invites a reconceptualising of (counsellor) education and its pedagogical practices.  
 
This thesis concludes with an initial consideration of the kinds of pedagogical practices and 
challenges such a post-human re-imagining might produce for counsellor education. In particular, 
I draw on the posthumanist concepts of emergent listening and diffraction to conceptualise the 
group process participants engaged in, and reconfigure the posthumanist pedagogical possibilities 
of a shift from reflective to diffractive practice in counsellor education. Requiring an openness to 
the not-yet known, diffractive practice as pedagogy invites counsellors-in-training beyond known, 
habitual, and normative reproductions of identity and practice. I suggest that a collective, 
diffractive process, where posthumanist notions of entanglement, dynamic relationality, and 
difference underpin embodied and creative practices of telling and listening, affords both 
























This thesis enacts a diffractive experiment in knowing-in-being. The materialization of the 
knowledge produced in the following pages has not come about solely through will and effort, 
although that has played an (intra-)active part. What has come to matter has been cut together-
apart, in an entanglement of irreducible relations of responsibility, that extend across multiple times 
and spaces, enfolding ontologically inseparable, multiple, dynamic, material-discursive-affective 
forces (Barad, 2012).  
This work performs an iterative, ethico-onto-epistemological engagement with posthumanism, and 
Barad’s (2007) theoretical framework of agential-realism, in order to disrupt, dislodge and shift, 
dominant humanistic ways of knowing in relation to identity for counsellors-in-training. Through 
diffractively mapping entangled ‘tear encounters’, as emergent within the lived experience of a 
small group of counsellors-in-training, I argue for the reconceptualization of counsellor-in-training 
identity as a “phenomenal matter”, a material-discursive practice, not an individual achievement 
(Barad, 2012, p. 32). Decentring humanism’s self-contained individual, and reconfiguring 
counsellor-in-training identity in posthumanist terms, as an ongoing materialization of the world’s 
iterative intra-activity, necessarily invites consideration of pedagogical implications for counsellor 
education. Engaging with the concept of a posthumanist pedagogy, and drawing on the 
methodology of collective biography taken up in this research, I imagine how counsellor education, 
and reflective practice, might be reconfigured to take account of a posthuman educative subject.  
Before turning to attend to (the problem of) the current, dominant, humanist conceptualisations of 
the subject of counsellor education in the following chapter, I wish to situate the beginnings of this 
project. I do this, not with the intention of starting at the beginning, in a linear sense, but of 
attempting to make visible, and map, significant entangled forces intra-actively producing a way 





migrating into an academic identity as a counsellor educator, and to the history of counsellor 
education in Aotearoa, New Zealand, the context of this research. Finally, in this introduction, I 
offer an outline, or map, to introduce the reader to the thesis chapters.     
Finding my way into this project 
When I began this project of exploration into the lived experience1 and identity formation of 
counsellors-in-training, I was in the midst of my own transitions in relation to professional identity. 
I came to conceptualise myself as being in a “a transitional space between the per(form)ing of old 
and new identities” (Barraclough, 2014, p, 363). I had recently been appointed to an academic 
position as a counsellor educator, having previously worked primarily as a psychologist, 
counsellor, and most recently, a clinical educator, for over fifteen years. I imagined the writing of 
my first academic paper in my new position as a “moment, among other moments”, which “might 
come to represent an arriving, a merging or an integration, which foreshadows a becoming” (p. 
363). These imaginings spoke of “deeply felt and specifically liberal-humanist desires to be taken 
up” by others, and myself, as an appropriate and competent academic subject (Davies & Gannon, 
2006a, p. 172).  
I explored this experience, at the very beginning of my research, through the use of ‘poetries’ as a 
method of inquiry (Brogden, 2010; Richardson, 1994; Richardson, 2010; Richardson & St. Pierre, 
2005). Such a method provided a way of exploring different aspects, dimensions, and relationships 
with, my research topic (Richardson, 1994). I was drawn to poetry for its capacity to engage with 
the multiplicity and complexity of our social worlds, without needing to reduce or categorize 
experience, rather, seeing the possibilities for it to “open the text to interpretation and destabilize 
the “coherent” narrative….” (Fitzpatrick, 2012, p. 9), and “to leave the meaning open” (Ellis, 2004, 
                                                          
1 Lived experience is defined as “that which can be known through the five senses” (Richardson, 1997, p. 66), rather 





p. 203). The political power of poetry (Holman-Jones, 2005), “to challenge canonical social science 
discourse…to transform us personally, open up our research practices, as well as teach us about 
injustice, encouraging us to join in the struggle”, was central also to my desire to experiment with 
poetry’s possibilities (Ellis, 2004, p. 204), and continues to be throughout this thesis, in my use of 
poems. Apart from enabling me to use this exploration of my own lived experience of migrating 
identities to further think into the lived experience of my research participants, this use of poetries 
was significant for what their analysis highlighted (Barraclough, 2014). I clearly recognised in my 
own words both the potency, and the myth, of the liberal-humanist subject. This became most 
evident to me in my analysis of the following poem (p. 370):    
Doubt 
Today, the gap is wide 
I flick between your words, 
    associate professor, 
       on the page 
and the apps on my iPad, 
   ‘Dictionary’ and ‘Wikipedia’. 
I am 
     lost 
     in 
     translation. 
Excitement 
‘your abstract has been accepted’ 
now tempered with 
     fear 
the abstract 
    was the best bit. 
Models of perfection 
   are viewed 
   from a great distance. 
   How can I 
      traverse 






    the clothes on my back, 
       and my offspring 
          in tow? 
I recognised in my words those liberal-humanist desires to be taken up by others, and myself, as 
unique and individual (Davies & Gannon, 2006b). I noted my view of myself as a solitary, self-
contained ‘I’, engaged, through effort and will, in traversing the (linear) distance toward ‘models 
of perfection’, which seemed eternally out of reach, even more so with mothering in tow. Such 
ideas of myself all spoke of humanism’s individual subject, of that rational, autonomous, “solitary 
and heroic” (p. 176) subject, where becoming competent, forming my academic identity, could 
only be achieved through will, reason and hard work alone (and maybe some luck). However, 
through engaging with poststructural ideas in analysis of the poem (Monk, Winslade, Crocket & 
Epston, 1997; Davies & Gannon, 2006a), I recognised the illusion of the humanist subject, in its 
denial of the real and complex social and cultural contexts through which I was constituted, and in 
my dependence on the power of others to name me competent and appropriate (Barraclough, 2014).            
Given that students entering postgraduate counselling programmes are often transitioning into 
study from a previous career and are often ‘mature’ students2, I surmised that the metaphor of 
‘transitional space’, with the resulting doubt, confusion and uncertainty, may be equally applicable 
to their lived experience. In addition, I was interested in dispelling the illusion of the humanist 
subject, and instead working with counsellors-in-training to make visible, and thus revisable, the 
discourses through which they made meaning, and made themselves (Davies, Brown, Gannon, 
                                                          
2 In this research (see chapter two) this is the case for seven of the eight participants, with an average 
age of 48 years. Examples from other studies of counsellors-in-training note average ages of participants 
as 40 (Nelson & Jackson, 2003), 32.7 (Auxier, Hughes & Kline (2003), and 34.1 (Maruniakova, Rihacek & 
Roubal, 2017). Folkes- Skinner, Elliot & Wheeler (2010) report on research with counsellor-in-training, 
“Margaret (not her real name) (who) was a 50-year-old woman with a professional business background 
of 15 years” (p. 85). Obviously, I have taken examples to show a trend, and have not seen, nor 





Honan, Laws, Mueller-Rockstroh & Petersen, 2004). As a counsellor educator, coming to 
understand and conceptualise this experience for the counsellors-in-training I was working with, 
and the implications for our collective practices of teaching and learning, was a strong impetus for 
me in undertaking this research.          
In addition, in my therapeutic work as a psychologist and counsellor, I have been strongly 
influenced by, and committed to, understanding the experiences and possibilities for change with 
my clients in social constructionist and poststructural terms (e.g. Burr, 1995; 2015; Derrida, 1981; 
Foucault, 1979), working, and training, within the therapeutic frameworks of systemic, solution 
focused and narrative therapies (de Shazer, 1988; de Shazer, Kim Berg, Lipchik, Nunnally, Molnar, 
Gingerich & Weiner-Davis, 1986; Monk et al., 1997; White & Epston, 1990). As such, I understood 
clients’ lived experiences as being co-constituted in the broader socio-political contexts of their 
lives and relationships, and mediated through language (White & Epston, 1990). I understood client 
change to be a collaborative, co-constructed, relational process. I drew on the premises of narrative 
and solution focused therapies in that while the narratives we construct around our lives, through 
the discourses available to us, have real effects on our lives, they “do not encompass the full 
richness of our lived experience” (Monk, 1997, p. 13). The co-creative practices of this orientation 
to counselling offers an invitation to clients to deconstruct and re-story alternative and preferred 
pasts, presents and futures, “unearthing dormant competencies, talents, abilities and resources” (p. 
24).  
Working within these frameworks, I developed a way of being - sometimes called a ‘stance’ - in 
relation to my clients, encompassing particular postmodern ways of understanding the therapeutic 
process (Monk, 1997). For example, I eschew the notion of universal truths about clients’ 
experiences, being interested instead in local, historical, situated knowledges. This requires me to 
take a non-expert, not-knowing position, in relation to client ways of knowing, and maintain a 





1997; Thomas, 2013). While a very brief outline, these statements offer some context to my 
philosophical orientation to understanding client lived experience and processes of change in 
counselling. Coming to teach on a counsellor education programme offering the solution focused 
model of therapy to its students was a clear theoretical fit for me. However, I soon recognized that, 
as an educator working with students, not clients, and in an educative rather than counselling 
process, I needed to reorient myself to the work I was engaged in. This led to a desire to understand 
the lived experience of counsellors-in-training, processes of teaching, learning and identity 
formation, in theoretical ways consistent with both my philosophical orientation and that of the 
model being taught on the programme – i.e. social constructionist. However, as I outline in chapter 
one, the lack of literature conceptualising the lived experience of counsellors-in-training from 
anything but a humanistic orientation, provided further significant impetus for embarking on this 
research.  
Such literature did not engage with the relational, socio-political contexts co-constituting the 
counsellors’-in-training own identities, and bore no relation to social constructionist ideas of 
identity which we were espousing in the context of teaching/learning about solution focused 
counselling. This seemed contradictory to our underpinning philosophical aims, and a 
philosophical disconnect for our students. Hence, just as I drew on theoretical and philosophical 
understandings of the self, experience and processes of change in my work as a counsellor, I 
embarked on this research in order to be able to do the same for my new work as a counsellor 
educator in relation to counsellors-in-training. 
An ontological turn 
As a thesis should, ultimately this project takes me far beyond the place I started and into territory 
I could not have imagined in setting out. In desiring to learn about the lived experiences of 





migrating, and forming new, identities, I entered the theoretical realm of posthumanism (Braidotti, 
2013, 2016; Barad, 2007). Moving beyond my known understandings of the discursive formation 
of the self and the socially constructed nature of knowing, this thesis engages with the ontological 
turn occurring across the social sciences (Lather, 2016). This turn, after the cultural turn, 
encompasses a bringing back of the materiality of the world, not in a Marxist sense but, in feminist 
terms, it is more in relation to the body and the natural world (Alaimo & Hekman, 2008b; Lather, 
2016). The linguistic and cultural turn has enabled complex and productive analyses of the 
“interconnections between power, knowledge, subjectivity and language” (Alaimo & Hekman, 
2008a, p. 1), as taken up in counselling approaches such as narrative and solution focused therapies. 
However, this new onto-epistemology opens up fundamental questions about ontology, 
epistemology, ethics, politics, and the intra-active, rather than dualistic, relationship between 
matter and meaning, the material and the discursive (Barad, 2007).  
In this thesis, engaging in particular with Karen Barad’s (2007) posthumanist framework of 
agential realism, I put such theory to work in order to interrupt, and reconfigure, “both radical 
constructivism and the notion of independently existing individuals” which currently frame 
theories of subjectivity and agency for both researchers, and counsellors-in-training (Lather, 2016, 
p. 2). This leads to an inevitable, posthumanist, rethinking also of counsellor education, with 
attention given also to bodily, material, and affective forces as (intra-)active in the educational and 
therapeutic encounters of counsellors-in-training. A posthumanist orientation invites counsellors-
in-training to think beyond known, habitual, and normative reproductions of identity and practice. 
As Winslade says of therapeutic practice, and I suggest in relation to counsellor education, such 
practice “has to continually reinvent itself, and redescribe itself, in order to stay relevant and vital” 
(Winslade, 2009, p. 332). It/we must be equipped to respond to the ever changing conditions of 
life, and to seek out the most sophisticated analyses of what it happening in the entangled world of 





aims to do in relation to that which I have outlined above, I wish to situate this work in the 
counsellor education context in which it was undertaken.  
The research context – counsellor education in Aotearoa New Zealand 
The following overview of the history of counsellor education in this country demonstrates a 
philosophical shift from original notions of counsellor training, to current conceptualisations of 
professional education, consistent with shifts in other fields, such as teacher education. What was 
previously “seen as training – a more limited vocational process of teaching skills – later became 
professional education, acknowledging the wide professional responsibilities of counsellors and 
signalling a philosophical shift” (Crocket, Flanagan, Winslade & Kotzé, 2011, p. 5). Such a shift 
requires attention beyond ‘skills’ to matters of curriculum and pedagogy, and to meeting the needs 
of both the “changing student group…and the changing circumstances…of life in New Zealand” 
(p. 5). In a field where the majority of literature still refers to students of these programmes as 
‘counsellors-in-training’, it is clear that research attention to pedagogical matters of counsellor 
‘education’ is still required. The following section outlines this history, before I return to consider 
my use of the term ‘counsellor-in-training’ throughout this research.  
The development of counsellor education in New Zealand has been similar to the UK and the USA, 
with its origins mainly in vocational guidance in the 1930s. At this time, under a Labour 
government extending social welfare provisions and instituting polices promoting full 
employment, adequate incomes, accessible health provisions, housing opportunities and free 
education, a state-funded vocational guidance service was established in schools (Hermansson & 
Webb, 1993; Miller, 2014). By the 1960s, guidance and counselling in education began with the 
creation of guidance counsellor positions in secondary schools, with an emphasis on “remedial-





1993, p. 216). This was seen as a response to the perceived increase in social, educational, and 
behaviour challenges being exhibited by “troubled adolescents” (Miller, 2014, p. 104).   
Those appointed to these vocational and guidance counsellor positions were recruited from 
amongst already experienced teachers, with responsibility for counselling training soon contracted 
to newly developed programmes with the Education departments/faculties of universities. In 1973, 
the first university-based training course began, and by the 1980s counsellor training programmes 
were in existence at five of the six universities across New Zealand. Selection of students was 
carried out, not by the “university trainers”, but by the “schools who appointed guidance 
counsellors in consultation with Department of Education Inspectors with responsibility for 
Guidance” (Crocket et al., p. 4). Programmes were originally postgraduate diplomas consisting of 
a year of academic study followed by a year of practicum work in the school, eventually moving 
to Masters programmes, initially in Education, latterly a Master of Counselling. Interestingly, 
Crocket et al. (2011) point out curriculum tensions from the outset with these homogeneous 
University programmes largely following US models of school counselling developed in response 
to their particular US context. That is, “at a time when the agenda in the US was to identify talent 
for universities – particularly in maths and science – in the context of the Cold War and the space 
race with the USSR” (p. 4). In contrast, in New Zealand, guidance counsellor positions were 
established in response to social needs, in particular to growing concerns about “juvenile 
delinquency and teenage pregnancy” (p. 4) and a governmental commitment to ensure social 
stability.  
Through a similar time period, a second form of counsellor training, likened to “an apprentice style 
training” was also developing (p. 6). Marriage Guidance emerged in the post-World War II years, 
and similar to the UK, developed in response to the effects on families of the social conditions of 
the time. With funding and oversight from the Department of Justice, Marriage Guidance offered 





recruited from the community and offered in-house training. In a similar way, throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s other agencies developed counselling services through recruitment and in-house 
training, such as Lifeline, Youthline, and other social service agencies often connected to and 
sponsored by churches (Crocket et al., 2011; Miller, 2014).    
The social policies of this period continued for almost fifty years until the early 1980s, providing 
for guidance and counselling primarily delivered through the large state institutions of education, 
health, justice and labour. For various reasons, including local and international economic factors, 
and the difficulty of sustaining the costs of the welfare state, challenges arose against a continuation 
with the same policies and ideology which had resulted in “large bureaucracies, centralized control, 
excessive state intervention, and overregulation” (Hermansson & Webb, 1993, p. 214). In a little 
over a decade, the Labour government of the 1980s, along with the National (Conservative) 
government that succeeded them, set about implementing policy that sought to dismantle the 
welfare state and reconstitute it with ‘the free market state’, neoliberal policies underpinned by free 
market monetary policies. This had the effect of removing or lessening state responsibility, along 
with deregulation and decentralization. Such ideological and policy changes were to have major 
impacts across society, not least for mental health, guidance and counselling, which continue to be 
seen and felt to this day, with underfunding of services for mental health, lack of available, and 
affordable, treatment and counselling options, and an “under-resourced, over-worked and stressed 
mental health workforce” (Elliot, 2017).    
The effect of this loosening of ties between the (now) Ministry of Education and counsellor 
education programmes also had significant implications. Decentralisation saw schools and other 
social service agencies obtain the right to appoint their own counsellors, and a market sprung up 
for counsellors in private practice with access to various third party funding. The deregulation in 
education led also to the significant growth in the number of counsellor education programmes, in 





This proliferation continues to raise challenges around issues such as equivalence of qualifications, 
access to professional membership of the national counselling body, the New Zealand Association 
of Counsellors (NZAC), programme accreditation, and tensions around cooperation and 
competition amongst programmes (Crocket et al., 2011).   
Alongside these changes, has been the ongoing development of curricula in the postgraduate 
university programmes, the site of this research. This has entailed a shift away from the original 
imported US content focused curricula to more locally integrated approaches to counselling. For 
example, the University of Canterbury offered a New Zealand version of a micro-skills approach, 
later introducing the solution focused approach, which remains the current model taught in the, 
now, Master of Counselling programme (Crocket et al., 2011).  
Tensions and challenges remain in the contemporary environment of counsellor education in New 
Zealand, not least in regard to the apparent control of curriculum and standards by a number of 
stakeholders, including professional organisations, government funding agencies and departments, 
employers, national qualification and curriculum administration bodies, the academic institutions, 
counsellor educators, and, of course, students. Counsellor education continues to be shaped by its 
history, these forces, and ongoing changing socio-political conditions. (Crocket et al., 2011). The 
research described in this thesis, conducted with students undertaking a Master of Counselling 
programme (at one of the five original universities offering counselling education) is thus situated 
in, and influenced by, this historical, and contemporary context.   
At this point, I want to comment on the use of the term ‘counsellors-in-training’ throughout this 
thesis. I have adopted this term due to its common use within the literature to collectively describe 
a particular group of students, namely those embarking on counsellor education in a post-graduate 
programme, usually at Masters level. Given, particularly in New Zealand, the proliferation of 





philosophical, and aims of these programmes, my aim in using this term, is to situate this research 
within this one particular educative area. However, drawing on a “Derridean politics of metaphor” 
(Gale & Wyatt, 2007, p. 806), I propose putting the counsellor-in-training sous rature, or ‘under 
erasure’, in order to simultaneously recognise and question the term’s meaning and accepted use, 
and to think this subject differently, against the grain of the well-known, taken for granted subject 
of phenomenology and humanism (Davies, 2010), and against the notion of training in preference 
for that of education.       
Overview of this thesis 
The main focus of this thesis, therefore, is to explore what might be produced in thinking beyond 
the limits of predominantly available humanist conceptualisations of the lived experience and 
developing identity of counsellors-in-training, through engaging theoretically, in particular, with 
posthumanism and Karen Barad’s framework of agential-realism. The resulting reconfiguring of 
this educative subject of counsellor education naturally invites a consideration, too, of implications 
for teaching and learning in counsellor education. The thesis is structured in four parts, enacting, 
in part, onto-epistomological shifts which occurred during the undertaking of the thesis. Part one, 
titled ‘beginnings’ includes this introduction, the following chapter considering the current research 
literature relevant to the experience of undertaking training to become a counsellor, and the 
subsequent initial methodology outlining the generation of data with participants.  
In chapter one, I examine available research exploring the lived experience of counsellors-in-
training and ways such experiences have been conceptualised. Consideration is given to how 
professional identity formation is understood, and limitations are identified in relation to the 
primarily humanistic conceptualisations of both the lived experience and professional identity 
formation for counsellors-in-training. Following this, I outline the methodological approach of 





participants, data generation and ethical issues. Collective biography was chosen at the time for its 
capacity to generate an exploration of both individual, and collective, memories and experiences 
of encounters of significance to the counsellor-in-training participants. Theoretically, it offered a 
way in which counsellor-in-training participants could flesh out moments of their lived experience 
in order to examine the discursive contexts through which their counsellor subjectivities were 
constituted, my initial aim. This second chapter outlines the aims, ethics, participants, and 
processes of these group workshops.                   
Part two, titled ‘onto-epistemological shifts’ marks a diffractive moment in this research encounter, 
a shift of knowing-in-being, which reconfigures the ethico-onto-epistemology of this research 
project. I start in chapter three, by giving an account of a turn toward a posthuman onto-
epistemology, in particular drawing on Karen Barad’s (2007) posthumanist performative 
framework of agential realism. This thinking comes to underpin the ongoing theorising of this 
research project in relation to methodology, researcher subjectivity and data analysis to 
understandings of the nature of knowledge itself and how we come to know in relation with and as 
part of, rather than about, the world. I outline Barad’s account of how material-discursive practices 
come to matter, of the role of human and non-human forces, the material and discursive, natural 
and cultural factors, in rethinking notions of knowledge, identity, causality, agency and ethics. I do 
this in order to situate the remainder of this research project within such an onto-epistemology.       
Given this radical shift, I return to methodology in chapter four, and in particular to a rethinking of 
notions and practices of reflexivity in attending to questions of legitimation of knowledge, and 
researcher positioning in relation to knowledge production. I proceed to lay out the challenges and 
tensions of methodological reflexivity, arguing for a shift from the optics of reflection/practice of 
reflexivity to one of diffraction (Haraway, 1992; Barad, 2007) in our research practices. Implicit in 
this, and which I explore, is a reconceptualising also of my researcher subjectivity, which, in a 





data (Lenz Taguchi, 2012).  In exploring this, my aim is to argue for the usefulness of a diffractive 
rather than reflexive methodology, as well to further situate this research in the broader onto-
epistemological framework of post-humanism.  Following on from this, in chapter five, I explore 
further methodological implications of aligning my research with posthumanism, and diffraction 
as concept and method. I do this in order to envisage other tools I can think with, in entering what 
feels like such unknown terrain, engaging with the potential of the analytic device. I draw on 
Suchman’s (2012) definition of an analytic device as an inventive method, an analytic resource, 
through which things are made, and proceed to explore and explain three particular analytic devices 
– the poem, pattern, and (re)(con)figuration - and how these might be productive in this research 
project.  
Part three marks a turn to data analysis as thinking with posthumanist theory. I begin with chapter 
six, where I explore and document my beginning engagements with data analysis, my return to the 
individual interviews and collective biography groups after significant engagement with 
posthumanist theory, with writing, thinking and reconfiguring methodological practices in light of 
such theory. I document my unpreparedness for what emerges in bringing theory into relation with 
the data, with my researcher subjectivity and with a re-turning to the voices and faces of my 
participants. I outline how I was challenged to let go of the post-structural subject and re-engage 
with matter, with what came to matter, in thinking instead with material-discursive practices in 
relation to subject formation for counsellors-in-training.        
The remainder of part three of the thesis includes two main data analysis chapters – seven and 
eight, along with two interludes. An interlude is an “intervening or interruptive period, space or 
event” (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/interlude), when an “activity is different 
from what comes before or after it” (http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/interlude). 
I use the two interludes in a diffractive sense to signify an interruption to the focus of the data 





discrete nature of emerging knowledge which the text, at face value, performs. It is diffractive in 
the sense that the interludes are intra-active with the chapters, with each emerging as particular 
material configurations of their entangled intra-relating (Barad, 2007).                 
Interlude one marks a clear turn toward the material-discursive, an opening up to intra-active flows 
and currents, to material-discursive practices and diffractive patterns. What began to ‘glow’ 
(Maclure, 2010) in the researcher-data-participant-research entanglement was the materiality of 
participant tears. I use this interlude to explore what it means to think tears as an affective-material-
discursive practice, as an embodied, entangled dynamic relationality (Barad, 2007, Wetherell, 
2012), and to outline a brief exploration of historical and contemporary conceptualisations of tears, 
crying and weeping in the psychological and cultural studies literature, in order to situate my 
current conceptualisations. In chapter seven I begin a diffractive, experimental mapping of the 
presence of tears in counselling encounters as spoken about by participants in the collective 
biography groups. Such tear encounters are re-presented as poems, in order to further enact, or ‘cut 
together-apart’ (Barad, 2007) the contingent and entangled “processes of patterning” (Hughes & 
Lury, 2013, p. 786) in the spacetimemattering of tears. Moving between the words of my 
participants, re-presented in the poems, and, in particular, Barad’s agential realist, posthumanist 
framework, I explore tears as a mark of an embodied alterity, as intra-actively produced - enabled 
and constrained - by a multiplicity of forces, including human and non-human ones, and as enacting 
the ongoing (re)configuring of a counsellor-in-training subjectivity.    
Following on from this, I began to think also about the im/possibility of tears, tears as made 
intelligible through both presence and absence. I explore this turn toward an articulation of tears as 
a ghostly presence, a present-absence, an invisible yet potent force for counsellors-in-training, in 
the second interlude. I use this interlude to return to Barad (2010) in order to understand what might 
be produced in thinking with her descriptions of the hauntological nature of quantum 





those which are experienced as indeterminate or undecidable, yet which become determinate in 
their intra-active present-absence, I proceed to map the multiple forces enacting both of these 
notions of tears, as articulated by my participants in relation to their counselling encounters. 
Ultimately, through this mapping of tears as present and ghostly, I suggest that tears, far from being 
reduced to an emotional response, can best be described as enactments of ethical, social, material, 
affective, discursive and political relations. 
Such analysis enabled me to bring forth not just the complex and intra-active material-discursive 
forces at work in the materialisation of tears, but through tears, the forces at work then, also, in the 
ongoing and iterative (re)(con)figuring of counsellor-in-training subjectivities. This analysis 
clearly worked to disrupt dominant conceptualisations of the autonomous, rational, individual 
educative subject of counsellor education. In part four, I turn to the pedagogical implications for 
counsellor education of this posthumanist reconceptualization of the educative, counsellor-in-
training, subject. If the educative subject is not that autonomous individual, but is reconfigured as 
an ethical, vital, moving embodiment of multiple affective-material-discursive relations, then 
different conceptual tools and practices are required for education. In continuing to draw on the 
research with the participants in this study, I reconceptualise the processes they engaged in, through 
the collective biography groups, as diffractive practice, underpinned by posthumanist pedagogical 
theory-practice of, for example, emergent listening. Such a reconceptualization has implications, 
too, for counsellor educators and requires a reorientation to both the educative subject and the 
purpose of counsellor education, as well as to the theory-practice of teaching and learning. As I 
outline, this is a discombobulating experience, with its requirements to work against both the 
individual subject of humanism, and the dominant notion of learnification evident in the current 
socio-political climate, together co-constituting an outcome focused curriculum and similarly 
oriented pedagogical practice (Biesta, 2009). However, despite these and other challenges, I 





graduates capable of participating in, ethically and responsibly, the reconfiguring of the “material-
social relations of the world” (Barad, 2007, p. 35) and of those in it, of being responsive to the 









The problem of the subject of counsellor education 
Recent commentary in the counselling and psychotherapy literature on the lived experience of 
counsellors-in-training continues to emphasize the need to learn more about the experiences and 
challenges counsellors encounter during their training years (Grafanaki, 2010b; Pierce, 2016). In 
addition, it is suggested that the theory and practice on training novice therapists is fairly outdated 
(Pascual-Leone, Rodriguez-Rubio & Metler, 2013) and that very little scholarly work has focused 
on conceptualising the learning and training environment in regard to counsellor preparation 
programmes (Lau & Ng, 2014). Folkes-Skinner, Elliot and Wheeler (2010) go so far as to claim 
that no studies exist that directly investigate the experience of trainee counsellors, and the ways in 
which training programmes help them to develop as practitioners, and more recently still, that no 
research was found investigating the changes experienced by individual trainees over the course of 
their education (Folkes-Skinner, 2016).   
It is suggested that while researchers “struggle to grasp the complexities and processes involved in 
the development of new counsellors” (Grafanaki, 2010a, p. 81) many students in such training 
programmes continue to experience potentially negative impacts, such as a sense of incompetence, 
confusion, increased anxiety, stress and even burnout (Grafanaki, 2010b; Christopher & Maris, 
2010; Folkes-Skinner et al,, 2010; Truell, 2001; Kumary & Baker, 2008; Skovholt & Ronnestead, 
2003b; Auxier, Hughes and Kline, 2003). Additionally, there is a body of research which has 
suggested that trained or experienced counsellors are no more effective than inexperienced 
clinicians, or those without training, and, as such, it is time for counsellor education to revise the 
common, outdated, practices related to the clinical training of counsellors (Whiston & Coker, 
2000). Around the same time, researchers and counsellor educators criticized the field for 





therapist development, such as relationship quality and the person of the counsellor or therapist” 
(Nelson & Neufeldt, 1998, p. 76; Winslade, Monk & Drewery, 1997). This shift in thinking away 
from the primary emphasis in counsellor education as skills training becomes more relevant in light 
of the ongoing research into factors which influence client outcome – including extra-therapeutic 
variables (40%), hope, expectancy, and placebo effects (15%), specific therapy model and 
techniques (15%), and common factors (30%) (Lambert, 1986, 1992; Lambert & Barley, 2001; 
Leibert & Dunne-Bryant, 2015, Wampold, 2001). ‘Common factors’ refer to the elements that exist 
in all forms of psychotherapy, and are those factors most closely associated with therapist activity, 
or client-therapist relationship factors. There is a significant, growing body of evidence that it is 
this shared group of core factors, emphasizing the collaborative, relational work of therapist and 
client, which are most significant in contributing to positive client change (Hubble, Duncan, Miller 
& Wampold, 2010; Lambert & Barley, 2001; Wampold, 2010).    
Such evidence goes against a still prevailing view that “to be an accomplished psychotherapist one 
must be well versed in evidence based treatments (EBT), or in those models that have been shown 
in randomised clinical trials (RCT) to be efficacious for different “disorders”” (Duncan, 2013, p. 
4). In fact, Hubble et al. (2010) state the evidence is now indisputable – change resulting from 
psychotherapy derives from key factors that transcend all approaches. “The data are unequivocal: 
All treatment approaches have won, and all deserve prizes” (p. 33). What this means is that much 
of the variability of client outcome in counselling and therapy is actually attributable to the potency 
of the client, therapist and therapeutic alliance, rather than the choice of therapeutic approach. 
However, despite the numbers, percentages and large body of research attempting to quantify such 
a process, the common factors are not “invariant, proportionally fixed, or neatly additive”, rather 
they might be better described as “interdependent, fluid, and dynamic’ in a reciprocal, contextual, 






Given the significance over the years of researching the efficacy of particular models of 
psychotherapy with clients, the associated focus in counsellor ‘training’ on learning the ‘skills’ of 
evidence based techniques, and the recent shift in focus toward the more potent role of the therapist 
and therapeutic alliance in therapy outcomes, it seems timely to revisit the counsellor education 
literature, particularly in relation to the developing counsellor or therapist. Indeed, Orlinksky et al. 
(2005), recognising that the study of psychotherapies has been favoured over the study of 
psychotherapists, suggest the resulting paucity of research is due in part to this implicit bias in 
thinking about therapy “basically as a set of methods, techniques, or procedures that are efficacious, 
in and of themselves”. That is, that therapists, “when properly trained, are more or less 
interchangeable” (p. 5). When we think of counselling and therapy as a professional-personal 
relationship, where multiple, fluid, and complex factors interact to influence the process and 
outcomes for therapists and clients, reconsidering the education and training of counsellors, beyond 
technique, becomes a valuable and essential area of research.    
The following discussion and review of literature has thus been shaped by, and in response to, a 
number of questions centred on the individual who embarks on and proceeds with, education to 
become a counsellor. Who is the individual, or subject situated at the centre of counsellor 
education, the educative human subject? How does this individual, counsellor-in-training subject, 
become a counsellor? What are the processes, experiences, changes she/he/they go through in this 
educative experience and how does/might counsellor education respond to shaping these 
experiences, this process?  In attempting to make sense of the literature, and in order to reflect the 
shifts emerging in this project, I have structured this chapter into three main sections. The first 
section is underpinned by current, and historical, taken for granted, dominant ways of 
understanding the individual at the centre of counsellor training. That is, this section reviews 
literature which explores the experience and development of the counsellor-in-training as that 





universalising, internal and depoliticising trends of explanation” (Hook, 2005, p. 28), also 
described as the individualised subject of phenomenology (Davies, 2010), “on whom we have 
based so much of our thinking about being” (p. 54). This is a counsellor-in-training whose being 
as a self-contained, “self-reflective, self-thematizing human subject” (Willig, Potter, Wickham, 
Kendall & Hook, 2005, p. 32) is taken for granted in that he/she/they are atheorized. This 
counsellor-in-training emerges from a predominantly American and humanistic counselling 
literature, underpinned by Rogerian person-centred counselling practices at the heart of training 
programmes (Rogers, 1957/2007; 1961). In this section, I explore the themes generated from this 
body of research on the experiences of counsellors-in-training, as well as conceptualisations of 
development, change and identity during this period of professional education. I discuss some 
implications for counsellor education emerging from this body of literature, before finally 
considering the limitations of humanistic conceptualisations of the individual. In general, all of the 
literature reviewed pertains to post-graduate education programmes in counselling, which are 
generally Masters programmes, consistent with the programme of the participants in this current 
research.    
The second section follows the turn in counselling and counsellor education to postmodern, social 
constructionist and post-structural approaches, including Narrative and Solution-focused therapies 
(White & Epston, 1990; de Shazer, 1988; de Shazer et al., 1986). In this section I consider the 
literature discussing the conceptualisations of the counsellor-in-training subject, in particular their 
identity formation as relational, co-constructed, storied and as always situated in relations of power 
(Crocket, Kotzé & Flintoff, 2007), along with identified implications for counsellor education. At 
this point I consider the most significant, current pedagogical practice in place in counsellor 
education, that of reflective practice, which has come to be seen as necessary due to the multiple 






In the final section I consider the shift emerging currently in the social sciences literature toward 
conceptualisation of the posthuman subject (Braidotti, 2006), of identity as more than internally 
subjective, and more than discursively produced and performed. What has been termed the 
“posthuman predicament” in a world of “fast-moving technological advances and also of 
contemporary political developments” in relation to economic globalization, the war on terror, and 
the earth’s changing ecosystem has significant implications for rethinking human subjectivity and 
ethical relations “worthy of the complexity of our times” (Braidotti, 2016, p. 13). Some in the field 
of counselling, in particular those engaging with the systemic and narrative traditions, have begun 
to incorporate the thinking from the writing of French philosopher, Gilles Deleuze (1994; Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987) into conceptualisations of therapeutic practice (Sermijn & Loots, 2015; 
Winslade, 2009). However, although recognising the exciting possibilities for such 
experimentation in relation to therapeutic work with clients in systemic therapies, Semijn & Loots 
(2015) note its application to be embryonic. As far as I am aware, there has been no application of 
posthumanist thinking to conceptualisations of the counsellor-in-training subject, or counsellor 
education pedagogy. Aligning with Winslade (2009), who suggests that “therapeutic practice has 
to continually reinvent itself, and redescribe itself, in order to stay relevant and vital”, that it must 
seek out the most sophisticated analyses of what is happening in the world in which we live and 
work” (p. 332) I propose the same for the field of counsellor education and the emerging 
counsellor-in-training subject.  
The humanistic individual of counsellor education 
The majority of, albeit relatively limited (Pierce, 2016), research into the lived experiences of 
counsellors-in-training has been carried out with a humanistic understanding of the individual.  Its 
aim has been to better understand the educational experience and process, recognising that training 
to be a counsellor is likely to be cognitively and emotionally demanding, complex and 





theories have been put forward in an attempt to explain this, including the transition from lay helper 
to student to novice practitioner (Folkes-Skinner et al, 2010; Skovholt & Rønnestad, 2003), going 
through a process of “both intra-psychic and outward practical adaption” (Howard, Inman & 
Altman, 2006), the challenges of experiential learning, suggested to lead to disequilibrium and 
discomfort (Furr & Carroll, 2003), and the requirement to actively, and experientially, integrate 
personal and professional knowledge and selves in the development of a professional identity as a 
counsellor (Auxier et al., 2003; Wagner & Hill, 2015). Counsellors’ identities have been theorised 
to differ from identities formed in many other professions, due to their development of a 
‘therapeutic self’, a “unique personal blend of the developed professional and personal selves” 
(Skovholt & Rønnestad, 1992, p. 507; Auxier et al., 2003). The following discussion explores this 
research in more detail, in order to understand some of the current thinking around the experience, 
processes and development of a counsellor identity during counsellor education.   
The recent, and pertinent, research looking specifically at individuals’ experience has explored the 
existential experiences of counsellors-in-training (Pierce, 2016), how a trainee counsellor changes 
at the start of training (Folkes-Skinner, 2016; Folkes-Skinner et al., 2010), inner experience such 
as feelings and concerns (Hill, Sullivan, Knox & Schlosser, 2007), and more focused areas such as 
experience of impasse (De Stefano, D’Luso, Blake, Fitzpatrick, Drapeau, & Chamodraka, 2007), 
self-confidence (Bischoff, 1997; Bischoff & Barton, 2002), and stress and psychological distress 
of the counsellor-in-training (Kumary & Baker, 2008, Skovholt & Rønnestad, 2003; Truell, 2001). 
Each of these pieces of research offers not only evidence of the lived experience during training, 
but reflections on the significance for the process of the developing counsellor-in-training and 
implications for education programmes to consider. I’ll briefly outline this limited research in order 
to begin to consider what we already know about the complexity of this experience, and why 






One of the most recent papers in this area begins by affirming that “(l)ittle research exists about 
the lived experiences of counsellors-in-training during their practicum and internship experiences” 
(Pierce, 2016, p. 135). Drawing on an existential understanding of human beings, and their “inner 
nature” as being simultaneously unique to the individual and universal, Pierce uses a psychological, 
phenomenological approach to explore the existential experiences encountered by five counsellors-
in-training during their practicum and/or internship experiences. A number of interesting themes 
emerged. Anxiety related to the transition from classroom based training and experience to working 
in a professional setting was present in a surprising way for participants. Pierce suggests this was 
connected to a recognition of their personal limitations in relation to the reality and magnitude of 
counselling work. Participants described emotional and mental exhaustion, connected with guilt 
arising in the face again of the responsibilities of professional counselling combined with a growing 
awareness of personal limitations. Also present were multiple moments of uncertainty in their 
professional abilities, and questioning of their own capabilities, related to fear of others’ 
perceptions. This fear resulted in a reluctance to address this experience with peers and supervisors. 
Worry, loneliness, and self-doubt were also noted as existential themes in the experiences of these 
participants. Of note were also the ways participants reported these challenging experiences were 
mediated, including through trusting relationships with faculty who could normalise their 
experience, and with peers who’s sharing of experience seemed to offer some relief from the 
anxiety. Theorised through an existential lens, Pierce suggests participants began the “personal 
work of awareness of the authentic self and acceptance of responsibility for their choices, 
particularly as they related to being genuine in the counselling session” (p. 148).              
Work by Folkes, Skinner and colleagues (Folkes-Skinner, 2016; Folkes-Skinner et al., 2010), has 
focused on looking at individual trainee counsellors’ experience, with an emphasis on how a trainee 
changes, using a series of semi-structured interviews during the first three to six months of 





is, “training to be a therapist is stressful and... inevitably involves significant shifts in identity, self-
knowledge and confidence” (Folkes-Skinner et al., 2010, p. 89-90). In addition, Folkes-Skinner 
(2016) concludes that “professional counsellor training can provoke problematic emotional 
experiences and that their assimilation may lead to personal and professional growth” (p. 168). In 
this case, she advocates for the use of ‘personal development groups’ for trainees, over personal 
therapy, citing additional research which suggests such groups help trainees to increase self-
awareness, emotional resourcefulness, and improve interpersonal skills, in relatively short time 
frames.    
De Stefano et al. (2007) chose to explore trainees’ experiences of being stuck under the premise 
that understanding more about ‘challenging moments’ would yield further knowledge of the 
process of counsellor development. They suggest that trainees learn and develop higher level 
competencies from the experiences of such challenges. Eight students in their first practicum course 
took part in the research and were interviewed at two points in time, first after they had identified 
experiencing a difficult moment with a client, and then again after they had received supervision 
about it. Three themes related to each interview emerged from the results.  Trainees’ experiences 
at an impasse were categorized as not knowing/not doing, experience of negative affect, and 
experience of failure. Feelings of incompetence, confusion, doubt and negative affect were typical 
trainee experiences. The researchers concluded that supervision was a helpful process for 
addressing such intense and complex issues as experienced by the trainees, who were 
simultaneously trying to attend to client issues whilst learning and using clinical skills.  
Bischoff & Barton’s (2002) research with 39 marriage and family counselling trainees looking at 
trainees’ development of self-confidence follows on from a pilot study (Bischoff, 1997).  During 
this pilot study, thirteen beginning therapists completed monthly logs describing their experiences 
during their first three months in clinical placement. Data analysis revealed the primary 





study (Bischoff & Barton, 2002), telephone interviews with participants were conducted at the end 
of their twelve month clinical practicum inquiring, retrospectively, about influences on their 
development of clinical self-confidence whilst they undertook the practicum. Based on the 
responses, the researcher developed a three-stage model of trainee confidence development over 
the period of their year-long practicum. This was characterised by movement from anxiety about 
performance and fear of being found to be a fraud by clients, to trusting their own perceptions, to 
a fragile stabilization of self-confidence. They suggest the development of clinical confidence is 
the key developmental task faced by beginning counsellors. 
There seems to be an expectation and normalising of the experience of counselling students in 
training being a stressful one. It is suggested that this stress is not due to academic demands, but to 
the combined clinical demands of beginning work with clients. Although this idea has been 
discussed in the literature, there has been a lack of published research on the ‘negative’ or ‘stressful’ 
experiences of students, particularly as directly reported by students (Truell, 2001). Truell’s 
impetus to researching this comes from reports in the literature suggesting that, as a profession, 
counsellors have not always been successful in managing the negative effects of the work on 
themselves, with indications suggesting alcohol and drug abuse and rates of suicide among 
counsellors are of concern.   
Truell’s (2001) research focused specifically on what he termed the negative effects of learning 
counselling. Using an in-depth, semi-structured, qualitative interviewing method with six Diploma 
in Counselling graduates from a UK university, he inquired into the effects of learning counselling 
on their relationships, their experiences of stress and any ways the training programme had 
supported them in mitigating against the effects of stress. He concluded that counselling trainees 
do report experiencing significant negative feelings during their training, related both to changing 
relationships and unrealistic self-expectations. Interestingly, he reports that participants often 





to integrating the personal and professional selves. Participants reported “struggling with acting 
out all the skills of a counsellor and not feeling the same way on the inside” and “not letting myself 
be free to be myself. I didn’t/don’t know how to be myself and be a counsellor” (p. 82).   
Whilst noting that he purposefully focused on negative aspects of learning counselling, and as such, 
the results are not set against a wider context of the trainee’s experiences, Truell nevertheless 
concludes that training programmes could benefit their students by incorporating a component on 
‘becoming a counsellor’. Focusing exclusively on how the trainee is developing as a counsellor 
both personally and professionally, he suggests, would not only benefit the trainees but would also 
potentially provide much needed opportunities for further research in this area.   
Kumary & Baker (2008) questioned just how necessary the various stresses of counselling training 
are, by conducting a postal survey with 109 UK counselling psychology trainees. They found that 
students reported stressors fairly evenly across the categories of ‘academic’ ‘placement’ and 
‘personal and professional development’. Whilst the nature of the study (postal questionnaire) did 
not allow for in depth data, the researchers concluded that the trainees’ reports of stress levels and 
associated distress levels were unacceptably high. These authors challenged the discourse of the 
inevitability of stress that surrounds such training programmes and invited readers to usefully 
consider their remaining question: “do training programmes expose trainees to unacceptable stress 
levels while simultaneously promoting high levels of vulnerability/openness to experience?” (p. 
26). Other educators and researchers, recognising the potentially harmful effects of stress on 
counselling students with increased risks of burnout, have begun to highlight the importance of 
offering tools for self-care, such as introducing mindfulness training into counsellor education (e.g. 
Christopher & Maris, 2010; Schure, Christopher & Christopher, 2008; Christopher, Christopher, 
Dunnagan & Schure, 2006; Maris, 2009), alternative and complementary self-care strategies (Wolf, 
Thompson, Thompson & Smith-Adcock, 2014), and wellness practices aimed at facilitating 





positive effects of introducing mindfulness practices for counsellors-in-training, not only on 
student personal wellbeing, but also in relation to their professional relationships with clients, other 
interpersonal relationships, and professional development in general. Mindfulness is suggested as 
an antidote to many of the stressors identified above, with the counsellors-in-training showing less 
reactivity and automaticity, more inner awareness, and being able to incorporate changes in practice 
more quickly and with less self- recrimination (Christopher & Maris, 2010).  
Theorisations of developmental processes 
Connected to this research on counsellor-in-training experiences, and the particular challenges 
which have been identified, is work which offers conceptualisations of this process of development 
during this seemingly fraught period. Some of the most widely cited work is that of Thomas 
Skovholt and Michael Rønnestad (1992; 1992/1995), who began a qualitative research project in 
1986, interviewing one hundred therapists/counsellors, ranging from those in graduate school to 
those with 25 years of post-training experience, in order to better understand the developmental 
path over the career lifespan of therapists and counsellors. These authors have continued this work 
(Rønnestad & Skovholt, 2003; 2013; Skovholt 2012), including revising their original 
conceptualisations (Rønnestad & Skovholt, 2003; 2013) along with many other collaborations 
focused on the development of psychotherapists in relation to, for example, master or expert 
therapists (Jennings & Skovholt, 1999; Jennings, Goh, Skovholt, Hanson & Banerjee-Stevens, 
2003) and practitioner resilience (Skovholt & Trotter-Mathison, 2016). Of particular interest here, 
however, is their conceptualisation of a ‘phase model’ (revised from their original ‘stage model’) 
of counsellor development, and formulation of themes describing central processes of 






Initially developing an eight stage model of counsellor development over the lifespan, this was 
eventually, for reasons of parsimony and clarity, collapsed into a six stage, renamed ‘phase model’, 
of counsellor development through a reviewing of the original data (Rønnestad & Skovholt, 2003). 
These phases are: the lay helper phase, the beginning student phase, the advanced student phase, 
the novice professional phase, the experienced professional phase, and the senior professional 
phase. Of particular interest here are the beginning student phase, which is said to be characterised 
by initial excitement, combined with insecurity, apprehension, anxiety, challenge, and lack of 
confidence, and the advanced student phase, characterised by feeling pressure to do things even 
more perfectly than before, being conservative, cautious and excessively thorough, maintaining an 
external focus still of looking to models, but moving gradually to an internal focus (Rønnestad & 
Skovholt, 2003). Updated, again, to the ‘novice student phase’ (Rønnestad & Skovholt, 2013), this 
is defined as the period from the “beginning of a graduate training programme in one of the helping 
fields through the second year of training, which normally encompasses “the beginning practicum” 
or its equivalents” (p. 55).  The advanced student phase is the last part of graduate training, where 
the student is working as a therapist or counsellor in a practicum setting or internship. Both of these 
phases are consistent with the counsellor education programme of the student-participants of the 
current research.     
While echoing the emotional challenges of previous research facing counsellors-in-training, 
Rønnestad and Skovholt draw on various developmental theories to conceptualise this “universality 
of experience” (Skovholt, 2012, p. ix). For example, they find Lerner’s (1986) review of the theory 
of psychological development offers fundamental features of the concept of development 
consistent with the process of counsellor development. That is “(a) development always implies 
change of some sort, (b) the change is organised systematically, and (c) the change involves 
succession over time” (Rønnestad & Skovholt, 2013, p. 11). In developing their stage/phase model 





conception of psychosocial stages and identity development, each associated with particular 
developmental tasks and outcomes. This conception of identity development is a significant one 
for explaining the process of becoming a counsellor, described by Skovholt (2012) as the internal 
work of the “unfolding practitioner self” (p. 67). Variously described as an “internal subjective 
feeling and reality”, an “internal clarity about oneself”, this process of identity achievement, 
through “internal sculpting” is said to take time and to be the most important task for practitioners 
in education (p. 68). Skovholt likens this process to an adolescent play-acting in the adult world, 
where the student practitioner must try on versions of a new self, or parts of new identities, often 
imitating experts and external models of practice in the process of moving toward an internalised 
practitioner-self identity. Identity achievement is likened to shifting from an incomplete, fragile 
practitioner self to feeling and experiencing a solid sense of self. Skovholt (2012) suggests this 
process is more aptly described in cyclical terms, both going round and round and deepening at the 
same time, all the while sensing how others react, thinking and talking with others, and making 
adjustments as one moves toward an identity that “reflects me, who I am, and how I am in the 
world” (p. 68).         
Whilst drawing on models of identity development (e.g. Erikson), Skovholt and Rønnestad (2003) 
draw also on their empirical data to consider the particular challenges and tasks inherent in the 
development of a professional therapist self, particularly for those encountering the demands of 
early practice. These include the ambiguity and complexity of professional counselling work, the 
relational and affective demands of establishing a therapeutic alliance and regulating emotional 
boundaries, managing the demands of applying theory in practice, while relying on inadequate 
conceptual maps, and the unique task of “the merging of the personal and the professional.” 
(Skovholt, 2012, p. 75). This is all the while navigating between the multiple sources of influence, 





(professors/supervisors/mentors/therapists), peers/colleagues, one’s own personal life, and the 
social/cultural environment (Skovholt & Rønnestad, 2012).          
Developing a professional identity 
The study of professional identity for the counselling profession has become the focus for 
numerous researchers, with counsellor education given a primary task of “providing programmes 
that allow students to find new ways of viewing the world, the profession, themselves and others” 
(Nelson & Jackson, 2003, p. 2), while at the same time recognising their role in the field’s 
establishment of a clear, unified, collective, professional identity (Prosek & Hurt, 2014; Reiner, 
Dobmeier & Hernández, 2013). It has been suggested that there is a need for the development of a 
strong, and stable sense of professional identity in order to prevent confusion and negative 
consequences when counsellors enter the workforce (Nugent & Jones, 2009). A professional 
identity can provide a frame of reference, and contribute to a sense of professional belonging and 
uniqueness (Pistole & Roberts, 2002). Initially drawing on the leading work of Skovholt and 
Rønnestad, work in this area also recognises the limitation of their model with its focus on whole 
career development, rather than being specific to the period of counsellor education. As such, an 
emerging body of research has attempted to explore and theorise in more depth the process of 
identity formation for counsellors-in-training (Auxier et al., 2003; Fragkiadaki, Triliva, 
Balamoutsou & Prokopiou, 2013; Gibson, Dollarhide & Moss, 2010; Healey & Hays, 2012; Moss, 
Gibson & Dollarhide, 2014).     
The findings from these studies remain generally consistent with the work of Skovholt and 
Rønnestad. For example, Auxier et al. (2003), in undertaking two rounds of individual interviews 
and a focus group interview with eight Masters’ degree students, using a grounded theory data 
analysis approach identified a recycling identity formation process. The authors suggest that 





evaluation to eventually assume a counsellor self identity. They identify this as a growth or 
developmental process, albeit a difficult one at times, during which time trainees struggle to define 
and clarify their interpersonal and counselling identity. Trainees are seen to reflect on their 
experiences (conceptual, experiential) and gain self-awareness and growth through this reflection. 
More recently, Gibson et al. (2010), also selecting grounded theory methodology, conducted seven 
focus group interviews with a total of 43 counselling trainees, across different stages in their 
programmes. The results yielded a “developmental grounded theory of the transformation of 
counsellor professional identity ... in which three developmental tasks exist that describe the work 
that must be accomplished to transform identity” (p. 27).  They suggest these tasks define areas of 
development that constitute professional identity, including definition of counselling, 
responsibility for professional growth, and transformation to systemic identity integrated with the 
professional community. The transformational process itself is described as one of moving across 
time and experience, from external validation through course work, experience, and commitment, 
to internalised responsibility or self-validation. The authors suggest this is consistent with other 
literature where professional identity has been shown to move from a reliance on external teachings 
and validation to reflect an internal locus of evaluation (e.g. Rønnestad & Skovholt, 2003; Auxier 
et al, 2003).     
These findings are also consistent with those of Nelson and Jackson (2003) who conducted a 
qualitative study of professional identity development with Hispanic counselling trainees.  In 
analysing data from semi-structured interviews, general themes emerged that the authors noted 
were consistent with the previous literature on professional identity development of students who 
were not members of ethnic minority groups.  These included gaining knowledge, personal growth 
and experiential learning. Themes that they identified as mediated by cultural issues specific to 
Hispanic counselling students included the importance of relationships (family, professors, peers), 





perceptions of the counselling profession. All of these factors were seen to influence the 
development of a counsellor professional identity, relationships perhaps most so.  Nelson and 
Jackson’s (2003) study is the only one which has suggested that professional identity development 
may be affected by, or interact with, culture. It remains, however, situated within a developmental, 
essentialist model of identity development, as does it seems all of the literature reviewed thus far. 
Finally, one other study has considered that the concept of professional identity may be influenced 
by a variety of cultural roles, and has focused “specifically on the influence of societally defined 
gender roles on individuals’ appraisals of their own professional identity” (Healey & Hays, 2012, 
p. 56). Conducting the research with counselling practitioners, educators, and trainees, the authors 
concluded that identifying as male or female in the counselling profession had a significant 
influence on professional identity development, with results indicating that men may feel more 
empowered in the field, be receiving better mentorship, support and encouragement.   
Humanistic conceptualisations of identity – some considerations  
As I have indicated above, the body of research outlined thus far, on experience, development and 
identity is situated within a particular humanistic, psychological and phenomenological framework 
or ontology of the self, identity and human development. This purports a conceptualisation of 
identity as universal, as existing within an individual, as unified, stable, and self-contained, 
developed through internal or ‘intrapsychic’ processes, across time and experience. I wish to 
explore this a little further here, given the still strong hold such conceptualisations have in 
counsellor education and conceptualisation of the counsellor-in-training, despite that “(i)n the last 
30 years, identity has become disconnected from this originary image” in the turning of researchers, 
in particular, to postmodern and poststructural conceptualisations of identity and experience 
(Wetherell, 2010, p. 22). While I will come to discuss these constructions of identity, in relation to 
the associated shifts in the counselling field, it is these early, humanistic, conceptualisations of 





As is noted above, Skovholt and Rønnestad’s conceptualisations of trainee development draw on 
the work of identity theorist Erik Erikson, the most prominent identity theorist of the 1950s to 
1970s (Wetherell, 2010). Many of his conceptualisations of identity can be seen reflected in the 
theorising of the developing identity of counsellors-in-training, as outlined above. For example, 
Erikson’s ideas about identity as a struggle, a developmental achievement unfolding in stages, with 
particular tasks and dilemmas needing to be negotiated at different stages, as well as identity 
manifesting “as an authentic and stable self”, “a sense of personal coherence” (Wetherell, 2010, p. 
7). Such ideas are consistent also with the humanistic approaches to counselling (Rogers, 
1957/2007), with the theorising of developmental processes of identity formation for clients who 
are considered to be “positive in nature…socialised, forward-moving, rational and realistic” 
(Rogers, 1961, p. 90). These humanistic, therapeutic processes are intended to enable each 
individual “to become a separate and distinct and unique person” through more fully living the 
“experiences of his total organism, rather than shutting them out of awareness” (p. 118). Similarly, 
in phenomenological thought, the singularly unique but universal, self-contained human individual 
(Davies, 2010) resides at the centre of much psychological thinking, and underpins accounts of 
experience, as outlined above for counsellors-in-training. Such individuals, under humanism’s 
reach, whether being conceptualised in counselling, counsellor education or research, are primarily 
engaged in activities of developing personal awareness of experience, of “‘recognising’, 
‘understanding’, ‘processing’ and ‘coming to see’ who one is in the world” (Wetherell, 2010, p. 
14).  Arising from Cartesian based modernist accounts of the self, dating back to Descartes’ model 
of the thinking self, and the period of Enlightenment (or Age of Reason), the Western self, and 
identity, has come to be strongly associated with notions of rationality, independence, autonomy 
and self-knowledge (Alcoff, 2010; Wetherell, 2010). Such notions similarly underpin theorisations 





While such humanistic conceptualisations represented important philosophical shifts, particularly 
in the field of counselling in a turn away from Freud’s deterministic view of human nature and 
behaviour as “determined by irrational forces, unconscious motivations, and biological and 
instinctual drives” (Corey, 2017), they have nevertheless come to be seen as limited in current 
thinking around identity. Indeed, Wetherell (2010) notes that “the main interest of Erikson’s work 
outside of this area of psychology is now historical” (p. 7), with researchers also doubtful when it 
comes to universally defined and experienced stages and norms in identity development (Wetherell, 
2010). Such universal stories or grand “metanarratives”, “in which key aspects of the plot involve 
development, reasoning, cognition and so forth” (Walkerdine, 1993, p. 452) also began to be seen 
as purporting reductionist, essentialist, Eurocentric masculine accounts of the ‘real’ which left little 
room for any Other accounts, or only for accounts which understand difference in (subordinate) 
relation to dominant norms of development and identity. This is obvious in the accounts of 
experience, development and identity above, where difference (e.g. gender, race, ethnicity) is made 
invisible and “particular relations of power and oppression” inscribed inside the practices taken to 
be universal, are ignored (Walkerdine, 1993, p. 461). Such a recognition calls for accounts of 
identity and development which are historical, specific and local (Walkerdine, 1993). Indeed, in 
the turn to, for example, postmodernism and poststructuralism, attention in identity studies has 
engaged in a “shift from understanding what identity is to understanding how identity is 
discursively constructed” and performed (Wetherell, 2010). While I will talk more about this shift 
below, in relation to associated shifts in the field of counselling, and in further chapters, I firstly 
want to finish a consideration of the implications and limits of this self-contained individual at the 
centre of the above discussed identity forming practices.                
Davies (2010) refers to this individual as ‘phenomenology’s subject of will’, which, she says, “is 
both an idea and an accomplishment that we each labour over, attempting to make real an idealized 





found wanting, and against which we judge others and find them wanting” (p. 55).  Such judgment, 
and inevitable failure, “is based on the assumption that who we are is accomplished through our 
own choices – ‘who we are’ is a result of will” (p. 55), of individual agency. It is no wonder then, 
that in research underpinned by current, dominant conceptualisations of identity development in 
counsellor education, that self-doubt, stress, and anxiety constitute the most common descriptions 
of counsellor-in-training experience. In this scenario, the individual, striving to achieve an 
idealised, universalised, version of a counsellor-self, even while understanding “itself as original, 
a unique being” is conditioned to believe it does so through its own will, agency, and efforts. Davies 
says identity is all-important for this subject-of-will, who is positioned in relation with the already 
known, striving to become recognised and recognizable within the already determined and 
regulating forms of recognition, evident to counsellors-in-training within the clearly available 
models and revered figures of counselling. This has the effect of a double regulating force – both 
to be recognised as the competent counsellor, and as the competent, autonomous, rational, self-
contained, educative subject. In both cases, these individual, autonomous identities, while 
seductive are illusory, in that “to become that autonomous agent, that one and no other, we must 
disavow our dependence on, and our vulnerability to, the other and to discourse. We thus create an 
illusion of the individual entity that pre-exists its interactions with others” (Davies et al., 2013, p. 
683). Such paradoxical processes result in an intense focus on self (as unique), a striving for 
recognition, producing not only anxiety and self-doubt, but even narcissism and paranoia, along 
with a continual need to defend against individual failure to match up to ideal norms (Davies, 
2010). 
In summary, whilst the research and humanist conceptualisations explored above have been central 
in bringing attention to the complex personal-professional processes counsellors-in-training are 
engaged in, they hold significant limitations in light of contemporary theorisations of identity. Such 





subject”, that “singular, self-contained human individual” (Davies, 2010, p. 54) is given 
fundamental status, when “’ahistorical’, universalizing, internal and depoliticizing trends of 
explanation” are prioritized (Hook, 2005, p. 28). Indeed, Skovholt & Rønnestad (1995) 
acknowledge, but do not address, in their initial, early attempt to construct an accurate and 
generalizable model of counsellor development that it is impossible to include all of the critical 
dimensions through which people differ, including, they say, age, experience level, gender, race, 
work setting, cognitive style, theoretical training, and family of origin. However, not only are these 
important multiple identities made invisible in the universal, so too are the dominant discourses 
though which individuals are subject to the conditions of possibility for their own being and 
becoming (Davies, 2010). With the counselling literature also just beginning to consider what it 
means to take up the call to reconfigure the nature of identity as intersections of “social locations 
and cultural factors (i.e., dis/ability, affectional orientation, ethnicity, race, gender identity and 
expression, spirituality and religion, residency in a country or educational program, and many other 
identities that are not mentioned and yet are important)” (Peters, 2017, p. 178), attention to 
conceptualisations of counsellor-in-training identity seems ever more urgent.  
Counselling moves to social constructionist and poststructural identities 
However, these have not been the only explanations of identity for counsellors-in-training. It is 
important to note the significant exception to these dominant humanistic models in the form of the 
poststructural/social constructionist theorising of student storying of professional identity in 
counsellor education (Crocket & Kotzé, 2011; Winslade, 2002). This work draws on the narrative 
therapy tradition (White & Epston, 1990) and the authors draw on the work of Davies and 
colleagues (e.g. Davies, 2006; Davies, Flemmen, Gannon, Laws & Watson, 2002) in attending to 
post-structural identities as socially and culturally produced. This in turn influences their co-
construction of the curriculum and pedagogical practices through which they demonstrate attention 





Kotzé, 2011). With an emphasis on relational identity, and the learning communities (Wenger, 
1999) they are a part of, students are encouraged to actively story their learning and ongoing 
professional identities (Crocket & Kotzé, 2011). Professional identity for counsellors-in-training 
can then be described as “dynamic, holistic, and continuously constructed through social 
interactions…rather than “defined by a list of attributes, or “achieved” in a finalistic sense” 
(Waters, Altus, & Wilkinson, 2013, p. 2).   
Writing, for example, from Winslade (2002) and Crocket and Kotzé (2011) refers to the ‘storying 
of professional identity’ which is at the heart of their counsellor education programme in Waikato, 
New Zealand. They refer to practices which go “beyond the humanistic and structuralist 
understandings of personhood that tend to be taken for granted in the fields of counselling and 
counsellor education” (Crocket and Kotzé, 2011, p. 393). Their particular approach to counsellor 
education draws from the traditions of poststructuralist/social constructionist theory and narrative 
counselling practice in particular. Hence, the focus is on people’s lives as shaped by a range of 
cultural stories or discourses, such as “professionalism, individualism, competition, gender, 
consumerism, race, class, to name a few” (Crocket & Kotzé, 2011, p. 394). This discursive 
approach views the stories people tell about themselves as being shaped by discourses which 
prevail in all of the contexts in which they live, thus people are shaped by and also shape discourse. 
The storying of professional identity, which takes place throughout the counsellor education 
programme, occurs with attention to power relations and to stories of privilege, access, success and 
failure. Identity is viewed as being constructed within all these discourses, in relationship with 
others and with the experiences the programme offers.   
In contrast to the essentialist notions perpetuating in the literature above, Winslade (2002) 
comments “we do not invite students to construct a self-contained notion of identity, one that is 
owned within the individual and independent of how they are experienced by those consulting 





35). As such, all learning activities are designed to destabilise traditional constructions of people 
as individual learners, engaged primarily in internal processes in response to their environments. 
Instead, in social constructionist terms, students experience “doing knowledge and doing identity 
together” (p. 396). Thus, identity becomes relational, fluid (non-fixed) and multiple.    
This notion of identity, and associated counsellor education practices are reflective of the linguistic 
and cultural turn which fostered complex analyses of the interconnections between power, 
knowledge, subjectivity, and language (Alaimo & Hekman, 2008a). Drawing on postmodernism, 
social constructionism and post-structuralism, the counselling theories of Narrative Therapy and 
Solution-focused therapy significantly shifted the possibilities within the counselling landscape 
from its previously dominant psychological and humanistic underpinnings. As Wetherell (2010) 
also recounts, this turn shifted the focus “from investigating experience to investigating how 
accounts of experience were constructed following more sophisticated analyses of the workings of 
language, self-description, and human meaning-making (p. 13).  
Counselling programmes such as the one at Waikato University have embraced the discursive turn 
and what it means for how clients come to construct themselves and their lives, for how trainee 
counsellors come to construct their professional identities, and for how educators shape their 
teaching practices (Crocket et al., 2007). However, as can be seen in the research literature, 
humanistic, essentialist notions of professional identity prevail in counsellor education. Whilst 
counsellor educator-researchers such as Winslade (2002) and Crocket and Kotzé (2010) eloquently 
describe how they apply theories of post-structuralism to their teaching practices, and to students’ 
experience of storying professional identities, there appears to be no research examining such 
practices in action, or articulating this experience from the students’ perspectives. It was with this 
in mind that I initiated the current research with student-participants engaged in a counsellor 
education programme, learning a social constructionist model of counselling practice. I turn to this 





this, I firstly wish to outline the emergence in counsellor education of the key pedagogical practice 
of reflective practice, situated within counsellor education programmes underpinned by a range of 
therapeutic approaches, from humanistic to social constructionist. Recognizing the complexity, 
ambiguity, and interaction of the personal and professional in developing ethical and effective 
counselling practices, and the personal-professional challenges in becoming effective practitioners, 
reflective practice has become key in the field of counsellor education.              
Reflective practice in counselling 
I draw here on two main texts of reflective practice in counselling – Stedmon and Dallos’s (2009b) 
edited book Reflective Practice in Counselling and Psychotherapy and Bager-Charleson’s (2010) 
book by the same name. Such reflective processes are aimed at allowing developing practitioners 
to be ‘self-critical and ethical’ (Dallos & Stedmon, 2009), to examine and assess their own 
experiences in order to become more aware of the processes, values, assumptions and theories 
informing their counselling practice, resulting in transformative learning (Bager-Charleson, 2010). 
Such processes inevitably involve stages of reflection which invite the practitioner to begin with a 
self-awareness through noticing something disconcerting, interesting or unexpected from their 
counselling practice, then proceeding to look back on it in order to explore in in more detail. This 
meaning making may include intra-individual, relational, social, and cultural reflections (usually 
depending on the counselling orientation) and might be best described as “a successive process of 
analysing and reanalysing important episodes of activity, drawing on multiple levels of 
representation” (Dallos & Stedmon, 2009, p. 4).   
Dallos and Stedmon distinguish between personal reflection in action, the spontaneous and 
immediate act of reflecting during the moments of counselling, and personal reflexivity – “the act 
of looking back over, or reflecting on, action”. This is conceptualised as a “metatheorized 





of further conscious scrutiny” (2009, p. 4). Self-awareness includes attention not only to behaviour 
or language, but awareness of bodily sensations, emotions, memories, experiences and cognitions 
evoked at the time of the reflection in the moment. Reflexivity, as a way of then looking back on 
such awareness, typically includes application of knowledge and theory to make sense of the 
recalled episode. Dallos and Stedman suggest reflexive practices of looking back should draw on 
multiple sources of knowledge, including particular counselling theory, social status in terms of 
gender, class and ethnicity, self-narratives of personal life experiences, personal agendas, 
motivations and perceptions of power and inequality. However, in addition to such knowledges, 
they also argue for practices of reflexivity including creative, artistic and playful elements in order 
to recognise the personhood of the counsellor at the he(art) of counselling, their preferences, values, 
likes and dislikes which contribute to “fresh insight and learning ‘outside the box’” (p. 5). Given 
the attention to sensory and bodily experiences as much as to verbal and cognitive processes in 
awareness and reflection, it is suggested that similar processes be explored during reflexivity, that 
is engaging other symbolic systems such as signs, images, or movement to reflect on the episode 
in question. Ultimately such reflexive practices have come to be seen as necessary due to the 
complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in counselling practice as a process guided not only 
by application of knowledge and competencies, but as “an ongoing fluid interactional process 
between the practitioner and clients” (p. 12). 
Bager-Charleson’s (2010) text is primarily aimed at student counsellors and psychotherapists, 
designed to offer an understanding of the concept of reflective practice as a means of supporting 
counsellors and psychotherapists in developing efficacious and ethical clinical practice. She seems 
to draw primarily on Schön’s thinking for her framing of reflective practice, similar to Dallos and 
Stedmon, offering reflection in and reflection on practice as key terms. Embodied in these and other 
reflective concepts are the notions of looking back on our practice in order to see what is reflected 





and looking then at what appears, has the aim of building on mistakes or challenges, transforming 
“negative experiences into valuable wisdom and knowledge” (p. 30). Bager-Charleson points out 
that “reflective practice involves more than just looking at ourselves in a mirror; it involves a form 
of ‘dialectical engagement’” (p. 30) which invites an ongoing and recursive engagement, that does 
not stop at what an initial reflection may reveal about an individual’s assumptions or values guiding 
their practice. In this way, dialectical reflective practice, involving “(t)he ability to ‘try on’ new 
perspectives and world views and critically reassess ourselves, our ideas, our values and 
assumptions is often referred to in terms of ‘reflexive awareness’” (p. 31). Thus, just as Dallos and 
Stedmon build on Schön’s (1983) original work proposing The Reflective Practitioner, Bager-
Charleson also links reflective practice with notions of reflexivity and critical reflection, inviting 
reflections not just on personal and theoretical matters but also requiring social, cultural and 
political interests to be taken into account. While reflexive practices have the capacity to take us 
beyond uncritical reflection on action, it has to be noted that the significance of the body of work 
emerging from Schön and his colleagues cannot be downplayed in relation to its challenge to the 
professions (it has been especially influential in teaching and the health professions) to reconsider 
practice as more than rational, technical, instrumental applications of knowledge.                     
Both texts present reflective/reflexive practice across a range of counselling models from person-
centred, psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) to systemic and narrative 
therapy, noting all models clearly advocate reflective practice as an essential component of their 
approach (Stedmon & Dallos, 2009b). What changes, depending upon the therapeutic approach, 
are the aspects which practitioners might reflect upon. For example, while all models advocate 
reflection on the therapy and the skills for doing it, some will also include personal reflection on 
the therapist themselves, their own lives (pasts and/or presents), and the contexts, including socio-
political aspects in which they work (Stedmon & Dallos, 2009b). In addition, reflective practices 





reflections on video or audio tapes, and in supervisory relationships, which typically involve one 
practitioner and one supervisor. Sometimes this may be expanded to include peers or teams such 
as in systemic family therapy and narrative therapy training and practice through the use of 
reflecting teams. Much of this reflection follows Schön’s reflection on action which requires 
reflection in a retrospective way, apart from systemic and solution-focused therapies which include 
‘live’ supervision in an attempt to foster reflection in action, occurring more closely in time to the 
events of reflection.          
Clearly reflective practice has developed as a key component across models in counselling and 
psychotherapy training and practice. Without the emphasis given to reflecting in and on practice, 
it might be assumed that one can become an effective counsellor through rational and technical 
application of a range of skills. Rather, the development and incorporation of reflective and 
reflexive practices in counselling and psychotherapy acknowledges the complex, ambiguous, 
relational, cultural and political nature of “‘doing’ therapy – the therapist becomes part of the 
process that she is trying to step back from and observe” (Dallos & Stedmon, 2009, p. 3). These 
practices have given us a way to make sense of encounters we have with clients, particularly when 
something surprising, unexpected or disruptive occurs or when we may have felt anxious or 
uncertain about what to say or do next. Not only can such practices offer support to practitioners 
during the challenges of new learning, but they are theorised as ways of developing practitioner 
competence, through transforming earlier experiences into “deeper levels of understanding” (p. 
15). Introducing critical reflection and reflexive practices has also enabled reflection to go beyond 
the traditional personal, psychological nature of therapy, where intra-psychic processes are 
emphasized at the expense of social, cultural and political influences – both on individuals and the 
process and context of therapy itself. Such reflexive processes have enabled a taking into account 
power and the constitutive role of language and discourse in shaping client and counsellor 





discourses of gender, class, race, and other subject positions and categories which embed and 
embody taken for granted cultural assumptions. As Stedmon & Dallos (2009a) conclude, 
professional identities are intimately connected to the ways in which reflective practice is 
performed. The discursive practices through which practice is analysed play a powerful part in 
shaping and constraining “how we construct our own personal and professional identities” (Boston, 
2009, p. 174).       
Whilst it is clear that the tradition of reflective practice has become a rich and valuable one for the 
field of counselling and psychotherapy, conceptualisations of reflection and reflexivity pose their 
own challenges. This is something I explore more particularly in chapter four, in relation to the use 
of these concepts methodologically, before returning to a re-consideration of reflexive practice in 
counsellor education in chapter nine, when I consider pedagogical implications of the findings from 
this research. For now, I conclude this section by noting the limitations identified by Stedmon and 
Dallos in relation to the concept of reflective practice. 
Dallos and Stedmon (2009) introduce the concept of reflective practice by connecting the term 
reflection to its Latin roots, “re- meaning ‘back’ and flectre meaning ‘to bend’” (p. 1), noting its 
first application in the context of light ‘bending back’ off reflective surfaces. Related to this, they 
draw on Greek mythology’s Narcissus, renowned for falling in love with his own reflection in the 
water, noting that reflection in this sense lends itself to “narcissistic navel gazing” and to merely 
reflecting back the limited views we each see (p. 1). They later caution against the danger of 
reflective practice becoming inward looking, if it only exists within the terms of the current 
therapeutic model being applied. Like Narcissus, they say, “there is a sense of entrapment whereby 
the therapist can only ‘see’ what has come to be defined as ‘seeable’”. This then becomes “a 
metaphor of infinite regression…illuminating only further reflections upon reflections of 
reflections.” (Stedmon & Dallos, 2009a, p. 191). As a way of attempting to overcome this limited 





practices in supervision draw on a range of different models, thus working at multiple levels of 
representation and analysis. As I note above, I revisit further challenges identified in remaining 
with reflection and reflexivity as metaphors and practices for interrogating our accounts of the 
world in later chapters. 
The posthuman subject 
Finally, in this chapter I wish to introduce the turn to the notion of the posthuman subject (Barad, 
2007; Braidotti, 2016). As will become clear in the following chapters, my initial research aims 
were to theorise the lived experience of counsellors-in-training from social constructionist and 
poststructural underpinnings, in order to explore the relational processes and discursive practices 
through which counsellor-in-training subjectivities are produced (Wetherell, 2010). It was with this 
in mind that I engaged in initial processes of data generation. However, this research project 
eventually became one committed to experimenting with posthumanism, onto-epistemologically, 
and in relation to the counsellor-in-training as posthuman subject. While the following chapters 
document, perform and experiment with this intra-active (Barad, 2007) production of knowledge, 
I wish to conclude this chapter with a brief introduction to identity in posthuman terms. Karen 
Barad, whose posthuman agential realist framework I draw on significantly in this project, says,      
“Identity formation is a contingent and contested ongoing material process; “identities” are 
mutually constituted and (re)configured through one another in dynamic intra-relationship 
with the iterative (re)configuring of relations of power. (2007, p. 240-241).   
 
Identity here is reflective of what has become known as the material turn, with thinkers attempting 
to move beyond discursive construction to accounts which give attention to how the material and 
the discursive, nature and culture, interact in the constitution of bodies, subjects and objects. 
(Alaimo & Hekman, 2008b). This involves a rethinking of fundamental questions about ontology, 





reconceptualising, identity is not an inherent characteristic of humans, rather it is conceptualised 
as an entanglement, an intra-active becoming in which ““part” of the world becomes determinately 
bounded and propertied in its emergent intelligibility to another “part” of the world” (Barad, 2007, 
p. 335). Identity in this sense is ongoing performance or materialization, an articulation of the world 
in its becoming, where the human, at the centre of theorisations of identity as outlined throughout 
this chapter, is decentred. However, as Davies notes (2014), “I anticipate that these two kinds of 
subject cannot actually be separated, and that they too depend on each other” (p. 34). That is, the 
self who has an identity, Davies’ (2010, 2014) ‘subject of will’ does not disappear in an illusory 
linear ontological movement to a posthuman subject, but rather might be conceptualised of an intra-
active force always present in the ongoing production of the posthuman subject. The focus shifts 
however, to “intra-active encounters in which the new emerges, rather than the accomplishment of 
the illusory entity or self” (Davies et al., 2013, p. 684).    
Braidotti (2016) states, “(w)e are experiencing at present an explosion of scholarship on nonhuman, 
inhuman and posthuman issues…(T)he posthuman predicament enforces the necessity to think 
again and to think harder about the status of human subjectivity and the ethical relations, norms 
and values that may be worthy of the complexity of our times” (p. 13).  While poststructuralism 
enabled a rigorous calling into question of the humanistic ideals of reason, autonomy and universal 
categorical representation, posthumanism not only reconfigures the nature/culture binary with a re-
turn to the agency of the material world, but also invites us to rethink power, matter and meaning 
as intra-active, entangled, dynamic, co-constitutive networks of relations “that structure our “being 
human”” (Braidotti, 2016, p. 15). This entails rethinking posthuman subject formations. 
According to Braidotti (2016), “human subjectivity in this complex field of forces has to be re-
defined as an expanded relational self”. She describes this new ontology as “a re-grounding of 
subjects in the radical immanence of their embodied and embedded locations” (p. 22). This 





open, relational, self-other entity…with special emphasis on the embedded and embodied, affective 
and relational structure of subjectivity” (p. 23).  As Barad (2007) and Braidotti remind us, this is 
also an ethical posthuman becoming. Braidotti (2016) describes a posthuman ethical imagination 
in the form of “ontological relationality, which stresses an enlarged sense of inter-connection 
between self and others” (p. 25). This is Barad’s intra-action and responsibility, which rejects self-
centred individualism and hierarchical dichotomies. In this way, a counsellor-in-training identity 
is an ethical, vital, moving embodiment of multiple affective-material-discursive relations, it is an 
enactment of “unfolding the self onto the world, while enfolding the world within” (Braidotti, 2016, 
p. 26).   
The following thesis is an experiment in thinking this theory with the data generated with the 
counsellor-in-training participants, in order to reconceptualise understandings of identity and 
subject formation for counsellors-in-training and consider implications for the field of counsellor 
education. My focus on the field of counsellor education in this thesis, and my engagement with 
this posthuman turn, has led to a necessary rethinking, reconceptualising or reconfiguring the 
posthuman counsellor-in-training-subject formation. This is, of course, not a unitary, universal or 
fixed reconfiguring. Rather, the mapping, or critical cartography (Braidotti, 2016) which follows 
is also a situated, immanent, relational, intra-active and open-ended entanglement. My hope is that 
others will intra-act with the embodied and embedded knowledge produced here to continue to 
rethink, expand and reconfigure the ethical and just possibilities for (re)conceptualising the subject 






CHAPTER TWO  
Methodology 
In this chapter I outline the methodological approach of collective biography and the particular 
form it took in this research. Collective biography was chosen for its capacity to generate an 
exploration of both individual, and collective, memories and experiences of encounters of 
significance to the counsellor-in-training participants. With a research focus aligned with the 
feminist and, now earlier, poststructural theorising of collective biography (Davies & Gannon, 
2006a; 2009; 2011), this methodology offered a way in which counsellor-in-training participants 
could flesh out moments of their lived experience in order to examine the discursive contexts 
through which their counsellor subjectivities were constituted. At the same time, it is theorised a 
transformative process occurs, in the telling. This chapter explores these aims of collective 
biography, including an overview of its initial poststructural theorising underpinning my 
methodology of data generation. I return to its evolution toward a more “Deleuzian/Baradian 
approach (Davies et al., 2013) in my final chapter on pedagogical implications arising from this 
research, when I consider methodology as pedagogy. Finally, in this chapter, I document the 
adapted use of this approach in my research, including participants, workshops, data, and ethics.   
Collective Biography 
Collective biography is an approach initially situated in the post-modern tradition of social sciences 
research. Its feminist, and initial, post-structural underpinnings aligned well with the original 
epistemological and theoretical focus of this research - to explore the subjective and discursive 
production of the possibilities for knowing and being for counsellors-in-training. I was interested 
to explore the possibilities and challenges for counsellors-in-training in coming to embody a 





I saw that much of the research generated through the use of collective biography as a research 
method, had engaged with similar aims – that is, exploring “ways in which students and their 
teachers come into being in multiple ways in their encounters with each other” (Davies & Gannon, 
2009, p. 5). An explanation from an early paper captured what it was I hoped this method would 
enable for my participants, and my research, to move beyond the dominant humanist 
conceptualisations of their lived experience and identity formation processes to instead consider 
processes of subjectification: 
We set out as archaeologists of our own lives…We thus use our embodied selves as vehicles 
for observing the plays of power and knowledge in relation to the processes 
of…subjectification. In doing so, we do not assume ‘real’ or essential selves or that we have 
found the ‘true’ story in these tellings” (Davies et al,, 2002, p. 293).  
What was additionally appealing was the way in which the process itself made it possible to go 
beyond exploration of the individual, to research the collective processes of transformation which 
occur within and over the course of the workshops, through the actual writing, telling and listening 
that occurs. Davies and colleagues describe this work as transgressive, as a way of making visible, 
and therefore revisable, “the discourses through which we make meanings and selves” (Davies et 
al., 2004, p. 369). I was interested in a research method which invited both this visibility and 
revisability for counsellors-in-training, and which enabled a deconstruction of that humanistically 
oriented counsellor-in-training “as existing independent of various collectives, of discourse, of 
history, of time and place” (p. 369).   
By using the collective biography workshops (outlined below) themselves as a site of data 
generation, I also envisaged this method as offering an alternative to the retrospective, and language 
based nature of interviews and journals relied upon as methods of data collection thus far in 
exploring the lived experience of counsellors-in-training. With this emphasis on generating data 
which could be described as messy, embodied, affective, relational and collective, it was my hope 





reality” I wished to understand (Law, 2004, p. 5). In the following sections I outline the history and 
process of collective biography as it informed these initial processes of data generation with my 
study participants.          
Collective biography has its feminist roots in the memory work of German feminist and socialist 
Frigga Haug and her colleagues (Gannon, Walsh, Byers & Rajiva, 2012; Cornforth, White, 
Milligan & Claiborne, 2009) who used this method to research female socialisation and female 
sexualisation (Onyx & Small, 2001). Their method involved members of a group writing down 
their memories of past events focusing on a particular theme, for example, related to the female 
body. The resulting memory stories were then circulated, discussed and reassessed among members 
of the group eventually leading to a final account documenting the processes of production of the 
sexualised female body (Davies and Gannon, 2006). While this original use of collective memory 
work has subsequently been taken up at different times and its use developed across different 
disciplines, such as psychology, nursing, education (Davies and Gannon, 2006), management and 
marketing, its social constructionist, feminist underpinnings have remained (Onyx & Small, 2001).     
For the purposes of my research, I was most interested in the strand of collective biography 
developed, from Haug’s original memory work, by Bronwyn Davies and colleagues (Davies & 
Gannon, 2006a; 2009; 2011). In particular I wished to embrace their purpose of fleshing out 
moments of lived experience in order to examine the contexts through which individuals are 
constituted and constitute themselves, and through which we then begin to see and experience 
mo(ve)ment (Davies, 2009), transformation or ‘becoming’ other than who we have been.  Davies 
calls such mo(ve)ment ‘doubled action’ and suggests that “in dwelling in, and on, particular 
moments of being” (Davies, 2009, p:9) through collective story-telling, writing and re-writing, we 
open up new possibilities for seeing, being, and ultimately becoming, both individually and 





participants recalled (telling, writing, drawing or making), and of the possibilities for movement 
that would occur in the collective experiences of that fleshed-out telling. 
Central to this method is a focus on remembered moments of experiences and encounters, which 
participants work with, through the shared work of telling, writing (drawing), listening, re-writing, 
to re-member the deeply felt sensory, embodied detail of those lived experiences.  Through asking 
questions of each particular moment, such as “(h)ow did it smell, how did it feel on your skin, your 
face, your stomach, your back?” they aim to write and rewrite the experience until the “precise 
detailed moment (becomes) imaginable in a lived bodily sense” (Davies, Flemmen, Gannon, Laws, 
& Watson, 2006, p. 173). Such processes aim to take us beyond the current linguistic descriptions 
of identity, beyond the Cartesian mind/body split which much learning is still predicated upon, to 
understanding and embracing a more holistic, and contextualised, embodied understanding of 
identity, as outlined above.   
Drawing in particular on the bodies of work of Judith Butler and Michel Foucault (Davies et al., 
2002; 2013), processes of working with memories and experiences enact post-structural 
assumptions of the nature of memory and of the construction of the self, made particularly clear in 
contrast to humanist ideas of an essential, enduring and stable self. This particular use of collective 
biography takes up this post-structural view that we are all “subjects-in-relation, subjects-in 
process” (Davies, 2009 p. 8), and seeks to make visible the dominant discourses through which we 
are simultaneously constituted and constitute our selves. Power and vulnerability are central to the 
theorizing of Butler and Foucault, and Davies and colleagues draw on this in exploring the subject’s 
dependence on and vulnerability to “discourse and its utterance in the accomplishment of ourselves 
as recognisable” (Davies et al., 2013, p. 682). In the methodology of collective biography, it is 
through the detail of the telling that the constitutive work that is going on, and has gone on, is made 
visible, and the “(illusion of the) autonomous subject” is made possible. (Davies et al., 2006, p. 





work on us at one particular moment, at an affective3 level, that we then “open both ourselves and 
discourse to the possibility of change” (Davies and Gannon, 2006b, p. 5).   
Memories, or stories of experiences, in this process, are not therefore viewed as truthful or fixed 
representations of experience itself, nor in humanistic terms as internal and personal (Wright, Lang, 
& Cornforth, 2011). Such stories we first tell about ourselves are viewed in this way as underpinned 
by the dominant humanistic notions of an autonomous individual self.  In collective biography 
practices, these memories and the experiences they represent are not only exposed in their 
embodied detail to be discursive, but are also then re-made or lived again in the telling. This re-
making occurs not only in the “mind/body of the one who remembers, but in the minds/bodies of 
the members of the collective biography group who are engaged in listening to each other’s 
memories” (Davies and Gannon, 2011, p: 130). In this way, in collective biography, what was 
initially viewed as an individual’s telling or ‘grand narrative’ of their own individual experience or 
encounter, is remade through a communal space into a collectively re-imagined and embodied 
knowledge of being, that then also opens up spaces and possibilities for becoming other in ways 
not previously possible.  As Davies states, “in working collectively with memories, we live 
intimately within our own bodies, and our bodies take on the intimate knowledge of each other’s 
being” (Davies, 2009, p. 9).   
Such collective biography processes are not presumed to occur simply with the coming together of 
a group of individuals. The story telling, the re-making of memories through technologies of telling, 
listening, writing (drawing) and re-writing, works to open up spaces for new becomings only when 
attention is given to the building of communal space. This occurs through each group member’s 
                                                          
3 Affect here is described by Davies as being what is “felt before thought”, that which has a “visceral impact on the 
body” (Davies, 2009, p. 11), as opposed to emotion which is seen to be the categorising or labelling of that felt, 






“willingness to listen and be open to others” (Davies, 2009, p. 11), and through a “particular kind 
of close attention to each other’s stories” (p. 8). Indeed, it is suggested that this ‘ruthless pursuit’ 
of the embodied detail of the memory is also possible when a “profound level of trust and mutual 
commitment has already been established among the workshop participants” (Davies, 2009, p. 12). 
It was with these ideas in mind, that this method was deemed to be particularly well suited to the 
research proposed with a cohort of counselling students, who had recently spent one year learning 
and working together, developing these very skills of listening with close attention and building 
trust and mutual commitment with one another.        
Recruitment 
Collective biography studies reviewed range from as few as three (Wright et al., 2011) to four 
(Cornforth et al., 2009) up to a stated preference for six to seven participants (Davies & Gannon, 
2006a). What is considered most important is the commitment of the participants, both to the 
process of collective biography and the chosen topic, and to “the long and complex haul of 
collective work” (Davies and Gannon, 2006b, p. 9). Fewer than four participants was not desirable 
for this study, both because of the desire to research a collective process and to generate sufficient 
data for a PhD study. More than eight participants was also not desirable due to the different group 
dynamics emerging which may inhibit a collective process, such as subgroups forming, or lack of 
time for all participants to take part.    
I adopted a qualitative research process of purposive (deliberate and non-random) sampling as it 
allowed me to select participants on the basis of the feature or process I was interested in 
(Silverman, 2000). In this case the process to be studied was counsellors-in-training experiences of 
coming to embody a counsellor identity. Purposive sampling also requires that the parameters of 
the population to be studied are given critical consideration, including that the group, setting and/or 





Given the particular group I was interested in researching this process with are students undertaking 
a counsellor education programme, this was where I aimed my recruitment.      
More specifically, counsellors-in-training who had completed Part I of a Masters’ counsellor 
education programme and who were embarking on Part II were invited to participate. At the time 
of recruitment, twelve students had completed Part I, one of those students was not continuing to 
Part II, and thus information was sent to a total of eleven students. It was not envisaged that all 
eleven students would wish to/be able to take part in the research. However, should more than eight 
have wished to take part, I aimed to recruit participants including a cross section of age, gender, 
ethnicity, and counselling placement. Interestingly, all eleven expressed an initial desire to take 
part.     
As mentioned above, these students had recently completed one year of coming together to 
undertake two compulsory papers in the counselling programme. I was the lecturer for one of these 
papers which focused on group process, thus this particular cohort of students had built 
relationships with each other, and with me.   
The other compulsory paper covered social constructionism in the context of counselling and the 
therapeutic model of solution focused therapy.  It was through this paper that students began to 
undertake counselling work with clients and thus to particularly develop their skills of listening 
and close attention to the lived experience of their clients. It was in Part II of the programme that 
students work more intensely with clients, undertaking a more time intense practicum or internship, 
where up to 450 hours of counselling practice was required, of which 280 were face to face with 
clients. It is at this level of more time intensive engagement with clients that the literature identifies 
as a particularly important and challenging time for identity development for counsellors-in-





As I was able to not be engaged in directly teaching (and thus assessing) this particular cohort of 
students, as they (and we) had already formed mutually trustworthy relationships, and, as they were 
embarking on a year of more time intense client focused work (as opposed to theory/class based), 
this group of students were deemed the most suitable to approach for the purposes of this research.  
An initial email was sent to all eleven counsellors-in-training inviting them to take part in the 
research. A further email was sent to eight participants with attached information sheet and consent 
form (see appendix 1). 
Participants 
Eight participants chose to take part in this research. However, while all participants took part in 
some of the groups, due to other commitments and sometimes unforeseen circumstances, not all 
participants were present for every group meeting. All participants were undertaking a counselling 
practicum in Part II, some full time, and some part-time. This meant all participants in this research 
were currently undertaking regular supervised counselling work with clients in a school or 
community counselling setting. They had all completed Part I of the programme which required 
them to complete a minimum of 65 hours of counselling experience, of which a minimum of 40 
hours was face to face counselling.      
Several participants have provided me with information about themselves to be included here, as 
well as choosing their own pseudonyms. Some participants were happy for their names to be used, 
but I have chosen to use pseudonyms throughout in order to protect their anonymity.  Participants 
ranged in age from 22 years to 67 years, with an average age of 48 years. Seven of the eight 
participants were women, and one male. Five of the participants were Pākehā or of New Zealand 
European descent, one participant was New Zealand Māori, one was South East Asian Chinese, 
and one was of Pasifika descent. Seven participants had returned to tertiary education to study 





childhood, primary, secondary and tertiary education settings. One participant was embarking on 
counselling education having just completed her undergraduate degree.      
Participants expressed a range of reasons and hopes for taking part in the research, including 
“needing time spent talking and reflecting with my course colleagues”, “an opportunity for me to 
watch the formation and development of counsellor ‘persona’/identity”, “a chance to give back and 
contribute to further learning”, “a chance to explore where/how I would fit in the world of being a 
counsellor”, and “an opportunity to maintain close ties with many of my fellow counselling 
trainees”. 
Data Generation  
Individual Interviews 
Participants were invited to take part in an initial individual interview with me, reflecting on their 
journey as a counsellor-in-training up to this point, including their ideas about what it means to be 
a counsellor, their process of deciding to become a counsellor, and their understandings and 
experiences of the process thus far (see appendix 2 for the semi-structured interview schedule). 
Interviews were conducted either at the University or at participants’ homes, depending on where 
was most convenient for them. They lasted between one to one and a half hours and were video or 
audio recorded.  At the end of each interview participants were invited to depict their process of 
change up to that point through the use of drawing and/or metaphor. All participants completed 
this and proceeded to share their drawings with each other in the first meeting of the group.  Given 
the large amount of data generated in this project, and the fine grained data analysis, I have not 
drawn on the interview data for the most part in the analysis. As such, I have chosen not to expand 






Collective biography workshops 
Davies and Gannon, in particular, have been using and continuing to develop the practices of 
collective biography for close to two decades now (Davies & Dormer, 1997; Davies et al., 2002; 
Davies and Gannon, 2006, 2009, 2011; Gannon, Walsh, Byers & Rajiva, 2012; De Schauwer et al., 
2017). It is not a fixed approach which stands still. The iteration of collective biography employed 
in this research, similarly, while drawing on the central practices of the approach as detailed below, 
evolved in relation to the participants, the approach and through participant feedback and practices 
of researcher reflexivity.    
The particular practices intended to be employed in the data generation workshops were outlined 
and shared in a written document with participants prior to the beginning the workshops (see 
appendix 3). These are taken primarily from Davies and Gannon’s (2006) outline in their book, 
Doing Collective Biography (pp. 9-15), and also influenced by their more recent writing at the time 
of developing the workshops for this research (Davies & Gannon, 2009, 2011). These practices 
were envisaged as providing a site within which the research questions could be best explored. 
While these are described in a linear, coherent way, this was often not the way the groups went, 
with much overlapping of the processes, and with not all workshops including all of the processes 
as outlined. A total of eight workshops took place, approximately monthly, for two to three hours 
at a time, over the period of one year, rather than within the usual three to seven day time periods 
of the workshops described by Davies and colleagues. This was in order to follow the experiences 
of the participants over the period of their practicum year, and to make the workshops manageable 
in the busy lives of those participating. This time period of meeting enabled the group to continue 
to build and maintain relationships and rapport. As noted above, not all eight participants were 
present at each group meeting. One participant was absent for five of these groups, including the 
final three, as although she had wanted to take part, other commitments meant she was ultimately 





attended all eight groups, four attended seven groups, one attended six groups, and one attended 
five groups. The following table summarises numbers present for each group. 
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Participants 7 7 7 5 3 8 6 7 
 Table 1: No. of participants present in each collective biography workshop 
The focus in the workshops was on descriptions of embodied experience rich in affect and sensory 
detail, avoiding and exposing clichés and explanations. Stories from the lived experience of the 
counsellors-in-training were explored in this way, through writing, telling, and individual and 
collective art-making. Questions were asked by all to expose further clichés or explanations as 
listeners were invited to attempt to imagine and embody the very memory they were hearing, with 
the aim of “coming as close as possible to the immediacy, intensity and intimacy of that embodied 
moment... (while also working) towards a sense of open borders, of porosity between subjects – of 
the subjects within the stories and also of the subjects who come together to form the research 
group” (Gannon et al., 2012, p. 4).   
Throughout this process I determined to embody the (albeit challenging) role of workshop 
leader/facilitator. Those who have been a part of collective biography processes often comment on 
the importance of this role, for both research and process reasons. For example, Wright et al. (2011) 
comment that, “Sue’s role as leader was important, both with keeping us to clear research questions 
and to our chosen epistemological approaches” and that “‘this deconstruction process can be a 
wrench and needs to be managed well in order to be safe” (p. 476). As I outline below, and in the 
further data analysis and implications chapters, enacting one identity as workshop facilitator was 
challenging. Being a part of this group regularly produced, in me, multiple memories, affect, 





the group members. The depth of sharing among participants was personal and often emotive, and 
peer connection and support was evident. I continued to return to my role as facilitator, which 
involved listening, questioning, and loose structuring of the beginning of the sessions. I attempted 
to remain focused on eliciting their embodied memories and stories, which required a particular 
kind of listening presence in attempting to imagine and embody these shared memories. As a group 
we were able to attend also to the processes occurring, and members were clear on their desire and 
ability to take responsibility for their own emotional and personal safety, comfort, and needs in 
sharing and being part of the group. Group members remained committed to this and to the aims 
of the group, which enabled me to stay connected to my role as facilitator of a primarily research, 
(not therapeutic) process. At the same time, ongoing, careful consideration was given to the effects 
of my role as a participant-researcher. Where it seemed appropriate, I participated not just as a 
facilitator, but from a position as a counsellor, newly developing counsellor-educator, mother, and 
the many other identities present within the group. This was partly in order to decrease the 
perceived privilege and power, and otherness of the researcher, to encourage reciprocity and a 
richness and depth of sharing and experience. I return to some of these experiences in the final 
chapter, in discussing pedagogical implications arising from the use of collective biography in this 
way.        
Data 
The data generated over this initial period of the research, thus included individual interview 
transcripts, video, and transcripts of, recordings of the workshops. Data from the videos included 
verbal content (transcribed), affect, silences, emotion, physical space, and other matter arising in 
the time and space of data analysis. The ways in which the data were eventually conceptualised are 
discussed in the next section, and in the remainder of this thesis, where I turn, onto-





Participants were invited to keep reflective journals for “drafting memory stories and for recording 
other thoughts and fragments of memory” (Davies & Gannon, 2011, p. 131) in relation to the 
particular memory/experience questions and topics of discussion. While four participants offered 
me these journals at the end of the workshops, I have not used this data. The majority of participants 
tended to use their journals for writing during the workshops, which was often shared at the time, 
rather than writing in between our meetings.  
I also recorded researcher field notes over the period of the workshops. These included my 
experiences, observations, thoughts, affect, curiosities and reflections during and after workshops. 
I attempted to engage in a reflexive process with this writing, about the research, process and my 
role in it. This was in keeping with post-structural qualitative research, where effective field notes 
contain an awareness of how data are collected and recorded, and the role, perspective and position 
of the researcher in that process (Corwin & Clemens, 2012).  However, as I outline in chapter four, 
I came to question the limits of reflexivity, ultimately turning to diffraction, as concept and method, 
(Barad, 2007) and as “a critical practice for recognizing our own “semiotic technologies” for 
making meanings” (Haraway, 1988, p. 570). As I will show, this entailed a shift from seeing myself 
as a reflective, reflexive, self-referential observer of the world towards someone who understands 
the world from within and as part of it whilst participating in its ongoing performance. 
Research rigour/Trustworthiness  
Undertaking qualitative research in social sciences has typically required us to consider different 
notions of reliability and validity than we would normally consider in traditional positivist research 
paradigms. Even then, the criteria for how qualitative research should be judged and evaluated has 
been shifting over time. Lichtman (2006) suggests that “one of the most controversial areas 
surrounding qualitative research is how to evaluate what you read” (p. 189) and suggests that there 





sciences suggest we are in a period of post qualitative inquiry, or post inquiry (Lather, 2016; Lather 
& St. Pierre, 2013; St. Pierre, 2014), reflective in particular of the ontological turn away from 
conventional humanist research to, for example, new materialisms and posthumanism. Such work 
defies categorizing and defining, as it is based on an ontology of knowing “embedded in an 
immanence of doing” (Lather, 2016, p. 5). Again, while the chapters from this point on in my thesis 
respond to the ontological turn and post-qualitative inquiry, at this point I return to an outline of 
the practices informing my approach at the time of conducting the collective biography groups.   
Drawing on epistemologies of feminism, social constructionism and post-structuralism provided a 
clear ground at the time from which to guide my research. I was guided by principles of feminist 
research, for example, seen to encompass the following characteristics: “addressing issues of 
power, emotions, notions of objectivity/subjectivity, researcher reflexivity, and power and 
authority in re/presentation” (Harrison, MacGibbon & Morton, 2001, p. 326). Similarly, social 
constructionism demanded attention to issues including trustworthiness, reflexivity, subjectivity 
and multiple perspectives (Lichtman, 2006). Taking such considerations into account I chose to 
foreground the following ways of ensuring rigour throughout my initial process of data collection 
during the interviews and collective biography groups.   
Researcher responsiveness: Practicing openness, creativity, sensitivity, and flexibility in relation 
with the research and participants was deemed important (Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson and Spiers, 
2002). I worked closely with my supervisors and participants to ensure adherence to these qualities.  
Methodological coherence: (Morse et al., 2002): Ensuring congruence between the aims of the 
research components of the method was deemed important and adhered to in choosing the method 
of collective biography.   
Appropriate sample (Morse et al. 2002): The sample needs to consist of participants who best 





Reciprocity: In my commitment to feminist values of equality, transparency (Etherington, 2004) 
and relationship in research I attempted to prioritise notions and actions of reciprocity in my 
engagement with participants. Paying attention to the give and take of social interactions, 
developing rapport and empathy, incorporating the emotional aspects of the research relationship 
have all been identified as ways of not only ensuring good, rich and thick data, but also of working 
to respect feminist politics (Harrison et al., 2001). In this way, it was my intention to not only 
generate rich data and ensure trustworthiness of the data through relationships of reciprocity, but 
also to offer something potentially beneficial to my participants through their involvement in the 
research.           
Researcher reflexivity: Engaging in reflexivity as a researcher means operating on multiple levels 
at any one time, questioning assumptions and always being open and curious about what might be 
influencing or informing my relationships with participants, with data and with my topic 
(Etherington, 2004). Incorporating processes of researcher reflexivity assumes a commitment to 
postmodern ideas which challenge the existence of a measurable reality that can known separate to 
subjectivity. Using reflexivity shows the relationship between the acquired knowledge and how it 
came to be, thus adding to the trustworthiness of the research.  It was my aim to use writing as a 
method of inquiry (Richardson,1994; Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005), writing throughout the 
research process in order to continually inquire into my own experiences and assumptions as a 
researcher (self) in relation to my participants (other) and to make my positioning as transparent 
and explicit as possible (Speedy, 2005). While, this writing became a significant part of this 
research, diffraction, rather than reflexivity, comes to encompass my onto-epistemological 
assumptions guiding and explaining the use of my own writing in this thesis.            
Member checks: I aimed to involve the participants as much as they, and I, were able in checking 
and constructing meaning around the data. I offered transcripts, reported on tentative analyses at 





This became more difficult as time went on, after the groups ended. With a turn to a diffractive 
process of data analysis, which became, not about representing what was, but making knowledge 
anew, produced from a process of knowing in being, and thinking with theory, I attempted to keep 
participants informed about the processes and offer accounts of my diffractive analyses.    
Ethics 
In addition to ensuring I performed traditional ethical procedures including gaining informed 
consent (see appendix 4 for ethical approval), the right to information concerning the purposes, 
processes, and outcomes of the study, the right to withdraw at any stage, and confidentiality (to 
protect the right to privacy and do no harm) (Etherington, 2007), there are a number of ethical 
issues I additionally considered in relation to carrying out this research. Foremost has been to 
consider the implications of my relationship with the student-participants. I had been a lecturer on 
the counselling programme for the year in which these students completed part I of the programme.  
This part is the most taught-course intensive part of the programme (as opposed to practice based) 
and I co-ordinated and taught one paper, co-taught another paper, and was a co-facilitator of the 
two day intensive workshop which all counselling students completed prior to beginning the 
counselling programme. This effectively meant I met with all of the students regularly over the 
course of the university year, and had responsibility for grading their work. 
 
In part II, all students-participants were undertaking a practicum which requires completion of a 
certain number of counselling hours. This course was practice based and required a portfolio of 
work to be submitted at the end. This was the only remaining counselling paper for my participants, 
and it was arranged that my counsellor education colleague had full responsibility for this paper, 
as such I was able to have no role in the teaching or assessment for the year of the students’ 





Although the dual nature of my relationships with these students perhaps had the potential to 
complicate the research, I believe such a relationship actually contributed to, and potentially 
enhanced, the possibilities for undertaking this kind of research. The building of relationships with 
the participants over the previous year was almost necessary to being able to generate such rich 
data and experiences. Collective biography, in its methodology, requires participants to be in 
relationship, and together to create a space safe enough to reveal and (de)construct stories about 
their lives which may not have come to light previously, and which will certainly come to light in 
new and previously unknown, and often unexpected ways. This prior experience of relationship 
building, I believe, was necessary for the methodology of collective biography to be most effective, 
for the participants to continue to feel safe in the process, and for the possibilities of this research 
process to be realised. 
In addition to ensuring I had no part in assessment, it was also my intention to be transparent about 
these processes and issues with all participants, to discuss and invite their considerations on these 
and any other potential areas of conflict or tension which may arise due to the dual relationships 
we experience. In doing this my intention was to hold to my own feminist ethics of care and 
equality, whilst also recognising the power and autonomy possessed by those participating in the 
study, that is, not assuming that because I have previously held power as their lecturer that this 
renders them devoid of any power. As Etherington (2007) suggests, by naming and acknowledging 
the participants’ power — “as well as, and alongside, my own—we (were…) able to engage in 
more equal negotiations concerning (their) involvement in my study” (p. 602). 
An additional ethical issue concerned the maintaining of the anonymity of the students in the 
presentation of this research. Grafanaki (1996) rightly asserts that the maintaining of “anonymity 
and the confidentiality of data is a critical issue in counselling research, because of the intimate 
nature of the material being gathered” (p. 333). Although this research is not specifically gathering 





intimate nature. Because I was also looking at a group of students from one year group, at a 
particular university which I, the researcher and author, work at, it was important to consider 
removing as many of these identifying details as possible. In a similar context, Grafanaki (1996) 
suggests that it can be difficult to preserve anonymity of research participants in a small university 
community when they are part of a case-study. She suggests that in such cases biographical and 
background information which might identify them must be altered. 
For example, I do not include the year in which the research took place and I group together certain 
biographical information about the participants, rather than offering separate biographies. 
Interestingly some of the participants, when I asked them which information they would like 
included, and to choose a pseudonym, said they are happy for their real name to be used (which I 
have not done). Finally, in addition to these considerations I was also interested in developing and 
maintaining ethical practice as I engaged in this research with the research participants. Guillemin 
& Gilliam (2004) make the distinction between procedural ethics and ‘ethics in practice’ in 
conducting qualitative research (p. 262). This required an ongoing attention to the circulation of 
power in the groups, and to transparent communication about data and the ongoing research 
process, of which I attempted to keep participants informed.   
Ultimately, in this research I asked participants to explore and engage with their own personal 
experiences of becoming counsellors, a process which the literature suggested was likely to be 
fraught with confusion, uncertainty, anxiety, self-doubt and stress. Using the process of collective 
biography meant that I asked participants to feel and describe these experiences, as close as possible 
to the actual embodied affect they experienced at the time. Whilst this could be described as 
difficult, painful or perhaps freeing, I remained ethically obligated to first and foremost ensure I 
did no harm. My practice as a psychologist and counsellor for over fifteen years, and my experience 
of working as an educator on the counselling programme enabled me to work ethically and safely 





experiences and interactions of the participants during the workshops, and to my role, my 
experiences and my interactions within the workshops. It is these interpersonal aspects of the 
research which Guillemin & Gilliam (2004) suggest are the “substrate of the ethical dimensions of 
research practice” (p. 275). Through engaging with sensitivity and empathy, as well as competency, 
the ethical notions of autonomy, dignity, and privacy of the research participants became a living 




















CHAPTER THREE   
Posthuman feminist ethico-onto-epistemology  
This point marks a diffractive moment in this research encounter, a shift of knowing-in-being, 
which reconfigures the ethico-onto-epistemology of this research project. In this chapter I give an 
account of (coming to) a posthuman onto-epistemology, in particular drawing on Karen Barad’s 
(2007, 2010, 2012) posthumanist performative framework of agential realism. This thinking comes 
to underpin the ongoing theorising of this research project in relation to methodology, researcher 
subjectivity and data analysis to understandings of the nature of knowledge itself and how we come 
to know in relation with and as part of, rather than about, the world.  Drawing also on post-
qualitative inquiry (St. Pierre, 2014) particularly in the field of education and the work of Donna 
Haraway in feminist technoscience studies (1988, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2003, 2004), I outline the 
ontological turn (including my own) from humanism and post-structuralism to posthumanism. This 
entails a shift from the discursive/linguistic as ways of understanding the constitution of 
knowledge, the world and our selves within it. A shift to the inseparability of nature-culture, of the 
material-discursive, in producing iterative and entangled ways of knowing in being, of knowing 
produced as part of the ongoingness of the world. In this way, this chapter is also an attempt to 
perform a knowing-in-being, and a knowing, always, in-the-making. Thus, in it, I insert poems as 
markers of my own ways of knowing, and as entangled knowledges-in-the-making produced in 
relation with the multiplicity of forces constituting knowing. I do this in an attempt also to perform 
some of the messiness, multiplicity and non-linearity of coming to know, of the production of 
knowledge. I originally conceptualise my use of poems as “writing as a method of inquiry” 
(Richardson, 1994, italics in original), as a way of coming to know, albeit a partial, situated and 
local knowing (Barraclough, 2014). As I outline in chapter five, I come to re-conceptualise this 





I turn to Barad and her agential realist framework, outlining her account of how material-discursive 
practices come to matter, of the role of human and non-human forces, the material and discursive, 
natural and cultural factors, in rethinking notions of knowledge, identity, causality, agency and 
ethics. I do this in order to situate the remainder of this research project within such an onto-
epistemology. That is, I turn to posthumanism as a framework underpinning this research project 
and its production of new knowledge, and thus guiding me methodologically, and innovatively in 
the counselling literature, in seeking answers to my research questions:  
‘What are the lived experiences of counsellors-in-training in coming to embody a counsellor 
identity/subjectivity4 during counsellor education?’   
‘What are the pedagogical implications for counsellor education and counsellor educators of 
reconceptualising this process of identity formation?’     
 
Worlds-in-the-making 
A girl speaks to me of her dislike 
of how she looks in photographs. 
This makes me so sad, 
I do not know what to do, 
or what to say, to counter the years 
(hers, mine and those women all the way back 
                                                          
4 I use both the poststructural terms subject and subjectivity as well as the term identity.  As a grammatical term, 
‘subject’ highlights the role of language in recruiting us into the particular ways we are able to give accounts of 
ourselves. It also allows an encapsulation of the notion of freedom or autonomy in that this is tied up with the local, 
social, cultural signifying practices of which the subject is subjected to.  The term also allows for discontinuities and 
contradictions in that the subject can take up a number of shifting and inconsistent subject-positions. This is in 
contrast to typical humanistic understandings of identity which implies sameness, fixity and a self-contained, 
enduring sense of self (Belsey, 2002).  I don’t use identity as a term in this humanist sense, but rather in a 
posthumanist sense, as outlined towards the end of chapter one.  Researchers and writers use both terms, 
‘subjectivity’ (e.g. Braidotti, 2016) and ‘identity’ (e.g. Barad, 2007) when referring to the formation of the 
posthuman subject. As will become clear, a posthuman subjectivity is an expanded, relational self in contrast to a 





to the beginning of time) 
of nature-culture’s effects on girls’ and women’s worth - 
embedded in a gaze. 
 
A woman speaks to me of her overwhelm. 
I have no suggestions 
for how to plan better, work smarter, 
prioritise more. 
I lead her to the only truth I know, 
yes, she is working twice as hard, unable to say no, 
doing it all, to prove her worth, 
to those who are watching, 
to those who are judging, 
who have the final judgment, 
who have marked her as other, 
a woman of colour. 
 
I refuse to name her not-enough-ness 
as hers alone, 
her sense of unworthiness 
as hers to fix.  Instead, 
I despair with her 
at the end result, 
at the burden we place 
upon her, 
to remake the brokenness of this world 
on her own. 
 
A counselling colleague speaks to me 
of a teenage girl who came to talk to her. 
She had a back-story of violence at home, 
not towards her, you understand, she only saw 
(and heard and lived and felt) 





or rather her dad 
beating the crap 
out of her mum. 
(Doesn’t it matter how we say it, which way round we tell it?) 
The question was how to respond, 
what could she say, 
where to begin, 
whose responsibility? 
It wasn’t new, this story, it’s as old as time, too. 
This girl, this mum, 
they’ve told it all before. 
 
There’s fire in me. 
To raze the ground. 
To cauterize, cremate and shape anew. 
Do we really keep hearing and telling and living 
the same stories over and over again? 
Then, over and over again we must sit up, 
stand up, shout until we are hoarse, 
‘It’s not ok it’s not ok it’s not ok.’ 
 
I think I understand a little 
of how bodies and meanings and lives 
are made, but I don’t yet know 
how to engage in this at times, barely possible, 
but always necessary, practice 
of building our worlds anew. 
(June 2015) 
 
Philosophical and scientific questions of what is real or true, of what is the nature of things, of our 
social, physical, metaphysical, and material realities are ontological ones. How we go about 
ascertaining that knowledge or figuring out what is real or true are epistemological ones. The two 





postmodern, social constructionist and poststructural theories of knowing have primarily informed 
understandings of the world and ourselves in it, in counselling and counsellor education. 
Counsellor-in-training lived experience and identity research, as outlined in chapter one, has been 
underpinned by positivist, phenomenological, and interpretivist methodological approaches. Such 
approaches can be described as representationalist, and as ontologically foundationalist, seeking to 
provide a comprehensive and accurate representation of a real world, which forms the basis of 
knowledge claims (Rosiek & Gleason, 2017). Postmodernism and social constructionism 
challenged the certainties of modernism, and realism, and invited instead views of knowledge 
claims as situated, partial, and embedded within cultural and historical stories, as well as bringing 
into greater focus the relationship between the storyteller, the listener and the knowledge claims 
(Etherington, 2004). Methodologies inspired by poststructuralism reject the idea that 
representations we make of the world of our research “can be guaranteed by an exclusive 
relationship to the reality” of the object of study (Rosiek & Gleason, 2017, p. 6). Indeed, an aim of 
social analysis underpinned by poststructuralism, with an emphasis on linguistic mediation, is to 
“generate a principled undecidability about our interpretations of the social” (p. 6). As is outlined 
in chapter one, research exploring the lived experience and identity formation of counsellors-in-
training remains predominantly situated within positivist and interpretivist paradigms. This has an 
effect on the kind of knowledge claims subsequently able to be made, often in particular, generating 
‘grand narratives’, failing to recognise the “irreducibly mediated nature of all truth claims” (p. 8), 
and failing to recognize how “conceptions of knowledge often serve to predetermine” the research 
ends we seek and achieve (p. 8). What kinds of knowledge might be produced, if we understood 
the world and our relation to it in different ways, and thus attempted different ways of engaging 
with it in producing knowledge about it? In effect, this is where I have come to, in relation to the 
research on counsellor-in training identities, but also in relation with my own onto-epistemologies, 





world is made, un-made and can be re-made, and how we might all participate in this process of 
worlds-in-the-making. The following is my attempt at coming to understand, and explain, how this 
might be achieved, and what might be produced differently, in relation to what has variously been 
termed the “onto-ethical” (Rosiek & Gleason, 2017) or ontological turn (Lather, 2016), the material 
turn (Alaimo & Hekman, 2008b), post-qualitative inquiry (Lather & St. Pierre, 2013) and the ‘post-
post’ (Braidotti, 2013). In what follows, I map my traversing of this turn, specifically in relation to 
posthumanism and Karen Barad’s (2007) ethico-onto-epistemology, in order to re-situate myself 
and this project.    
Beginning, un-doing and re-turning onto-epistemology 
As will be evident by now, my interests have been oriented toward ontologies of being and 
becoming, toward feminist themes of change and transformation, in particular relation to identities, 
counselling and education (Hinton & van der Tuin, 2014). I am in agreement with Elizabeth Grosz 
when she speaks of feminist theory’s “necessity, in the future, of providing other ways of knowing, 
other ontologies and epistemologies that enable the subject’s relation to the world, to space and to 
time, to be conceptualized in different terms” (Grosz, 2002 in Hinton & van der Tuin, 2014, p. 2). 
This is not to dismiss all that has come before, rather it invites an ontological reconfiguring of 
causality and temporality as multidirectional and “an understanding of time as non-linear, intensive 
and inventive” (Coleman, 2014, p. 30), in order, possibly, to envision the past as enlivening the 
future in the present. Such ideas about ‘alternate’ ways of knowing introduce the onto-
epistemological shift I speak about in this chapter, and ultimately put to work in this research.   
I align myself here with St. Pierre (2014) and her questioning of the (im)possibility of attempting 
to do post-qualitative inquiry, an experimental kind of research inquiry which occurs once one has 
shifted the ontological beyond a conventional humanist qualitative methodology grounded in the 





and the knowing subjectivity of the author. St. Pierre writes of the disconnect evident in much 
research in education between methodology, epistemology and ontology, where authors claim a 
“post” ontology in their thinking (e.g. a poststructural ontology using Foucault) and yet go on to 
adopt a conventional humanist qualitative methodology (e.g. drawing on notions of a Cartesian 
subject and taken for granted understandings of data, interview, or fieldwork). For example, she 
says, “we found qualitative studies that claimed to use poststructural theories of the subject but 
then in the methodology section included descriptions and treatments of people as humanist 
individuals with unique “voices” waiting to be set free by emancipatory researchers” (p. 10). St. 
Pierre urges those thinking with the “posts” to unlearn or forget conventional qualitative 
methodology with its “grid of normalizing human concepts, many of which are positivist” (p. 10) 
and to instead begin with ontological and epistemological commitments or to “think with theory” 
(Jackson & Mazzei, 2012) and that in doing this, methodology will, and must, follow.   
This is not a simple undoing, however, this working both within and against the normalizing and 
dominant discourse of humanism, of the knowing human subject producing knowledge of the 
world.  It is risky and only ever experimental, with no template or guide to work from in thinking 
here, with a posthumanist ontology, which by its very nature means nothing ever stays the same. 
Throughout this work then it is my intention to work against the conventional qualitative research 
process and its humanist and positivist underpinnings, whilst recognising it is unlikely I will ever 
fully succeed in this endeavour. Wherever possible, in thinking with theory, I attempt to put that 
theory to work in this text, recognising Derrida’s (in St. Pierre) ontological position that “there is 
nothing outside of the text” explained by St. Pierre to mean that that “the text is always already of, 
with the world; it is never “just text.”” (St. Pierre, 2014, p. 11).         
Thus, in thinking with posthumanist theory, my knowing or ontology of the world cannot be written 
as though I am separate from the world of which I write about, as though I am looking out on it in 





knowing comes from being in it, with it, and of it, from “a direct material engagement, a practice 
of intra-acting with the world as part of the world in its dynamic material reconfiguring” (Barad, 
2007, p. 379).  It is my aim therefore, in this part of the chapter, to attempt to “return” (Hughs & 
Lury, 2013, p. 787, italics in original), rather than reflect on, some of my own intra-active 
entanglements with onto-epistemology in order, not to “replay a string of moments” (Barad, 2007, 
p. ix) to demonstrate “a singular or unified progressive history” (Hughs & Lury, 2013, p.787), but 
to enliven and reconfigure the past and future in this intra-active writing present.   
This is not, however, and never has been, an innocent re-turning.  Whether we term it language, 
narrative, or the technology of writing, according to Haraway (1994) these all refer to forms of life 
and we “cannot afford neutrality about (their) constitution and sustenance” (p. 62).  Every moment 
presents itself with questions of responsibility and accountability for the world’s ongoing 
reconfiguring (Barad, 2007) and the point, according to Haraway, is not just to read the webs of 
knowledge production, but to participate in the processes, “to make a difference - however 
modestly, however partially”, “in order to foster some forms of life and not others” (p. 62).  Thus, 
my modest and partial re-telling below is always already entangled with lively feminist and social 




Springbok tour of New Zealand – 
in my family sports and politics  
figure large, 
but not in any intended  
knot of entanglement. 
Invercargill, Southland,  
a strong rugby province 
where a barbed wire fence  





Rugby Park – 
my brother, aged thirteen 
throws eggs at the protestors,  




Formative years – a blue voting 
middle class white roughcast  
house in suburbia.  
All the right zones 





I cycle to the Girls’ High School  
on my blue ten-speed 
come rain or shine  
becoming with  
girls-can-do-anything (a man can already do)     
Latin chants  
non scholae sed vitae discimus – 
traces so deeply rooted  
in my body – 
not-for-school-but-for-life-we-are-learning 
that I am sixteen again,  
living out my anarchy 
in absenteeism  
and local pubs.    
 





Rats and mice, underfloor  
and in Skinner boxes. 
Lay down the poison,  










I think, I sense, I perceive 
the coming of a crisis. 
  
1994.  
Social construction,  
deconstruction 
reconstruction. 
A shifting of allegiance,  
a loosening of ties,  
a change of heart.  
From Leith Walk to the Hocken building, 
degrees of freedom to  
degrees of uncertainty, 
I cannot see straight – 
distance is subjective 
time is relative 
culture counts and  
meaning matters 
in the space between  
you and I 
where we talk ourselves  








New horizons,  
different shores. 
Pain and privilege co-implicated  
as I walk up the prime-minister strewn  
staircase of 10 Downing St,  
an esteemed guest  
of the new liberalism – 
penetrating the patriarchy,   
the psyche,  
this past-present of a future  
in/determinable. 
Broken bones and broken hearts 
bruised and bloodied,  
battered and beaten 
I listen and listen,  
ache and break, 
in this first ever safe house 
I make my vows  
to de-pathologise,  
my feminist oath  
to fight right back,  
to smash the system,  
cracked and skewed,  
bloodied and broken.  
 
And now-before-and-after. 
This going back and coming forward, 









made, unmade and re-made. 
I am left undone,  
a redoing,  
moment by moment. 
A spacetimemattering  
of indeterminate beginnings 
and endings,  
a queer quantum writing  
that makes time  
and makes me  
and makes known  
its own becoming,  
entirely and intimately 
in its pen and paper,  
finger and keyboard, 
mind and matter,  
now and then,  




practices of be(com)ing.   
(October, 2015) 
 
Writing this necessitates a beginning, and an end, although neither can necessarily be determined.  
The end material product might suggest the existence of a separate, subjective ‘I’ whose mind is 
digesting, interpreting and describing objective, fixed, material for the production of the knowledge 
eventually appearing on this page, in a time-ordered fashion. One interpretation of this is that 
knowing or knowledge is mediated through the mind to produce a representation of an objective, 
external, and stable reality.  Or, as Barad says, “the ontology of the world is a matter of discovery 





is purported to be independent of all practices of representation. In this ontological view, there 
exists a gap, a separation, between a self-contained knower, an independent existing reality, and 
representations of that observable/knowable reality.   
Ontological challenges have come in many forms against this positivist view of the world, and 
feminist critiques have been numerous5. It is my intention throughout this thesis to experiment in 
thinking/working/playing and becoming with a post-humanist onto-epistemology in an attempt to 
rethink, or reconfigure, human subjectivity in the context of being and becoming a counsellor-in-
training. It is my hope that by going beyond the dominant humanist conceptualisations, and 
positivist and interpretivist methodologies, that something new will emerge in our thinking about 
the process of the formation of the counsellor-in-training subject.       
 
Toward a diffractive and affirmative knowing-in-being 
In particular, as indicated, I am drawing on Karen Barad’s (1996, 1998, 2003, 2007, 2010,) post-
human, performative, theoretical framework of agential realism as outlined in depth in her book 
‘Meeting the Universe Halfway: quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning’ 
(2007). However, it must be noted that this ‘drawing on’ is always a diffractive6 reading of agential-
realism as described by Karen Barad, as influenced by Donna Haraway (1988, 1991, 1994, 1997, 
2003) but also as taken up and thought with by others (e.g. van der Tuin, 2011a 2011b, 2014; 
Hinton, 2014; Højgaard & Søndergaard, 2011).   
Specifically here, I use the term diffractive to refer to a subjectivity and temporality at work in 
practices of knowing-in-being (van der Tuin, 2014), to an interference pattern (rather than a 
                                                          
5 See Chapter four for more discussion of this in relation to the crisis of representation and some of the challenges 
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reflection on) which becomes known in my writing produced through entangled intra-active 
practices with readings on agential-realism. Thus, my writing here is not intended to “displace the 
same elsewhere” (Haraway, 1994, p. 63), rather it is a performative, dynamic materialization of 
material-discursive practices of knowing-in-being in relation with multiple other forces including 
the theoretical ideas I am discussing, my past knowings, and the material limits of producing 
knowing on the page. 
I draw on the diffractive idea of working along affirmative rather than, primarily, critical lines.   
According to Haraway (1994) while critical vision has been central, and necessary, to critical 
theory in order to “unmask the established disorder that appears as transparently normal” (p. 62) it 
does not go far enough toward making a difference and affirming that the world can be otherwise. 
This affirmative notion is taken up by van der Tuin (2011a, 2014) who draws on Barad (2007) and 
Grosz (2005) in suggesting that “reading diffractively breaks through the academic habit of 
criticism and works along affirmative lines” (van der Tuin, 2011a, p. 22). I am using this notion 
here, of a diffractive and affirmative kind of reading, in considering the texts and theories I am 
reading which are informing my onto-epistemology as outlined here. That is, in outlining a post-
humanist onto-epistemology it is not my intention to dismiss, and dissent from all texts and theories 
which have come before, in particular those which I have known (e.g. realism, positivism, social 
constructionism, post-colonialism, post-structuralism).   
Instead, thinking along diffractive and affirmative lines offers a generative and dynamic 
reconfiguring of old and new, established and emerging, concepts and traditions, without being 
underpinned by an oppositional binarism. In this way, new onto-epistemologies, and the texts they 
intra-act with producing, are “always generated with the texts and projected futures of the past, and 
in the living present as always/already moving toward a future” (Van der Tuin, 2014, p. 235). I find 





the articulation of an onto-epistemology, which seeks not to discount that which has come before, 
nor to imply that which is articulated is static, and closed to that which is already on its way.   
In articulating her theory of feminist technoscience, Haraway proposes a refiguring or a knotting 
together into a string figure of three interknitted discourses named cultural studies; feminist, 
multicultural, antiracist science projects; and science studies. She notes however, that these 
discourses are not preconstituted, bounded scholarly practices which exist entirely outside of one 
another. Rather they can be seen as knots, place markers, “in a constitutively interactive, 
collaborative process of trying to make sense of (…) worlds we inhabit and that inhabit us” 
(Haraway, 1994, p. 66). Neither does she envision her knotted, string figures as finished and closed 
articulations of the world, rather her hope is that her readers will pick up the patterns, invent their 
own promising knots and figures, in an ongoing re-articulating of unfinished, less deadly, worlds.   
Hence, my articulation here of an onto-epistemology, is a pattern or a string figure, diffracted 
through so many texts and made up of a number of more significant knots, of posthumanism, 
agential-realism, poststructuralism, new material feminisms, of a coming together into something 
which might resemble social-material-affective-discursive practices of knowing-in-being. The 
following, then, is an attempt to articulate these knots in a way which might begin to do justice to 
their complexity, performativity, and historicity and which invites the reader into their own 
diffractive reading as they intra-act with this text, and which opens up other ways of knowing in 
relation to the lived experience of counsellors-in-training.   
What came before: a local entanglement  
Whilst I am particularly drawing on Haraway and Barad and their feminist, technoscientific 
theories which can be said to come under a post-humanist ontology7, here I am first attempting to 
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outline some broader understandings of the term posthumanism as I have come to understand it 
and as I aim to use it in this project. Drawing particularly on posthumanism as it has been taken up 
in cultural studies and education, feminism and philosophy, I aim to sketch some of the key, broader 
ideas which come to underpin a posthuman onto-epistemology in this project. Necessarily 
entangled with this is a going back and going forward, moving between theories of realism, the 
linguistic turn to social constructionism and poststructuralism in order to come to the past-present-
future of posthumanism. 
As humans have become, and have been seen to be, entangled in complex and intricate relationships 
with more-and-other-than-human entities such as digital, cybernetic and medical technologies, 
other animals and species, the environment and the material world, the anthropocentric notion of 
the unitary human subject as the centre of all things has necessarily come to be reworked. This is 
not necessarily a new reworking, as Pepperell (2005) suggests, the posthuman era, the age of 
uncertainty, could be said to have been originated in the period leading up to World War I since 
this was the time of emerging quantum physics and cubism, a reworking of the representation of 
things and the order of time and space. Indeed, although not originally captured under the umbrella 
of posthumanism and preferring now the “awkward term” of companion species (Haraway, 2008b, 
p. 164), Donna Haraway’s technoscientific figures such as the cyborg (1991), OncoMouse (1997), 
companion species (2003, 2008) and naturecultures (2003) have all been working to unsettle, 
destabilize and even dismantle the defining and assumed boundaries between humans/animals and 
                                                          
use of the term “posthumanism” also “marks a refusal to take the distinction between human and non-human for 
granted, and to found analyses on this presumably fixed and inherent set of categories” (2007, p. 32).  Whilst 
Haraway does not claim the term posthumanism, preferring instead companion species, her work and the figures 
she has used all the way back to her feminist, socialist Cyborg Manifesto of 1983, have always been about a 
rejection of rigid boundaries between the human and more-or-other-than-human in the interests of “an ethics and 





technology, between animals/other species and humans, and between nature and culture, just as a 
theory of posthumanism does today.   
As Haraway says, in offering us the example of the human body, in which human genomes can 
actually only be found in 10% of all the cells while the other 90% are filled with the genomes of 
bacteria, funghi and other species, “to be one is always to become with many” (2008b, p. 4).  
However, in posthumanism, and companion species, this notion goes beyond traditional ideas of 
co-habiting alongside one another. Haraway’s companion species is, she says, a “permanently 
undecidable category, a category-in-question that insists on the relation as the smallest unit of being 
and of analysis” (2008b, p. 165), which, in line with Barad’s concept of intra-action8, does not pre-
determine the status of the species. Consistent with post-human notions which contest bodily 
boundaries, the locus of identity (Toffoletti, 2002)  and the unitary status of the subject, Haraway’s 
(2008b) companion species’ trope tells us that “every species is a multi-species crowd” (p. 165).     
This idea of indeterminate or unstable boundaries in a complex and entangled relationship between 
humans and more-and–other-than-human stands in stark contrast to the humanist ontology which 
has been culturally dominant since the Enlightenment, which places man and individuals at the 
centre of all things, as apart from the rest. As Barad (2007) states, representationalism, 
individualism, and humanism all labour together, their forces hard at work in anthropocentric 
Western culture, neo-liberal politics, and all of the places in between. As is stated above, such 
ontologies claim a knowable, observable, discoverable world, whether it be natural, cultural or 
social, out there, able to be represented in the knowledge making practices of individuals.   
Posthumanism is not the first to challenge such claims. In my discipline areas of education and 
counselling, post-modernism, social constructionism and post-structuralism have achieved much 
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distance from humanism, from its agentic, autonomous, rational and self-contained human subject-
of-will (Fox and Alldred, 2013), from its structures of binaries, categories, hierarchies and other 
grids of regularity and normativity (St. Pierre & Pillow, 2000) and from its particularly devastating 
effects for those who exist on the wrong side of the binaries (including, but not limited to “most 
white women, people of colour, the sick, and others with reduced powers of self-direction 
compared to the One True Copy of the Prime Mover”  (Haraway, 1994, p. 65)). Theories of social 
constructivism and social constructionism9 have insisted that we take a critical stance toward our 
taken-for-granted ways of understanding the world, essentially those of positivism and empiricism. 
Social constructionism cautions us to be sceptical in our assumptions of the ‘true’ nature of reality, 
and instead invites us to consider the role and influence of social constructs and categories we use 
to describe or represent the world, as pertinent to actually constructing or making knowledge. That 
is, our knowledge of the world is limited or constructed by the means through which we describe 
it, rather than bearing a direct correspondence to an objective reality. In addition, the language, 
concepts and ways in which we understand the world are culturally and historically situated and 
are constructed through social processes, again rather than individual, objective observation (Burr, 
1995).  Such ideas form the basis for Solution-focused brief therapy which sees the possibilities 
for clients’ futures as being not determined by their pasts, nor limited by labels or categories, but 
rather as partly socially constructed through a particular use of language during the social process 
of therapy. These ideas have contributed to my ontology of the world and its becoming since I was 
first introduced to them in my counselling training in the early 1990s. However, as theories 
underpinning knowledge claims in research related to counsellor-in-training lived experience they 
seem to have enjoyed limited uptake.   
                                                          
9 While these terms are sometimes used interchangeably (Burr, 1995), social constructionism is a term more readily 
associated with social psychology and is said to underpin post-modern approaches in counselling such as Solution-





In a similar way, theories of post-structuralism have offered significant challenges to humanist and 
realist ontologies of social life, human action, subjectivity and the nature of and possibilities for 
change and transformation. My own relationship with post-structuralism initially developed 
primarily through learning and engaging with practices of Narrative Therapy, and the writings of 
its co-founders, Michael White and David Epston (1990), who were influenced, among others, by 
the ideas of the mid-twentieth century French philosophers Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, 
two of the major figures associated with post-structuralism. As White states,  
The pursuit of poststructuralist understandings of human action have taken me to studies of 
critical philosophy, to literary theory, to cultural anthropology, and to postmodern ethics. 
These studies are far removed from the orthodox psychologies and counselling/therapy 
theories which are informed by the structuralist discourses” (1997, p. ix). 
White’s reference here to structuralist discourses refers to therapies which advance the theoretical 
ideas that universal, unitary structures exist which are determining of the subject, “that subjectivity 
is either internally generated or externally imposed” (Barad, 2007, p. 46).  Such examples of these 
can be seen particularly in Freudian theories of psychoanalysis, with the structures of the id, ego, 
and superego, the unconscious, subconscious and unconscious and its deterministic theories of 
personality and pathology (Jones-Smith, 2016) or in modern psychology’s structures and categories 
of mental illness as evidenced in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Fifth 
Edition (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). White’s locating of these as ‘discourses’ refers 
to the post-structuralist notion that these structures, or the distinctions such theories and categories 
make, are not necessarily given by the world or existent within the subject, but are instead 
(re)produced by the symbolizing or signifying systems we learn, that is, via language which is 
inclusive of images and symbols (Belsey, 2002). Of importance too is the notion that ‘discourse’ 





Rather, discursive practices always take local, historical forms, which is what Foucault sought to 
describe (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). 
Working as a narrative therapist has meant taking a critical view of what counts as legitimate 
knowledge in regard to practice and to the very culture of counselling and therapy. It has meant a 
questioning of many taken for granted ideas about the nature and cause of people’s difficulties and 
of ways of working with them in the pursuit of more satisfying practices of living. For example, 
“thick descriptions” (Geertz, 1973 in White, 1997) of persons’ lives and actions which are informed 
by their own interpretations or meaning making are privileged over “thin descriptions” which are 
descriptions and interpretations typically arrived at and imposed by others. Such thin descriptions 
are seen as contributing to the narrowing of available options for action, or agency, in people’s 
lives (White, 1997). With a focus in therapy on language which invites a thickening of stories, 
partly through situating them in the multiple contexts of people’s lives (such as relationship, family, 
social, historical) alternative stories of preferred practices of living become available, which are 
then also able to be thickened, witnessed and acknowledged.   
Not only has narrative therapy drawn on poststructuralist ideas which challenge taken for granted, 
structuralist notions of subjectivity, and instead root the (im)possibilities for being and becoming 
in the signifying systems of language, White also follows poststructuralist philosopher Michel 
Foucault’s writing, in particular, on the inseparability of practices of power and knowledge (White, 
1997). While Foucault’s mid twentieth century studies of madness, medicine, punishment, and 
sexuality had an objective of creating a history of the different modes by which human beings are 





the control of what constitutes reason, knowledge and truth and the subject (Belsey, 2002)10.  He 
says: 
this form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the 
individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes 
a law of truth on him which he must recognise and which others have to recognise in him. 
It is a form of power which makes individual subjects. (Foucault, 1982, p. 212). 
That is, unlike previous versions of power, for Foucault power is not held and wielded by 
individuals or classes or institutions. Instead, it is seen as “dispersed and subject-less, as elements 
of broad ‘strategies’ but without individual authors” (Gaventa, 2003, p. 1) and as making or 
constituting subjects and knowledge through discourse.  In order to understand what power 
relations are about, Foucault claimed that one needed to investigate not an internal rationality but 
the antagonism or opposition to that which we are interested in. That is, the struggle against or 
resistance to the forms of subjection, and the struggles against forms of domination and 
exploitation. In this sense, power is relational and, again, does not exist within individuals, classes 
or institutions, rather it is dispersed, ubiquitous and appears and circulates in every moment of 
social relations. Foucault (1982) saw the exercising of power as a way in which certain actions act 
on and modify the field of others’ possible actions, “it is a total structure of actions brought to bear 
upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the 
extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely (p. 220)… (it is) a permanent provocation” (p. 222).   
Every relationship of power, which is rooted in systems of social networks, puts into operation 
differentiations (differences of status or privilege; economic, linguistic or cultural differences, 
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the necessity of reference to systems and practices of power in narrative therapy, and in poststructuralism, in order to 
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differences in know-how and competence) which are at the same time its conditions and its results. 
Power is this sense both produces reality, knowledge, truth and subjects, and is produced by these 
very same things. It is inseparable and its movement and effects need to be taken into account in 
any analysis of the production of knowledge and of social relations. The discursive is one particular 
way in which power’s movements and effects can be traced as “discourse is the vehicle through 
which knowledge and subjects are constituted” (Gaventa, 2003, p. 1). However, such strategies of 
power, although dominating, are as Foucault notes always existent in a relation of ‘agonsims’ and 
as such analyses must also always look for power in strategies of resistance11.      
More recently my use and understanding of poststructuralism has come through academic, 
feminist, post-structural writing by authors such as Bronwyn Davies (Davies and Harre, 1990; 
Davies, 2000, 2010) and her writing with Susanne Gannon and others on the methodology of 
collective biography (see previous chapter), Laurel Richardson (1997) and Elizabeth A. St. Pierre 
(2000; 2014; Richardson & St-Pierre, 2005; St-Pierre & Pillow, 2000). Their writing has reinforced 
and developed, for me, an ontology in which language, subjectivity, social organisation and power 
are inextricably linked. “Understanding language as competing discourses – competing ways of 
giving meaning and of organising the world – makes language a site of exploration and struggle” 
(Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005, p. 961). How we are able to make sense of the world depends upon 
the historical, cultural, social discourses that are available to us at the time. That is, we are partly12 
discursively constituted. This will be important as I go on to discuss coming to a post-humanist 
ontology, particularly, Barad’s agential-realist framework which outlines a posthumanist 
                                                          
11 While I will not be engaging in a strictly Foucauldian analysis of power and discourse, Karen Barad’s theory of 
agential realism has also drawn on Foucault and retains the discursive as a key part of her theory, albeit in quantum 
entanglement.  Hence, it is important to outline here both as part of my genealogy and also of post-humanism’s.    
12 I use partly throughout this discussion as a reflection of coming to the post-human framework of the intra-
activity of the material-discursive, such that while the discursive is still essential to ontology, it is configured in a 





performative account of material-discursive practices. Such an account, while moving beyond the 
solely linguistic turn of poststructuralism to re-consider materiality as a force (Alaimo & Hekman, 
2008b), does not move away from it altogether. In this sense, and as will become apparent, keeping 
an account of the discursive, albeit as an intra-active force, remains vital.   
A post-structurally informed ontology invites a consideration of the production of knowledge as a 
discursive practice, of subjects of research (authors and participants) as discursively constituted 
through and in language. As stated above, this implies “there is nothing outside of the text” (Derrida 
in St. Pierre, 2014, p. 11). In this way, knowledge produced is seen not as a representation of an 
observable truth, rather it is a discursive production, situated culturally, historically, linguistically, 
and, as such, can always be subjected to critique and deconstruction in order to make visible the 
discursive work that has gone into its constitution and the possibilities for its constituting of us. It 
was with this post-structural thinking that I began my research, in an attempt to do the, often 
difficult, work of shifting from, as Davies conceptualises it, “phenomenology’s subject-of-will” to 
“poststructuralism’s subject-of-thought” (2010, p. 54). While this has always been my orientation 
in my therapeutic work – to invite client’s to deconstruct and become curious about fixed views 
they (or others) may hold of their identities and in doing so to create space for alternative and less 
problem- or deficit-saturated possibilities for living to emerge – I was initially surprised to see the 
hold humanism (or phenomenology’s subject-of-will) had on me as I began to contemplate my own 
identities as a pre-cursor to engaging with my participants13. This made me alert to the very point 
that St. Pierre (2014) makes about the disconnect researchers often produce between espoused 
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ontological orientations of the “posts” (e.g. post-structuralism), and the ways they actually go about 
carrying out the research, as I have outlined above.   
For me, the question then becomes, what does it mean to incorporate an orientation to my research 
as partly discursively produced, to ensure that I hold onto the poststructural ideas of 
subjects/participants/author not as singular, self-contained, autonomous subjects acting through our 
own choices (Davies, 2010) and giving personal, unique voice to experience, but as subjects whose 
agency and knowing is partly constituted through the discourses (e.g. of gender, age, culture, 
emotion, mental health) available at the time. This moves me toward epistemological and 
methodological questions as these necessarily intersect with ontology, towards thinking “of our 
research subjects differently, against the grain of phenomenology” (Davies, 2010). In this research 
this moved me toward the methodological practice of collective biography (e.g. Davies and 
Gannon, 2006;), which originally encompassed the poststructural aim of inviting participants to 
engage in practices of “reflexive awareness of the ways in which discursive practices shape selves, 
shape worlds, shape desire, with the aim of opening up “the possibility of re-shaping, re-writing, 
re-visioning desire” (Davies & Dormer, 1997, p. 62).  Or, as Davies (2004) says, through making 
the constitutive practice of discourse visible, its effects become revisable.   
In a similar way, as the producer of this text, situated within the limits and affordances of certain 
prescribed academic requirements, and within the limits and affordances of my own situated 
knowing, I am always attempting to make visible the partly discursive practices of my own 
knowing, through, for example, poems situated throughout the text. However, this entails a 
recognition, not that I have now shown the whole truth about my involvement in the production of 
this knowledge, rather that what is produced, or what can be known (of my own constitution and 
of that of the text produced), is never the end, or a final knowing. I discuss this further in chapter 





constitution, which has the ultimate aim in research of making visible the subjectivity of the 
researcher in order to show both a connection and a separation between researcher subjectivity and 
the knowledge produced. The underlying assumptions and limits posed by incorporating this 
practice of researcher reflexivity as envisioned in a social constructionist or poststructural ontology 
are laid out in chapter four and ontological challenges and limits of this view are discussed further 
below in coming to a post-humanist ontology. Thus, suffice to say for now, that in this text, while 
I retain a focus on the discursive, I shift to a diffractive, rather than reflexive, ontology, where the 
agency of the researcher moves from a backward looking focus on “tracings of the already-known” 
toward “making new mappings, onto-epistemological, ethical, mappings, in which something new 
might emerge” (Davies, 2014b, p. 734). This will be a new undertaking in research in the area of 
counsellor-in-training identity formation and subsequent pedagogical implications for counsellor 
education.  As identified in chapter one, while there has been a body of literature engaging with 
practices of counselling underpinned by social constructionist and post-structural theories, such 
literature has reported on the ways they engage pedagogically with counsellors-in-training (e.g. 
Winslade, 2002), rather than engaging in the production of new knowledge/research with post- 
ontologies and epistemologies.      
A re-turn to posthumanism 
Possibly, it would have been easier at this point to remain with what I have known and come to 
know (in being) over the previous twenty years through practice as a counsellor/psychologist with 
poststructural leanings and research encounters increasingly erring toward post-structural 
ontologies. However, through a series of material-discursive encounters with people, places and 
texts too numerous to name or recall, my knowing-in-being has been altered irreversibly. I come 
to this point in my ontology, here, on the page, and in this work as a whole, with a desire to 





and practice the limits of a social constructionist and post-structural orientation to my work, both 
as a counsellor/counsellor educator and as a researcher, and (2) I am excited and intrigued by the 
possibilities a posthuman ontology may offer me in my research and in counsellor education 
practices for coming to know differently and in doing so producing knowledge which centres issues 
of responsibility and ethics in reconfiguring worlds. As Karen Barad (2007) says “each moment is 
alive with different possibilities for the world’s becoming and different reconfigurings of what may 
yet be possible” and “questions of responsibility and accountability present themselves with every 
possibility” (p. 182). What follows then, in addressing the two reasons stated above, is an ongoing 
reconfiguring of ontology, a coming to know the nature of world differently, in posthumanist terms, 
and in doing so a rethinking of the possibilities for what it might mean to produce this thesis, to 
be/come a counsellor and to consider the pedagogical implications as a counsellor educator.   
I have started to outline above the beginnings of thinking with posthumanism in terms of a shift in 
focus from the primarily linguistic nature of social constructionism and poststructuralism in the 
constitution of subjectivity and production of knowledge, to firstly recognising the non-human or 
more-than-human14 entangled forces also at play, outside of the anthropocentric imaginary (Asberg, 
Koobak & Johnson, 2011). What follows now, is an attempt to outline this move from social 
constructionism and poststructuralism, or from the linguistic turn to what is being called, by some, 
the “material turn”, overlapping also with the terms “new materialism”, and “material feminism” 
(Alaimo & Hekman, 2008b), which I understand to be a particular feminist model or approach to 
develop out of the broader framework of posthumanism.  Indeed, Karen Barad has been labelled a 
“material post-human feminist” (Herbrechter, 2013) and it is with these particular words, and 
ensuing meanings, in mind that I wish to proceed. However, I think it is also relevant to keep in 
                                                          






mind that while it is my intention to provide a comprehensive understanding of posthuman new 
material feminist philosophy, in particular Karen Barad’s agential realism framework, I am doing 
this in order that I am able to produce knowledge, and think with this particular theory with data 
generated with my research participants, not to outline an argument on the history of philosophical 
thought.      
Thus, while posthumanism recognises “a qualitative shift in our thinking about what exactly is the 
basic unit of common reference for our species, our polity and our relationship to the other 
inhabitants of this planet” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 2) and thus offers a serious challenge to the taken for 
granted status of the human, where the humanist assumption of  the “figure of Man” naturally 
stands at the centre of all things, material feminisms offers a particular rethinking within this, of 
the body and other materialities, and how these intermingle with meaning (Asberg et al. 2011, 
Alaimo & Hekman, 2008b). Central to both (posthumanism and material feminisms) is a reworking 
of dualisms, but in particular, of the social constructionist assumptions which hold in place a binary 
opposition of the “categorical distinction between the given (nature) and the constructed (culture)” 
(Braidotti, 2013, p. 2). While the linguistic and discursive turns, with their focus on the role of 
language in the constitution of social reality, have been vastly productive, in particular for 
challenging universal, positivist, taken for granted ways of knowing and knowledges, and for 
feminism, with its focus on connections between language, power, subjectivity and knowledge in 
understanding gender and other “volatile markings” (Alaimo & Hekman, 2008a, p. 1) such as age, 
culture, class and sexuality, these “turns” have now been noted to also have limitations.  
A discussion of these limitations comes both from the material feminist literature (e.g. Alaimo & 
Hekman, 2008b) and from the feminist science studies of Haraway and Barad. Stacy Alaimo and 
Susan Hekman, in Material Feminisms (2008a), summarise the bringing back of the materiality or 





been a turn toward the body as entirely constructed within discourse, which partly marks the 
feminist turn toward materialism. This is in no way a turning away from the discursive, rather, it 
marks a time to foreground, along with discourse, the very material forces of bodies, such as pain, 
pleasure, corporeal lived experience, biology, disease and so on. In a similar way, just as social 
constructionism has led to the dichotomizing of the material and the discursive, at the expense of 
the material, so too has this occurred with the nature-culture and real-constructed binaries. Donna 
Haraway’s work offers significant transformations on the category of nature, shifting it from an 
object to be reified, possessed and appropriated, an “essence to be saved or violated” (2008a, p. 
158), and a seemingly stable and material reality, to a force, a lively partner, a technology which 
“mutates into its binary opposite, culture and vice versa, and in such a way as to displace the entire 
nature/culture (and sex/gender) dialectic with a new discursive field…” (p. 172).  
Social constructionism, in its, some would say necessary, move to challenge realism and to show 
science and knowledge as socially constructed, has shifted the bulk of attention onto cultural factors 
(Barad, 1996). As Barad points out, 
(t)o be fair, this is where the burden of proof has been placed: social constructivists have 
been responding to the challenge to demonstrate the falsity of the worldview that takes 
science as the mirror of nature. Nonetheless, as both the range and sophistication of 
constructivist arguments have grown, the charge that they embrace an equally extreme 
position – that science mirrors culture – has been levied against them with increasing 
vigour” (1996, p. 162). 
 
This move to centre language, culture, the discursive, and social constructs in our research practices 
and our understandings of reality as therefore constructed and situated in the milieu of these very 
cultural, social, historical and discursive practices has necessarily meant a denying of observable, 
knowable, realities and truths. As a feminist science scholar, and an admitted social constructivist 





“there is a need to elaborate further upon the crafting of ontologies. We need to understand the 
technologies by which nature and culture interact …I seek some way of trying to understand the 
nature of interplay of the material and the cultural in the crafting of an ontology (1996, p. 163-
164).”  Acknowledging that she is not the first to seek to articulate a position which rejects the 
extremes of the “objectivist, subjectivist, absolutist, and relativist stances” (p. 165), Barad identifies 
the theories of science generated by other feminist science scholars, including Haraway’s (1988) 
theory of situated knowledges (a key influence for Barad), who also reject both extremes of 
objectivism and epistemological relativism and the attempts of both to deny the embodiment of 
knowledge claims. As Haraway puts it, in clearly laying out the move from objectivity to 
relativism, or “from hostile science” to “multiple personality disorder”,  
I, and others, started out wanting a strong tool for deconstructing the truth claims of hostile 
science by showing the radical historical specificity, and so contestability, of every layer of 
the onion of scientific and technological constructions, and we end up with a kind of 
epistemological electroshock therapy, which far from ushering us into the high stakes tables 
of the game of contesting public truths, lays us out on the table with self-induced multiple 
personality disorder” (1988, p. 578). 
 
Haraway pursued her desire for a feminist version of objectivity, one which rejects both the 
disembodied ““view from nowhere”, the “God trick” of infinite passive vision, and the equally 
irresponsible relativist “view from everywhere”, posing embodied sight” through her theory of 
situated knowledges, or “view from somewhere” (Barad, 1996, p. 180). This view represents a 
feminist, rational objectivity which portrays a still embodied and partial, but also accountable and 
responsible positioning. “Science”, for Haraway, becomes about producing better, more 
responsible, accounts of the world, in a world which is understood as lively, active and generative. 
Her body of work has been key in influencing Barad’s work and those who use it, and in 
understanding the current move, or re-turn, to material feminisms being rapidly and prolifically 





for example, Osgood & Giugni, 2015a, b; Osgood, Giugni & Bhopal, 2016; Asberg, Thiele & van 
der Tuin, 2015; Hughes & Lury, 2013)15.   
Thus, I too, find my ontology on the move, unable to resist now the pull of the world and all of its 
materiality in experimenting with what it might mean to explore and produce a situated, ethical, 
responsible, better account of the world, and of a world which is lively, where bodies and 
materialities exert force and agency, yet not in ways which are separate from the 
semiotic/discursive. It is my aim to attempt this in my own material-discursive encounters with 
participants, with data, with theory in this research, and in my production of the text. This is not a 
return to materialism, but a re-turn of material-discursive practices, that in order to fully (or more 
partially) think through, and with, I now turn to Barad.   
Agential-realism: a framework of post-human performativity or how material-discursive 
practices matter 
I show that an empirically accurate understanding of scientific practice, one that is 
consonant with the latest scientific research, strongly suggests a fundamental inseparability 
of epistemological, ontological, and ethical considerations. In particular, I propose 
“agential-realism” as an epistemological-ontological-ethical framework that provides an 
understanding of the role of human and nonhuman, material and discursive, and natural 
and cultural factors in scientific and other social-material practices, thereby moving such 
considerations beyond the well-worn debates that pit constuctivism against realism, agency 
against structure, and idealism against materialism…(this) entails a rethinking of 
fundamental concepts that support such binary thinking, including the notions of matter, 
                                                          
15 Osgood and colleagues are inspired by Donna Haraway’s work to think differently, with posthumanism and 
materiality, about the regulation and governance of gender in early childhood, about motherhoods, and about 
quality in early childhood education;  Asberg et al. consider ontology in the overlaps and clashes of feminist 
materialist genealogies and object-oriented ontology, and centre Haraway’s seminal works in their consideration of 
“material-semiotic world-making practices”  (p. 165); Hughes and Lury re-turn to Haraway and her concept of 





discourse, causality, agency, power, identity, embodiment, objectivity, space, and time 
(Barad, 2007, p. 25-26). 
The fact that Barad draws on insights from some of the “best scientific and social theories, 
including quantum physics, science studies, the philosophy of physics, feminist theory, critical race 
theory, post-colonial theory, (post)-Marxist theory and post-structuralist theory” (2007, p. 25) in 
her feminist interrogation of notions of both identity and science (Barad, 1996), makes her ethico-
onto-epistemological agential-realist framework necessarily complex and comprehensive, as well 
as increasingly generative amongst a wide range of disciplines, not least education (e.g. Lenz 
Taguchi, 2010; Ringrose & Rawlings, 2015; Taylor & Ivinson, 2013). My aim here, therefore, is 
to attempt to produce an account of her framework through which I articulate my own knowing-
in-being of her onto-epistemological framework, that can be seen both as productive for thinking 
the production of knowledge in this thesis as a post-humanist performative account, and for my 
theorising of the data, or thinking with theory in my data analysis.    
Barad has situated her framework as a “post-humanist performative account”, citing that such a 
labelling could be seen as a potentially diffractive elaboration of Judith Butler’s (1993, 1997) 
notion of performativity, as words, concepts, nouns not as static descriptions or representations but 
as incessant and repeated actions, as “doing”, (e.g. gender) and Donna Haraway’s crucial insights 
which destabilize the boundaries between human/non-human, material/semiotic and nature/culture 
(Barad, 2003). Crucially, Barad’s elaboration of these insights involves a “post-humanist notion of 
performativity” (2003, p. 808) which offers an account of the causal nature of the relationship 
between discursive practices and material phenomena, between human and non-human forms of 
agency, as productive practices through which specific boundaries are enacted in an ongoing, 
dynamic (re)configuring of the world. This is a performativity which understands “thinking, 
observing and theorizing as practices of engagement with, and as part of, the world in which we 





Bohr’s physics and the objectivity of ‘phenomena’ 
In developing this agential-realist ontology, Barad, a physicist herself, particularly draws on the 
philosophy-physics writings of physicist Niels Bohr, who won the Nobel Prize for his quantum 
model of the atom, and his epistemological framework which offers a radical challenge to 
“Cartesian epistemology and its representationalist triadic structure of words, knowers, and things” 
(Barad, 2003, p. 813). Having read much of Barad’s, and of those using Barad’s, work over the 
previous few years, I have come to appreciate the marrying of physics with philosophical and 
methodological thinking, although appreciate the leap this may require for the reader on first 
encounter. As Barad says, the “foundation issues in quantum physics…serve as a testing ground 
for long-standing philosophical quandaries, including some of those most central to 
metaphysicians,  philosophers of science, and poststructuralists alike, such as the nature of identity, 
being, meaning, and causality” (2007, p. 248-249), all of which are central to the questions of 
counsellor-in-training identity of this thesis.   
Bohr rejected the “atomistic” ontology which claims “things” as entities with determinate 
boundaries and properties, and subjects, objects, knowers and known as having pre-existing, 
inherent distinctions. However, while also rejecting the notion that language and measurement 
mediate access to an independently existing reality, he nevertheless developed an epistemology 
which held onto the possibility of the real, or of objective knowledge. It is this notion of ‘realism’ 
which Barad also holds onto in further developing Bohr’s insights into her own onto-
epistemological framework as an account of, among other things, the “conditions for objectivity... 
(and) the role of natural as well as cultural factors in scientific knowledge production…” (Barad, 
1996, p. 168). It is my aim now to begin with an attempt at a summary of some key aspects of the 
Bohr’s physics as interpreted by Barad, who has studied and drawn upon his work for more than 





ultimately thinking my data with Barad’s framework, which I go on to do in this thesis. As Barad 
says “it would be just as dishonest to attribute the full development of this framework (agential 
realism) to Bohr as it would be to deny that my thinking about Bohr’s philosophy-physics is 
everywhere present in my formulation” (2007, p. 123). 
I want to start with the physics, as this is the epistemology on which Barad draws, as a basis for the 
development of her onto-epistemology, or the inseparability of one from the other, and having 
some understanding of this, I think, aids in both understanding and using the new, and complex 
concepts her framework offers, such as intra-action. As a physicist, Barad has turned to quantum 
mechanics and the work, in particular of Niels Bohr, as stated above, who was a physicist of the 
same era as Einstein, and made significant contributions to the long historical debate of the 
wave/particle paradox and the nature of light and matter. What interests Barad are the implications 
of the findings and interpretations made by Bohr in relation to the philosophy of science, to the 
eternal questions we ask about both what is the nature of reality, and how can we go about finding 
this out. Indeed, ultimately Barad concludes that there are clear parallels between Bohr’s 
methodology and feminist and other located-knowledge methodologies (Barad, 1996). Put simply, 
if that is possible, the wave/particle duality paradox became evident firstly as a feature of light and 
shortly after was also shown to be a feature of matter. The paradox was that light, and matter, 
appeared able, under different experimental conditions, to exhibit features of either particles or 
waves, which are in fact mutually exclusive concepts. One, significant, interpretation to this was, 
that there was no inherent, or essential, essence or reality to light or matter, but rather, the features 
they exhibited were in some way dependent upon the surrounding conditions with which they 
interacted. Particles are described as “localised objects that occupy a given location at each moment 
in time.” Waves, on the other hand, mean that light would be described as consisting of “objects 





that move along a stretch of beach: and furthermore, different waves can overlap…and occupy the 
same position at any moment of time, unlike particles” (Barad, 1996, p. 178).   
It was clear that light and matter could not exhibit features of both waves and particles at once, 
these being mutually exclusive. While classical realists searched for some unifying explanation 
(which was not to come), Bohr adopted a new approach examining the circumstances under which 
these distinct features were produced, eventually leading to his theory of complementarity. As 
Barad interprets, for Bohr, “concepts are defined by the circumstances required for their 
measurement. That is, theoretical concepts are not ideational in character; they are specific physical 
arrangements... measurement and description (the physical and the conceptual) entail each other 
(…in the sense of their mutual epistemological implication)” (2007, p. 109, italics in original).   
In this way, observations then, cannot claim to refer to objects of an independent reality and Bohr 
refers to this inseparability as ““quantum wholeness”, or the lack of an inherent/Cartesian 
distinction between the “object” and the “agencies of observation””. Particular instances of this 
“single situation” interaction or “non-dualistic whole” are referred to by Bohr as a “phenomenon” 
(Barad, 1996, p. 170). Thus, unambiguous accounts of a phenomenon must include a description 
of all relevant features of the experimental arrangement - any meaning made, or theory developed, 
is inseparable from the physical arrangement in which the effects occurred. As a result, says Barad 
“method, measurement, description, interpretation, epistemology, and ontology are not separable 
considerations” (1996, p. 173).   
What is real then becomes not some fixed notion of things existing prior to signification, nor of 
things as only constituted in language, but reality as composed of “things-in-phenomena” (Barad, 
1996, p. 176). Such things consist of non-dualistic or inseparable measurement practices or 
physical arrangements of apparatus, agencies of observation, and “permanent marks…left on 





conditions of possibility for objectivity, for knowledge, and knowledge (ontology) only obtains its 
meaning in relation to the physical conditions of its possibility (epistemology).  I don’t think this 
new idea can be understated, as just as the differing physical apparatus in the scientific experiments 
did not reveal the underlying nature of light but rather interacted to produce the effect of light as 
either wave or a particle, so too is knowledge not revealed, but only exists in, inseparable, relation 
to that which produces it. These ideas underpin Barad’s onto-epistemological framework of 
agential realism – there is an objective reality (realism), but the most basic unit of this is not things, 
rather it is phenomena (things in in-separable relation), and “the nature of (this) observed 
phenomena changes with corresponding changes in apparatus” (agential) (Barad, 2007, p. 106). 
What this means for my work will hopefully become more apparent as I go on to think through and 
with my data and the issue of the production of identity in the area of counselling training, in 
relation to Barad’s theory. At this point, my intention is to firstly situate my onto-epistemology for 
my thesis, and the production of knowledge in this agential-realist framework, such that knowledge 
which emerges here is seen as inseparable from my own agency of observation, from the methods 
used, the descriptions employed, and the interpretations made. Knowledge is situated within this 
entanglement that is phenomena. Thus, for now, having introduced these key ideas of Bohr’s and 
Barad’s, I now wish to move more particularly onto Barad’s framework of agential-realism (or 
how material-discursive practices matter), in which she has incorporated further ideas, as I have 
previously said, from post-structuralism, feminist theory, critical race theory, post-colonial theory, 
and (post)-Marxist theory.   
Material-discursive practices matter – coming to an onto-epistemology 
Material-discursive-(super)vision 
A fantail rests on the table 





its flight sweeps through me. 
A piwakawaka 
becomes monarch, 
both vessels  
of dead living love. 
 
Porous boundaries leaking 
In/animate flux, 
me-you-boys-who’ve- gone 
but will (not) leave 
marks on bodies that 
will not erase. 
 
The above poem was written after a counselling-supervision encounter and during a period of 
intense reading of Barad’s work. Looking back on it now, I already understand what I wrote in a 
different way. The experience which is written about is not abstract, is not solely constituted 
through language or in some internal experience, but is a material-discursive product of the 
inseparable entanglement of bodies, of coffee cups, images, meanings and experiences of fantails 
and monarchs, and of loss, as past and present, and physical and sensory and discursive.  
It is not enough to leave this onto-epistemology there, however. We have brought the material 
(back) into a central relational position in the production of knowledge, as other posthumanist 
theories are seemingly also doing, (see, for example, Deleuze and Guatarri’s (1987) notion of the 
assemblage or Latour’s (2005) Actor Network Theory), however, as Barad identifies, Bohr’s 
epistemological, proto-performative theory does not go far enough for her in his articulation of it. 
In particular, she identifies the lack of a clear articulation of the nature of ‘apparatus’ and his 
seeming reinsertion of the liberal humanist subject as experimenter standing outside observing the 
“resulting marks on bodies” (2007, p. 153). The fact is that this (Barad’s) onto-epistemology is not 





assembling together to produce different effects, as observed by a separate knowing subject. This 
is about not taking separateness, or boundaries, or difference, as an inherent feature of the world, 
as fixed or given, nor simply as the end result of certain processes, but rather, about what 
differences might come to matter when inseparability and accountability are the onto-
epistemological starting points. 
Given the complexity and detail of this onto-epistemology (see, for example, Barad’s (2007) 500 
page book in which she outlines it), and the focus of this thesis, it is my hope to proceed with this 
explanation which might suffice for laying the foundations of this posthumanist performative 
ontology here, while also recognising that I will be returning to it in my thinking through the 
subjectivity of counsellors-in-training and what such a theory might offer both for them and for 
counsellor education. There are, therefore, three key developments which build on Bohr’s 
beginnings, which I think are essential to address here in outlining further key components of 
Barad’s onto-epistemology. These are (1) the nature of apparatuses as specific material-discursive 
practices which are more than laboratory instruments or social forces that produce differential 
effects; (2) human subjects as neither outside observers of apparatuses (e.g. social forces) nor 
“independent subjects that intervene in the workings of an apparatus, nor the products of social 
technologies that produce them” (Barad, 2007, p. 171) but as part of, and participating in, the 
entangled world-body space in its dynamic reconfiguring, and (3) agency, and an ethics of 
responsibility, not as either aligned with human intentionality or distributed over human and non-
human forms, but as an enactment of a material-discursive practice, of specific materializations, 
not that we choose or determine, but which we participate in enacting.  First, an overview of the 
nature of phenomena in Barad’s agential realist framework is useful. 
From Bohr, we know that phenomena are the ontological inseparability/entanglement of objects 
and apparatus, the boundaries and properties of which only become determinate (meaningful) 





existent meaning, but rather this meaning only becomes determinate through particular 
arrangements or enactments. In her theory of agential-realism, Barad says “phenomena do not 
merely mark the epistemological inseparability of “observer” and “observed”; rather, phenomena 
are the ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting “components”” (Barad, 2003, p. 815). 
This new notion of intra-action among components is key to her framework and stands in contrast 
to the usual ‘interaction’, underscoring a profound conceptual shift. Interacting components, such 
as human and non-human forces, observers and observed, measuring devices and objects would 
suggest the interaction of independent, pre-existing, separate entities. Intra-action, on the other 
hand, delineates the ontological inseparability of these entities, the non-dualistic nature, with the 
emergence of their boundaries and properties only becoming determinate through the larger 
material arrangement (material practices). “Intra-actions enact agential separability – the local 
condition of exteriority -within phenomena” (Barad, 2003, p. 815). That is, without the ontological 
pre-existent exteriority between components (subjects and objects), the notion of intra-action 
provides the conditions for the possibility of objectivity, known by Barad as the making of “agential 
cuts”. The agential cut enacts a resolution (objectivity) of the otherwise indeterminate and intra-
acting “relata-within-phenomena” (Barad, 2007, p. 140). An intra-action cuts ‘things’ together and 
apart. Moreover, this also entails a reworking of causality. Cause and effect only become 
determined through agential cuts, the agential cut enacts a causal structure in phenomena. These 
do not stand still, however, but are merely a part of the ongoing reconfiguring of the world.   
I am helped to understand the complexity of this account by moving out from the finer details to a 
broader account of the implications for the ontological becoming of the world. Quantum theory, 
and hence agential realism, does not hold human concepts, human knowledge, and indeed humans 
as foundational elements. These “things”, or phenomena, are merely a part of the world’s ongoing, 
dynamic and intra-active becoming, emerging as specific configurations, articulations, in its 





exist as a result of, and as part of, the world’s ongoing intra-activity, its dynamic and contingent 
differentiation into specific relationalities.” (Barad, 2007, p. 353). How this happens is important. 
While we, humans, do not determine, or will, or have pure agency (or cause) in the determining of 
the world, neither are we pure effect, simply receivers of, or spectators to, its unfolding, in and 
around us. According to agential realism, “through our advances, we participate in bringing forth 
the world in its specificity, including ourselves. We have to meet the universe halfway, to move 
toward what may come to be in ways that are accountable for our part in the world’s differential 
becoming” (Barad, 2007, p. 353).     
The implications of this are many, not least for accounts of objectivity – where the line between 
subject and object is not fixed, or pre-existent to particular practices of their engagement – and for 
our own accountability in the ongoing and entangled practices of the reconfiguring of the world, 
which is what I propose this thesis to be, and do. I return now to what I see as three key 
developments in Barad’s framework which move her account beyond Bohr’s, and which provide 
further understanding of phemomena and the nature of their intra-acting subjects, objects and 
apparatuses.   
Material-discursive practices or the nature of an apparatus 
Barad’s theory encompasses a particular posthuman form of performativity, examining the 
practices through which differential boundaries are stabilized and destabilized, whether in the 
formation of knowledge, the materialisation of bodies (human and non-human) or the production 
of the subject, hence its usefulness for this thesis. As she says, “there is a host of material-discursive 
forces— including ones that get labelled “social,” “cultural,” “psychic,” “economic,” “natural,” 
“physical,” “biological,” “geopolitical,” and “geological”— that may be important to particular 
(entangled) processes of materialization” (2003, p. 810). These are the very apparatuses Bohr refers 





broad framework to account for the ongoing reconfiguring of all materializations. An 
understanding of apparatuses then, as material-discursive practices, refers to the practice or 
enactment through which boundaries are constituted, or agential cuts are made. They are not mere 
lab instruments or social forces which act in a performative way. Nor are they merely the material 
or physical or social device or force set in place to produce differential outcomes. They are not 
fixed or static arrangements operating in the world. I find it helpful, as Barad does, to start with the 
scientific practice and follow where she leads in coming to understand what then, apparatuses 
actually are, in an agential realist sense. 
In thinking with Bohr we came to see that the nature of reality is not fixed but rather it is in part 
constituted by the very physical arrangement (or apparatus) through which we view it.  That is, the 
conceptual-discursive emerges in relation to the physical apparatus. Barad points out that, even in 
science, “apparatuses are not preformed interchangeable objects that sit atop a shelf waiting to 
serve a particular purpose”, (2003, p. 816) rather, they themselves are phenomena, “constituted 
through particular practices that are perpetually open to rearrangements, rearticulations, and other 
reworkings” (p. 817). Furthermore, they are always in the process of intra-acting with other 
apparatuses, with time, and space, that result in the production of new phenomena: “boundaries do 
not sit still” (p. 817). However, what seems key to come back to, in this scientific complexity, is 
that, in Barad’s elaboration of Bohr’s work, “apparatuses are the material conditions of possibility 
and impossibility of mattering; they enact what matters and what is excluded from 
mattering…(they) enact agential cuts” (Barad, 2007, p. 148). They are discursive/boundary-making 
practices – “specific material (re)configurings (of the world) through which “objects” and 
“subjects” are produced…(and) through which the determination of boundaries, properties, and 
meanings is differentially enacted” (p. 148, italics in original). They are the practices through which 





Barad notes both concord and discord between Foucault’s account of discursive practices and 
Bohr’s account of apparatuses, and draws on Foucault in elaborating her own agential-realist 
framework. She notes that for Foucault, discursive practices are the “local socio-historical material 
conditions that enable and constrain disciplinary knowledge practices such as speaking, writing, 
thinking, calculating, measuring, filtering, and concentrating. (They) produce, rather than merely 
describe, the subjects and objects of knowledge practices” (Barad, 2007, p. 147). Apparatuses, as 
material conditions, in a similar way are productive of the phenomena produced. However, through 
Bohr, Barad notes a much more mutually intimate (ontologically inseparable / intra-active) 
relationship between concepts and materiality, matter and meaning, the material and the discursive, 
which also “calls into question the dualisms of object-subject, knower-known, nature-culture, and 
word-world” (p. 147). In this framework what was once identified as separate “things” is now in-
articulable in the absence of the other.   
Regardless of difference here, both accounts (Foucault and Barad) continue to reject the humanist 
notion of meaning as equating to utterances emerging from the consciousness of a unified subject, 
instead insisting on meaning as always emerging from (constrained by) a local, immanent field of 
(material) possibilities. Meaning (as discursive practices) here is not embedded within a word or a 
group of words, but is “an ongoing performance of the (material-discursive) world in its differential 
dance of intelligibility and unintelligibility” (p. 149). In this way, a genealogical accounting of the 
material-discursive practices through which certain boundaries or divisions are enacted, becomes 
possible, as is the aim in part of this research. That is, to perform, or show, as much as possible the 
multiple material-discursive forces through which the knowledge of this thesis is produced, 
recognising it as knowledge-in-the-making, a knowing-in-being, whereby the knowledge produced 
is inseparable from the apparatus of its production. I also explore the material-discursive practices 





in-training subjectivities, and ask what part the ‘human subject’ plays in all of this, if neither solely 
the cause nor the effect of such mattering.    
Human subjects as part of an ongoing performance 
Barad highlights an ambiguity in Bohr’s articulation of the human knowing subject, one which 
seems to follow us through all social constructivist and postmodern knowledge accounts. That is, 
she notes that on the one hand Bohr’s experimenter appears able to act as an outside observer to 
the effects of his experiment, choosing the apparatus and noting the results, like a liberal human 
knowing subject. However, Bohr also articulates a position which denies the Cartesian 
presupposition of an inherent boundary between observer and observed, knower and known. As 
Barad states “(h)uman concepts are clearly embodied (in physical arrangements) but human 
subjects seem to be frustratingly and ironically disembodied” (2007, p. 154). In part, she concedes, 
Bohr’s focus was on laboratory measurements, rather than on the wider ontological implications 
of quantum theory, and in particular for notions of the human in the production of knowledge. It is 
this aspect which Barad reworks in her theory, in part continuing to draw on Bohr’s initial 
epistemology. It is important to note here that while some objections have been made in relation to 
a “problem of ‘scale’ in considering Barad’s insights from quantum physics, in relation to processes 
of subjectification that take place within everyday human and nonhuman life” (Juelskjaer, 2013, p. 
755), Barad refutes this, through her posthumanist stance, as merely a result of the familiar classical 
mindset which privileges the position of man as apart from all others, as separateness as the 
condition for objectivity. Fittingly, her posthumanist stance asks: “should not the “human” be 
accounted for in terms of the theory and the specific intra-actions from which it emerges, rather 
than the other way around?” (2007, p. 323). As she aligns her theory with other physicists, such as 
Mermin, who suggest “(t)o restrict quantum mechanics to be exclusively about piddling laboratory 





outside the laboratory (1998, p. 756 cited in Barad, 2007, p. 323), so too, do those who believe the 
new thinking this translation makes possible to be worth the effort (e.g. Juelskjaer, 2013).   
In this accounting for the human, Barad thus goes on to review many of the challenges to this 
individualistic conception of human bodies, and its presumption of pre-existent bodily boundaries, 
as a lead in to her own clarification of Bohr’s seeming ambiguity in her own agential-realist 
framework. Indeed, she comes to the conclusion that the twentieth century has been witness to 
significant scientific, philosophical, anthropological and experimental contestations of this taken 
for granted view, and that it has become clear that the nature of bodily, and other material, 
boundaries is actually a “result of the repetition of (culturally and historically) specific bodily 
performance” (2007, p. 155). In her post-human performative account, human bodies then are 
constituted along with, and as part of, the world, rather than pre-existing in the world. In this way, 
she says, the body’s materiality is an entanglement, in the quantum sense, which is always in the 
making. Bodies and subjects, just as with apparatuses, are not static, predetermined individuals 
exerting knowing or influence over the world. They do not ‘hold’ values or beliefs which they must 
attempt to make known in order to do their utmost to prevent these from influencing ‘results’. This 
thinking, says Barad, continues to reify culture and nature and gender and science into different 
categories when, in fact, the social and the scientific are co-constituted, made together, as ongoing, 
open-ended, entangled, material-discursive practices. Humans, in this framework then, are 
dynamic too, they do not enter (scientific) practices as “fully formed, pre-existing subjects but as 
subjects intra-actively co-constituted through the material-discursive practices that they engage in” 
(Barad, 2007, p. 168).   
My attempts throughout this work are to show, as much as possible, the ongoing and entangled co-
constitution of my subjectivity (as one always in the making) through these material-discursive 
research practices rather than to attempt to lay out any pre-existing or static notion of who I am, of 





dynamic, open-ended and entangled co-constituting of the counsellor-in-training, recognising that 
any mapping (agential cuts)  is necessarily entangled with my own researcher-in-the-making 
subjectivity and any apparatuses/material-discursive research practices I employ. All matter 
(bodies, words, documents, all materiality) in this sense is “a dynamic intra-active becoming that 
never sits still…(and) is generative not merely in the sense of bringing new things into the world 
but in the sense of bringing forth new worlds, of engaging in an ongoing reconfiguring of the 
world” (Barad, 2007, p. 170). This last point brings me to my third of Barad’s key developments 
in her framework – that of ethics and accountability in this always and ongoing reconfiguring of 
the world.  
Agency, accountability and ethics 
When there is so much entangled in this dynamic reconfiguring of the world, the question of agency 
and accountability for how these new worlds get reconfigured arises. Humanist accounts of 
research findings speak of human bias, actions, choices, values, beliefs and so on, and of making 
these explicit so as to set their influence aside, through bracketing (e.g. Pierce, 2016). Inherent in 
such accounts is the notion of the bounded, pre-existing, separate, individual containing such 
properties which, when made explicit, are able to be removed from ‘biasing’ or exerting undue 
influence over the production of real accounts of knowledge. Accountability is produced through 
this process of accounting for inherent, fixed and self-contained values and beliefs. Poststructural 
accounts suggest that human bodies are subjected to discourse or are produced through discursive 
practices and agency/power is typically to be found in deconstruction. In research practices, 
accountability is often attended to through practices of methodological reflexivity, which I discuss 
in depth in the following chapter. In Barad’s account, however, agency, and thus accountability, is 
found within neither the human nor language/culture. That is, “the phenomena produced are not 





Language or Power” (2007, p. 171).  Where then does this leave the role of human practices and 
what does this mean for ethical accountability in our knowledge-making research practices? 
As has already been stated, humans are an intra-active part of the ongoing reconfiguring of the 
world, albeit we ourselves are also an ongoing reconfiguring; although we do not make it so, we 
do participate in what may come to be. Agency, in this agential realist account, is not something 
we (or indeed non-humans) have or do not have. How can it be when, by this account, there is no 
determinate separability of entities prior to their intra-action? Agency, and accountability, is not 
restricted to the realm of human action, though nor is it, in this post-humanist account, simply now 
dispersed across human and non-human forms. Agency is, “crucially” says Barad, “a matter of 
intra-acting; it is an enactment; not something that someone or something has… (It) is “doing” or 
“being” in its intra-activity…it is…iterative reconfigurings of topological manifolds of 
spacetimematter relations – through the dynamics of intra-activity” (2007, p. 178). What I think is 
perhaps even more crucial about this is what Barad says next. “Agency is about changing 
possibilities of change entailed in reconfiguring material-discursive apparatuses of bodily 
production, including the boundary articulations and exclusions that are marked by those practices 
in the enactment of a causal structure” (p. 178). The cuts that are made, the boundaries that are 
enacted, which are productive of phenomena, which matter, in ongoing knowledge production, are 
open to particular and changing possibilities at every moment and open up possibilities for change. 
It is in these differing possibilities that Barad says lies an ethical responsibility for the world’s 
becoming, “to contest and rework what matters and what is excluded from mattering” (2007, p. 
178).   
We, as researchers, participate in boundary making, in marking what gets excluded, in making 
marks on bodies and in enacting matter, we are an “agential part of the material becoming of the 
universe” (p. 178), or the material production of knowledge. Accountability and ethics then means 





separate, and outside of the self. ““(T)hey” and “we” are co-constituted and entangled through the 
very cuts “we” help to enact” (p. 179). How such cuts come to be made, how such differences 
differ, is a matter of intra-activity, in which we participate in making the cuts, in cutting ““things” 
together and apart” (p. 179). Thankfully, such cuts are never enacted once and for all, that is, 
possibilities for change, and as such, responsibility and accountability, for the remaking of 
material-discursive boundaries, are always present and open.   
At this point in my articulation of this ethico-onto-epistemology, this accounting for agency and 
ethics, and for the cuts that I will make, relate for me to my role in participating in the production 
of the knowledge-in-the-making in this thesis-phenomenon. I think, now, not of my participants as 
“other”, nor of myself as an individual humanist or even post-structural researcher-subject-I. 
Rather, I understand this research process as an intra-action, as ongoing material-discursive 
practices, where “I”, my “participants” and what comes to matter are iteratively reconfigured, 
made, produced in the ongoing and dynamic research-in-the-making.  This process is one in which 
I participate, however, in making cuts, in marking bodies, and in bringing forth new worlds 
(knowledge-in-the-making). Accounting for my part in this becomes a diffractive, rather than a 
bracketing or reflexive, process, which I turn to in the following chapter.          
Spacetimemattering 
A final configuring seems necessary at this point least I leave the reader under the illusion that 
iterative reconfiguring, or change, refers to a continuous, linear process occurring in or through 
time and space. This is not what Barad intends, nor what the evidence she reads from Bohr, 
suggests. This is another twist in her framework, which offers both challenge and possibilities for 
reworking what it means to produce knowledge and for how matter comes to matter. This is 
quantum entanglement and it is best understood by a brief and final return to Bohr’s philosophy-





The quantum eraser experiment asks the question, given the resulting pattern of wave/interference 
or particle is due to the entanglement of the object and the measuring device/apparatus, might it be 
possible to restore the interference pattern by “undoing” or “erasing” the which-path detection16. 
What this experiment once again confirmed was the ontological priority of phenomena over 
inherently separate “things”. What is even more interesting about the quantum eraser experiment 
is what is says about time, pasts, presents, and futures. From these experiments, Barad concludes 
that,  
it’s not that the experimenter changes a past that had already been present, or that atoms 
fall in line with a new future simply by erasing information. The point is that the past was 
never simply there to begin with and the future is not simply what will unfold; the “past” 
and the “future” are iteratively reworked and enfolded through the iterative practices of 
spacetimemattering…all are one phenomenon… Space and time are phenomenal, that is, 
they are intra-actively produced in the making of phenomena…” (2007, p. 315).   
This is a difficult notion to make sense of, being contrary to traditional and dominant 
understandings of the linearity of time and our existence as individual entities in space.  However, 
I think it has useful and important implications worth pursuing in the theorising of counsellor-in-
training subjectivities-in-the-making and indeed for processes of counselling and change itself. 
“Becoming is not an unfolding in time” and the notion of discontinuity means that “changes do not 
follow in a continuous fashion from a prior state or origin, nor do they follow some teleological 
trajectory – there are no trajectories” (p. 181). Agency, in this “spacetimemattering”, becomes a 
larger space of possibilities and entails possibilities for “discontinuous” changes in the “topology 
of the world’s becoming” (p. 182). Intra-actions continually reconfigure what is possible, and 
questions of accountability and responsibility present themselves with each moment of 
                                                          
16 A full explanation of the physics of this seems beyond what is necessary for this purpose, however, I think it is 
useful to once again, situate Barad’s framework in the original experiments she draws on. As she says, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the laws of quantum mechanics apply only to the restricted domain of microscopic 





reconfiguring. Seeing the production of knowledge here as a discontinuous one, regardless of the 
presentation of chapters in linear form, as a spacetimemattering, not as a continuous unfolding, 
invites the reader to engage with it in a similar way, with the expectation that further entanglements 
with readers, time and space will be productive in other ways, opening up still further possibilities 







CHAPTER FOUR  
From methodological reflexivity to diffraction 
Post-modern nausea 
Bamboozled by some claims 
of post-modernism, where doubt 
seeps in under every doorway. 
We take nothing for granted, 
no knowledge is truth, 
simplicity is mired in complexity, 
the complex oh so simple. 
The residence of the I is many, 
in here, out there, in between, 
multiple selves, true self, false self, 
one world, no self. 
Illusions, fantasies, defences. 
Us and them, I and thou, me and you, 
all one. 
 
My seeing is partial 
My knowing is momentary 
My holding on is tenuous 
as each truth gradually, slowly 
succumbs to the next, 
merging like earth and water 
into mud. 
Existentialism, spiritualism, economics. 
Therapy, religion, materialism. 





Love, intellect, presence. 
The way is rocky, hazardous, 
the air is murky and grey, 
it is difficult to see beyond 
where I am, beyond this obsession 
with I, with its incessant demands for  
coherence, consistency, certainty, 
and freedom. 
 
My stomach is nauseous 
from throwing up its contents 
I cannot digest 
this choosing, or not, of one. 
Where am I in this research? How do I fold in and out of this whole process? And how do I say something 
on this page that will tell a story, represent something about that when as I write the very words, it is all 
shifting and moving again?  (Researcher journal)  
 
I think my problem and “our” problem is how to have simultaneously an account of radical 
historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice 
for recognizing our own “semiotic technologies” for making meanings, and a no nonsense 
commitment to faithful accounts of a “real” world, one that can be partially shared and 
friendly to earth-wide projects of finite freedom, adequate material abundance, modest 
meaning in suffering, and limited happiness.  
      (Haraway, 1988, p. 579) 
In this chapter I return to methodology, agency and accountability in our research practices, in 
order to consider issues arising in relation to the shifting ontologies outlined in the previous chapter. 
As is illustrated in the poem above, I have grappled with questions of researcher positioning, 
accountability, and place in relation to emerging knowledge claims, to the point where everything 





engage with methodological practices of reflexivity, not for humanistic self-reflection and 
bracketing purposes, but as a constructivist approach enabling “an interrogation of the practices 
that constitute our accounts of the world” (Campbell, 2004, p. 163).  However, onto-
epistemological shifts to posthumanism have rendered this also no longer sufficient in 
understanding my role in the production of knowledge, and in practices of accountability.    
As such, I begin this chapter by returning to the crisis of representation in the social sciences arising 
from the ontological challenges to modernism, objectivity, foundationalism and humanism posed 
by postmodern (Richardson, 1994) and social constructionist (Burr, 1995) worldviews and feminist 
critique (Haraway, 1988), in order to understand the development of methodological practices of 
reflexivity. I do this in order to understand, and lay out, the onto-epistemological challenges 
reflexivity sought to address, in order to determine, or not, its continued usefulness. In particular I 
explore the shift in view from an objective world exposed through observation and available for 
documentation and representation through recording, naming and categorization to one made 
through social processes and interactions. In this social constructionist view, what is ‘found’ in 
research is always contingent, situated and partial. I further explore how a particular feminist 
orientation (Haraway, 2004) to research as situated and contingent knowledge making practices 
challenges also the underlying patriarchal binary structures implicit in realist, objective ontologies 
and epistemologies. Given also the notion of the multiplicity of the post-modern subject, the 
question arose as to how to attend to the legitimation of knowledge in this post-positivist social 
science era (Lather, 1993). As I outline in this chapter, a substantial response to this challenge was 
the development of practices of methodological reflexivity, my own initial choice in this research 
project.  
However, as I proceed to lay out in this chapter, methodological reflexivity is not without its own 
onto-epistemological challenges, with several researchers exposing the deep tensions in, and limits 





Barad (2007) concludes the geometric optics of reflection and associated practices of reflexivity 
actually take us no further than the traditional realist approaches we started with.  This chapter 
concludes with a discussion of what it might mean to move from this optics of reflection/practice 
of reflexivity to one of diffraction (Haraway, 1992; Barad, 2007) in our research practices. Implicit 
in this, and which I explore, is a reconceptualising also of my researcher subjectivity, which, in a 
diffractive analysis, entails a transcorporeal, embodied, becoming-with in relation to, at least, the 
data (Lenz Taguchi, 2012). In exploring this, my aim is to argue for the usefulness of a diffractive 
rather than reflexive methodology, as well to further situate this research in the broader onto-
epistemological framework of post-humanism.   
The promise of reflexivity 
The phrase ‘crisis of representation’ has been used prolifically in the human sciences to refer 
specifically to the uncertainties and tensions arising from the epistemological undoing of the 
presumed correspondence between social reality, or lived experience, and the research 
representations made of it (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln & Denzin, 2003). Arising during the 
mid-1980s (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994), this crisis reflected the analogous challenges to modernism, 
objectivity, foundationalism, and humanism. That is, a significant troubling of the previously 
assumed certainty that there is an essential objective reality which, through rigorous research 
practices, we can come to describe, know, and ultimately claim as truth. Such ontological 
challenges to our beliefs about the nature of the world and our attempts to describe it, particularly 
in the social sciences, have appeared in the forms of social constructionism (Gergen, 1985; Burr, 
1995) and post-modernism (Richardson, 1994). Whilst these terms themselves do not always have 
clear and consistent boundaries in use and definition, they are nevertheless essential to 
understanding the shifts in knowledge-making practices over the previous nearly half century. 





the real nature of the world can be exposed through observation (Burr, 1995), documented through 
recording and represented through naming and categorization.   
Instead, social constructionism and post-modernism invite us into a knowing of the world which is 
partial, situated and contingent. It is a world which is made through social processes and 
interactions (Burr, 1995), and, in which what is made (found) is contingent upon the apparatuses 
and processes used in its very knowledge-making. In this sense, knowledge claims can never equate 
to objective, universal truths, but always remain socially, culturally and historically constituted. A 
feminist orientation towards foundational and positivist worldviews incites further ethical and 
political considerations of these contingent knowledge-making practices. Donna Haraway, feminist 
science studies (FSS) scholar, suggests that it is not enough to “show radical historical contingency 
and modes of construction for everything”, that we have to go further than this and “insist on better 
accounts of the world” (Haraway, 1988, p. 579) in response to historical and ongoing practices of 
domination and oppression.   
Feminist critique of realist, objective research challenges the underlying patriarchal structures 
implicit in such research, where the researchers’ “view from nowhere” (McCarthy, 1994 in Pillow, 
2003, p. 178), also called the “God-trick” (Haraway, 1988, p. 581) creates nameless, locationless, 
invisible researcher positions which ultimately privilege and reproduce male, white, rational, 
disembodied ways of knowing and knowledges. Underpinning the practice of such objective forms 
of knowing lies the grand theory of humanism dating back to the Enlightenment period, also known 
as the Age of Reason, in which cultural and intellectual forces in Western Europe began to 
emphasize reason, analysis, and individualism (rather than God and religion) in the production of 
truth and knowledge (St. Pierre & Pillow, 2000; Pillow, 2003).   
One structure from this period which continues to underpin modern research practices, and which 





binaries, or dualisms, include, but are not limited to: subject – object; self – other; mind – body, 
male – female, knower – known; rational – emotional, civilized – primitive; truth – illusion; total 
– partial (Haraway, 2004). This dualistic structure subversively, through the invisible researcher 
positioning and objective assumptions of the realist worldview, continues to privilege the first 
position in these binaries (self/man/knower/truth) as the dominating and colonising force. That is, 
the ‘object’, the ‘other’, the ‘body’, the ‘female’ all become marked, defined, dominated, oppressed 
through an invisible patriarchal structure. The effects of humanism’s binaries are far-reaching and, 
indeed, devastating to many of those on the wrong side of the binary who “have struggled to reclaim 
and rewrite untold histories, to subvert what counts as knowledge and truth, and to challenge those 
who claim the authority to speak for them” (St-Pierre & Pillow, 2000, p. 5). The consequences of 
the former way of seeing has had profound implications, for representations of truth and for the 
perpetuation of patriarchal, Eurocentric, and ultimately oppressive, to many, ideologies.      
Given this crisis of representation, what develops also is a crisis of authority and of legitimacy.  
This led to questions about how our research practices can give better and ‘truer’ accounts of the 
world. If, as social constructionists claimed, all knowledge is constructed - socially, historically, 
and culturally; if, as feminist, postcolonial and critical theorists claimed, we need to take account 
of the position, power and authority of those speaking, then what are the conditions of the 
legitimation of knowledge in such a post-positivist social science (Lather, 1993)?  If we recognise 
the complexity and multiplicity of the post-modern subject, then how can our research methods, 
methodologies, and writing and representing strategies attempt to encompass and reflect this 
complexity? 
A substantive response to these questions has been the development of methodological practices 
of reflexivity. Indeed, Pillow (2003) notes that reflexivity is called upon in almost every qualitative 
research book or article, with qualitative researchers routinely using reflexivity to “better represent, 





work of representation. However, reflexivity, once suggested as the new canon in generating 
counter-practices of authority (Rajchman, 1985 in Lather, 1993) is not without its own challenges. 
The following section aims to discuss common practices and assumptions of methodological 
reflexivity as a response to the call of postmodernism to better account for the socially constructed, 
and multiple nature of truths, ultimately concluding with its consequent limits.   
Bringing a more unsettled field into view  
Reflexivity refers to bi-directional or circular relationships between causes and effects. As a 
methodological practice in the social sciences, it can be understood as a bending or “turning back 
upon itself, for example, the turning back of an inquiry or a theory or a text onto its own formative 
possibilities” (Macbeth, 2001, p. 356). Or, as Woolgar (1988b) states, “the willingness to probe 
beyond the level of ‘straightforward’ interpretation” (p. 16). It requires us as researchers to move 
beyond personal reflection and interpretation and question the wider personal, social, historical and 
cultural contexts in order to understand how these impact on the ways we interpret the world 
(Etherington, 2004). Reflexivity invites scepticism towards taken for granted ways of knowing, 
critical reflection, and ultimately inquiry which brings not resolution but more of an unsettled field 
into view (MacBeth, 2001).   
Thus, in contrast to the modernist construction of knowledge where a view from nowhere equates 
to a view from everywhere, reflexivity invites us to illustrate a view which is situated, contingent 
and partial. This has been taken up in research practice in several ways, generally through a turning 
back, or reflexive gaze, upon the self as researcher and/or the researcher’s practices of 
representation. In this way, reflexivity requires an acknowledgement of, and exploration into, the 
situated construction of any knowledge claims, in relation to both the subjectivity of the researcher 
and the representational practices being used. The theoretical orientation will influence the 





moves beyond modernist objectivity, but remains politically neutral (Campbell, 2004), to feminist, 
post-colonial, post-structural, queer and critical orientations which insist reflexivity must include 
a looking back on the gendered, classed, raced, cultural, aged, and other hegemonic discourses 
which constitute any knowledge making practices (St. Pierre & Pillow, 2000; Macbeth, 2001; 
Campbell, 2004; Davies et al., 2004). 
Whilst it is not my intention to document the multitude of ways reflexive methods17 have 
proliferated in response to the crisis of representation, I do intend to outline broad approaches to 
reflexivity developed and used by qualitative researchers, in order to examine its underlying 
assumptions and ultimate limits in responding to the crisis in ways hoped for. Various researchers, 
in sociology, education, and social and feminist science studies of science have examined the issue 
and use of reflexivity as it intersects with debates around representation (Campbell, 2004; Davies 
et al., 2004; Lather, 1993; Latour, 1988; Macbeth, 2001; Pillow, 2003; Woolgar, 1988a). Terms 
and phrases including ‘uncomfortable reflexivity’ (Pillow, 2003); ‘ambivalent practices of 
reflexivity’ (Davies et al., 2004); meta- and infra-reflexivity (Latour, 1988); positional and textual 
reflexivity (MacBeth, 2001), and benign introspection (reflection) to radical constitutive reflexivity 
(Woolgar, 1988a) have all been attempts to both name what it is that reflexivity does and to move 
beyond its identified limits. Indeed, the concept of reflexivity has never been a simple solution to 
the crisis of representation, as evidenced by Woolgar in 1988b, who was then, already beginning 
to explore “the ways in which reflexivity has been variously ignored, evaded, diminished, pursued 
and celebrated” (p. 2). 
 
                                                          
17 Although, in beginning this research I engaged in such reflexive practices in an attempt to overcome the limits of 
modernist research identified here.  I attempted to begin to both situate myself in the research and make myself 
visible as researcher as well as disrupt stable representations of the real through the use of autoethnography and 





Reflexivity as recognition of self 
What then have methodological practices of reflexivity been able to offer us, in our attempts to 
move beyond objective, disembodied knowledge-making practices towards recognising the 
contingencies of knowledge and towards a science which, in attending to the political, moves us to 
insist on better accounts of the world? In attempting to answer this, Pillow (2003) usefully moves 
us beyond the range of typologies of reflexivity (e.g. methodological, inter-textual) to instead 
consider common practices, or strategies, of reflexivity in qualitative research. One practice which 
has become prominent in qualitative research is “reflexivity as recognition of self/researcher know 
thyself” (p. 181). Similar to Macbeth’s (2001) positional reflexivity, the focus is on an expression 
of the subjectivity of the researcher, on “articulation of one’s analytically situated self” (p.38). As 
Pillow notes, while researchers have responded to this call to confession in a myriad of ways, all 
are attempting to give a reflexive account acknowledging that their selves interact with and 
influence the research process and, ultimately, the knowledge constructed. Such researchers use 
reflexivity as a tool often to situate themselves, their personal histories and ongoing reflexions in 
relation to the research process as a way of showing the constitutive relationship between the 
knowledge producer and the product, and thus to create more valid research claims.  
There are, however, several tensions inherent in this practice. As well as considering these, my aim 
is to understand the onto-epistemological assumptions at play in these reflexive practices in order 
to also, eventually, consider alternatives. As Pillow (2003) points out, in contrast to a post-modern 
subject as multiple, complex, and proliferative, it seems that this kind of self-reflexivity can invoke 
the “Cartesian belief in a unified, essential self that is capable of being reflected on and is 
knowable” (p. 181). An awareness of a self as separate, rather than as also being produced by, and 
in relation to, the research processes, is also invoked, as is the idea that this self can be ‘captured’ 
and recorded. As Davies et al. (2004) note, the idea that one can both gaze at oneself and also be 





the reflexive self then becomes somehow a taken for granted knowledge, and no further inquiry 
into its production seems required. That is, researchers who engage in this kind of reflexivity 
seldom further trouble or question their own notions of knowing and, paradoxically, assume that 
by putting themselves into the text, they have adequately responded to the messiness of 
representation (Pillow, 2003). However, as Latour (1988) states “their arguments in feeding back 
on themselves nullify their own claims.  They are in effect self-contradictory…” (p. 155). 
However, meta-reflexivity, or inquiry into the production of our own reflections and reflexions, as 
a response to this aporia brings its own problems, not least of which, Haraway (1988) terms “self-
induced multiple personality disorder” (p. 578). For one, it assumes a linear knowing and 
potentially an ultimate knowable foundational truth. For another, this assumes that each layer of 
reflexivity produces more knowing than the last. Latour (1988) suggests otherwise, that each layer 
is no more, or less, reflexive than the others, that they are all just equal stories, each standing side 
by side, each “bearing on something else” (p. 169, italics in original). Thus, while I agree with 
Pillow, that there remains an ongoing need for researchers to identify and account for their own 
positioning, particularly when those positions are ones of privilege, I also find myself in agreement 
that self-reflexivity as a counter practice to the crisis of representation may be little more than a 
“hall of mirrors” (Davies and Gannon, 2012, p. 369).   
Accounts that make the world alive 
Latour’s (1988) response to meta-reflexivity, at the time, came in the form of infra-reflexivity.  This 
was premised upon his view that no amount of methodology (“tedious… reflexive loops” (p. 173)) 
will bring a text closer to the distant thing it purports to represent. For that reason he suggested 
that, rather than piling layer upon layer of (needless) self-consciousness, we just have one layer – 
the story. This, he suggests, while it avoids the reductionism of meta-reflexivity, also does not mark 





using tailor-made causes, with more details, not less, in order to avoid generalities and to write 
stories which end up with local and provisional variations of scale. Thus, Latour’s reflexivity 
becomes one of a multiplicity of genres and styles, of accounts that “make the world alive” (p. 
173).    
This would seem similar to Haraway’s18 desire, as quoted at the beginning of this chapter, for both 
a “radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects”, and a “no 
nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world” (1988, p. 579). With Haraway’s desire 
for both real and situated knowledges, there is the possibility of moving beyond the one language 
of the invisible knower, and its oppressive repercussions, to construct partial, situated, local 
knowledges. Situated knowledges that are real and that also comprise an ethical and political 
impulse for real change by “offering richer, better accounts of a world, in order to live in it well” 
(p. 579). As Haraway terms it, this is a “feminist objectivity” (p. 581) where the issue may be more 
one of ethics and politics, than epistemology. 
Before I continue down this path which is potentially taking me away from practices of 
methodological reflexivity, at least of the self at this stage, I want to return to consider the writings 
of Pillow and others as they trace other kinds of reflexivity offered as potential antidotes to the 
crisis of representation. Such reflexive practices can be encapsulated in the idea of coming to know 
and represent the other in our research. If we have given up on the previously assumed one to one 
correspondence between our textual practices of representation and the reality we are attempting 
to represent, how else can we demonstrate a post-modern and socially constructed knowing of the 
                                                          
18 Haraway is clearly influenced by Latour and references him in her writing, stating at one point (Harway, 1988, 
notes) that “Latour is not otherwise a notable feminist theorist, but he might be made into one by readings as 





other? Reflexivity, in this sense, has come to be used to point to the limits of representation, whilst 
still maintaining a focus upon representation as desirable, necessary and somewhat possible.    
A central theme of this kind of reflexivity is the disruption of realism and textual coherence and 
correspondence through the writing of instability in and through the text with the use of various 
devices or experiments in textual display (Macbeth, 2001; Woolgar, 1988a). This has come to be 
known as ‘textual reflexivity’ and has been especially taken up by feminist researchers who also 
wish to deconstruct the authority of the researcher in coming to know the other (Macbeth, 2001; 
Pillow, 2003). Such texts re-present data in multi-vocal forms, often letting the subjects speak for 
themselves, and use textual devices such as poetry, stories and plays to unsettle and redefine the 
modernist relationship between representation and reality (Barraclough, 2014; Richardson, 1994). 
However, in doing this, at least two paradoxical and troublesome effects are often realised.   
First, introducing a textual layer of reflexivity acknowledges that research always occurs in the 
context of an unequal power relationship, yet, in writing reflexively, offers an account which 
assumes this has been addressed. As Pillow states, the very act of reflexivity may “perpetuate a 
colonial relationship while at the same time attempting to mask this power over the subject” (2003, 
p. 185). Second, reflexivity has come to be associated with validity and in many cases those using 
it have come to assume that a reflexive text equates to a more valid, or more truthful, representation 
of the voices of their subjects. Given reflexivity’s initial attempts to address the crisis of 
representation, it seems, after all, that it might well be potentially leading us right back to where 
we started – seeking the ‘truth’ in our representations.   
Attempting to make the discursive visible   
I cannot complete a consideration of the crisis of representation and the promise (and limits) of 
practices of reflexivity without a turn to post-structuralism and its central theories over the last half 





in Davies, et al., 2004, p. 363). Engaging with post-structuralism’s ideologies of the shifting and 
multiple self/subject as constituted in and through multiple discourses and practices invites a 
reflexivity which turns the gaze of the researcher upon “discourse—turning language back on itself 
to see the work it does in constituting the world” (Davies et al. 2004, p. 360). In line with ideas of 
reflexivity outlined above, post-structural practices of reflexivity have developed to make visible 
both the discursive production of the subjectivity of the researcher and well as the discursive nature 
of research practices in constituting knowledge production. Ultimately, this work has been ground 
breaking in producing “different structures of intelligibility that, in turn, produce different 
epistemologies, ontologies and methodologies” (St. Pierre & Pillow, 2000, p. 2). 
Post-structuralism’s move toward situating the self, and research practices, as constituted in 
language and discourse has been significant in shifting the way we ‘do’ reflexivity.19 Moving 
beyond the contradictions inherent in practices of reflexivity which ultimately lead us back to a 
humanist self that appears unified, knowable and fixed, post-structuralism potentially offered a way 
to engage with a shifting, contradictory view of the self in research, a self that is in fact a discursive 
process. Thus, rather than offering a meta-reflexivty, or potentially endless reflections on 
reflections, a reflexivity employed through the lens of post-structuralism enables “the subject to 
see itself in all its shifting, contradictory multiplicity and fragility… and also to see the ongoing 
and constitutive force of the multiple discourses and practices through which it takes up its 
existence” (Davies et al., 2004, p. 363). Viewing reflexivity through a post-structural theoretical 
lens means that not only are the subjectivities of researcher and researched viewed as discursive 
processes, but that the research practices and texts are also seen in this way. Thus, reflexivity 
                                                          
19 As I have mentioned in previous chapters, I initially come to understand post-structuralism through practices of 
Narrative Therapy (Freedman & Combs, 1996; White and Epston, 1990), which draws on the work of Derrida and 
Foucault in considering the constitution of the subject in and through language and discourse, and in the possibility 
of rewriting subjectivity through practices of deconstruction. Theoretically and methodologically I have drawn on 
the work of Lather, Davies, St-Pierre and Pillow in order to further understand and use feminist post-structural 





becomes about turning the reflexive gaze back upon the discursive practices, the circulation of 
cultural meanings signified through language, in order, not to find origins or truths, but to trace the 
“the constitutive force of discourse in the lives of subjects”  (Davies et al., 2002, p. 291). 
Yet still, with all of its useful and necessary looking upon the discursive constitutive processes at 
play, a post-structural reflexivity seems to lead us in circles back again to humanist notions of a 
pre-discursive, real, unified, knowing subject who engages in the looking, who has a certain agency 
to look back and name the constitutive processes of the present, or past moments. So, as Davies et 
al. (2004), after Butler (1995 cited in Davies et al. 2004), ask “how then are we to conceptualise 
the doer behind the deed?” (p. 385). Through exploration of this very question Davies et al. were 
led to conclude that to engage in such reflexive practices necessarily entails occupying an 
“ambivalent position of competent agent and transgressive critic” (p. 385). That is, whilst 
acknowledging the limits of our knowledge in that we can “never float free of discourse” (p. 385) 
in our reflexivity and research practices, we must nevertheless find our way to write the stories that 
make visible the effects of discourse.           
At this point we are left with the usefulness of a post-structurally informed reflexivity that has the 
ability to take us beyond realist and objective ways of knowing, to employ reflexive practices which 
allow us to show selves and research practices and texts as discursive processes, but we remain, as 
Davies et al. suggest, occupying a position of ambivalence, continuing to work both within and 
against the dominant language of humanism. It is perhaps not surprising then that researchers have 
sought to continue to interrogate such deep tensions in, and limits to, the practices of reflexivity 
(Davies et al. 2004; Pillow, 2003; MacBeth, 2001).  Ultimately, this has led many, particularly 
feminist, researchers to abandon reflexivity altogether as a workable concept which adequately, 
and ethically, addresses onto-epistemological understandings of the world  (e.g. Davies & Gannon, 
2012; Davies, 2014b; Lenz Taguchi, 2012; Mazzei, 2014; Osgood et al., 2016). In addition to the 





that it leads us “into searching for origins even when the conceptual work we are doing tells us 
there is no such thing as the original” (Davies and Gannon, 2012, p. 369-370). That is, through 
self- and/or constitutive reflexive practices we still seek to account for our representations of an, 
albeit socially constructed, reality. According to Barad (2007), this geometric optics of reflection 
actually takes us no further beyond the traditional realist approaches we started with.   
The following section thus intends to further explore what it might mean to move from an optics 
of reflection to one of diffraction in our research practices. Barad’s objections to the widespread 
reliance on the optics of reflection and practices of reflexivity and her move to what she (after 
Haraway, 1992) terms a diffractive methodology are discussed. My aim in doing this is to argue 
for both the usefulness of a diffractive rather than reflexive methodology in this research, as well 
to situate this research in the broader onto-epistemological frameworks of new material feminism 
and post-humanism.  
Haraway’s diffraction  
So, for me, the most interesting optical metaphor is not reflection and its variants in 
doctrines of representation. Critical theory is not finally about reflexivity, except as a means 
to defuse the bombs of the established disorder and its self-invisible subjects and categories. 
My favourite optical metaphor is diffraction--the noninnocent, complexly erotic practice of 
making a difference in the world, rather than displacing the same elsewhere (Haraway, 
1994, p. 63). 
Although I will be going on to discuss Barad’s uptake and development of the concept of diffraction 
I want to return to Donna Haraway as the originator of the use of this term in relation to research 
practices of reflexivity, and whose work I will also draw on in thinking diffractively.  Haraway’s 
work, positioned with Feminist Science Studies (FSS), and much of her writing since the 1980s 
can be said to focus on questions of the ethics, politics and onto-epistemology of the production of 





‘cyborg’ (1991), ‘modest witness’ (1997) and ‘companion species’ (2003, 2008b) to explore and 
exemplify her theories. As can be seen in her quote at the beginning of this chapter her commitment 
to what she calls “situated knowledges”, drawing on notions of a feminist objectivity and critical 
reflexivity, has been long and reflects her desire to interrogate both the “apparatus of production” 
of knowledge and the question of “who flourishes and who does not, and how” (Haraway, 2008b, 
p. 157) in our knowledge- and world-making practices. It is through this ongoing work that 
Haraway ultimately attempted to move beyond the limits of a critical reflexivity and coined the 
concept of diffraction in order to further her project that we should seek to produce “knowledge 
potent for constructing worlds less organized by axes of domination” (Haraway, 1988, p. 585). 
It may be Haraway’s proclivity for the metaphorical, and in this case for the particular metaphor of 
a “much maligned sensory system in feminist discourse: vision” (Haraway, 1988, p. 585) that led 
her to the term diffraction. She says,    
(v)ision is always a question of the power to see (p. 585)… How to see? Where to see from? 
What limits to vision? What to see for? Whom to see with? Who gets to have more than 
one point of view? Who gets blinded? Who wears blinders? Who interprets the visual field? 
What other sensory powers do we wish to cultivate besides vision?” (Haraway, 1988, p. 
587). 
 
Here, Haraway brings to the fore the idea, her belief, that the struggles over what counts as 
knowledge, or ‘rational’ accounts of the world, ultimately is a question of these struggles of the 
‘who’ and ‘how’ of our seeing. Critical vision and critical reflexivity, she suggests, have been 
crucial to an unmasking of the ‘god-trick’ of patriarchal, colonising, and normative seeing and 
knowing, and to the move to more situated, partial and embodied (reflexive) practices of knowing. 
However, although important, Haraway seems to suggest that this move from seemingly objective 
to relativist accounts of the world does not go far enough. “It is full reflexivity’s hesitance here and 





from one to multiple possible accounts, still leaves all knowledge claims as equal. Indeed, Haraway 
suggests that “relativism is the perfect mirror twin of totalization in the ideologies of objectivity; 
both deny the stakes in location, embodiment, and partial perspective” (1988, p. 584, my emphasis). 
It is here that Haraway eventually departs from the optics of reflexivity. Moving to a reworking of 
her model of situated knowledges (1988) she introduces the figure of diffraction (Haraway, 1992, 
1994, 1997) to help imagine her yearning for a non-innocent, feminist, multicultural and anti-racist 
techno-science project. Diffraction, as a more useful metaphor than reflexivity, in her terms,  
 
does not produce the same, displaced, as reflection and refraction do. Diffraction is a 
mapping of interference, not of replication, reflection, or reproduction. A diffraction pattern 
does not map where differences appear, but rather maps where the effects of difference 
occur” (Haraway, 2004, p. 70).   
 
The purpose of this, for Haraway, is not only then to “get at how worlds are made and unmade”, 
but “to participate in the processes, in order to foster some forms of life and not others” (1994, p. 
62). Haraway talks about this as simply, modestly, having an ethico-political commitment to 
making a difference, having a desire or yearning to go beyond deconstruction and criticality toward 
a reconfiguring or re-worlding in the research stories that we tell, or to at least point the way to the 
making visible of something other than the same, that might make different, and particular, kinds 
of worlds and knowledges come alive, in a way that are power sensitive, not pluralistic.   
However, to do so is not without challenge, or risk. Risk of assuming the position of rational, 
humanist knower in desiring to ‘make a difference’ with preconceived ideas of what that difference 
might look like. The challenge, and risk, I think, is well encapsulated by Schneider who, in 
hesitating at the potential evocation of closure and unity that imperatives such as ‘making a 





Doubt, modesty, partiality, endless self-other criticism and scrutiny? Without question” (2002, p. 
474).   
Further challenge from remaining with Haraway’s figure of diffraction lies in her seeming to stop 
short of fully developing a model of what those diffractive practices she alludes to might be 
(Campbell, 2004). Haraway’s diffractive ways of seeing patterns of interference as a way of making 
new and different meanings has, however, been taken up by Karen Barad (2003, 2007, 2014) in 
her theory of agential realism. It is this combination of, or diffraction of Haraway and Barad’s 
notions of diffraction, and diffracting of diffraction by others, which inform this research, and it is 
Barad’s theory in particular that I wish to take up and discuss here.   
 
Diffracting diffraction, with Barad 
“Diffraction is not a singular event that happens in space and time; rather, it is a dynamism 
that is integral to spacetimemattering. Diffractions are untimely. Time is out of joint; it is 
diffracted, broken apart in different directions, noncontemporaneous with itself. Each 
moment is an infinite multiplicity” (Barad, 2014, p. 169). 
 
Writing this here, now, in this spacetimemattering is not a singular event. Although my aim is to 
create a piece of writing which shows an understanding of diffraction and gives an outline of how 
this project will/does use this concept, the material limitations of this product inevitably restrict the 
documenting of the actual past-present-future entangled encountering that has been-is-will be 
diffraction’s diffractive interference and spacetimemattering in my life-work. As such, I start this 
section diffractively, interfering with the usual linear flow of coherent writing, by inserting other 
matter, from other times and spaces. My desire is to map some of the effects of diffraction’s 






Figure 1: Diffraction – I see it everywhere.  
Last day of the summer holiday, January, 2014; Paton’s Rock, Golden Bay.  
Today, I am reading Iris van der Tuin (2014), on diffraction, post-humanist interpellation and new 
materialism as always/already informed by French bodily materialism. I’m reading/writing/thinking at 
home, interspersed with, diffracted through, baking raspberry and white chocolate muffins for my 
children’s lunches, the smells now leaking into my body and senses as I read/think/write, listening to the 
sounds of Bizet echoing from a CD on the stereo and willing him to finish as his tempo is moving far too 
quickly for my much slower thinking.   
The speed of the music infusing itself into me is instilling in me a panic that I cannot keep up, with the 
music, with my PhD, with my work, with my mothering, partnering, daughtering, with the resulting 
dispersion of myself into the multiplicities of being and becoming demanded by my choices.   
A thesis to mark arrives in my in-box, an additional teaching to prepare just as I have finished three weeks 
of teaching and look toward some space for this reading/writing/thinking, teetering on the edge of the 
abyss, looking toward the unknown, always/already taking a plunge into thinking/doing/being in 





I can never keep up, catch up, stay up. Choice-feminism, un/equality politics and neo-liberalism constitute 
me as the individual woman, who can try harder, work harder, give it more effort, choose to have it all – or 
not, who can become like Them-Man, and then not like me – woman.  Or, or, or…?   
Is that what I hope Iris can help me figure out, know-in-being? Know in the being of baking-writing-reading-
listening-working, in the being of my body’s panic-fear-overwhelm-desire, embodied, fleshy, corporeal 
knowing that comes through and of LIFE itself, immanent, not of GOD and gazing from a disembodied 
nameless, locationless, above. What ‘I’ come to say/think/write is not even ‘me’ but a mobile ‘subject-
shifting’ knowing-in-being that comes from the material-discursive practices of the I that is baking-reading-
listening, that is mother-lecturer-woman- and, and, and, that is fleshy, material, embodied, and, like the 
molecules of water, rippling from the stone that lands, that is actually, always/already in motion.   
Interrupted, disturbed, in-through-out this material-discursive relationality, called into being, differing, 
disrupted, always already at the abyss. Beyond a taxonomy, a categorization, that might propel me to 
attempt to fit, and never fit, a certain naming of self. Instead, a calling into knowing-in-being through 
interruption into/from a past-present-future entanglement.  An interruption to this entangled train of 
thought as I pause to pick up children from school, a diffractive interference leading me, calling me, into 
another abyss.         
(Research journal, March 2015) 
 
Following Barad, at this point I return with her to the phenomenon of diffraction, both as trope and 
as a physical phenomenon, to explore the history of its philosophy-physics and the feminist 
theorizing Barad draws on, and the coming together of both. I do this in order to develop further 
clarity around what diffraction as a physical phenomenon actually is, in order to think differently 
with it, and to consider its profound offerings as an analytical tool, in particular as an alternative 





deployed diffraction, as concept and method, in order that I might think with (diffract) Haraway, 
Barad and others, in being and becoming diffractive (rather than reflexive).  That is, in order to 
consider what material-discursive practices diffraction as analytic practice might produce for the 
purposes of re-encountering (with) my data. 
Physical phenomenon – diffraction as concept 
I begin with a re-turning to the previous chapter and my outline of Barad’s post-humanist 
performative framework of agential realism, and its underpinning physics. At the heart of this 
notion of diffraction here, are the diffraction experiments Barad refers to, which investigate the 
nature (or identity) of light and matter, showing that, depending on the apparatus used, both light 
and matter can be either wave or particle, two mutually exclusive identities. The apparatuses used 
in these two-slit experiments, are called “diffraction gratings” and are said to measure the effects 
of difference, a “diffraction pattern” (Barad, 2007, p. 73). Thus, already, we can see diffraction as 
both an apparatus of investigation (a methodological tool) and as a phenomena 
(object/pattern/entangled state) of investigation. In this way, “diffraction not only brings the reality 
of entanglements to light, it is itself an entangled phenomenon” (2007, p. 73). Barad points out here 
that, as entanglements (intra-actions/spacetimematterings) are highly specific configurations, it can 
be ‘hard work’ tuning apparatuses to the particularities of the current entanglements under 
investigation. She notes the key question will be how to explore entanglements, and the differences 
they make, responsibly. Barad is referring to the physics of quantum entanglements here, to the 
diffraction patterns made by light and matter in their intra-activity with apparatuses. However, she 
is also using diffraction as a trope, in order to offer the reader help in exploring other entangled 
patterns of difference. I will explore how others have taken this diffraction trope, or metaphor, and 





A diffraction (interference) pattern, in a classical (non-quantum) sense, has to do with the way 
waves (sound, light, water) combine, under the right conditions, to bend and spread when they 
encounter an obstruction, such as ocean waves passing through a hole, or the ripple in a pond when 
a stone interferes with the stillness. The waves are said to be diffracted, and the stone or the hole 
acts as a diffraction apparatus. A pattern of the effects of difference or superposition, is produced 
in this intra-action of obstruction/interference and overlapping waves (Barad, 2007). Diffraction 
patterns can be observed everywhere, says Barad, from the surfer taking advantage of diffractive 
waves created by a rock to the rainbow effect of light observed on a compact disc; indeed 
“diffraction plays a role in nearly all optical phenomena” (Young & Freedman, 2004 in Barad, 
2007, p. 80).   
A diffractive method, in this sense, looks for the effects of difference: diffraction patterns produced 
through interference/obstruction/overlapping. In contrast, reflecting apparatuses, like mirrors, are 
defined by sameness. As Haraway suggests “reflexivity, like reflection, only displaces the same 
elsewhere, setting up worries about copy and original and the search for the authentic and really 
real…” (Haraway, 1997 in Barad, 2007, p. 71). Critical reflexivity’s attempts to take account of 
the researcher’s role in the constitution of knowledge, or to turn the mirror back on oneself, as this 
optical metaphor suggests we do, becomes a limiting metaphor in the presence of diffraction. 
Reflexivity, in the context of a social constructionist ontology, merely constitutes knowledge as a 
reflection of culture, rather than nature (Barad, 2007). Mirrors abound and reflections at a distance 
can be endless in a search for an imagined, more or less fixed, original. While categories of 
difference may be reflected upon in attempts to be reflexive, e.g. gender, race, class, diffraction 
moves difference beyond fixed categories and instead “is itself the process whereby a difference is 
made and made to matter” (Davies, 2014b, p. 734 italics in original).     
Taking diffraction’s possibilities further, Barad goes on to outline a quantum understanding of 





classical understanding of the wave like behaviour of a diffractive pattern is a useful contrasting 
metaphor, to reflexivity, for thinking methodologically (think bending, overlapping, interfering, 
interrupting, difference), a quantum understanding is able to take us beyond the classical notion of 
fixed identities, as we see when we return to Barad’s agential-realist framework and her reading of 
Bohr.  As she says,  
while it is true that diffraction apparatuses measure the effects of difference, even more 
profoundly they highlight, exhibit, and make evident the entangled structure of the changing 
and contingent ontology of the world, including the ontology of knowing. In fact, 
diffraction not only brings the reality of entanglements to light, it is itself an entangled 
phenomenon” (Barad, 2007, p. 73). 
Barad is referring here to the wave-particle duality paradox, and in particular the quantum finding 
that particles or matter, under certain conditions (in certain entanglements) can produce diffraction 
or wave patterns, leading to the conclusion that matter’s nature or identity is anything but fixed or 
determined. Hence, diffraction as methodology, as a material-discursive phenomenon itself, not 
only offers a tool to map the effects of entanglements but its use depends upon a quantum ontology 
of the intra-active, dynamic, changing nature of the phenomenon itself under investigation.   
The researcher is wholly implicated in this, and shifts from a reflective, reflexive, self-referential 
observer of the world towards one who understands the world from within and as part of it whilst 
participating in its ongoing performance. This thus “entails a critical practice of engagement, not a 
distance-learning practice of reflecting from afar” (Barad, 2007, p. 90).  In a diffractive onto-
epistemology, we, as researchers, are not uncovering things as they are, or were, rather we are 
participating in, are intra-actively part of, knowledge-in-the-making, or the world in its ongoing 
(re)configuring. Thinking diffractively requires accountability and responsibility in the part we 
play in these knowledge/world-making entangled material-discursive practices. Barad comes back 





difference in the world, critical in the sense of our responsibility as researchers for “understanding 
which differences matter, how they matter, and for whom” (p. 90).   
A diffractive interrupting  
I attempt and experiment throughout this research to embody this lively onto-epistemology and to 
disrupt the very notions it interrupts - of linear stories, researcher distance and writing up as 
representation. My aim is to learn about and use diffraction not as though it exists independently 
from the ‘me’ using it and the data encountering it and the time and space being reconfigured in 
the moments of its use. This aim, in fitting with the onto-epistemology of this thesis, is to show 
diffraction’s entanglement, its intra-activity, with this research-in-the-making, with my researcher-
subjectivity-in-the-making, not as a linear process, but as an always lively and iterative process of 
“(re)configuring of patterns of differentiating-entangling” (Barad, 2014, p. 168). 
Here, then, in this space of interruption, I introduce and re-turn (to) a major event which haunts 
this research, through its presence in bodies and land and living and every moment since September 
4th 2010. Although I did not meet with my participants until after this time, they were all engaged 
in the counselling programme, and arrived, along with me, having all been impacted in some ways 
by living through the major earthquake sequence20, from which we continue to experience effects 
in Canterbury to this day. I introduce this here, as a way of diffracting diffraction, as a trope for 
thinking earthquakes as diffractive – “cutting together-apart (one move) in the (re)configuring of 
spacetimemattering” (Barad, 2014, p. 168), and as producing diffraction patterns. I re-turn to the 
earthquakes “not by returning as in reflecting on or going back to a past that was, but re-turning as 
                                                          
20 The 2010–2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence occurred within the upper crust of the South Island of New 
Zealand. As of 15 July 2011, the sequence had included three major shocks: the Mw 7.1 Darfield earthquake (4 
September 2010, 4.35am) followed by an Mw 6.2 event on 22 February 2011, 12.51pm and an Mw 6.0 event on 13 
June 2011, along with a rich aftershock sequence of 27 shocks with Mw>5.0 (Sibson, Ghisetti, & Ristau, 2011). As at 
Feb 2014 there had been 11,000 associated earthquakes and aftershocks (Moon et al. 2014). 185 people were 





in turning it over and over again – iteratively intra-acting, re-diffracting, diffracting anew, in the 
making of new temporalities  (spacetimematterings), new diffraction patterns” (p. 168).    
“Canterbury will pause to reflect on a poignant milestone on Monday 22 February as it commemorates 
the fifth anniversary of the February 2011 earthquake… Mayor Lianne Dalziel says, "This is an important 
event for the Christchurch community to reflect on what happened the day of the earthquake but also 
look at how far we've come” (Rebuild Christchurch, 2016).  
“This moment is dispersed/diffracted throughout the paper, and this moment, like all moments, is 
itself a diffracted condensation, a threading through of an infinity of moments-places-matterings, 
a superposition/entanglement, never closed, never finished” (Barad, 2014, p. 169) 
 
Fault lines 
The world was reconfigured 
over and over again. 
The earth, 
a massive tornado sweeping 






4.35: 7.1 - 12.51: 6.3 
time and magnitude marks 
our bodies, 
it throws 
my children’s bodies 
to the ground and 
shakes 








cut together-apart, between 
before and during, 
after and since, then 
and now.  No 
 
going back, only going 
on, made and re-made, with every 
loss and every terror and 
every broken glass and smashed 
plate that 
we swept away too soon 
to remove 
the evidence that was 
the reminder 
in the ongoing and 
relentless, unknowing 
of lives and 
worlds and flourishing and flailing, 
who got which 
made to matter in 
diffraction’s queer and quantum 
cutting - of earth and 
water, land and loss and 
fault, 
deep layers of 
liquefaction and legal action, 










Diffraction’s feminist theorizing and ongoing responsibility 
 
Up to this point, much of my discussion of Karen Barad’s agential realist framework and her 
development of diffraction as concept and method has been centred around understanding it in 
relation to its philosophy-physics. However, as Barad states, “(t)he yearning for justice, a yearning 
larger than any individual or set of individuals, is the driving force behind this work…” (2007, p. 
xi). As such, her framework is clearly not only a new onto-epistemological offering, but an ethical 
one as well, thought through (or diffracted) with ““critical social theories”, (including) feminist 
theory, critical race theory, queer theory, post-colonial theory, (post)-Marxist theory, and post-
structuralist theory” (p. 26). Given our quantum understanding of diffraction, as both concept and 
method, diffraction’s project, then, becomes about queering binaries, challenging notions of (fixed) 
identity, and rethinking how and what differences comes to matter, in order that we might 
responsibly and responsively engage in the ongoing work of the re-opening, unsettling and re-
configuring “of what might yet be, of what was, and what comes to be” (Barad, 2010, p. 264, italics 
in original).   
This becomes my project also, as thinking diffractively with my data invites me to ask what and 
how differences come to matter for counsellors-in-training, not in order to ascertain any final, grand 
and unified narrative, but rather in order to unsettle and reconfigure who and what (might) come(s) 
to matter in an ongoing iterative process of differentiating-entangling, of cutting things together 
and apart (in one move). This entails a simultaneous response-ability for what comes to matter and 
for what gets excluded, for recognising entanglements necessitate exclusions; cutting things 
together, necessitates cutting things apart. This matters, both for my encounters of entangling-
differentiating with my data and for tracing the entangling-differentiating diffraction patterns 
within the data itself.  
Barad (2014) illuminates this notion of identity as mattering, as being the indeterminate made 





feminist theorizing, in particular with the work of Donna Haraway, Trinh Minh-ha and Gloria 
Anzaldua. What I take to be key to this theorizing, and of use for my work, is Haraway’s (1992) 
reading of Trinh Minh-ha’s notion of the “inappropriate/d other” and Barad’s reading of 
Anzaldua’s notion of the “crossroads”, both with diffraction. To be inappropriate/d, says Haraway, 
is “not to fit in the taxon, to be dislocated from the available maps specifying kinds of actors and 
kinds of narratives, not to be originally fixed by difference”. Rather, “(t)o be an ‘inappropriate/d 
other’ means to be in critical, deconstructive relationality, in a diffracting rather than reflecting 
(ratio)nality – as the means of making potent connection that exceeds domination” (Haraway, 1992, 
p. 300). Tracing how difference is enacted, how it comes to matter, how it intra-acts, how it doesn’t 
fit the available taxon, how the available taxon leads to dislocation, and starting with difference not 
as categorical, natural and fixed, all then become possibilities for thinking diffractively with data.   
Barad highlights how Trinh’s work (1988, in Barad, 2014) was about disrupting humanist notions 
of identity and difference which were defined through a colonizing logic, whereby identity takes 
the form of stabilising and maintaining the self through excluding (and dominating) what is Other 
or non-I, or on the other side of a binary, such as male-female; adult-child; white-black; mind-
body; well-ill; able-disabled. Difference then is defined by clear categories with absolute 
boundaries, and, as we have seen, power and privilege have come to be afforded to those on the 
‘right’ side of these binaries. The only options in this configuring of fixed identities, for those 
afforded less power, is, as Trinh says, to attempt to become equal to the other, whilst being “always 
condemned to remain its shadow” (Trinh T. Minh-ha in Barad, 2014, p. 170), given the investment 
in hegemony of those dominant. Thus, while difference itself continues to be constructed in such a 
binary way, there are few options for true change. 
Inspired by Trinh’s notion of disrupting the binary structure and actually figuring difference 
differently, Barad returned to the physics of diffraction. In another example of diffraction in action, 





returning to an experiment which showed patterns of light appearing “within the darkness within 
the light within…” (2014, p. 170), a pattern unable to be explained by what were the current known 
laws of reflection and refraction. Diffracting the physics then back through Anzaldua’s Borderlands 
(/1991/1999), a seminal feminist studies text, Barad continues to queer the binary and 
develop/diffract her reconfiguring of diffraction as differences-in-the-making. She does this 
through both the dark/light, and other, diffraction experiments and with Anzaldua’s queering of the 
darkness/light binary, of which she says darkness has come to be equated with absence, lack and 
“the negative, base and evil forces – the masculine order casting its dual shadow – and all these are 
identified with dark skinned people” (Anzaldua, in Barad, 2014 p. 171).   
To me, this queering of what has been taken for granted as the physical, at least, truth of reality, is 
both intellectually challenging and exciting for the possibilities it offers for rethinking identity, and 
as such the possibilities for who and how we (individually and collectively) can be and become 
different, not to each other. Rather than working within the patriarchal defined binary structures of 
the status quo Barad, through diffracting diffraction, invites a complete reconfiguring of how the 
very differences we take for granted as natural or given, can actually be seen to be indeterminate, 
contingent, and instead as differences always in the making, differing within, with no fixed origins 
or destinations. Diffraction patterns in the two-slit diffraction experiment indeed reveal “that 
darkness is not a lack. Darkness can be produced by ‘adding new light’ to existing light – ‘to that 
which it has already received’. Darkness is not mere absence, but rather an abundance. Indeed, 
darkness is not light’s expelled other, for it haunts its own interior” (p. 171). Old boundaries are 
breaking, leaking, and indeed new research in diverse fields is beginning to queer binaries 
previously held up to be impassable (e.g. mind-body, see Giulia Enders (2015) work on the 
complexity of the ‘gut’, its brain, and as constitutive of the ‘self’ in ways previously thought to be 





Anzaldua speaks of being in the borderlands, being a crossroads, transcending or “tunnelling 
through” the apparent dual and multiple identities from within – not through erasing difference, 
but, as Barad says, through a “relation of difference within” (Barad, 2014, p. 175). Anzaldua, she 
says, “understood the material multiplicity of self, the way it is diffracted across spaces, times, 
realities, imaginaries” (p. 175). Being the crossroads, I read here as being indeterminate, and as 
difference coming to matter in the ongoing and iterative reconfiguring of diffraction/intra-
action/differencing. Difference is not flattened out or erased in any unifying sense, rather its very 
material historicity and how it comes to matter, and as such, how it may come to matter differently 
is what comes to be at stake in this reworking. The crossroads, or indeterminacy, is not a static 
place of waiting to become. Rather, it is a “dynamic through which that which has been 
constitutively excluded re-turns” – that which has been made to matter, has become intelligible, is 
always infused with that which has been excluded, hence entangling, or cutting together, always 
necessitates differentiating, or cutting apart (i.e. diffraction’s wave-particle paradox – difference 
differing within). The self is thus not an “I’ who exists on the outside looking in (or the inside 
looking out), but is rather an always ongoing un/doing and im/possibility, fixed in neither time nor 
space nor taxonomy.                      
Diffraction in action 
What does it mean then to think diffractively, to be diffractive rather than reflective or reflexive? 
Both Haraway and Barad tell us that diffraction entails responsibility and accountability for what 
comes to matter, for making a difference, in our knowledge making practices. However, rather than 
enacting a moral choice, diffraction’s responsibility entails an “iterative (re)opening up…through 
the iterative reworking of im/possibility…” (Barad, 2007, p. 183). Barad also tells us that meaning 
is material, it matters. As such it would seem most helpful in coming to think how I might put a 
diffractive methodology to work, to now move beyond attempts to understand diffraction’s as 





It seems apt to start with Barad, who has not only developed diffraction’s possibilities, put who 
also puts it to work, in her work (2007, 2010, 2014). She highlights a diffractive methodology as a 
respectful attention to the fine, small detail of relations of difference in thinking insights from 
different theories, times, and places through one another. This is not in a usual positioning of one 
theory against another nor a simple adding of cumulative results, when more than one come 
together. Barad’s approach is rather to “place the understandings that are generated from different 
(inter)disciplinary practices in conversation with one another” (2007, p. 93). In fitting with 
diffraction’s outline above, this means “engaging aspects of each in dynamic relationality to the 
other, being attentive to the iterative production of boundaries, the material-discursive nature of 
boundary-drawing practices, the constitutive exclusions that are enacted, and questions of 
accountability and responsibility for the reconfigurings of which we are a part” (p. 93). She does 
this in the enactment of her agential-realist framework by readings insights from Bohr’s 
philosophy-physics with several other theories as mentioned above. Barad also enacts diffraction 
as method in later work in which she continues to intra-act with quantum understandings of 
diffraction in order to make new diffraction patterns, to diffract anew in diffraction’s ongoing 
reconfiguring (2010, 2014). In doing this Barad, usefully, creates Acts and Scenes, except this play 
cuts across time and space and makes them anew, enacting diffraction’s, like the electron she 
invokes as host,  dis/jointed movement, dis/orientation, and ghostly dis/continuity. Diffraction as 
methodology, she says, which I take up in this thesis, is “readings texts intra-actively through one 
another, enacting new patterns of engagement, attending to how exclusions matter” (Barad, 2010, 
p. 243). I am also drawn to her attempts to write, or perform, her papers (2010, 2014) “in a way 
that disrupts the conventions of historical narrative forms…tales of continuous accretion…sagas 
of progress from an earlier time period to a later one punctuated with discoveries that lead the way 
out of the swamp of ignorance and uncertainty to the bedrock of solid and certain knowledge” 





experience of time, place and space’s disjointedness, its dis/continuity and its entangled nature, 
disrupting linearity and smooth transitions with fixed beginnings and endings. This is a writing and 
a reading where past, present and future are iteratively threaded through one another, re-turned to 
and from, where moments do not stand still, but rather point toward “multiple pasts in the present 
and futures-yet-to-come” (Blackman, 2015, p. 187). I see the making of the work produced here 
on these pages, as a diffractive process, an entanglement of pasts and presents, enacted with the 
use of poems interfering with the text, disrupting its continuity, where the moments, encounters, 
and meanings produced are threaded through one another, not in a fixed way, but a dynamic, always 
pointing toward futures-yet-to-come, way. This diffractive process is eventually also enacted in the 
data analysis, as becomes evident in part three of the thesis.       
Given the centrality of ethics and justice to diffraction’s reconfiguring and its history with feminist 
theorizing, it is perhaps not surprising that it has been taken up methodologically in feminist 
academic work in order to unsettle and reconfigure categorical notions such as gender (Osgood & 
Giugni, 2015a), motherhood (Osgood et al., 2016), sexuality (Allen, 2015), desire (Mazzei, 2014), 
anger (Davies, 2014b), childhood (Taylor & Blaise, 2014), girls’ ill-/well-being (Lenz Taguchi and 
Palmer 2013), researcher subjectivity (Lenz Tagughi, 2012, 2013a), loss (Allegranti & Wyatt, 
2014), mathematical subjectivity (Palmer, 2011), and academic writing (Handforth & Taylor, 
2016). In addition, a diffractive reading method has been usefully employed in feminist 
philosophical and sociological work furthering the exploration of matter, meta-physics, gender, 
responsibility and difference (Van der Tuin, 2011a, 2014; Hughes & Lury, 2013; Thiele, 2014; 
Sehgal, 2014). The following discussion highlights some of the ways diffraction as method has 








Researcher subjectivity – where/what/who am I? 
In considering the work of Lenz Taguchi on researcher subjectivity, to begin with, I am re-turned 
to the place where I began (this chapter) to articulate my struggle to come to terms with the place 
and performance of the I/me in conducting research: 
 
The residence of the I is many, 
in here, out there, in between, 
multiple selves, true self, false self, 
one world, no self. 
Illusions, fantasies, defenses. 
Us and them, I and thou, me and you,                                                                                        
all one. 
… 
it is difficult to see beyond 
where I am, beyond this obsession 
with I, with its incessant demands for                                                                                        
coherence, consistency, certainty, 
and freedom. 
 
Having come now to conceptualise my researcher subjectivity as intra-actively, iteratively always 
in the making, in the process of being reconfigured and produced in relation to and entangled with 
my data, participants and spaces, times and places of my research, whilst also intra-actively 
producing all of those things and ultimately the knowledge enacted in the writing of this thesis, I 
am curious also to think with Lenz Taguchi and others in order to diffract a researcher subjectivity 
further. Particularly, as at this point my conceptualising is an intra-active one produced through 
significant amounts of reading with Barad and others, not necessarily though an iterative process 
of working diffractively with data.  
In contrast, Lenz Taguchi outlines how, it was only after rereading documentation produced in a 





feminist post-constructionist theorists such as Karen Barad, Rosi Braidotti, Claire Colebrook, Myra 
Hird, Patti Lather and Elizabeth Grosz” (Lenz Taguchi, 2013a, p. 1103) that a knowing of the 
transformation of a researcher subjectivity began to correspond with her embodied involvement 
throughout the research. Thus, she uses diffraction here to “read” insights through one another in 
order to “produce a knowing of a kind that transgresses the mind/body binary” (p. 1103) to rethink 
researcher subjectivity as ultimately a “becoming “molecular-girl””, drawing on Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept (p. 1103).    
I see the conclusions Lenz Taguchi draws as aligning well with a diffractive notion of researcher 
subjectivity, which invoke a feminist challenge to the dominant image of the researcher as “an 
individual rational subject and mind, a mind that tries to understand the world through analysing 
data that are, so to speak, outside and separate from (her-)/him, and a mind which is understood to 
be separated from the body in the process of thinking” (2013a, p. 1104). Instead, she tells of how 
the group shifted their reading of the data from thinking with the dominant meaning of binaries as 
negative difference, toward Deleuze’s notion of difference as a positive, affirmative one, a 
continuum and a multiplicity, and as “in a constant state of becoming different in itself” (p. 1108), 
similar it seems to Barad’s theorising of difference differing within, as outlined above. The 
researchers came to experience themselves, not as the detached, thinking, external observers of the 
data, but rather as reading the data “from an imaginary embodiment: reinstalling ourselves as 
embodied affective beings in the event to relive the data in a totally different and unforeseen way” 
(p. 1108), which perhaps can also be configured as a reconfiguring, an intra-active re-turning, 
where the body of the researcher is wholly installed in the process of knowledge production. What 
this then does is to offer a shift beyond research as data representation, in that, through what Lenz 
Taguchi, after Deleuze, calls a “collective researching-body-assemblage, increasingly more and 
different articulations are reconfigured which “widen the realities of the data” (p. 1109). Being in 





companionship with other beings, matter and discourse” (p. 1109), comparable, it would seem, to 
the inseparability of the researcher from matter and discourse in Barad’s intra-active 
entanglements. ‘I’ am an inseparable participant in this entangled research process, and thus of the 
knowledge produced, not the rational, decision-making, separate, producer of research findings.   
Indeed, Lenz Taguchi (2012), also theorises this process from Haraway and Barad’s notion of 
diffraction, suggesting a diffractive analysis entails a transcorporeal, embodied becoming-with the 
data, where the body is “a space of transit, a series of open-ended systems in interaction with the 
material-discursive ‘environment’” (p. 265). She draws on Merrell’s (2003 in Lenz Taguchi, 2012) 
concept of the “bodymind” (p. 267) in referring to this use of all of our bodily faculties and our 
imaginary in a diffractive analysis. Allegranti and Wyatt (2014) similarly speak of an 
“intracorporeal” process in the mattering of data. Others have similarly described this diffractive 
process as one where knowledge emerges in-between the researcher and data, at a crossroads 
“marked out in the very intersection between the data, theory, methodology and the researcher” 
(Palmer, 2011, p. 8). This inevitable installing of oneself in the entanglement of knowledge 
production means engaging with our own previous and ongoing experiences of the realities we are 
researching, with our sensory, affective responses and memories, our imaginaries and with our own 
omnipresent multiple subjectivities, such as gender, class, race (Lenz Taguchi, 2012;  Lenz Taguchi 
& Palmer, 2013). It means recognising we are not acting only as intentional, rational knowers, but 
instead must become open to being “stirred and affected” by our (inseparable) relations with all 
manner of more-than-human others…” (Taylor & Blaise, 2014, p. 386).   
Such engagement has no presumption of fixity of those subjectivities and memories and affects, 
rather they are viewed as shifting, differing in response to, at least, the data, the theory, the writing 
and the method. The aim is not to reflect upon in order to separate them out, rather to recognise the 
very inseparability of our bodymind in the dynamic process of knowledge production and use this 





important consideration then of the how and what and why of what might be different in such a 
diffractive research process.  
Such a process requires attention to fine detail and hard work, in order to make matter intelligible 
in new ways and to imagine, disturb and intervene in order that other possible realities can be made 
to matter (Lenz Taguchi, 2012; Palmer, 2011). This production of knowledge thinks beyond 
traditional, habitual and reflexive research processes of coding and thematic analyses with its 
imperatives to produce coherent and recognisable narratives. Osgood et al. (2015a, 2016), for 
example, enact diffractive analyses in order that they might figure both gender (2015a) and 
motherhood (2016) differently, to move beyond reflecting back the already known themes and 
discourses, and instead “move the debate on” in different, active and generative directions, to go 
“beyond what we thought we knew” (p. 6). Mazzei (2014) similarly invites us to work the limits 
and limitations of our existing research practices and to instead engage in a diffractive, thinking 
data with theory, where analysis becomes “rhizomatic” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) rather than 
reductive, hierarchical and linear. In this way I return, with Haraway (2004), to diffraction’s 
beginnings, to engage in diffractive research practices which are “a mapping of interference, not 
of replication, reflection and reproduction” (p. 70) in thinking with the entangled material-
discursive practices of counsellors-in-training. Also with Haraway, with a noninnocent, ethical and 
political impulse, I intend to diffractively map who and what may come to matter differently when 
hidden and naturalised assumptions of fixed and distinctive categories and identities are called into 
question and figured differently, through this inevitably entangled work of enacting boundary-
making agential cuts in the production of knowing in being, that is a diffractive analysis. This is a 
knowing, and a production of knowledge, where subjects and objects cannot be defined in advance 
of the research encounter; “it is an emergent process, in which subjects and objects become 
different in the encounters through which they emerge and go on emerging differently…through 





renewed aim, to participate in, and experiment with, a diffractive research process, in re-
encountering my data, in installing my bodymind in relation with theory and data, in order to see 
what this entangled research process might produce in coming to know about the lived experience, 
and subject formation, of counsellors-in-training. It turns out this was not an easy process, 
unsurprisingly. The following chapter outlines further theory I enlisted in order to help me re-turn 
to the data to perform this diffractive data analysis. Following this, in part three, I offer an account 







Analytic Devices – making, re-making and un-making  
 
Having outlined significant, and challenging, shifts in onto-epistemology and associated 
methodological practices, in this chapter I explore further methodological implications of aligning 
my research with posthumanism, and diffraction as concept and method. I do this in order to 
envisage other tools I can think with, in entering what feels like such unknown terrain21. Drawing 
on the work of those already thinking and researching with posthumanist ontologies, I find the 
notion of the analytic device useful for mapping and describing the performative methods I will 
draw on in data analysis. I use Suchman’s (2012) definition of an analytic device as an inventive 
method, an analytic resource, through which things are made. This clearly aligns with Barad’s 
notions of apparatus and diffraction, as oriented towards an articulation of dynamic and intra-active 
processes, with the aim of opening up to the multiple possibilities, rather than “converging toward 
singular truths” (Boehner, Gaver & Bouchner, 2012, p. 185). I proceed to explore and explain three 
particular analytic devices here – the poem, pattern, and (re)(con)figuration - and how these might 
be productive in this research project, in particular, how they might enable an articulation of the 
processes and practices, and subject formation, of counsellors-in-training.                   
 
Analytic device 
In order to think, diffractively, with theory (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012) I am drawing on the practice 
of the analytic device as an inventive method “through which things are made, and a resource for 
their analysis and un/re-making” (Suchman, 2012, p. 49). Lury and Wakeford (2012) trace the 
                                                          
21 Although I have chosen to place this chapter in the onto-epistemological section in the linear layout of the thesis, 
it was only after attempts at data analysis (documented in the following chapter (six)), and the particular challenges 
and knowing that produced, that I re-turned to this particular theory in order to explore more useful tools to think 
with. This chapter is the outcome of that reading and thinking, and what I took with me back into a diffractive 





history of the notion of device in social and cultural analyses back to “Foucault’s notion of dispotif 
or apparatus” (p. 8), as a system of relations with a strategic, or organising, function. They go on 
to note how this feeds into recent understandings of the performativity of methods in the enactment 
of the social, for example, in Barad’s (2007) notion of the apparatus, and Haraway’s (1997) notion 
of materialised refiguration. While such devices offer a means to draw attention to the “semiotic-
material relational-doing-thingness of methods” (p. 10), it is important to recognise the uncertain 
“grasp” of such a device, which does not aim to “fix” such relations in place, but rather opens up 
to ambivalence, ambiguity, and uncertainty as productive states for exploration. Such inventive 
devices or methods are thus oriented toward articulating processes, performing situated, and 
dynamic, relations, and to always making a difference - designed “not to capture what is so much 
as to inspire what might be” (Boehner et al., 2012, p. 185).  I aim to use them here, as Boehner et 
al, articulate, to “open up possibilities, rather than converging toward singular truths” (p. 185). 
Devices themselves are not fixed processes, able to be inserted into data in replicable ways. They 
too, are material-discursive practices, which are intra-actively transformed with each use and 
articulation of the happening of the social world. The following outlines the analytic devices I draw 
on in articulating the happening of tears for counsellors in training.        
Poem 
I have used the poem up to this point as a ‘method of inquiry’ (Richardson, 1994), to think with, 
throughout this project. In a reconfiguring, I now think of the poem as an analytic device, as a 
structure which ‘cuts things together-apart’ to produce a diffractive pattern. Just as diffraction is a 
“mapping of interference” (Haraway, 2004, p. 70) so too, the poem, offers a structure to map a 
myriad of interferences, of human and non-human encounters and non-linear figurations of time 
and space. Poems, like Osgood and Giugni’s (2015a, 2015b, Osgood et al., 2016) Odes and PhArts, 
are offered as “valid knowledges generated as non-representational figurations that capture the 





multi-sensibilities. While Osgood and Giugni similarly present Odes as a “materialization of 
posthumanist logic to reconfigure and offer diffractive readings” (p. 355) they do so not with the 
intention of decoding them. In contrast, while my intention is also to offer poems as valid 
knowledges, it is to use them additionally as an analytic tool, with which to map and think, in 
relation to my encounters with the data and theory, and in asking ‘how and what comes to matter 
for counsellors-in. training?’ 
I draw here, too, on Barad’s, in elaborating on Bohr, agential realist understanding of an apparatus, 
in thinking about what it is, my use of the poem might do. Apparatuses, as with the poem, are not 
merely a collection or assemblage of human and non-human devices and forces. Rather, says Barad, 
they “are specific material reconfigurings of the world that do not merely emerge in time but 
iteratively reconfigure spacetimematter as part the ongoing dynamism of becoming” (2007, p. 142). 
As a material arrangement, an apparatus, and a poem, is productive of giving meaning to certain 
concepts (hence the poem as apparatus can also be called a material-discursive practice). Concepts, 
then, can be seen as being materially embodied within the confines of the poem (which then become 
embodied in a subsequent entanglement with the reader/time/space mattering of the read poem).  
Thinking back to the ontology of agential realism makes this clearer. The poem enacts the 
phenomena, through cutting together mutually intra-acting components, potentially enacted as lines 
in the poem. These components are not individually pre-existent, but rather only become 
determinate, intelligible or able to be differentially articulated through their causal intra-activity in 
the production of the phenomena.  
Apparatuses, and poems, also produce differences which matter. The poem, as an analytic and 
performative device is a boundary-making practice, formative of matter and meaning, that matters. 
In this way, the poem is not a static and fixed representation of things in the world, but an ongoing 





excluded from mattering, that is, through its structure, certain things are cut-together, apart, from 
others. I think these notions of ‘mattering’ and ‘reconfiguring’ align well with certain feminist and 
activist poets, whose poetic work is political, and whose work has worked to make the invisible 
visible, and change the landscape of possibilities for those marginalised and oppressed within the 
capitalist patriarchal systems. Writing in the New Yorker on the work of Adrienne Rich, for 
example, Claudia Rankine (2016) comments, “(w)ith Rich came the formulation of an alternate 
poetic tradition that distrusted and questioned paternalistic, heteronormative, and hierarchical 
notions of what it meant to have a voice, especially for female writers”. Poetry, in this sense, 
becomes not just literary or romantic or clever, but aims for a far wider, and more life determining, 
reach. This is particularly evident, too, in the infamous words of Audre Lorde:  
For women, then, poetry is not a luxury. It is a vital necessity of our existence.  It forms the 
quality of the light within which we predicate our hopes and dreams towards survival and 
change, first made into language, then into idea, then into more tangible action.  Poetry is 
the way we give name to the nameless so it can be thought. The farthest horizons of our 
hopes and fears are cobbled by our poems, carved from the rock experiences of our daily 
lives” (Lorde, 1984, p. 37).  
 
Poetry, in these forms, is most definitely a material-discursive practice, reconfiguring the world in 
all senses for the writers, for the world of poetry and for all of those who have had the privilege 
and pleasure of reading such work. New boundaries are enacted through the force of poetry, “not 
merely in the sense of bringing new things into the world but in the sense of bringing forth new 
worlds” (Barad, 2007, p. 170). This is true also in the sense that a poem intra-acts with the reader 
to produce an affective force. Poet, David Whyte, in speaking about poetry, suggests that 
“poetry...is not about a subject, not about a quality, or an experience, it is the experience itself” 
(Whyte, 2012). Such personal and evocative texts have come to be seen as potentially powerful, 
political, and meaningful in qualitative research, with the capacity to “move writers and readers, 





Jones, 2005, p. 764). In staying with a relational ontology, “affect refers to the force of intensive 
relationality - intensities that are felt but are not personal; visceral but not confined to an 
individuated body” (Whatmore, 2006, p. 604). In this sense, the force of poetry to move, to affect, 
is a dynamic relational one, an intra-action between, at least, words and bodies. Such a theorising 
reflects the new materialist, post-qualitative “shift of concern from what things mean to what they 
do”, “a shift from an onus on meaning to an onus on affect” (Whatmore, 2006, p. 604). Thus, the 
poem as an analytic device is intended to doubly work to reconfigure what things do rather than 
express what things mean, as well as to advance performative understandings of knowledge-
making practices for counsellors in training which may go on to affect others.   
Pattern  
I initially draw on Barad’s concept of the diffractive pattern as an analytic device to think with, as 
outlined in the previous chapter. This thinking invites a quantum understanding of the nature of 
reality and offers a tool for analysis which invokes an attention to the specificity and a detailed 
mapping of the “entangled structure of the changing and contingent ontology of the world” (Barad, 
2007, p. 73). In the mapping of a diffractive pattern, we attend to how, within the phenomena of 
interest, its components are cut together-apart to form a diffractive pattern, a local causal structure. 
Such components are not pre-existing, boundaried entities coming together to form the pattern, 
rather “the cut makes a connection” (Hughes & Lury, 2013, p. 794) in an ongoing, indeterminable 
and open field. Such cuts (together-apart) are “never once and for all, but continual and continuing” 
(p. 794).   
I want to consider what else might be gained by building on this relational, dynamic and material-
semiotic concept of pattern as an analytic device for thinking with the data, by drawing on the 
writing of others who are similarly using such notions of pattern to think with (Hughes & Lury, 





data as part of analytic practices. They outline an approach, however, which seeks to identify 
“processes of patterning” (p. 786), reflecting complex, quantum and ecological thinking, out of 
which emerges situated knowledge. They return to Haraway’s (1988) work in highlighting the 
concept of situatedness, drawing on, and bringing to the fore again, her ideas on the generative 
significance of dynamic relations of multiplicity, of the making of connections as well as divisions 
in the patterns of movement we are studying. They draw on Haraway and Barad’s ideas of 
diffraction in exploring the analytic potential of pattern for generating alternative ways of thinking, 
particularly in relation to difference. I find this especially useful and wish to focus on the 
articulation of this in relation to using the concept and device of a (diffraction) pattern to map not 
“where differences appear, but rather...where the effects of difference appear” (Haraway, 1992, p. 
300), and to focus not on “differences in any absolute sense, but... (on) the entangled nature of 
differences that matter’ (Barad, 2007, p. 36). 
If I am using the concept of pattern, in particular a diffractive pattern, to think with, or as an analytic 
device, then what exactly am I mapping, when it comes to differences that matter? Barad says, that 
according to “classical Newtonian physics, everything is one or the other: particle or wave, this or 
that, here or there” (2014, p. 174). Quantum physics, and diffraction, trouble this onto-
epistemology and queer this binary type, or duality, of difference. Barad refers to differences such 
as subject and object, wave and particle, position and momentum, binaries which, in classical 
physics were viewed as absolute separations, with matter able to assume the identity of only one 
or the other in time and space. Barad suggests however, that all differences are contingent, not fixed 
or given, and are indeterminate prior to specific intra-actions that enact cuts. She says, “that which 
is determinate (e.g. intelligible) is materially haunted by – infused with – that which is 
constitutively excluded (remains indeterminate, e.g., unintelligible)” (2014, p. 178). Binary 
differences, in this way, exist as a relation of difference within. Inside/outside, subject/object, 





of the other, it is simply that when one is made to matter, when it appears, it is as an entangled 
effect, not a fixed essence or identity. Barad troubles the very ontology of identity and the 
boundaries of the categorisations used to mark our identities. Thus, mapping in a diffractive sense 
is never about identifying the essence of fixed identities, rather it is always about mapping the 
contingent, entangled nature of the particular differences and how they come to matter, in the 
ongoing performance of identity. It is my hope that this contingent, entangled nature of identities 
will become evident in the following chapters, particularly in relation to my mapping of the identity 
of ‘tears’, as constituting ongoing counsellor-in-training identities.         
Re-turning then to Hughes and Lury, and others, additional insights can be gained from drawing 
on pattern in this way as an analytic device to think with. Hughes and Lury pursue the idea of an 
ecological (rather than social) epistemology underpinned by ideas aligned with Barad’s, in that any 
entity is seen to exist “multiply in ways that may not be initially apparent, for entities” entangled 
and dependent existences mean that none is fully defined by its entanglement in any one particular 
assemblage” (Bell, 2012, p. 113 in Hughes & Lury, 2013, p. 791). Such an epistemology is always 
process oriented, constructive (rather than deconstructive or destructive), and non-essentialist. 
Attention to pattern is suggested as a way of locating situatedness within the ever-moving processes 
of becoming. They suggest pattern in this sense can be located with the moments of difference 
between gathering/grasping together and dispersal/letting go, similar I think to Barad’s notion of 
the agential cut - a simultaneous dis/connection in which a pattern is made. Pattern, they say, also 
draws attention to both “repetition and difference, to entanglement and to partial relations between 
figure and ground, entity and environment” (p. 792).   
Stenner (2012) similarly writes of the device of pattern and its use to social scientists in that it 
offers an improved way of conceiving of “an immanent universe in process of becoming” (p. 145). 
Pattern, as device, presupposes the concept of distinguishable “modes of togetherness”, or a 





individual elements. Contrast, Stenner suggests, is a key concept in pattern, which requires a 
recognition of processes not just of gathering, but of the difference created between the gathering 
together and the dispersal. He uses the example of starlings swooping in unison and dispersing into 
tiny elements, and stresses the cumulative iteration required for such patterning to occur, which is 
also always changing. Bringing it back to social science, Stenner asserts that subjectivity is 
characterized by ‘patterning’ (p. 143), which he seems to suggest, after Bergson, is a process of 
selectivity, of identifying and enhancing “contrast effects, ‘cutting out’ or ‘parsing’ simplified 
patterns of image from the undivided flux that Bergson called the ‘fluid continuity of the real’” (p. 
143).   
The affordances of pattern as a concept, what this can entail and how it can become an inventive 
device in thinking through the happening of the social have become clearer to me through 
expanding here on Barad’s diffractive pattern. In particular, through ideas of situatedness and 
patterning “not as a position or identity, but as emergent in the diverse processes of differentiation” 
(Hughes & Lury, 2013, p. 795), which involve processes of gathering and dispersal, contrast, 
repetition and difference, and mutually transformative relations. But pattern is also more than the 
sum of its processes. Jeffries (2012) describes pattern as physical evidence of abstract knowledge, 
or material evidence of the oscillations of the world. Through the materiality afforded by pattern: 
conceptual, emotional, textured, we are given space to examine the way these surfaces, or figures, 
of patterning make the invisible, visible. As Barad says, this is not easy work and requires a fine 
attention to detail, to the coalescing and converging, and to the dispersing and letting go, of 
connecting threads and forces intra-actively reconfiguring what comes to matter.   
I turn now finally to (re)(con)figuration, as concepts to further think with in increasingly nuanced 
ways. I draw here on Lucy Suchman (2012) and her use of configuration as a device and also Donna 
Haraway (1997) and her use of the figure. I don’t see this process as a deepening of thinking around 





thinking with the details of each device through one another, where each disturbs, interferes with, 
and ultimately affirms and strengthens dynamic links between them to produce a patterning device 
to think the happening of subjectivity for the counsellor in training with.   
(Re)(Con)figuration 
I am increasingly interested in how things in the social world are configured in particular ways and 
in how they can be reconfigured, in how certain patterns are made, in contrast to a multiplicity 
which could be, might still be or could have been. Barad offers a way of examining both the 
material and the discursive in exploring what comes to matter, and how, and reminds us that we 
are always part of the world in its ongoing reconfiguring, (which I will come to here as well). 
Suchman suggests configuration as a methodological tool has two broad uses. First, similarly to 
how I have outlined patterning above, it “alerts us to attend to the histories and encounters through 
which things are figured into meaningful existence, fixing them through reiteration but also always 
engaged” (2012, p. 50) in a process of coming to be, and is equally explanatory for objects and 
subjects. In drawing on Barad, she suggests configuration places emphasis on both the discursive 
and the material and how they come together. In this way, configuration as a device works in 
reverse to enact a way of analysing or delineating both composition and bounds (cuts) of, what she 
calls an object, and what I refer to above as a pattern. This requires attention not only to the 
components (present and absent) comprising the object, but to how these come to be figured 
together, which necessarily requires attention to both power and affect in the figuring or patterning 
of social processes and their effects. 
The second part of the work configuration can do, according to Suchman, and which builds on how 
I have discussed pattern so far, is to draw analytic attention not just to the composition or practices 
enacting the object (pattern / figure), but to the significance of that object, the work that it can, and 
does do and the cultural imaginaries it materialises. Figuration considered in this way, has a double 





practices which become naturalised over time, and generative cultural circulation of those resulting 
figures and associated significances, which also act to render their constitutive practices invisible. 
Figuration acts to hold the pattern, and its constitutive material-semiotic practices together in order 
that it, the figure, moves forth in various ways. Configuration as an analytic device comes to form 
part of a toolkit for thinking about the constitutive and generative, reiterative and (potentially) 
transformative material-semiotic conjoining. Ultimately this enables an opening up of the 
(congealed and invisible) relations held in place and the labours that sustain them, for them to be 
reenacted differently, or reconfigured, and for this multiplicity to also be made intelligible. Through 
this articulation, a reanimating and a re-imagining of these figures that populate socio-material 
imaginaries and practices can occur (Suchman, 2012).      
Ultimately, at this point, I am particularly interested in these processes in relation to reimagining 
the figure of the counsellor in training as she is currently articulated, typically as a novice, as an 
autonomous, humanist subject on a linear journey towards expertise. I am interested in opening up 
to and examining the diffractive patterns, material-semiotic practices and forces, labour and 
relations which are in fact constituting this figure and in doing so, reconfiguring her. As Barad says 
of diffraction’s project, our aim is “engage in the ongoing work of the re-opening, unsettling and 
re-configuring “of what might yet be, of what was, and what comes to be” (2010, p. 264). 
Before I end this section in a re-turn to the place of my agency in relation to these analytic devices, 
I want to re-turn to Haraway and her project of figuration, especially as her work is a constitutive 
thread of much of the current work, such as Suchman’s and Barad’s, around (re)(con)figuring. 
Haraway has stated she is “consumed by the project of materialized refiguration” (Haraway, 2004, 
p. 223), primarily in her field of technoscience, but more broadly in working to reconfigure 
humanity’s modernist, generic, universal figure which has the “face of man”, and is endowed with 





“bearers of rights, the holders of property...with access to language and the power to represent...” 
(Haraway, 2004, p. 42). Through the politics of her work, she has claimed the use of the figure to 
name, story and enact new figures, of speech and of possibility for a non-generic humanity. Her 
figures (e.g. cyborg, ‘modest_witness’, oncomouse, companion species) - their forms, contexts and 
articulations - can be read to hold subjectivities such as those articulated above, subjects which are 
“shifting and multiple organised across variable axes of difference” always in the making (p. 54), 
constituted through historical material-semiotic practices, and never settled. A figure, she says, 
“collects up the people; a figure embodies shared meanings in stories that inhabit their audiences” 
(Haraway, 2004, p. 223). I use this idea here to think about the figure of the counsellor-in-training, 
and the shared meanings which have been gathered up, to this point, and continue to inhabit those 
who are training. I am in search of another figure, along the lines of Haraway and Barad’s 
figurations which tell different stories of the subject, that are partial, situated, relational and always 
in the making.     
In building on pattern and configuration as devices to think and work with, I finally draw also on 
Haraway’s string figure and process of string figuring, to “propose and enact patterns for 
participants to inhabit” (Haraway, 2016, p. 10). String figures are traced back to the string figure 
games and their diverse cultural histories of independent inventions of threads tied together and 
made by hands and brains, in the “relays of patterning” (p. 13). She likens this process of string 
figuring then to patterning, where what comes to matter is constituted in intra- and inter-action, 
where string figures are thinking and making practices, pedagogical practices and world-making 
performances. String figures tell, pattern and enact sympoietic (“complex, dynamic, responsive, 
situated, historical” (p. 58)) and semiotic material stories through their threads, knottings, 
connections and patterns, and become a figure for ongoingness, continually made, un-made and re-





In relation to thinking with my data in (re)(con)figuring the processes and practices of the 
counsellor-in-training, I am drawing then, primarily on the analytic devices of (diffractive) 
patterning, (re)(con)figuring, and string figuring, as outlined above. However, I am also reminded 
of the importance of re-conceptualising the ‘I’ who is drawing on these in a data analysis process, 
who is a diffractive rather than reflexive I, who is also always in the making and continually 
becoming-with in the entangled process of data-analysis (see my writing on researcher subjectivity 
in the previous chapter).  Finally, I am re-turned to the question of ethics and responsibility which 
underpin both Haraway and Barad’s projects. (Re)(con)figuring, making cuts, patterning and string 
figuring are never innocent or neutral projects.  I take on the advice offered by Vicki Bell to “cut 
well”, to guide me in embarking on this endeavour: 
Given the potentially infinite number of relevant elements in an intra-acting materially-
enacted world, the inexhaustible plethora of “entangled genealogies” (Barad, 2007), the 
event of a new conception, fact or correlation has to be one that, by definition, makes a 
demonstrable difference. The limit is precisely indifference. In other words, the advice to 
one who wishes to tell an entangled genealogy is not so much to represent accurately as it 
is to ‘cut well’, which is to say provocatively or perhaps ‘generatively’, inviting the concern 




















DATA ANALYSIS –  








CHAPTER SIX  
 
Toward a decentring of the subject in data analysis  
 
Introduction  
This chapter documents empirical beginnings of data analysis and subsequent thinking with theory 
in this project. It outlines an initial attempt at data analysis which caused me to pause and question 
what I was actually doing in beginning this empirical process. Having spent significant amounts of 
time both generating data and reading-writing post-humanist theory up to this point in this project, 
I was unprepared for what would happen when I brought these two things (and my researcher 
subjectivity) together into the process of data analysis. This diffractive process generated 
significant knowing-in-being/doing for me which I wanted to capture and expand upon in order 
take that knowledge back into ongoing data analysis, in what can be described as an iterative, intra-
active, reconfiguring process of data analysis.  
The following then is a discussion of significant knowing produced in this reconfiguring process. 
I begin, at what I thought was the beginning, with data from my first interview. I proceed to 
document the multiple directions ‘thought’ was propelled in as a result of diffracting data with 
theory with researcher subjectivity (and likely multiple other forces, too). With each consideration 
produced, I then attempt to plug that back into thought about further analysis, in order to continue 
the iterative process of data analysis and reconfiguring in the production of new knowledge. 
Specifically, along with documenting the intra-active processes enacted, this chapter proceeds to 
outline the following main considerations:  
(1) the limits of a linear text for enacting thought’s multiplicity, hence the introduction of ‘split 
texts’ as a diffractive experiment;  
(2) the challenge of enacting respect and care for the words/voices/bodies/traces of my 





(3) recognition of a submission to positioning researcher and participant as intentional meaning-
making–subjects – moving instead toward mutually constitutive processes of matter making itself 
intelligible; 
(4) the strength of my own post-structural inclinations to think the subject in relation to discourse, 
resistance and agency in the world – a diffractive experiment ensues where the past touches the 
present and data meets theory in order to enliven anew post-structural and posthuman thinking 
with subjectivity; 
(5) Focusing anew on what comes to matter for counsellors-in-training – de-centring the human 
subject and inviting ‘wonder’ into entangled intra-actions; and 
(6) the limits of the interview – re-turning to the ‘good and appropriate’ data of collective 
biography groups in order to ‘do more with less data’. 
Entangled beginnings 
In coming specifically to the process of data analysis, I began by listening to, and reading through 
my first individual interview after months of reading-writing post-humanist theory, looking 
particularly to engage in a diffractive analysis, different to any kinds of analysis I had previously 
encountered. This interview was one of the eight where I inquired into the participant’s tracing of 
her psycho-social history of becoming a counsellor, into thinking back on the places and spaces 
and affects of first encountering the im/possibilities of becoming a counsellor, and of co-
constructing, in conversation with me, her ideas and experiences of being and becoming a 
counsellor, having experienced her first year in the counselling programme.  
As can be seen from the questions devised for this semi-structured interview (appendix 2), my 
thinking at the time was primarily influenced by social constructionist and post-structural ideas. 
That is, I was interested to co-construct narratives which articulated the participants’ ideas about 





around what it is to be a counsellor, and explore how they negotiated and navigated through those 
discourses, and were both positioned and able to position themselves in relation to them (Davies, 
1991; Davies and Harre, 1990). In effect, I was interested in processes of subjectification from a 
discursive underpinning, particularly as a contrast to the humanist thinking dominant in theorising 
the lived experiences of counsellors in training. However, in re-turning to the first of these 
interviews, with a, seemingly, changed onto-epistemological understanding of subjectivity as 
dynamic, intra-active, material-discursive practices, I was interested, and challenged, to now think 
differently, diffractively, with this data.                 
 
In this way, prior to installing my bodymind in/with/through the interview data, I began to think about 
exactly what I might be doing differently in this intended “data analysis after coding” (St. Pierre & Jackson, 
2014, emphasis in original), that has become analysis as instead “thinking with theory” (Jackson & Mazzei, 
2012). I have read, written and lived diffraction and post-humanist performative theory for months, maybe 
even years now, and it has worked its way into my bodymind in particular ways, yet, and, I found myself 
apprehensive about my capacities to theorise or “think with theory” with my data. Faced with what felt 
equally daunting and exciting I found myself thrust back into humanist expectations of my ‘self’ as the 
rational knower, tasked with uncovering and representing the truth that exists in the data, or at least an 
intelligent interpretation of it. Faced with this recognition I was reminded of earlier reading-writing with 
St. Pierre (2014) on the disconnect evident in much research in education where authors claim a ‘post’ 
ontology yet go on to enact a humanist qualitative methodology. Rather than reacting with a Cartesian 
sense of failure, I became curious about my (material-discursive) difficulty in enacting this shift in onto-
epistemology and open to where this curiosity might lead me.  I was buoyed, too, to recognise my own 
ontological becoming enacted in my very curiosity and openness to the material-discursive entanglements 
that are producing my researcher subjectivity, in this iterative and dynamic process of knowledge 
production. 
 
I found myself re-turned toward my own earlier writing, enacting Katie King’s (n.d.) idea of pastpresents, 
“how the past and the present continually converge, collapse and co-invent each other”, as I sensed my 
enacting the tensions of working both within and against the normalizing and dominant discourse of 
humanism, of the knowing human subject producing knowledge of the world. This re-turn, or collapse of 





only ever experimental, with no template or guide to work from in thinking here, with a post-humanist 
ontology, which by its very nature means nothing ever stays the same. Having been opened up, for a brief 
moment, from the normalising discourse of humanism and its dominant research practices which incite 
me to start at the beginning, as if there were origins rather than just the “always already becoming in 
entanglement” (Lather & St. Pierre, 2013, p. 630), I became curious to follow these material-discursive 
openings produced through and with my becoming-researcher subjectivity, with the ideas of pastpresents 
and intra-activity, back into the data.    
 
However, at the same time, and before re-turning to the researcher-data-research entanglement, I 
experienced a frustration at the limits of this linear mode of telling, here, as I felt myself desiring to move 
in multiple directions at once with the data, sensing the multiplicity of thought in its intra-active 
production, and yet being constrained to write and act as if one thought, and act, is linearly produced, one 
after another, rather than multiple, all at once.   
 
Hence, my diffractive experiment in this chapter with text, split between text as usual, and text 
boxes, fonts, and text alignments in this analysis, in order to perform a ‘material-discursive 
mapping’ of the data-researcher-research entanglement, which can perhaps go some way to 
articulating the intra-active, and non-linear, inseparability of this lively research process. I attempt 
to map this through (1) the ‘main’ text which outlines the data analysis process and analysis which 
result from thinking the data with theory;  
(2) text boxes with text which offer occasional mappings of my entangled researcher subjectivity as it is 
both produced in, and productive of, this entanglement; and 
 
(3) text boxes with text  
of ‘poems’ produced 
from the data. 
 
Lenz Taguchi talks about this in relation to her own collaborative analyses of data as a multiplicity 
of analyses that “seemed to grow wildly like weeds or grass” where “all kinds of matter, including 
human discourse…are involved in processes of making themselves intelligible to each other in 





signifies both the challenge, and the importance, of attempting to articulate here the dynamic 
entanglement of ‘all kinds of matter’ that is the dynamic practice of knowledge production. For 
without this, we are likely returned to that dominating, and debilitating, sense of the inherent 
separability of knower and known, and the humanist logic of the rational, autonomous individual 
acting upon the world, rather than intra-acting as a part of it in its ongoing iterative reconfiguring. 
Hence, it is my hope that the insertion of ‘text boxes’ does some of this work, of enacting a 
diffractive pattern, where each interfere with, overlap, run through and leap about each other, where 
differences emerge within and where, ultimately, knowing materialises differently in between the 
material-discursive practice of split texts (Mol, 2002). Also, in line with Mol (2002) who uses the 
split text in her writing, I would add that my text is not glued to the page where it happens to be 
printed and the parallel texts may be read out of time and space with each other, thus producing 
iterative reconfigurings of the diffractive patterns which may emerge for the reader(s).  
I am also reminded at this point of Barad’s agential cuts, where the cuts that are made, or enacted, 
necessitate also, exclusions. The linearity of many parts of the text, that is, the performative 
enactment of ‘thought’ as that intra-active process of knowledge production, means that even 
though one idea is described, or performed, at a time, it is always ‘cut-apart’ from multiple others 
in this ongoing and entangled process. In this way too, there is no single root of origin or essence 
to be found and described, only a starting in the middle “to look for what emerges in the connections 
among these different fields and flows” (Lenz Taguchi, 2013b, p. 714), or for what is made 
intelligible. Thus, my becoming researcher subjectivity, which I also attempt to map here as part 
of this phenomena of knowledge production, is not the essence of ‘me’ or ‘my’ 
experience/thought/knowing, but a decentred subjectivity, where thought comes into being through 
a “deep loading interconnectedness and companionship” with, at least, but not only, the data, 
multiple other writers and researchers and texts, and with the “material discursive places and spaces 





entanglements is not easy to map within the current limits of text based products, I nevertheless 
think it is essential to attempt, in order that more and more iterations will build on, or diffract 
through, each other, so that the material-discursive practices of subjectification and knowing can 
become intelligible in ways that reconfigure what it is to be/come and know. Thus, reading from 
such a perspective invites, too, not simply a paying attention to the multiplicity of what is present, 
enacted on the page, but also a recognition of what might have been excluded, but not non-existent, 
a looking for the ghostly traces or absences which are also always a part of what comes to matter, 
on the page.        
Care, respect and an ethical response 
This re-turning to the ‘data’, seeing the faces and hearing the voices of my participants, and thinking with 
theory has concurrently produced in me a multiplicity of affect/thought in relation to my participants. I 
struggle with the idea of continuing to refer to their generosity in participating as ‘data’ which seems to 
remove all sense of the very lively lived-felt-transformative experience we all participated in. To somehow 
reduce this to words on a page feels like, a disservice, at least. Not only did I interview and facilitate 
collective biography groups with each of them, but I worked with them as students, over a period of at 
least two years, and in the period where I was just beginning as a lecturer and they were so very generous 
to me, in that student-lecturer relationship also. The question arises, how do I enact respect and care in 
what feels like an appropriation of particularly vulnerable aspects of their lives, that they have entrusted 
me with, and how do I do that in relation with a post-humanist onto-epistemology, which has come to be 
important to my theoretical analysis, subsequent to my time with these participants/students?  At this 
point in time, having excluded the possibility of inviting them to take part in analysis with me perhaps 
through further collective biography groups, and having maintained email contact with them inviting them 
to remain engaged in any way they wish, I return to thinking with theory. I am prompted to ask ‘how am I 
conceptualising the data - the voices and faces and bodies of those about whom I am writing?’ It seems 
important to gain some sense of this, lest I slip into notions of representationalism, believing that what I 
come to tell here needs to be, (as if that were even possible let alone desirable), an accurate 
representation of what took place in the time and space of the interviews and collective biography groups. 
This seduction of representationalism leads me to another question, ‘does respecting and caring for my 
participants equate to ensuring I accurately represent their voices/words/experiences?’ In recognising the 
emergence of this question, I am reminded yet again of  the challenges and difficult work which is required 





different researcher practices and subjectivities to emerge” (Lenz Taguchi, 2013b, p. 715).  Re-turning (to) 
these emerging questions, I ask instead, how can I respect and care for the words/voices/bodies/traces of 
those participants from that time and space while recognising there is no ‘accurate representing’ only an 
iterative, dynamic and intra-active reconfiguring?   
 
I am reminded first of all, that this is an ethical reconfiguring, too, an intertwining of ethics, 
knowing and being, in that each intra-action matters. Care and respect then come to be about, not 
accuracy, but responsibility. As Barad reminds us, “intra-acting responsibly as part of the world 
means taking account of the entangled phenomena that are intrinsic to the world’s vitality and being 
responsive to the possibilities that might help us to flourish” (2007, p. 396). In such entangled 
materialisations, of new configurations, new subjectivities, she says, “even the smallest cuts 
matter” (p. 384). How can I enact responsibility then, with my data, with the moments, told and 
lived, with my participants and the traces of their entangled selves they have left in trust with me?   
 
I am impelled to think first of what I will not do. I won’t privilege my knowing over theirs, turning 
them into an object to be gazed upon from afar. In fact, I will discard the binary of the pre-existing 
subject and object from this outset. Instead, I will be open to our ongoing intra-activity, to the 
material traces of them, of me, of us, of our material-discursive encounters from those times, places, 
and spaces diffractively reconfiguring themselves as I encounter those traces in the present, 
knowing that each encounter, by the time it is present, marks a moment which is already past. 
I won’t look to reduce, code and categorize experience as constituted through language. I will look 
instead to tell of entangled moments of difference differing, to move beyond the material-discursive 
practice of binaries which seek to categorize, limit, reduce and fix, and ultimately both privilege 
and oppress. I will not look to ask ‘what does the data mean?’, assuming I can interpret the meaning 
hidden in words, that I can tell it like it was, is and can be, as if the data represent “humanist 





2014, p. 10). I will resist the humanist pull of speaking of a rational, self-contained, autonomous 
subject where agency and knowing emanate from within a stable and fixed subject (Mazzei, 2013; 
2016). Rather, I seek to open up (to) the entangled practices of how things came to be, and might 
yet be different, to see voice as an entangled, and ongoing material-discursive practice. I will look 
to ask instead ‘what can the data do?’ in order that entangled material-discursive practices of 
analysis may be generative and seek to make anew the possibilities for flourishing. In these ways, 
to begin with at least, I seek an ethical, respectful and responsible re-turn, in this time and space, 
with the already entangled material traces of voices and bodies of my data.  
Beyond human-centred linear narratives 
For some (likely linear) reason, I chose to start at the beginning with my data analysis and re-turn to the 
initial interviews I conducted with the participants prior to collective biography groups. Given the onto-
epistemological shift which has occurred for me, it is perhaps no surprise that I faced challenges in 
returning to now think this data with an agential realist framework. In thinking with Lenz Taguchi I see my 
inclination toward a centring of myself as researcher telling the human-centred linear narrative of these 
participants and their individual journeys toward becoming a counsellor. Engaging with the first interview, 
I resist such a humanist telling and start to recognise some of the tensions created for my participant 
through her narrative of the discourses around what it is to be a counsellor in contrast to how she narrates 
her own subjectivity. I can immediately imagine writing resistance and alternative stories to disrupt and 
counter the normative discourse of what it is to be a counsellor. And I see that this thinking is clearly how 
I framed my questions and what guided me in asking the questions I did.   
 
 
i didn’t see myself as a counsellor because 
i didn’t think I fitted the stereotypical view 
of what you think a counsellor looks like. 
In my mind i wanted to be a psychologist 
i started doing some planning to do that 
sort of had a few meetings 
i just thought this all seems very clinical and 





i don't know whether part of that was sort of 
the perceived stigma out there 
you know, that psychologists are more qualified 
and get paid a lot more. 
 
i didn’t see myself as a counsellor because 
i didn’t think I fitted the stereotypical view 
of what you think a counsellor looks like. 
They’re all quite old, quite old fashioned, quite serious 
just never really think, counsellors were positive and can be fun 
i always thought i didn’t want to spend my life 
listening to negative stories all the time 
i saw it as a hard job 
i thought you had to be a certain personality, 
serious, older, mature 
sit there with your pad and pencil 
and quite disconnected 
just this temporary person who 
was quite disconnected from you really. 
 
 
i guess it must be from my experiences 
of my counsellor at school 
which were terrible, he was terrible. 
he was definitely the type of counsellor 
I would not want to be, 
tell me what to do, didn’t listen, 
disagreed with everything i said, 
told the principal everything i said, 
and clearly he didn’t believe me. 
But i went and saw a counsellor again 
so i guess there must have been something 
that was telling me 





were going to be like that. 
 
i didn’t see myself as a counsellor because 
i didn’t think I fitted the stereotypical view 
of what you think a counsellor looks like. 
i thought my personality wouldn't fit 
with being a counsellor 
because i am quite, i guess, enthusiastic and positive 
i kind of thought maybe that wouldn't work 
it would be too in your face and 
people wouldn’t like that but 
it doesn’t seem to be that way, you know. 
 
i didn’t see myself as a counsellor because 
i didn’t think I fitted the stereotypical view 
of what you think a counsellor looks like. 
A counsellor’s meant to be like, 
really likes other people and 
likes being around other people. 
i like being around other people 
but at the same time 
i need my own time and that’s really important to me. 
So that i grappled with for a while. 
i was like, well how can i be a counsellor who’s there, 
who spends a lot of time with other people 
and you’re there for other people 
but yet be this personality type that doesn’t want to? 
 
i didn’t see myself as a counsellor because 
i didn’t think I fitted the stereotypical view 
of what you think a counsellor looks like. 
During that training process of being in a class 
it was really great to see such a range of people 





there’s no set way that i have to be 
that says i can be a counsellor. 
Look at the huge variety of people in the room 
young, old, different cultures, genders. 
That helped, because i thought, well, 
there isn’t that set way 
that you have to be. 
(Maia) 
 
Now, I wonder, how can I think differently with this data? Beyond linear, autonomous tellings, and 
even beyond vulnerability to the discursive. Toward the material-discursive. Beyond agency in 
resistance to dominant subject positions. Toward agency as an entangled, emergent, material-
discursive be(com)ing. Where do I start?  How do I become ‘thought’? Lenz Taguchi (2013b) 
offers inspiration for this process in investigating how our practices of thinking produce different 
researcher subjectivities and ultimately different knowledge. Through illustrations of collaborative 
practices of data analysis drawing on a “life-span narration” interview with a young Iranian woman 
(p. 710), Lenz Taguchi notes how easy it was in the initial phases of data analysis to want to 
“describe how Fataneh, as a body-subject, makes meaning of her lifeworld in the various places 
described in the interview” (p. 711). Lenz Taguchi speaks of Fatenah’s understanding of herself in 
a linear fashion, “first as a refugee and then as an immigrant girl, a relatively assimilated Swedish 
teenager, before “becoming Persian” again” (p. 713). In my initial readings of my interview data I 
saw how easily I understood Maia in a similar linear fashion, first as a young person experiencing 
counselling herself, then as a teacher coming to see herself as interested in and enjoying “helping” 
young people, before embarking on becoming a counsellor herself. I could re-present the narratives 
of how Maia, as body-subject, had made meaning of her life experiences which led her to the 





Similarly to Lenz Taguchi, who notes that such analysis also leads to exploration of “a lifeworld 
of resistance practices” such as Fataneh as “one who resists oppressive teachers, bullying Swedish 
kids, and demanding parents” (p. 711), I noted my inclination to look for discursive tensions Maia 
has been subjected to and how she has negotiated (resisted) these in order to constitute her own 
counsellor subjectivity. I find myself effortlessly drawn to this kind of post-structural theorising. I 
think I can easily see how the binaries, categories and normativities of what and how it is to be, the 
right and proper kind of woman, or counsellor, to fit the taxon, are both reproductive of these very 
taxonomies and productive of disaffection for those who do not fit. Then, there are individual 
stories of resistance that I can tell, of finding a way to counter the dominant ideas of counsellor as, 
for example, ‘serious, older, mature’ with the possibility of an effective counsellor actually being 
‘young, energetic, enthusiastic, and positive’.   
Going through this process and thinking with Lenz Taguchi (2013b) and others has led me to a 
different (entangled) knowing than that I may have had if I had simply begun to attempt to 
immediately think my data more intentionally, perhaps, with new materialism and Barad’s agential 
realism. Thinking this initial interview data in this way has, in particular, highlighted three things 
for me. First, continuing to ‘do’ data analysis in this way, even perhaps adding in the ‘material’ to 
also consider the ‘meaning of matter’ continues to position me, the researcher, as a separate, 
conscious, intentional meaning-making researcher-subject pre-existing any relations with the world 
(data). As Lenz Taguchi states, the “fundamental condition for this thinking still takes the human 
subject as a starting point” and “renders matter itself passive in the relation and the human subject 
as the only agent of knowledge-production, intention, and transformation” (2013b, p. 711). Thus, 
the challenge remains, in thinking with new materialisms and an agential realist framework, to do 
data analysis in a way which shifts from human meaning-making to instead enacting the mutually 





other” in their ongoing intra-active relations (Barad, 2007, p. 185). I attend to this challenge in my 
next iteration of data analysis, in the following chapters. 
Post-structural inclinations and re-thinking difference 
Second, and related to the point above, is my recognition not only of my inclination to position 
myself as an intentional meaning making researcher-subject, but also to position my participants 
in the same way. In desiring to hold onto the discursive in data analysis I almost effortlessly 
positioned Maia as a pre-existent subject vulnerable to, and left to negotiate, the imposition of 
norms. Whilst this recognition and deconstruction of power and discourse has been essential to the 
project of feminism, it is clearly not my intention in this research to produce knowledge which 
further highlights the ways in which counselling students are subject to and negotiate discourse in 
the process of becoming counsellors. Engaging with this interview data at this point highlighted 
for me the very different project I have chosen to undertake in order to produce a different kind of 
knowledge. Central to this recognition at this point is an understanding of difference. Staying with 
the post-structural philosophy of difference and its focus on norms and normativity as dominant 
systems of meaning we, as humans, are subject to, means that difference, and identity, is always 
conceptualised in relation to such systems. While this has been essential to challenge the 
dominating structures and systems of meaning of majority groups, this also equates to identity as 
always articulated in relation to dominant/majority groups, categories, and norms and often leaves 
resistance as the only means of enacting any other forms of life. Difference, in this sense, is said to 
be “negative”, understood as “marks of alterity in terms of identity or as a necessary othering of an 
unknowable Other” (Lenz Taguchi, 2013b, p. 712).   
In new materialisms thinking, however, including the work of Braidotti, Deleuze, (cited in Lenz 
Taguchi, 2013b) and Barad (2007), difference comes to be understood as a practice, a dynamic 





differentiating that is constitutive of the world and its intra-active becoming. In this sense 
differentiating as performative, as movement, flow and always becoming in relation cannot be 
about othering or separating or static difference as marks of identity resulting in binaries and 
hierarchies and endless failures.   
I am reminded therefore of this project’s aims, with its onto-epistemological focus on a post-
humanist agential-realist framework, that hopes to think counsellor subjectivity from a different 
starting point, other than the human subject as subject to discourse. While I have outlined this in 
previous chapters, this difference (in relation to difference) has come into a stark kind of focus at 
this point in relation to the entangled process of data analysis. (Perhaps indicative of the exact 
diffractive process of a transcorporeal, embodied becoming-with the data I refer to previously, 
where Lenz Taguchi describes the body as a “a space of transit, a series of open-ended systems in 
interaction with the material-discursive ‘environment’”? (2012, p. 265)). I am reminded that an 
agential-realist framework, a diffractive methodology, is attentive not to individual subjects and 
objects, but to phenomena or material-discursive boundary making practices that produce “objects” 
and “subjects” and other differences in an ongoing relationality, flow, intra-activity. Such an 
analysis of entangled practices must be attentive to the intra-action of multiple apparatuses. Thus, 
in returning to my data, I aim to once again, let go of the post-structural subject and her multiple 
identities, and instead attempt to begin thinking data with the concept of material-discursive 
practices. As I speak about later, enacting the concept of ‘wonder’ (Maclure, 2013) aids in this 
analytic process.   
Poststructural inclinations and a diffractive experiment 
In this (re-)realisation of agential realism’s focus, and my shift, from the post-structural subject, I 
am challenged to (re)think what thinking material-discursive practices with this data might 
produce, or, in other words, re-imagine what I thought I was doing and what I might actually be 





lively entanglement, I sense how focused on the ‘subject’ I have been, forever, on producing myself 
as an ‘acceptable’ subject, latterly on seeing myself as being produced in discourse and coming to 
produce myself as an, at times, ‘resistant’ subject. I have thought about my multiple identities and 
those of my participants and how we continually negotiate and labour to escape and eclipse the 
conditions of our existence. Rather than letting the intensity of this past remain a haunting, an 
absent-presence in relation to this project it seems fitting, with diffraction’s imperative to meet 
each moment and be attentive to the multiple apparatuses of our entangled practices, that I articulate 
some of these traces in this project. In doing this here, I re-turn (to) space-time moments from the 
beginning and middle of this project, or as Barad says, to “space-time coordinates” in a 
“Reiteration/ Reconfiguration/ Returning for the first time, again” in order to diffract, entangle, cut 
together/apart and enliven anew (Barad, 2010, p. 243) the practices of data analysis/thinking with 
theory in this project. In doing this, I am particularly interested to think with both the post-structural 
subject of my past-present theorising and the material-discursive practices of Barad’s theorising, 
in order that I do not come to enact a binary of either/or in further analyses, which I am at risk of 
doing when I state above my coming to the aim of ‘letting go’ of the post-structural subject and her 
multiple identities.      
 
Space-time co-ordinate 1: I began this project posing the research question: ‘What does it mean for 
students undertaking a counsellor education programme to embody a counsellor identity?’ likely 
wondering about the processes/challenges/tensions by which the self-in-relation negotiates and 
labours to integrate/embody/perform yet more identities. Through an autoethnographic beginning 
to this project (Barraclough, 2014) I interrogated my own experience of ‘migrating identities’ 
through the use of ‘poetries’ – writing as inquiry into my experience (Brogden, 2010). In response 
to my poetic writing inquiries, I then produced questions and curiosities in relation to thinking 





generation of data. This method followed autoethnography’s aim of situating the personal in 
relation to the social and cultural, in a kind of continual recycling, and here I used it in an attempt, 
as Fine (1994) says, at working the hyphen between self and other, to ‘probe how we are in relation 
with the contexts we study and with our informants’ (p. 72). The following text box presents my 
questions/curiosities generated at this time. The original poetries can be read in the paper 
(Barraclough, 2014): 
How do counsellors-in-training tell stories of their process of transformation? Are they, too, 
solitary, autonomous subjects viewing models of perfection from great distances? 
 
What other subjectivities will they have ‘in tow’? 
 
What competing discourses will they be struggling within/against and how will they be 
positioning themselves within these? 
 
Where are the sites of tension and struggle? 
 
Who do counsellors-in-training experience as producing their counsellor identities? Who do 
they experience as having power to name their competence? 
 
What processes or structures (e.g. assessment) do counsellors-in-training experience as 
holding power to determine their competency and their identities?  
How do counsellors-in-training position themselves in relation to the above? How do they 
position themselves as a participant in the conversations that produce the narrative of their 
lives?         
             (Barraclough, 2014) 
 
My analysis at this point drew on my therapeutic practice and the theory of narrative therapy (White 
& Epston, 1990; Monk, Winslade, Crocket, & Epston, 1997), the turn to narrative identities in the 
research literature (Smith & Sparks, 2008) and collective biography as influenced by post-structural 
ideas (Davies & Gannon, 2006a). As such I conceptualised of myself and my participants as 
subjects existing within multiple and competing discourses, who, through processes of 





position themselves differently, to take up agentic positions, to become participants in the 
conversations the social and cultural world was having about who and how they could be/come.      
Space-time coordinate 2: Through my reading for this thesis I continued to pursue this notion of 
the post-structural subject, inspired and influenced by the writing of Bronwyn Davies in particular, 
along with reading Barad, Haraway and Deleuze and so beginning to rethink ideas of the subject, 
self, agency and the material/cultural divide. This second space-time coordinate relays a written 
response (in the text box below) I made after reading Davies’ (2000) chapter titled ‘Eclipsing the 
Constitutive Power of Discourse’ in ‘Working the ruins: Feminist Poststructural Theory and 
Methods in Education’. In this chapter, she speaks of the possibilities of moving against, and 
beyond, the very discursive forces which shape us, using fiction to explore “particular instances of 
what it might mean for the writing/reading subject to “eclipse the conditions of its own 
emergence”” (Butler, 1997, p. 14 in Davies, 2000, p. 180). While acknowledging that some post-
structural writers deny that such eclipse, or agency, is possible due to the constitutive nature and 
power of discourse (e.g. Jones, 1997), Davies instead draws on the power feminists have found in 
poststructural theorizing to make the effects of discourse (re)visible in order to disrupt, resist and 
reimagine where and how to position themselves. Thus, I found myself trying, yet again, to 
understand if/how it might be possible for the subject to eclipse the (oppressive) conditions and 




a desiring body 
plagued 
by external signs 
and significations 
for how and what 







capable, competent, unique 
nurturing, nourishing, giving 
productive, reproductive 
capable of producing 
and reproducing 
more exceptional creatures 
 
an ever-present desire 
to eclipse it all 
to break free 
defy the boundaries, categorizations, 
that attempt to fix, lodge, 
define 
but, that enable her 




normal, successful, useful, meaningful 
words that tell her 
how to live 
a good life? 




but be careful 
not to substitute one category 
for another 
not to give up those descriptions 







linger a while 




in a place 
without inscription 
on the body 
marking out how one, or other 
should be, behave 
 
a place 
that she defines 








from a body’s desires, without 
being marked 
as different 
not fitting the taxon 
not good enough 
not correct 
 
because not fitting 
is always in relation to Other, 
an Other who is always better. 
now, there is no hierarchy 





in these, always, multiple 
moving, subject positions 
 
good enough is nowhere 
all there is here. 
the beauty of here, and there 
that resists any kind of categorization 
of fixed naming 
of fixed positioning 
of fixity. 
 
Instead, there is a fluidity 
an always-in-relation 
a situated in-between-ness 
of past-present-futures. 
full of possibility and potentialities 
for redeployment 
for eclipsing the structures, histories, and stories 
which attempt to fix her 
in place. 
 
fixed, stuck, frozen, 
limited, restricted, reduced, 
does a naming always limit? 
(or, can there be power in it, too?) 
or only in resisting the power 
of the Other to name? 
 
to be unnamed, outside of 
discourse, beyond - 
is that possible? 
to instead see, look 
for escape, lines of flight, 






in naming the discourse 
losing the clichés 
speaking from the body 
embodied writing, instead 
a transformative escape into 
that indefinable space 
if only for a moment? 
 
no longer fixed, fixable. 
an embodied fluidity 




literally and figuratively. 
no longer 
defined, pathologised and fixed. 
instead, categories are loosened 
marks are erased 




leaking, in excess. 
they can no longer name her 
reduce her or 
mark her as being 
one thing 
and not another 
 
she is always in excess 
of their naming 





what is more can be less. 




I have remained so firmly persuaded by the possibilities that exist as a post-structural subject for 
resistance, change and agency that I recognise my reluctance to easily let go of this feminist subject. 
This recognition here, from firstly re-turning to the data and then in thinking through the previous 
two space-time coordinates leads me to re-turn to the literature and do as Jackson and Mazzei 
(2012) suggest, use theory to think with data in order to open up to the production of new 
knowledge. What I am particularly interested in at this juncture is how theory might help me to 
think through what I am experiencing as a tension between (my) post-structural tendencies to want 
to start (and end) with the subject-in-discourse and post-humanism’s desire to afford new 
possibilities for thinking subjectivity, particularly in relation to displacing categorical distinctions 
such as the nature-culture/material-discursive boundaries (Toffoletti, 2002; Braidotti, 2013). In 
order to do this, I now draw on three empirical articles (Højgaard & Søndergaard, 2011; Juelskjaer, 
2013; Søndergaard, 2016) whose authors are particularly interested in relating Barad’s agential 
realism to post-structural feminist thinking (drawing on Judith Butler’s work especially but also 
Davies, Wetherell and others), in order to consider “where all of this may take feminist agential 
realist work on subjectivities” (Juelskjaer, 2013, p. 755).  Despite, or because of, my significant 
engagement with these theories (post-structural and agential realism) I agree with Søndergaard 
(2016) when she says “(t)he philosophical character of Barad’s and Butler’s work does, however, 
necessitate further specifications to inspire methodology vis-à-vis qualitative material” (p. 1), 
further stating that neither work explains how to do qualitative research including how to produce 
strategies for analysing qualitative material. In addition, Højgaard & Søndergaard (2011) claim that 





in its development of material-discursive processes of subjectification and power. It is therefore 
useful to turn to those who have taken considerable steps to apply post-structural and agential realist 
theorising to empirical analyses in developing further understanding of discursive and material 
forces in the processes of subjectification, and of the productive potential of agential realism for 
rethinking subjectivity.   
Recognising the multiplicity of forces operating in empirical fields, including technological, 
material and discursive, these authors became interested in new materialist theories to help navigate 
such complexities becoming apparent in empirical work. In particular, they used both post-
structural and agential realist thinking to theorise (1) subjectivity in relation to bullying and the 
case of twelve year old Marian (Højgaard & Søndergaard, 2011), (2) the constitution of ‘new’ 
gendered subjectivities in the case of 13-year-old students experiencing ‘new beginnings’ as they 
changed to a new school (Juelskjaer, 2013), and (3) the distribution of violence and aggression in 
the everyday lives of two children, Thomas and William, aged 9 and 11 years (Søndergaard, 2016). 
They were interested to not lose sight of how “normativities of sociocultural categories work on, 
in and through human beings” (Højgaard & Søndergaard, 2011, p. 340) or of the forces and kinds 
of power at work in constituting subjectivities, however, they wanted to extend their thinking 
toward matter, materialities, technologies and spatiality and temporality as further co-constituting 
forces in these processes. For this reason, I was particularly interested to see what their work in 
thinking the empirical with these aims, can offer my project with its similar desires, especially at 
this point of recognition of my bias toward the subject and the discursive. Several points emerge 
which are of interest to me. 
First, in an analysis which focuses on agential realism, the individual as occupying the central 
subject position shifts to occupying one of (potentially) many subject positions. In the case of 
Marian, the focus becomes not on her as an individual experiencing bullying, but of the enactment 





(or object) positions. Subjectivity here, then, becomes another intra-acting force, along with 
discourse, matter, technology, and so on. This enables an analysis far more sensitive to multiple 
elements contributing to the apparatus (material-discursive practices) of the production of, in this 
case, bullying (Højgaard & Søndergaard, 2011).   
Second, Højgaard & Søndergaard (2011) suggest that co-thinking poststructural and new 
materialist theory invites a scrutiny of not only the “detailed specifications of the boundaries, 
“properties,” and categories of the material forces involved in the enactments of the empirical 
phenomena in focus”, such as cell phones, websites, spaces, architecture and so on. In addition, 
they suggest consideration of “human entities and forces of enactments”, such as “desires, 
emotions, suffering, pleasure, etc., but (add that) such specifications should never be finally 
determined” (p. 349-350). The authors use the example here of the forces of a cell-phone and a 
particular desire intra-acting to produce an enactment of the phenomena (Barad, 2007) of peer 
bullying. Such a phenomena, or material-discursive practice, can then be analysed for its further 
enactments, circulations and transformations in the data. Ultimately, what this allows us to map 
and think differently are the multiple entities or forces (human and non-human) and how these 
intra-act in the production of phenomena, and how these very phenomena can go on to also be 
enacting forces themselves, all of this offering the possibility of more complex and finely tuned 
analyses. Given the potentially endless forces this brings into focus, it is interesting to note that 
Højgaard & Søndergaard conclude by emphasizing that the “choice” of entities and “choice” of 
phenomena a researcher selects and foregrounds in analysis will depend on the “researcher, on the 
research ambitions, and ultimately on how the phenomenon in focus is demarcated and defined” 
(2011, p. 351). This is similar in some ways to Bell (2012) who suggests we must “cut 
well…inviting the concern of others” (p. 117), whose words I take with me back into further data 





Third, Juelskjaer (2013) highlights the shift from how, in thinking with post-structuralism, bodies 
might take up different positions in the world, to how bodies are made along with the world, and 
as part of the world, in thinking with Barad’s agential realism. I am reminded here of my initial 
research question’s focus on ‘embodiment’ of counsellor identity, and on the processes by which 
my participants might come to take up this new identity, or way of being, in the world. A shift to 
agential realism highlights ‘embodiment’ now as a material-discursive practice, an ongoing and 
provisional enactment of “agential cuts that constitute material configurations of bodies and 
boundaries” (p. 756).   
Juelskjaer’s reading of Barad expands on this notion of being of the world by pointing to the 
importance of time and space in the making of these agential cuts, of how bodies and subjectivities 
are not made “new”, but are a dis/continuity, a cutting together-apart in an ongoing reconfiguring 
of time and space and matter. She illustrates this with a case study of Mary, “an ethnic white girl” 
who had moved from a multicultural school landscape to an almost all-white new school landscape 
(p. 759). Instead of a social constructionist/ poststructural analysis where “the student ‘sits’ in a 
time–space 1 (the interview context, a here and now) and tells about a time–space 2 (producing a 
past school life through a narrative of the ways she behaved, the friends she had, etc.), and thereby 
produces a present school life, a time–space 3 (manifesting the new beginning, the other place, 
positioning herself within that discourse)” along with a “time–space 4, in which the researcher 
conducts the analysis, while gathering the narratives of ‘past school life’ and ‘present school life’ 
from different parts of the interview” (p. 760), Juelskjaer is interested in what is produced by 
thinking differently, of viewing the interview “tellings as enactments rather than descriptions” 
(Jackson & Mazzei, 2012, p. 127 in Juelskjaer, 2013, p. 760). A troubling of the spatial-temporal 
ordering, a disrupting of a linear narrative situated in time and space, argues Juelskjaer, enables her 
to conceive of “multiple space–times as co-present and co-producing ‘Mary-the-white-girl’” (p. 





Mary’s past school life was not in a “simple sense ‘over’; it did not simply ‘live’ as a discourse of 
the past” (p. 761), but intra-acted with the present in complex ways to produce an ongoing 
reconfiguring of spacetimematter-subjectivity. In this way, linear notions of change and movement 
are disrupted, and “working with spacetimemattering involves setting time and space in analytical 
motion” (p. 765). Ultimately, Juelskjaer suggests, the question is not about what is new, but 
becomes instead about how subjectivities/students, and spacetimemattering, are done and undone 
in complex ways. 
Finally, what strikes me analytically from Søndergaard’s (2016) study on violence and aggression 
in the lives of children is her emphasis on putting aside causal and uni-directional relationships, 
shifting focus from individuals at the centre of violence, and instead opening up to the flows and 
currents of violence and aggression as they intra-act with and through the everyday lives of 
children. She uses an analytical metaphor of pouring “phosphorous dye into the processes 
entangled by violence and aggression that flow in the actions, fantasies, games, dreams, 
relationships, emotions and reflections” of the boys’ everyday lives (p. 6). In doing this, she says,  
(w)e would see currents, branches, veins—some would be thick and sturdy, others fibrous, 
all entangling with other kinds of processes, other currents of phenomena, which would 
dilute or disperse the phosphorescent dye along the way into new tones and nuances (p. 6) 
 
However, in thinking with both Barad and Butler, she brings us back to subjectivity, noting the 
very real effects violence, as intra-active phenomena, has in relation to child and youth subjectivity, 
being clear to point out that, while the flowing currents of aggression are enacting children’s and 
teenagers’ subjectivities, it is “without a unidirectional, given, or causal arc” (p. 9).  
In re-turning to my data, in thinking with the empirical-theoretical work of these authors, I am 
challenged to shift focus from individuals to the enacting of intra-active processes (material-
discursive practices) which both enact the subjectivities of counsellors-in-training and are enacted 





as one of multiple intra-acting forces and so become sensitive to the potentiality of multiple 
elements at play in the production of material-discursive practices, including material and human 
entities and forces, such as desire and emotion. I am curious to think, with Juelskjaer, beyond the 
post-structural subject as being situated in the world and enabled/constrained to take up new 
positions, toward my participants as being of the world, not as bounded bodies, but where 
embodiment is an ongoing and provisional reconfiguring of time and space and matter, and where 
they are continually done and undone in complex ways.  Finally, in thinking further with 
Søndergaard, I am interested in broadening and opening up to what comes to matter in the everyday 
lives of counsellors-in-training, in pouring phosphorous dye into the processes entangled with a 
becoming-counsellor subjectivity, looking for the currents, branches and veins that flow through, 
and with, their everyday lives.  
Embracing wonder in the production of what comes to matter 
What comes to matter for counsellors-in-training? How (not why) do these things come to matter 
and what do we do with what comes to matter? As I came to read the transcripts and re-watch and 
re-listen to the participants in the groups, along with continuing to read theory, I was inspired by 
writing from Hohti (2016a, 2016b) who draws on an emerging body of new materialist and post-
humanist child research. She advocates “an understanding of research with children as ‘lively 
entanglements’ in which special attention should be given to things that matter to children” (p. 
180). Matter, of course, in these contexts (hers and mine) is taken to assume a new materialist 
meaning. It refers to phenomena which are mutually constituted as material and discursive, as an 
entanglement of matter and meaning. Or, as Barad tells us, “phenomena are the ontological 
inseparability of agentially intra-acting components” (2007, p. 33).   
Re-turning to this theory, along with attempting a more overt shift away from my previous post-





came to matter for counsellors-in-training in the groups. I attempted to de-centre the human subject 
and instead invite “wonder” (MacLure, 2013) into my entangled intra-action with the videos, 
transcribed and spoken words, and participant-bodies of my research.  Interestingly, MacLure 
(2013) claims wonder as material, as being of both mind and body and suggests wonder, using 
Barad’s terms, is itself an entanglement or intra-action. It is hard to pin wonder down, to define it 
in order to ‘use it’, according to MacLure, it is relational and it cannot be clear “where it originates 
and to whom it belongs” (p. 229). She describes it as a “liminal condition, suspended in a threshold 
between knowing and unknowing, that prevents wonder from being wholly contained or 
recuperated as knowledge, and thus affords an opening onto the new” (p. 228). Given diffraction’s 
methodological aims to figure differently and to make matter intelligible in new ways in order that 
other possible realities can be made to matter, inviting wonder into the research entanglement 
seems apt.   
Following MacLure’s interest in the productive capacity for wonder in the entangled relation of 
data and researcher, and its apparent possibilities for further decentring me as the humanist-subject-
researcher, I thus decided to follow the phenomena of wonder back into the data. In engaging with 
this beginning of an idea of enacting wonder in the entanglement, I centred her affective 
descriptions of wonder as “movements of desire and intensity that connect bodies—human and 
nonhuman, animate or inanimate” (p. 229) and as a “potentiality (that) can be felt on occasions 
where something…seems to reach out from the inert corpus (corpse) of the data, to grasp us” (p. 
229). Such an orientation to data analysis perhaps requires a letting go of old practices of 
industrious, mechanical and cognitive searches for meaning within inert data and instead requires 
a greater attunement to and reliance on the senses, which, ironically perhaps, invokes a capacity 





body-mind engagement in relation to the diffractive methodological process22 and that such an 
engagement seemed to at first elude me, it seems useful to follow MacLure and others further at 
this point, in order to map a more detailed view of what an affective, sensory, body-mind data-
researcher entanglement might involve in relation to a diffractive methodology.  
MacLure clearly begins with proposing an attention to desire, intensity and the embodied felt sense 
of something reaching up from the data to grab hold of us. In previous work she has referred to this 
as a kind of encounter where the data begins to ‘glow’ (MacLure, 2010, 2013).  She suggested, for 
example, that a fieldnote fragment or a video image would start to glimmer, “gathering our 
attention” (2010, p. 282). She notes, too, that we can perhaps recognise the glow because “things 
start to slow down and speed up at this point” (p. 282). Time and attention can feel like it slows 
down as we attend to this one glowing spot in the data, while at the same time, connection can 
speed up and ‘fire’ off in multiple directions at once. For example, MacLure says “we begin to 
recall other incidents and details in the project classrooms, our own childhood experiences, films 
or artwork that we have seen, articles that we have read” (p. 282). Such an emergence does not 
result from our intentional or conscious control as a researcher, although I would suggest desire to 
attune to wonder forms part of the entanglement. This parallels with Barad’s concept of agency not 
as “aligned with human intentionality or subjectivity” (2007, p. 177), but rather as an enactment. 
In this way, my agency to perform a data analysis, or to find data that ‘glow’ is not an individual 
attribute that I possess and can impose on the data, but rather the emergence of data that glows, or 
of wonder, is an intra-active reconfiguring of spacetimematter relations, an enactment of 
inseparable data-researcher-space-time-material-discursive boundary making practices.  
                                                          
22 For example, I speak earlier of “engaging with our own previous and ongoing experiences of the realities we are 
researching, with our sensory, affective responses and memories, our imaginaries and with our own omnipresent 





At this point, in thinking about a re-turn to the group data, I have become clearer on my interest in 
what came to matter (and how) for this group of counsellors-in-training, in inviting wonder into 
the research encounter/entanglement and attuning to the emergence of ‘data that glow’, and in 
thinking the data diffractively with theory – that is, theory and data mutually constituting each other 
in order to produce something new (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012). Or, as Mazzei says, in a way that 
“spreads thought in unpredictable patterns producing different knowledge” (2014, p. 742). It seems 
almost impossible to name all of the possibilities which may be part of this dynamic iterative intra-
active reconfiguring, which is research, where time and space and matter are “produced and 
reconfigured in the materialization of phenomena and the (re)making of material-discursive 
boundaries and their constitutive exclusions” (Barad, 2007, p. 179).  Indeed, St. Pierre & Jackson 
state, “there is no recipe for this kind of analysis – for thinking with theory – because one has to 
first read and study theory carefully and then put it to work in a particular project” (2014, p. 717). 
Additionally, they describe this kind of “post-coding analysis” as “non-technique and non-method 
that is always in a process of becoming” (p. 717), that is always emergent and experimental and as 
such unable to be neatly secured and pinned down to a linear set of methodic steps.     
While it is comforting to find clarity in the opaque nature of such analysis it also seems useful to 
have found further clarity in re-turning to engage in this new, post-qualitative, diffractive process 
of thinking with theory. The following chapters tell these emergent, experimental stories of such 
engagement, of what is produced through data-researcher-wonder-theory-space-time-material-
discursive-affective entangled knowledges in the making.    
Limits of the interview 
I propose a final consideration before this re-turn to the data. Having come to this point in 
rethinking with theory these initial attempts to do data analysis, I have also come to question the 





kinds of posthumanist knowledge I wish to engage with. Having moved through this chapter with 
more clarity of what it might mean to decentre the human subject, I am struck by Mazzei and 
Jackson’s (2011) statement that interview methods in qualitative inquiry “oblige researchers to 
"center" the Subject” (p. 3). As Juelskjaer (2013) points out above, the interview invites a linear 
narrative of events, but it also results in the portrayal of a coherent narrative that is seen to represent 
the truth about an individual’s experience, even if this truth is seen to be co-constructed. At the 
centre of this is usually, as was the case with my interviews, the human subject of the interview. 
Acknowledging this, and continuing on with this interview data, for this project, results then in a 
perpetual working “within and against a project that is failed from the start” (Mazzei and Jackson, 
2011, p. 4).  
While Mazzei and Jackson go on to suggest that, just because we recognize the limits of interview 
as method this does not mean we should give up on it, their point caused me to consider further, 
‘what counts as data’? St. Pierre and Jackson (2014) in writing about post-qualitative data analysis 
after coding, suggest that too often we ignore the quality of data when it comes to analysis and 
assume all data we have collected “are equal and worthy of analysis” (p. 715). They argue instead 
for an approach which uses theory to determine first, what counts as data, and second, what counts 
as good or appropriate data? Then, “we can do more with less data” (P. Lather, personal 
communication, 1993, in St. Pierre & Jackson, 2014, p. 716) focusing instead on the difficult and 
complex work of analysis.  
Following this argument and returning to the theory with a consideration of diffraction’s reliance 
on the researcher’s ability to make matter intelligible in new ways beyond subject-centred 
recognition, reflexive interpretations of discursive perspectives and positionings (Lenz Taguchi, 
2012), I return to the ‘good and appropriate’ data of the collective biography groups, rather than 
continuing to work within and against the apparatus of the interview. The following chapters 





INTERLUDE ONE   
 




The crystal rags  
Viscous tatters  
Of a worn-through soul 
Moans  
Deep swan song  
Blue farewell  
Of a dying dream. 
Maya Angelou 
In this interlude, I outline how, in opening up to intra-active flows and currents, to material-
discursive practices and diffractive patterns, what began to ‘glow’ in this researcher-data-
participant-research entanglement was the materiality of participant tears. I begin this interlude by 
exploring what it means to think tears as an affective-material-discursive practice, as an embodied, 
entangled dynamic relationality (Barad, 2007, Wetherell, 2012), in contrast to tears as an emotional 
expression produced by a bounded individual. I outline the worthiness of tears as an object of study, 
given their presence in counselling spaces and absence in counselling literature, but mainly my 
analytic intention is to make visible the congealed and invisible histories, practices, labours and 
relations constituting the production of tears for counsellors-in-training. I turn to a brief exploration 
of historical and contemporary conceptualisations of tears, crying and weeping in the psychological 
and cultural studies literature in order to situate my turn to a material-discursive analytic 
engagement with tears in the following chapters (Blume-Marcovici, Stolberg & Khademi, 2015; 








Drawing on the ideas discussed in the previous chapter, I returned to the group data with a renewed 
post-humanist orientation to look beyond the post-structural subject. I returned to the voices, 
sounds, and bodies of my participants, in order to invoke MacLure's (2013) notion of wonder, 
around what came to matter during the hours we met together in that room over the period of several 
months. I was interested to summon Søndergaard’s (2016) metaphor of phosphorous dye in order 
to put aside individuals at the centre of inquiry and instead open up to the intra-active flows and 
currents, to material-discursive practices, diffractive patterns and to ongoing and provisional 
reconfigurings of time and space and matter. It was in this way that I now hoped to come to a 
different understanding of how such practices are constitutive of the ongoing reconfiguring of a 
counsellor-in-training subjectivity. In doing this, what started to glow for me, and immediately 
became evident as a material-discursive practice, a natural-cultural phenomena, were ‘tears’. 
Interestingly, MacLure (2013) states that the glow of data appears around singular points, “– 
‘bottlenecks, knots and foyers’ (Deleuze, 2004, p. 63 in MacLure, 2013, p. 662), that, she says, 
involve a loss of mastery over language (and ultimately, over ourselves), which certainly seems to 
apply here, as will become evident in the following mapping of how tears came to matter in this 
group. I start this interlude, with a poem from Maya Angelou, which to me speaks of the work I 
hope my analysis will do over the coming pages, a cutting together-apart of the material-discursive 
forces of tears, as phenomena. I place it here to mark that shift, to matter, force, and the liveliness 
of data that glows. 
As I have emphasised, in an agential-realist framework what comes to matter is not a matter of 
capturing (coding) and portraying an independently existing reality. Data analysis itself, or 
researcher practices, as Lenz Taguchi says, “can never be fixed, but must be invented again and 





agential realism in particular, as I also recall Søndergaard’s (2016) words that Barad’s work does 
not produce any clear analytic strategies. As expressed in the previous chapter, returning to the 
theory and to the work of those who have already engaged in similar struggles to ‘think differently 
with data’ was helpful for me in making a shift from centring the post-structural subject toward 
being attentive instead to matter, to material-discursive practices. As a result, my attention was 
drawn toward tears as an object/subject of analysis, and to the forces and encounters which produce 
them and the ways in which they flow and move and constitute the subjectivities of my participants. 
I immediately conceptualised tears as a material-discursive practice, or phenomena (Barad, 2007) 
seeing the materialisation of tears as inseparable from, intra-active with the discursive conditions 
which mutually constitute them, that is, tears not as “entities with inherent boundaries and 
properties but phenomena that acquire specific boundaries and properties through the open-ended 
dynamics of intra-activity” (Barad, 2007, p. 172). In this sense, the discursive practices and the 
materiality of the tears do not “stand in a relationship of externality to each other”… neither “are 
ontologically or epistemological prior” and “neither is articulated or articulable in the absence of 
the other; matter and meaning are mutually articulated” (Barad, 2007, p. 152). The more I read 
about tears, the more apparent this dynamic entanglement of matter and meaning became, 
particularly in the literature on the physiology of tears. For example, three different kinds of tears 
are recognised by physiologists and ophthalmologists, which not only have different functions but 
also different chemical, hormonal and protein compositions – referred to as basal, reflex, and 
psychic tears. “Basal tears are the continuous tears that lubricate our eyeballs. Reflex or irritant 
tears are produced when we chop onions, for instance, or get poked in the eye. Psychic or emotional 
tears are those caused by, and communicating, specific emotional states” (Lutz, 1999, p. 67). In a 
fascinating photographic study by photographer Rose-Lynn Fisher, to be shared in a book called 
The Topography of Tears (Fisher, 2017), Fisher has explored the physical terrain of more than one 





microscope with an attached digital camera. There are many factors, she states in the New Yorker 
(2014), “that determine the look of each tear image, including the viscosity of the tear, the 
chemistry of the weeper, the settings of the microscope, and the way I process the images 
afterwards.” Comprising a wide range of her own and others’ tears, “from elation to onions, as well 
as sorrow, frustration, rejection, resolution, laughing, yawning, birth and rebirth”, she suggests it’s 
as if each tear carries a microcosm of human experience. Some of the images are presented below, 
some of these first appearing in my Facebook feed, after which I then managed to trace their origin 
to the author, who subsequently gave permission for me to use her images here.    
    
Figure 2. Visual photographic-microscopic tears – Rose-Lynn Fisher (2017) 
 
In noticing both the very different material composition, and visual photographic-microscopic 
image, of tears, depending on the forces of their entanglement, including the apparatus of 
measurement, tears as intra-active phenomena becomes evident. Having come to this view, I then 
re-turned to the data in order to explore more of the material and the discursive mutually implicated 
in the articulation of tears for my participants. 
In thinking diffractively with Barad’s agential realist theory, the finding of tears as a repetitive 






in the material presence of, tears in the groups. However, in listening to the talk it became apparent 
that there were diverse and situated patterning processes at work in the enactment of tears. Paying 
attention to these offered the opportunity to bring forth the complex and multiple material-semiotic 
forces at work, not just in the materialisation of tears, but through tears, in the (re)(con)figuration 
of counsellor-in-training subjectivities. 
Thinking in this way, tears are construed here not as an object or thing with inherent boundaries, 
but rather as an entangled dynamic relationality, where the boundaries of intra-acting agents or 
forces are reconfigured to produce the real, material, situated effect of tears. This analysis aims not 
to understand the essence or singular meaning of tears as produced by a bounded individual. Rather, 
thinking tears as an entangled affective-material-discursive phenomena invites an analytic focus 
on the boundary making practices, or forces, that intra-act in producing the ever increasing 
multiplicity of tears. Drawing on Whatmore (2006), and staying with a relational ontology, tears 
can be seen to be a “force of intensive relationality”, an intensity that is felt but is not personal, and 
that is visceral but is “not confined to an individuated body” (p. 604). Such a view of the affective 
nature in particular of tears, also seems to align well with - rather than psychological views of basic 
emotions which attempt to abstract an entity from the social and cultural milieu in which it is 
situated - Wetherell’s theorising of the affective-discursive (Wetherell, 2012). She argues that 
“human affect is inextricably linked with meaning-making and with the semiotic (broadly defined) 
and the discursive. It is futile to try to pull them apart.  An affective practice like a dancing plague 
recruits material objects, institutions, pasts and anticipated futures” (p. 20). This seems to align 
with Barad’s notion of intra-activity, and the inseparability of mutually entangled forces, including 
space, time, matter and discourse. What Wetherell’s work brings to this discussion in particular, is 
a focus on the affective nature of such an entanglement, or practice as she calls it (similar again to 
Barad’s material-discursive practice). As she says, “it is the participation of the emoting body that 





kind of social practice” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 159). Just as Whatmore alludes to above, I agree with 
Wetherell when she places the emphasis on the particularity of the embodiment of affect, of 
locating it “not in the ether, or in endless and mysterious circulations, but in actual bodies” (p. 159). 
Thus, tears in this sense, as an affective intensity, although inseparably entangled and mutually 
constituted with other matter, bodies, times and spaces, are nevertheless located in and on a body, 
are embodied.  
Such a theoretical orientation requires a detailed focus on the intra-active forces at work in the 
materialisation of tears as an affective phenomenon, and thus provides an opportunity to challenge 
many taken for granted binary norms associated with the emotional, failing (to cope), humanist, 
autonomous individual subject. Indeed, one of diffraction’s tasks is to disrupt the patriarchal system 
of binaries which, as has been discussed, seeks to create false categories leading to the oppression 
of those on the ‘wrong side’ of these (e.g. rational-emotional, mind-body), and the normalisation 
of those marked as belonging to the dominant categories. Those existing within such hegemonic 
categories “read themselves as simply human in the way anyone can and should be” whereas those 
within a subordinate category are “marked and in need of remediation in order to become like those 
who are deemed to be more capable” or appropriate (De Schauwer, Van de Putte, Blockmans & 
Davies, 2016, p. 2). New materialist work, as Hughes and Lury (2013) state, drawing on the words 
of Suchman (2012), “inspires us to look anew at what has ‘become naturalised over time’ and how 
things can be ‘figured together differently’” (p. 791). It is my hope that this analysis of tears as a 
dynamic material-discursive relationality rather than, say, a personal failing, will go some way 
toward this.  
Why tears?  
I have suggested above that coming to ‘see’ tears in the data has been a process of re-turning to 
theory and of paying attention to data that “glows” (Maclure, 2010). In a diffractive analysis, Lenz 





becoming-with the data as researcher” (2012, p. 265). It is not that the phenomenon of tears lay 
inertly waiting in the data to be found and studied as an object of analysis. It is not that there are a 
finite number of analytic objects requiring unearthing in the data. Rather, tears emerged through 
my “body as a space of transit, a series of open-ended systems in interaction with the material-
discursive ‘environment’…” through “transcorporeal engagements with data” (Lenz Taguchi, 
2012, p. 265), through the intra-activity of, at least, my multiple (dynamic) subjectivities as 
counsellor, woman, mother, researcher (…) with the material-discursive phenomena that we have 
labelled ‘data’.    
There are likely a multitude of intra-active forces which have led me here, to notice, investigate, 
and map entangled genealogies (Barad, 2007) of counsellor-in-training tears, from personal 
childhood (and adult) experiences of tears as involuntary and excessive, undesirable and 
unavoidable, to witnessing the pain-filled tears of clients and students, friends and family, who 
shamefully apologise and wipe away this evidence of a natural-cultural physiological process.  The 
researcher-I is influenced also by the voluminous literature on the negative emotions seemingly 
produced through the process of training to become a counsellor, and the often resulting solution 
to find better ways of coping (e.g. Folkes-Skinner et al. 2010; Rønnestad & Skovholt, 2003; Truell, 
2001). The plentiful presence of tears as a site of intense affect in the data seemed to offer a way 
of exploring this further, but from a theoretically different perspective than the previously dominant 
humanist lens. My desire also to challenge, upend and reconfigure normative practices and 
assumptions that needlessly contribute to increased oppression and pain most likely contributed to 
the glow of tears as a site of further investigation. Desiring to make a “demonstrable difference” 
(Bell, 2012), and taking up the agential-realist’s “responsibility for the world’s becoming”, “to 
contest and rework what matters and what is excluded from mattering” (Barad, 2003, p. 827) is no 
doubt another force in the production of tears through this boundary making analytic practice. 





phenomena of tears, and for making visible the congealed and invisible practices, histories and 
relations constituting the production, and effects, of tears. It is hoped, that through such a mapping, 
tears of counsellors-in-training, and the labours that produce them, may begin to be made 
intelligible (figured) differently, multiply, and ultimately reanimated and reimagined for the 
formation of the counsellor-in-training subject (Suchman, 2012).    
Tears seem worthy as an object of further study given their presence in the counselling room, albeit 
that it is those belonging to clients which have typically been the ones counsellors must learn to 
respond to. While several books have explored this subject of tears, from scientific (Frey, 1985; 
Trimble, 2012), psychological (Vingerhoets, 2013) and cultural (Lutz, 1999) vantage points, in 
attempts to understand causes, meanings, effects and displays of such a “mysterious and complex” 
(Vingerhoets, 2013) phenomenon, there appears to have been little focus on such a prevailing 
material presence in the counselling literature. Such literature becomes even sparser when the focus 
is narrowed to counsellor tears. Jeffrey Kottler, a renowned author and teacher in the field of 
counselling, in his book ‘The language of tears’ (1996), explored tears as a form of communication, 
discussing their therapeutic benefits and limitations, and their paradoxical nature as mirrors of both 
pain and rapture. However, while Kottler’s work added to current psychological, social and cultural 
understandings and contributed knowledge for counsellors in understanding the phenomenon of 
tears, its focus was much broader than counselling itself. In addition, Lutz (1999) suggests, that 
despite research studies finding that tears occur with great regularity in helping relationships (e.g. 
doctor-patient; nurse-patient, therapist-client), there are a lack of courses which address this in any 
degree programmes. Whilst the medical profession has undertaken significant research into the 
crying behaviours of medical care providers, Blume-Marcovici, Stolberg & Khademi (2013) note, 
in referring to the dearth of such a therapeutic literature, “(i)t is striking that, as a profession that 
so explicitly values emotions and interpersonal interaction, psychologists have attended less to the 





More recently, therapist tears have been explored by Blume-Marcovici and colleagues (Blume-
Marcovici et al., 2013, 2015; Blume-Marcovici, Stolberg, Khademi & Giromini, 2015) who 
conducted an empirical investigation with six hundred and eighty-four U.S. psychologists and 
trainees of therapist crying in therapy. They noted that “the subject of therapist’s crying in therapy 
(TCIT) has been virtually ignored in the literature, with only one qualitative dissertation and three 
case studies devoted to the topic” (Blume-Marcovici et al., 2013, p. 224).   With 72% of their 
sample respondents reporting having cried in therapy, this lack of research is not due to the absence 
of such a phenomenon. The focus of this psychological research was to explore “the therapeutic 
situations in which TCIT may be most likely to occur (i.e., client demographics, when in treatment 
TCIT happens, session content), therapists’ experiences of their own tears (i.e., emotions felt, 
comfort/discomfort with tears, regret), and how clinicians work with their own tears in session (i.e., 
regarding therapeutic rapport, discussing TCIT with clients)” (Blume-Marcovici et al., 2015, p. 
401). While an exceptionally welcome addition to the field, my aim in undertaking an analysis of 
the (talk of) tears of counsellors-in-training is slightly different, as outlined above and throughout 
this project. That is, in pursuing an agential-realist analysis of counsellor-in-training tears I aim to 
open up (to) alternative possibilities and different knowledges in a way that recognises complexity 
in the mutually entangling and transforming processes which produce and enact tears. It is hoped 
that producing such knowledge will go on to effect counsellor education and in turn the possibilities 
for the subjectivity formation of counsellors-in-training.  
Conceptualisations of tears 
Hopes for a reconfiguring of tears begs the question, why is this necessary or even desirable? 
Without going in depth into a cultural history of the phenomenon of tears (which is done so well 
by Tom Lutz (1999) in his book ‘Crying: a natural and cultural history’ and by Ad Vingerhoets 





is nevertheless useful at this point to outline common views and current conceptualisation of tears 
and their effects. These will also be discussed further as and when they emerge in the data.   
The documented presence of tears in human culture can be found as far back in history as the 
fourteenth century B.C. in northwestern Syria. These findings offer a rich beginning to thinking 
about the diverse meanings tears do have, and have had, the power to embody and signify. Found 
on Canaanite clay tablets, a narrative poem tells the story of the death of Ba’al, an earth god 
worshipped by several ancient Middle Eastern cultures, and of how his sister, the goddess Anat, 
responds to the news of his death. The accepted scholarly translation of this particular part of the 
poem is that Anat “continued sating herself with weeping, to drink tears like wine.” (Lutz, 1999, 
p. 33)  Seemingly a recognisable grief induced response – weeping at the loss of her brother - the 
scholar who produced this translation argued that this story was actually related to a springtime 
tribal ritual moving through communal weeping and wailing to hysterical and raucous laughing 
over the course of several days. Interestingly, in this ritual, “frantic crying and raucous laughter are 
not opposed emotional displays but part of a continuum” (Lutz, 1999, p. 34), which viewed such 
emotional expression as a source of fundamental pleasure and social cohesion.   
Further explorations of historical texts, particularly Greek sources, make even clearer this 
nourishing, sustaining and pleasurable association with tears and crying, often in the form of 
transformative rituals. Lutz refers to The Iliad, where Homer talks of “desire for lamentation” and 
“taking satisfaction in lament” (cited in Lutz, 1999, p. 34). Ultimately, through his reading of such 
texts, Lutz concludes that weeping was so pleasurable, it was seen to “make one “shiver” with 
delight” (p. 35). This association of tears with pleasure was evident at least up to as recently as the 
mid twentieth century. For example, when psychologists began studying the psychophysiology of 
tears, William James wrote in his ‘Principles of Psychology’ (1890 cited in Lutz, 1999), pleasure 
was possible during the actual weeping part of what was called the ‘dry sorrow-weeping’ cycle. 





arguments about tears and pleasure, however, as Lutz (1999) concludes, the pleasure of tears 
remains inexplicably unexplored, and I would suggest, lost within the current cultural imaginary.  
More contemporary associations with the expression of adult tears include 
“powerlessness/helplessness, the loss (or threat of the loss) of an important relationship, and, at the 
opposite end of the spectrum, exceptional performances and the forging of new bonds” 
(Vingerhoets 2013, p. 261). Vingerhoets and Bylsma (2016) add, that “in addition, perceived 
empathy, altruism, and a basic sense of justice, essential building blocks of human society, are 
major reasons for tearfulness in adults” (p. 214). However, Lutz suggests a perhaps more complex 
and contradictory understanding of tears. He says, “(i)t is often …mixed emotions or competing 
desires – fear mixed with desire, hope mixed with despair –that can trigger the release of tears. 
(Lutz, 1999, p. 22). Regardless whether they be described as tears of happiness, joy, or pride or of 
mourning, frustration or despair, such an expression is generally viewed as an outward sign of an 
individual’s emotional interiority or of holding a particularly individual, personal meaning or 
experience.   
In a counselling relationship, a humanistic counsellor will likely be interested in the feelings the 
tears signify for their tearful client, a social constructionist or post-structural counsellor may be 
more interested in the language of the tears, and the stories and meaning they might signify for 
their client. Interpretations of counsellor tears will also vary depending on the theoretical 
orientation, for example, from the tears of genuineness and empathy of a humanistic counsellor to 
those of perceived projection of “unprocessed or unexpressed emotion by the client” by a 
psychodynamically oriented therapist (Blume-Marcovici et al., 2015, p. 418).  Interestingly, in their 
research Blume-Marcovici et al. (2013) found that cognitive behavioural therapists reported crying 
during therapy significantly less often than dynamically oriented therapists, even though the groups 
reported crying at similar rates in daily life. They suggested that perhaps this therapy’s focus on 





Despite there being only a small handful of researchers (Vingerhoets & Bylsma, 2016) who have 
contributed to current knowledge around the phenomenon of adult tears and crying, both in general, 
and more specifically in the counselling room, findings demonstrate the complex and potentially 
promising personal, social and cultural knowledges such investigations offer. Indeed, Vingerhoets 
& Bylsma (2016) suggest, from a psychological perspective, that “crying may be a window to 
obtain a better insight into important developmental processes like empathy and morality, as well 
as clinical conditions, including depression…”, whilst maintaining the view that a multidisciplinary 
approach is needed to “adequately study its meaning and impact on the individual and society” (p. 
215). 
Such a multi-disciplinary approach includes the influence of social and cultural practices and 
contexts on the presence, absence, and flow of tears. For example, it is apparent that throughout 
history, in relation to the ways the shedding of tears, crying and weeping have changed over time, 
as well as in anthropological studies across cultures, particularly in relation to accepted and 
expected public displays of tears. Culture dictates crying styles as well as when and how they 
should and can be expressed (Vingerhoets, 2013). Despite the lack of research on the topic of crying 
itself, several scholars have suggested that the process of civilization has been responsible for the 
increased restraints on the public displays of emotion, including crying (Vingerhoets, 2013). 
Indeed, Neoliberalism, with its “emphasis on the making of particular kinds of selves” in 
contemporary society, creates the conditions to increase the likelihood of tears for subjects “always 
on the boundaries of failure” (McAvoy, 2015, p. 26), while at the same time precluding the 
expression of such emotion, lest it affirm the very failure the individual subject strives to avoid. 
Attention to such a material-discursive production and materialisation of tears clearly forms part 
of an agential realist analysis of the tears of counsellors-in-training. Returning to Haraway’s notion 
of the binary certainly places the tears, as an emotional expression, clearly on the wrong side of the 





unpredictable, incoherent, and irrational – material evidence of an emotional self, all of which sit 
as a poor relation to the hegemonic rational, self-contained, coherent, knowing man. Such affective 
practices stand in stark contrast also to the power of the contemporary neoliberal discourse that 
prioritises and constitutes individuals as autonomous, rational, self-maximising, economically 
productive subjects (Davies & Bansel, 2007; McAvoy, 2015; Mountz et al., 2015). Pursuing such 
binaries, tears could equally be construed as female, private or domestic (not public), personal (not 
professional), hysterical (not rational) and so on. These discursive notions and their effects must 
also be mapped with the data. This attention to the fine detail of social-cultural forces offers a more 
detailed analysis of the practices and performances of a life lived and how they all entangle, and 
manifest in, with, through and on bodies, sometimes as tears.  
Whilst not exhaustive, the above discussion has offered a context and rationale for an engagement 
with counsellor-in-training tears as a material-discursive object of analysis. Study of tears in 
counselling, and more particularly with counsellors-in-training, is limited, but potentially valuable 
in adding knowledge to an under-theorised area and under-researched topic. At this point, I re-turn 
to the data and further transcorporeal engagements with it in order to see what might be produced 
through the enactment of tears as diffractive patterns, in order to examine how they may be figured 
differently, and how this then opens up the possibilities for a reconfiguring of a counsellor-in-
training subjectivity. In performing this analysis, a number of tear diffractive patterns emerged, 
which are mapped through the analytic device of the poem. The pattern-poems enacted in the 
following chapters draw from the participants’ talk of tears in the group sessions, in relation to the 
materialisation of tears, in their eyes and on their faces, while performing their roles on placements 
as counsellors in counselling sessions.  In fitting with an agential realist ontology, these patterns 
are not seen to be exhaustive or representative, rather, in the time and space of the lives and groups 
of these participants and with myself as researcher, now, they are what have come to matter. While 





may have been removed in order to enhance flow in the poems – often these were words such as 
‘you know’, but no removal of words was seen to alter the meaning or content of participants’ 
spoken words.   
Mapping the tear-poems enacted an initial stage of data analysis, with the next stage being a 
continued thinking with both theory and the poems in order to further enact the contingent and 
entangled “processes of patterning” (Hughes & Lury, 2013, p. 786) in the spacetimemattering of 
tears. In such a diffractive approach, I am reminded that this process is one of experimental 
encounter, where “the researcher does not know in advance what onto-epistemological knowledge 
will emerge from the experimental mix of concepts, emotions, bodies, images, and affects” 
(Davies, 2014b, p. 734, emphasis added), and that the researcher body acts as a “space of transit” 
(Lenz Taguchi, 2012, p. 265) for transcorporeal engagements with data, theory and other multiple 
elements of the research encounter, too infinite to be listed. It is this experimental process which I 





CHAPTER SEVEN  
A diffractive analysis: the presence of tears in counselling encounters 
This chapter performs a diffractive, experimental mapping of the presence of tears in counselling 
encounters as spoken about by participants in the collective biography groups. Tear encounters are 
re-presented as poems, in order to further enact, or ‘cut together-apart’ (Barad, 2007) the contingent 
and entangled “processes of patterning” (Hughes & Lury, 2013, p. 786) in the spacetimemattering 
of tears. I begin this chapter with a poem of my own enacting the materiality of tears in one my 
counselling encounters, not to privilege my own knowing, but to diffractively, and transparently, 
bring the knowing of my body into relation with those of my participants, in order to intra-actively 
think with, and think anew. While it is not possible within the parameters of this project to 
document the multiple forces enacting thought, it is my intent through this initial poem to highlight 
the entangled process of data analysis. What follows in this chapter is conceptualised as ‘thinking 
with theory’ (Mazzei & Jackson, 2011). Moving between the words of my participants, re-
presented in the poems, and, in particular, Barad’s agential realist, posthumanist framework, I 
explore tears as a mark of an embodied alterity, as intra-actively produced - enabled and constrained 
- by a multiplicity of forces, including human and non-human ones. Through such attention to the 
process of mapping the tear poems, a number of forces are made visible and further explored in 
this chapter, including gender, culture, age, counselling theory, practice and ethics, and other 
subjectivities, times and spaces. At the same time consideration is given not just to making such 
intra-active forces visible, but also, in thinking with Barad’s agential realism, to re-thinking notions 
of causality, time, ethics and agency in the ongoing configuring of a counsellor-in-training 







At the edge of tears – 

























I sit here now with this blank page in front 
of me and the words of ‘Porous’ to the left 
of the screen, a poem I wrote while in the 
midst of reading and absorbing new 
materialism and its possibilities, and in the 
midst of everyday life. The moment, 
because it really was only a moment, this 
poem refers to, occurred at the end of a 
counselling supervision session, where I 
was in the role of supervisor with a 
counsellor-client whom I had been working 
with for about two years. Although, already 
it’s clear that, as Barad says “(n)ot even a 
moment exists on its own”. Rather, 
““(t)his” and “that”, “here” and “now””, 
she says, “come alive with each meeting” 
and “(t)he world and its possibilities for 
becoming are remade in each moment” 
(2007, p. 396). This moment was an 
entanglement, of bodies, objects, affects, 
words, spaces, pasts, presents and futures 
yet to come. It was not a coming together of 
two individual, pre-existing entities acting 
with thought, choice and intent on and with 
Porous 
A fantail rests on the table 
   part object,  
becoming child – 
   its flight sweeps through me. 
 
A piwakawaka becomes monarch – 
   both vessels of dead living love. 
Porous boundaries leaking, 
  in/animate flux  
 
of me-you-boys-who’ve-gone 
   but will (not) leave 
marks on bodies  
   that will not erase. 
 





each other, although they were certainly a part of it. As Barad says “there are no individual 
agents” and “there are no singular causes” (p. 394). This poem depicts a moment of the 
emergence of tears, mine, although they were not the only tears present. These were not glassy 
or watery eyes, but tears rolling down my cheeks, perhaps the first time I had experienced this 
in a counselling session, despite the years I have spent sitting with people telling me the most 
agonizing and painful stories. I say ‘mine’, but whose tears were they if there is “no discrete 
“I” that precedes its actions”, if it’s only our (intra)actions that come to matter (p. 394). 
“I”, my supervisor subjectivity, am decentred, and tears become the subject being constituted, 
before becoming object and enacting my own subjectivity again – this marks a dynamism, a 
co-constitution of subjects along with objects which requires a letting go of the liberal humanist 
conception of the subject (Barad, 2007). It is not “I” that is in charge of the tears’ emergence, 
rather it is the intra-active ‘they’ who constitute my own formation, as part of the world. Tears 
as both subject and object, indeterminable, except for the cuts, and connections, which are 
made to matter.  
While the tears marked, and were located on, my body, I see their emergence now, their 
presence and their flow, their intensity, as a mark of an embodied alterity, of “having-the-other-
in-one’s-skin” - both human and “other than human” others (Barad, 2007, p. 392). The ‘others’ 
intra-actively co-constitute the tears, mutually transforming in the process, that is, nothing stays 
the same in the dynamic becoming of the world. The fantail, that sits on the table in the 
counselling space, an image on a coffee cup, takes flight in the body of my client as it intra-
actively enacts the loss of her child - not as mind-based memory, but as enlivened “marked 
historialit(y) ingrained in the body’s becoming” (p. 393). Time is reconfigured, the past is alive 
within the present, as fantail becomes monarch butterfly, which, in its flight, holds the absent-





p. 244). It’s been four years, and yet, when I see the date, it’s in these very days that were the 
last days we sat and held his dying body. It is like time collapses, or perhaps it is that the “past, 
present, and future were never “in a relation of linear unfolding, but threaded through one 
another in a nonlinear enfolding of spacetimemattering” (p. 244). There is no doubt more to 
this entangling, more threads which come together while others disperse to enact this 
diffractive pattern, this felt intensity of sadness, loss and love, hers and mine, now and then, 
here and there, locating itself in fantails and monarchs and coming to rest in the emergence of 
tears, at the edge of my skin.   
In order to seek more, and to make the invisible visible, I return to theory. Quantum physics 
and diffraction undo the onto-epistemology of the binary. I become curious about what might 
be seen to be fixed within this entanglement, and more curious still about its haunting – the 
absent-presence of that which is excluded. I am reminded of why I was compelled to write this 
poem, not because of the tears themselves – they were familiar, but because of their intra-active 
emergence with the professional (yet personal) space of the counselling room and the resulting 
discomfort, unease, and professional uncertainty this entanglement produced. Another layer is 
added in this dynamic, intra-active process as I recognise the tears themselves now intra-acting 
with that space, with my counsellor subjectivity, to produce this affective experience of 
discomfort, of ambivalence. In this ambivalence, I recognise the conflict which has emerged 
between the binary of the professional counselling space and the personal-relational moment 
of tears. Set up as a binary, my counsellor subjectivity cannot comfortably contain both. This 
is not a new challenge for the field of counselling, as outlined in chapter one, and as Nissen-
Lie et al. (2017) reiterate:  
It may be difficult to compare the work of psychotherapy with other professions 
because of its specific requirement that, to be of help to clients, the therapists must 
succeed in integrating their professional capacities and expertise with their personal 





Produced intra-actively in this encounter, the phenomena of tears, as personal-relational, 
emotional, uncontained and unpredictable, were haunted by the present-absence of a non-
crying, un-emotional (yet genuine and empathetic), technically competent, professional self.  
The establishment and hegemonic effects of this binary relation, no doubt with its origins in 
the histories of men’s professional paid work and public lives and women’s domestic unpaid 
labour and personal/private lives, has emerged here as significant. I am curious to think further 
with this finding, with the data, and with theory, in an effort to produce/diffract new 
knowledges beyond my body’s own knowing.   
Were these mutually exclusive subjectivities – the personal, emotional, crying self and the 
professional counsellor, and, or, in thinking with quantum physics does such a dualism, a 
difference, even exist at all? Does enacting the professional counselling self necessarily mean 
the personal, messy, emotional self can only ever be a haunting? Or, as Nissen-Lie et al. (2017) 
allude to, is this a false dichotomy to begin with, and only ever an always already blurring of 
one into the other? After all, as Barad says, when she talks of a quantum rethinking of the 
relationality between the scientific and the social, “what often appears as sharp entities…with 
sharp edges does not actually entail a relation of absolute exteriority at all. Like the diffraction 
patterns illuminating the indefinite nature of boundaries – displaying shadows in “light” 
regions and bright spots in “dark regions”, the relation (of the personal-professional) is a 
relation of “exteriority within”” (2007, p. 93). In order to further consider questions such as 
these and others which will surely emerge, I re-turn to the data and the emergence of tears with 
other times and spaces and bodies, to explore the multiplicity of the articulation of tears, and 
the entangled genealogies which co-constitute them. I consider how such articulations act to 
then co-constitute a (professional?) counsellor subjectivity and ultimately, in the final chapter, 






I turn now to the participant poems. These emerged from the talk within the groups. As such, 
the poems, as diffractive patterns, are intra-actively co-constituted by a multiplicity of forces 
including, but not limited to, the participant subjectivities, the material-discursive space of the 
room we shared, the time of the day we met and the timing within participants’ training, my  
researcher-, educator-, counsellor-, etc., subjectivities. They are therefore not presented as 
‘personal, individual’ accounts, rather as an always embodied alterity (Barad, 2007), here with 
the aim of further mapping the emergence and movement of tears.   
The material-discursive phenomena of counselling practice 
The poems presented in this chapter all speak of the enactment of tears in response, at least, to 
clients within counselling sessions. With the poems all situated in the counselling space I am 
interested to re-turn to Barad’s notion of the (material-) discursive in order to first think further 
and/or differently around how the material-discursive force of the counselling room might 
work intra-actively in the production of counsellor tears. Having seen the emergence of the 
professional/personal binary I am interested to further explore how counselling as a material-
discursive practice acts as a force in relation to the production of tears. Barad (2007) draws on 
Foucault and Butler in her performative account of the discursive, both in the performative 
nature of discursive practices and in the rejection of discourse as a synonym for language, 
speech acts or conversations. “Discourse is not what is said; it is what constrains and enables 
what can be said. Discursive practices define what counts as meaningful statements” (Barad, 
2007, p. 146, my emphasis). This is not meaning as a human-based notion, rather, in agential 
realism, “meaning is an ongoing performance of the world in its differential intelligibility” (p. 
335), that is, discursive practices are material reconfigurings of the world through which 
boundaries are differentially enacted. For Foucault, Barad suggests, discursive practices are the 
“local socio-material conditions that enable and constrain disciplinary knowledge practices” 





for the subjects and objects of particular knowledge practices. Counselling, considered in these 
terms, becomes an ongoing reconfiguring through which various boundaries, properties, and 
meanings are differentially enacted. It is a material-discursive practice which both enables and 
constrains, includes and excludes, particular kinds of doings, actions and conversations. (As 
we shall see though, this is only one, albeit a significant one, of the multiple forces operating 
at any one time in the moments depicted in the poems, and thus in constituting a counsellor-in-
training subjectivity).   
Barad, drawing on Bohr’s notion of the apparatus and quantum physics, proposes a diffractive 
reworking of Butler’s and Foucault’s discursive practices which she claims do not sufficiently 
account for the agentic role of matter and its relation to the discursive, nor for the intra-active 
and dynamic nature of the always changing world of possibilities. Hence, as outlined above - 
material-discursive practices. Thus, the intra-active force of the counselling space as a material-
discursive practice becomes a “boundary making practice”; it provides the “material conditions 
of possibility and impossibility of mattering” (Barad, 2007, p. 148, original italics). The 
counselling room, as a material-discursive practice, is a reconfiguring through which subjects 
and objects are produced – counsellors, clients, tears, problems and so on. Possibilities for 
being and becoming, are enabled, constrained, and reconfigured in relation with the intra-active 
force of such a material-discursive space.    
There is no simple description of such practices which might be seen to constitute the material-
discursive phenomena of counselling. As Cornforth (2006) notes, therapy is still an emerging 
profession with counselling praxis the interface of many contradictions and oppositions.  
Counselling, she says “brings together the social and the individual, the analytic and the 
experiential, the conscious and the unconscious, the quantitative and the qualitative. It both 
supports and challenges. It exists amongst many theories and many cultures. The management 





Furthermore, she suggests there is seldom agreement on the form and function of 
counselling/psychotherapy, which draws on multiple theoretical traditions including 
psychoanalysis, psychology, philosophy, cultural studies and the arts (Cornforth, 2006, p. 6).  
Others seem to almost embrace what may seem contradictory and complex in the process of 
counselling, suggesting therapy is by its own nature necessarily a “fluid, dynamic process, one 
involving a complex and nuanced series of interchanges” and that attempting to reduce it to 
“truncated and prescriptive” treatments may strip it of the very interpersonal processes critical 
to its success (Miller, Hubble, Chow & Seidel, 2013, p. 89).   
In mapping the forces or practices constituting the subjectivity of a counsellor in training, and 
in particular here in mapping the emergence of tears, it is imperative that the knowledge domain 
of counselling itself, despite its complexity and confusion, be considered as a productive and 
intra-active force, enabling and constraining the practices of the counsellor-in-training. The 
counselling programme in which the participants are a part of draws on a knowledge domain 
underpinned by a counselling code of ethics (NZAC, 2002), and a social constructionist 
approach to counselling (Burr, 1995; Visser, 2013) emphasising also the importance of the 
counselling relationship (Lambert & Barley, 2001). Perhaps at its simplest, this statement from 
the NZAC Code of Ethics (2016) summarises the aims of the counselling process these 
participants have been exposed to: 
Counselling involves the formation of professional relationships based on ethical values 
and principles. Counsellors seek to assist clients to increase their understanding of 
themselves and their relationships with others, to develop more resourceful ways of 
living, and to bring about change in their lives. Counselling includes relationships 
formed with individuals, couples, families, groups, communities and organisations (p. 
3).  
 
In enacting such practices, the counsellors-in-training as participants here, are therefore 





one other (a client) - a talking therapy - premised on the formation of a professional relationship 
and aimed at enabling change to occur for the client who sits opposite, through the process of 
both the relationship and the chosen therapeutic techniques. Practices involved in enacting such 
a professional relationship might be expected to include counsellor displays of empathic 
understanding, “the degree to which the therapist is successful in communicating personal 
comprehension of the client's experience; positive regard, the extent to which the therapist 
communicates non-evaluative caring and respect; and congruence, the extent to which the 
therapist is non-defensive, real, and not "phony."” (Lambert & Barley, 2001, p. 358).      
With such practices (albeit complex and contested) in mind, I turn to the poems in order to 
further explore how the material-discursive force of ‘professional counselling’ is enacted, is 
intra-active, and how this and other forces intra-act in the production of tears, and therefore in 



































Hannah’s words in poem two depict the emergence of tears as felt in the body before they 
appear, suggesting that in some instances, there is a bodily material-discursive force which can 
act to allow or suppress them. Hannah says ‘when I’m about to have some tears in my eyes’.  
She continues with this, saying ‘I just tell my client - / ‘I think I’m going to cry now’’. This 
seems to align strongly with the person-centred practice of therapist genuineness and 
congruence, described above as facilitative of a professional counselling relationship.  
Congruence, as originally defined by the originator of person-centred therapy, Carl Rogers 
(2007), “means that within the relationship (the therapist) is freely and deeply himself, with his 
I feel like sometimes   
  when I’m about to have some tears  
    in my eyes  
        I just tell my client – 
 
‘I think I’m going to cry now’.  
   I grab a tissue,  
     dab my eyes  
        in front of them.  
 
I have no hesitation in doing that,  
   because to me, that’s –   
     ‘I’m really listening to you’.  
        ‘I’m really resonating  
   
with what you’re feeling’  
   so I don’t,  
     I wouldn’t,  
hold myself back.  
 







actual experience accurately represented by his awareness of himself. It is the opposite of 
presenting a façade” (p. 242). Thus, tears are enabled within the context of the counselling 
relationship, here due to their resonance with counselling practices of genuineness and 
congruence and not presenting a façade, i.e. holding back emotion which is strongly present. 
Additionally, in this instance, the tears emerge in intra-action with a discursive counselling 
practice which aligns tears with a deep listening and resonance with the feelings of the client.  
Such tears again seem to be consonant with a strong relational emphasis in counselling practice, 
aligning with another of Rogers’ core conditions for therapy, empathy. Rogers writes that 
empathy, for a therapist, is about a sensing of “the client’s private world as if it were your own, 
but without ever losing the “as if” quality…To sense the client’s anger, fear, or confusion as if 
it were your own, yet without your own anger, fear, or confusion getting bound up in it” (2007, 
p. 243). However, he suggests that what is required of the therapist is not only a sensing, a 
feeling of resonance, but that the therapist communicates this empathy to the client. He says, 
“(w)hen the client’s world is this clear to the therapist, and he moves about in it freely, then he 
can both communicate his understanding of what is clearly known to the client” (p. 243). 
Hannah’s lack of hesitation in grabbing a tissue and dabbing her eyes, suggests just such a 
moving about in it freely.       
Hannah’s practice of tears might be said to be constituted, in part, by person-centred or 
relational discursive counselling practices, in a way which facilitates and encourages tears. 
Hannah says ‘I wouldn’t hold myself back’. Tears, in this sense, enact a professional 
counselling material-discursive practice, a professional counsellor subjectivity, embodying a 
primary force of professional counselling - to listen, be genuine and communicate empathy.  
Although Hannah describes the tears as signifying a resonance with what the client is feeling, 
suggesting the tears hold something of her own experience meeting that of the client’s, primacy 





is moved more in relation to what the client is saying, rather than overcome by the enlivening 
of something of her own body’s historiality. Such a pattern of tears as described here, despite 
her words ‘I wouldn’t hold myself back’, appear somewhat controlled, less messy, more 
minimal in their expression – she is able to tell her client the tears are coming, and ‘dab’ at her 
eyes with the tissue – they are not sufficient tears to require ‘mopping up’. While still being 
genuine, such a pattern of tears maybe more easily embodies a professional (self-controlled) 
discursive practice. This, despite perhaps being always haunted by the personal, or existing in 
a relation of ‘exteriority within’, as evident in the word ‘resonating’, meaning to have the 
quality or effect of making you think of/feel a similar experience.    
Thinking further of the enabling/constraining conditions of counsellor tears in the counselling 
space, I am compelled to think beyond the discursive practices available within the counselling 
field, to think of counselling as a material-discursive practice itself which also exists alongside 
other helping professions, and has its own material, socio-cultural history and practices. 
Counselling in New Zealand is described on the NZAC website as “the process of helping and 
supporting a person to resolve personal, social, or psychological challenges and difficulties”. 
A counsellor, described as “professional and well-trained” helps clients “to see things more 
clearly, possibly from a different view-point, and supports clients to focus on feelings, 
experiences or behaviour that will facilitate positive change”. Counselling is not, among other 
things, “getting emotionally involved with the client” or “looking at a client's problems from 
your own perspective, based on your own value system”. In this way, counselling invites a 
focus on a client’s personal challenges and difficulties and legitimates a space of support to 
focus on feelings, on the emotional world of clients, in contrast to the vast array of work, 
family, and public spheres where rationality is most often prized over emotion.  Emotion in 






However, clear parameters are laid down – the counsellor, in inviting the client to enter into 
their own emotional world (whether in relation to difficulties or to facilitate positive change), 
is not to become emotionally involved with the client or to consider the client’s problems from 
their own perspective or value system. Such material-discursive practices constituting the 
discipline of counselling can be seen then as a force acting to both enable and constrain the 
flow of counsellor tears. This can be seen more clearly if we are to return to Barad’s notion of 
intra-action, and even to Rogers’ empathy. It seems inevitable that, at some point, counsellors 
will ‘feel’ in relation to the feelings of their clients, and that this may emerge as a tearful 
display. I say inevitable given counselling’s invitation and legitimation of emotion, a 
counsellor’s imperative toward empathic sensing of the client’s world, and Barad’s notion of 
inseparability, of embodied alterity, of “having-the-other-in-one’s-skin” (Barad, 2007, p. 392).  
While all of these conditions act to enable and perhaps legitimate the possibility of counsellor 
‘tears’, there are disciplining conditions which act to constrain, evident in NZAC’s clear 
directive that a counsellor does not become emotionally involved, or enter into their own 
perspectives and values. Hannah appears to exemplify this ‘personal-professional’ balance, of 
empathic sensing and personal constraint in her display of restrained tears.   
Such tears, as material-discursive practice, can be said to constitute her counsellor subjectivity, 
not in a fixed sense, but rather as an ongoing reconfiguring. Tears too, are reconfigured, as is 
emotion, as are the material-discursive practices of counselling, all intra-actively produced 
through one another in this ongoing, dynamic, intra-active “reworking of the nature of 
production of the very technologies of production themselves” (Barad, 2007, p. 240). Further 
mapping will continue to open up the numerous possibilities, or technologies of production, 
intra-acting in producing such affective performances. After all, despite the material-discursive 
practices which might be read to constitute counselling practice, there are, in addition perhaps 





we pay attention to, whose affect we are open to, and whose experience becomes our 
experience” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 150).  Or, as Barad says “intra-actions iteratively reconfigure 
what is possible and what is impossible – possibilities do not sit still” (2007, p. 235).    
Power at work through material-social forces in the production of tears 
In continuing to consider tears in an agential-realist sense, as a dynamic and shifting 
entanglement of relations, rather than simply as a ‘thing’, further consideration must be given 
to the incorporation of material-social factors, which Barad suggests includes, but is not limited 
to, “gender, race, sexuality, religion, and nationality, as well as class” (2007, p. 224). Central 
to such work, she says, is a new materialist understanding of power and its effects on the 
production of bodies and subjectivities. Barad suggests that the politics of identity has been 
demarcated by a geometrical conception of power, which, through performative discourse 
positions (Ringrose & Rawlings, 2015), flattens out and makes static that which is in effect 
dynamic. Such a geometric perspective sees power as working through social categories, such 
as gender, by defining binary norms which “designate, for instance, who is an intelligible boy 
or girl” (Ringrose & Rawlings, 2015, p. 8). Drawing on Butler, Ringrose and Rawlings (2015) 
describe gender not as a pre-existent biologically determined element, but as enacted or 
performed as “socially and culturally informed expressions (stylised acts) which are produced 
and reproduced to “constitute the fiction of a coherent stable identity and give the illusion of a 
fixed set of gender norms” (p. 6). Power is not an external force that acts on a subject but rather 
works as a force through the production of these dominant norms which define what it is to 
perform an acceptable, or failing, subjectivity, e.g. gender. Agential realism, while drawing on 
such performativity theories, goes beyond their exclusive focus on the human/social realm. As 
articulated throughout this project, this is done through the notions of material-discursive 
practices and intra-action. Power as a force works through material-discursive relations through 





contingent, are intra-actively produced, reworked, and always hold the possibilities to be 
remade. It is this dynamic through which structures or categories are seen to be iteratively and 
intra-actively (re)produced and (re)configured which reworks “rigidified social formations of 
power” which foreclose agency and produce subjects as discursively determined (Barad, 2007, 
p. 240).      
With this in mind, along with the words of the participants, I am interested to think how the 
categories of gender, culture and age intra-act and mutually co-constitute tears. Not as fixed 
identities or separate categories, but as themselves material-discursive practices which are 
intra-active and mutually transforming in every intra-action – as always, intra-actively, in-the-
making (Barad, 2007). While I further map the entangled and intra-active relationship between 
tears and culture in poem four, poem three, below, introduces culture into the tear 


















‘It’s a cultural thing’ 
In talking of the emergence of tears in the 
counselling encounter, Kai, of Pacific Island 
ethnicity, says ‘it’s a cultural thing’. Tears are 
entangled with, inseparable from, culture in 
counselling encounters. I am curious, as I was re-
turned to Poem two, to Hannah’s words, who 
identifies herself as South-East Asian Chinese, 
how this ethnicity intra-acts in the production of 
tears in the counselling encounter for her, how is 
it mutually transforming with the other forces, of 
professionalism, of tears? I wonder too, then, how 
my ‘whiteness’, and my Western, Pākehā subjectivity, intra-act with the others forces I outline 
above, to generate my tears and my discomfort at their production in the counselling encounter, 
and ultimately, how these all intra-act to effect the counselling relationship and client 
subjectivity.  
 
I use the term ‘whiteness’ here as a “White racial identity” in order to make visible that which 
is said to achieve its “oppressive power through invisibility” (Sue, 2015, p. 149). That is, in 
order to challenge the common assumption that “that the study of race focuses only on “people 
of colour””, Rodriguez and Villaverde (2000), contend that ““marking” Whiteness--
illuminating veiled cultural assumptions of Whiteness as the norm--is an important step toward 
social justice” in education (Abstract online). In fitting with an agential-realist view, whiteness 
is conceived of not as a “stable object of study, nor a stagnant identity”, but as a “performative 
social interrelation”, “a fluid set of knowledges and practices…with important consequences” 
It’s a cultural thing as well, 
because with us  
it’s okay.  
 
It’s more like you say to that person – 
‘I’m hearing you’,  
‘I can relate  
to what you’re saying’ 
 
so in a situation like that  
I would cry, I mean, 
I’d be in tears 
 





(McDonald, 2005 in McDonald, 2009, p. 9). As such, it becomes more useful not to describe 
what whiteness is, but rather what it does and how it works, particularly in relation to its 
dominance, normativity, and privilege in social, psychic, cultural, and economic terms for those 
bodies racially marked as white (McDonald, 2009). Thus, I am challenged to not think of 
culture, when it arises in my data, as only relevant to “people of colour” (Rodriguez, 2000), 
but to instead look to make visible and examine the force of whiteness, and how its normativity 
and privilege also intra-act with other forces to produce particular effects. Considered in this 
way, I become curious as to how the privilege of my whiteness might intra-act with the 
perceived privilege of the ‘expert’ counsellor subjectivity, and with the rationality of 
professionalism to centre or privilege a counsellor’s tears, despite their ‘irrationality’. None of 
these forces exist separately, but rather intra-actively come to exist and act in mutually 
constitutive ways to enact tears, as an object and as a force. I wonder, how might these material-
discursive forces intra-act in a counselling encounter, to effect a client subjectivity given, 
particularly, the presence and movement of power through such an entanglement (e.g. potential 
client vulnerability and perceived counsellor expertise)?   
These are complicated, but important questions for the field of counselling, given both its 
relative newness as a profession and its potential for abuses of power in what can be a very 
private encounter. Whilst this analysis cannot do the work of exploring the effects upon clients, 
it can do the work of attempting to map and examine relevant forces and their potential effects 
for counsellors-in-training, including in their counselling encounters, in order to then consider 
pedagogical and ultimately client, implications. Tears, already, have become more than simply 
a mark on a face. In thinking with Barad, it becomes obvious, how, “in this relational ontology 
there is a strange topology, a world inside each point, each bit, each tiny moment” (Barad, 
2016, 35:18), a world inside tears. I wish to re-turn to the poems in order to continue to explore 





filled with other times and spaces” (2016, 34:38), in order to also think further about the 
multiple forces intra-acting within the world of a counsellor-in-training subjectivity.    
In poem three, above, Kai speaks of the tears as embodying, similar to Hannah in poem two, 
a practice of empathy, of ‘hearing’ and relating to the client’s words. However, she describes 
this as a ‘cultural thing’, whereas above I have suggested Hannah’s tears enacting a force of 
empathy as professionalism. Kai goes on to suggest in poem four, below, that, in a 
counselling setting with a Pacific counsellor and client, if she sits without tears - being 
professional, her client ‘will not think I relate to her’. I present the poem as a whole first over 
the following two pages, and then use excerpts to think with the theory in the main body of 


















  (i) 
I’ll have a problem  
trying to control  
my tears.  
 
I know it depends  
on the client I have  
in front of me. My client – 
 
it was really one of those  
hard cases where 
it was so emotional. 
 
I think I was so caught up  
with the emotions  
and I think there was a shift  
 
of me putting on a different hat – 
I look at the girl,  
more like my daughter. 
 
I’m trying to process  
what she’s talking about, but  
at the same time, 
  
trying to figure out my emotions here,  
what to do  
and trying to control, because  
 
I know, by theory  
you’re not supposed to,  
I’m aware of, the culture – 
 
this is a non-Pacific  
so it’s not okay to have tears. 
I was so uncomfortable, 
(ii) 
she was directly facing me – 
I’m looking around for a tissue  
and just pretending, you know,  
 
but I do have tears,  
just to hide the tears,  
and I’m looking for tissues. 
 
But if this is a setting – 
a counsellor setting  
with the Pacific, it’s okay.   
 
she’s not a Pacific person but,  
if this is a setting with a Pacific person 
and I sit like this – 
 
trying to be professional,  
that person opposite me  
will not think I relate to her. 
 
It happened that the girl – 
I found out that she’s Māori,  
and I said to (my supervisor), “she’s Māori  
 
and I think she was okay”  
because I get some sort of good rapport  
with the girl, so when she sees me  
it’s okay.  
 
and she was relaxing – 
it was a moment where she was emotional  
and I was as well  


















Turning to Sara Ahmed’s (2014) work on the cultural politics of emotion helps me to think/feel 
my way further through this. She states that emotions shape the very surfaces of bodies, and 
drawing on Spinoza (1959, in Ahmed, 2014), says that emotions shape what bodies can do.  
This orients her toward asking what emotions do, rather than what emotions are. Tears, in this 
sense, as an overt display of emotion, are a force, they enable bodies to do something, to act in 
certain ways, and not in others. These are not innate or characteristic forces though, rather they 
are material-discursive ones. Ahmed highlights how she does not think about emotionality as 
a characteristic of bodies, rather the more interesting and useful focus for her becomes about 
the processes “whereby ‘being emotional’ comes to be seen as a characteristic of some bodies 
and not others, in the first place” (2014, p. 4). Primarily, and historically, emotion has come to 
be associated with women, “who are represented as ‘closer’ to nature, ruled by appetite, and 
less able to transcend the body through thought, will and judgement” (p. 3). Associated with 
this, Ahmed says, is emotion as behind and beneath reason, as ‘less than’, in an evolutionary 
sense, due to its association with pre-history and primitive times. Such primitive times, and 
thus emotion, also comes to be associated with being “less white” (p. 3). This evolutionary 
(iii) 
And I think we have to go – 
you know it depends on your client,  
your relationship with your clients  
 
and this is what I thought. 
   
I kind of reflect on these things  
about tears, emotions, because,  
I think for us it’s different. 
 





(including of the brain, e.g. from the reptilian to the limbic to the neocortex) story of linear 
progress, which tells of the triumph of reason over emotion and of the development of the 
rational ability to control one’s emotions, relegates emotion, women and people of colour to a 
subordinated (backward) position. What it also does is to create norms which associate and 
legitimate emotion with being female and non-white, albeit in a subordinate position to being 
male, white and rational. Plugging this thinking back into the poem, culture – Pacific/Māori 
and non-Pacific - becomes a material-discursive force, intra-active in the production tears.  
Tears are not a natural characteristic of some bodies and not others, rather they embody political 
histories which continue to exert a force shaping how (and whose) bodies come to matter.        
In returning to the poems, we can see whilst the tears in both the words of Hannah and Kai 
appear to embody a practice of listening, hearing and relating, this is not the whole story. The 
forces of culture and professionalism, of client and counsellor subjectivities, intra-act in 
different ways, to enact different tear diffractive patterns and differing, thus, counsellor-in-
training subjectivities. This becomes apparent in Poem four, where Kai says ‘it depends / on 
the client I have / in front of me’, ‘I’m aware of, the culture - / this is a non-Pacific / so it’s not 
okay to have tears’. In contrast to the ‘okay-ness’ of her tears in poem three, produced between 
counsellor and client both of Pacific Island ethnicity, and which then enact 
listening/hearing/relating, she talks of being ‘so uncomfortable’, ‘looking around for a tissue’ 
and ‘just pretending’ not to have tears, when the emergence of her tears intra-acts with a non-
Pacific client. In this instance of her tears, they also intra-act with ‘theory’, with the gaze of 
her white, academic supervisor, and with ‘trying to be professional’ - all of which she reads as 
cautioning against crying, and with her mother subjectivity – ‘I look at the girl, / more like my 
daughter’, to produce tears which require ‘control’ and hiding. Tears which become personal 
(triggered by her mother subjectivity) and non-professional (against theoretical, academic, and 





conflicted, she experiences these tears as performing an unacceptable counsellor subjectivity 
and seeks to ‘control’ and ‘hide’ them. And then things change again. The tears move in a 
different direction. Kai finds out her client is Māori, she recognises the rapport she already has 
with this client, that ‘she was relaxing’, and the tears become ‘okay’ - ‘a moment where she 
was emotional / and I was as well / it was okay’. Suddenly her counsellor subjectivity, as 
enacted through tears, becomes acceptable again, desirable even, when performed intra-
actively with a Māori client, and with the flow of rapport.  
Tears are not cultural in the sense that their production and effects are dependent upon the 
ethnicity of the client or the counsellor. Rather culture, as a material-discursive force, intra-
acts with both counsellor and client subjectivity, in a relational sense, and with the multitude 
of other forces, to produce both the tears and the effects of them, on counsellor, client and 
counselling itself. It is only through such a mapping that we can begin to see the multiple, intra-
active forces co-constituting something, tears, which on the surface, can appear as a universally 
marked, individual phenomenon to be read in particular and limit-ed/ing ways. In this case, 
tears are enacted in relation to discursive practices constituting emotion as characteristic of 
some bodies and not others. The mapping of tears in this poem depicts the dynamic and intra-
active processes through which tears are enabled and constrained, are made intelligible, in 
relation, at least to the dynamic forces of culture and the counselling context. It is impossible 
to speak of and understand the performativity of tears, except as in relation to the multiple 
forces co-constituting their emergence. Reading tears in this way, enables a richer, more 








Male tears as brave and strong 
Poem five, and the words of Basil, pattern masculinity as a force in relation to the enactment 
of tears. This isn’t to say gender has not been present until now. Gender, and culture, may only 
arise in the narrative when they are enacted in relation to their non-dominance. The presence 
of no-gender and no-culture, or their absent-presence suggests taken for granted assumptions, 
and leads to an invisibility of such forces at work. This is evident above when I talk about 
whiteness as an obscured invisibility enacting discursive practices of privilege and power, and 
how a focus on culture inevitability equates to focus on other-than-white. In a similar way, the 
invisibility (made visible through the presence here of masculinity) of femininity as a material-
discursive practice in the co-constitution of tears also becomes a relevant force. Again, these 
are not essentialized categories of what it is to be male or female, rather a contextual, situated 
mapping enables us to consider how emotion functions as a gendering construct (Shields, 
2013), and in turn how (dynamic) material-discursive practices of gender co-constitute the 
emergence of tears. This is a move away from questions of gender differences to issues of 
gender and power in the performance of emotion/tears and of what comes to matter, for whom 
and how. Such a move invites consideration, not of essential difference, but of when and how 
emotion (tears) are made legitimate, in this instance through the intra-activity of material-
discursive practices of heteronormative gender, counselling, culture, age and so on.  
As I state above, drawing on Ahmed’s (2014) work on the cultural politics of emotion, emotion 
has a long history of a ‘natural’ connection with women, “who are represented as ‘closer’ to 
nature, ruled by appetite, and less able to transcend the body through thought, will and 
judgement” (p. 3). Female emotion - to be emotional - is likened to having one’s judgement 
affected, being reactive rather than active, and dependent rather than autonomous (Ahmed, 
2014). Such “feminine” emotion has been described as a “by-product of female reproductive 





(Shields, 2013, p. 425). In this same body of work examining late 19th century British and 
American Scientific writing, “masculine” emotion, by comparison, was described as “a 
passionate force evident in the drive to achieve, to create, and to dominate” (Shields, 2013, p. 
425). Thus, it is not simply that women have been constructed as emotional and men as rational, 
with higher status, power and value given to rationality, but even where masculine expressions 
of emotion are evident, these have achieved alternative legitimacy by being accorded values 
consistent with heteronormative masculinities – drive, achievement, and domination. Shields 
(2013) labels the ongoing work of disrupting essentialism and situating and contextualising the 
relation between gender and emotion a process of examining “fault lines”. Fault lines, she says, 
reveal gender-emotion enactments not to be natural expressions, but rather “ideologies 
embedded in social-structural systems” (p. 430). Through this, as well as an intersectional (and 
intra-actional) approach to social identities, not only can emotion become detached from 
gender, but the very notion of gender as a fixed binary difference is also called into question.   
For now, I return to the current context of counselling in order to further map gender as a force 
in the co-constitution of tears. First, looking back to the poems above, we see tears produced 
through female bodies. Gender here was an invisible force, unremarkable in relation to the 
context of tears and counselling. But how did it work? As I have identified, tears as an 
emotional phenomena are constituted as a normative practice of femininity, and as such their 
presence within the counselling room, a place also constituted by emotional (feminine) 
practices, is accorded legitimacy in relation to female bodies. Indeed, such practices likely 
reinforce the essentialized and naturalised version of female emotionality. The effects of 
counsellor tears for clients will be influenced by a multitude of other forces beyond this, 
















Turning to Basil’s words in poem five, the relation between tears/emotion and masculinity is 
brought to the foreground. Tears here intra-act with male bodies. Basil says, in working with 
young male clients ‘I cry along with them’. Here, the phenomena of his counsellor tears is intra-
actively produced with a male subjectivity, with male client and counsellor subjectivities, with 
the discursive-materiality of young-male-client tears, with the affective-material-discursive 
space of the counselling room and its privileging of emotional lives. Multiple forces intra-act 
to enable and legitimate the flow of tears, while Basil’s tears can also be read as a fault line – 
an “opportunity to disrupt essentialism (that) comes from pointing out the contrast between the 
widespread belief that ‘‘real’’ men are inexpressive and the coexisting numerous everyday life 
examples of ‘‘real’’ men expressing many different types and intensities of emotion” (Shields, 
2013, p. 430). Basil’s tears are enacted partly in a counter-cultural way, seemingly in resistance 
to the normativity of male tears as weakness. Male counsellor tears are enacted as brave and 
As a male counsellor  
I see quite a few guys who –  
well young men, who  
are on the verge  
of tears  
or are in tears, because  
their dad’s died  
or something.   
I cry along with them.   
I try and tell them that  
it’s brave and strong, 
actually  
to express your emotions,  
and healthy. 
 





strong, as a healthy emotional material-discursive practice, cut together-apart from female tears 
as an emotionally weak, vulnerable, and unhealthy/unwell (neurotic) material-discursive 
practice. Male emotion/tears in this context, are made acceptable, legitimated, through 
normalised male discourses of ‘brave’ and ‘strong’, embodied within a body marked as male. 
Tears and brave-strong-male mutually transform each other and come to inhabit one another 
and, in turn, inhabit and enliven the becoming-counsellor and -client. What seems to remain 
cut-apart, a haunting, still, is tears as vulnerable, male as vulnerable, yet somehow still made 
acceptable. Tears, it seems, still enact a weak/strong binary equated with the female/male 
binary and to be made acceptable, so as not to be constituted as a failure, male tears must be 
constituted by discursive practices of male strength.    
These tear patterns outlined thus far also reinforce their inseparability from the relationality of 
counsellor-client – they embody both subjectivities and do not make sense as belonging only 
to a personal, individual body. That is, they embody the relationality of male counsellor-male 
client, or Pacific Island counsellor-Pacific Island client, in that they would emerge differently 
and produce different effects, given different intra-acting genders, cultures and multiple other 
forces. It is only through this kind of mapping that we can begin to perceive the ways in which 
such forces, often invisible, move and flow and entangle in their intra-actions to produce lived 
experience for counsellors-in-training. That we can see lived experience not as that of a self-
contained, autonomous individual but that rather, “individuals emerge through and as part of 
their entangled intra-relating”, not “once and for all” but iteratively, dynamically, in an ongoing 
reconfiguration (Barad, 2007, p. ix). Thinking in this way for counsellors-in-training raises 
questions of what we do and how we respond to the new kinds of knowledge this produces. It 





(t)here are no solutions; there is only the ongoing practice of being open and alive to 
each meeting, each intra-action, so that we might use our ability to respond, our  
responsibility, to help awaken, to breathe life into ever new possibilities for living  
justly ( p. x). 
 
Neither is justice something to be achieved once and for all, rather it entails continual 
“acknowledgement, recognition and loving attention” (p. x). It is my intention to return to such 
response-ability, for now, I re-turn to mapping the diffractive tear patterns. 
 
Collisions  
In the next poem (six), Kelly’s words make visible numerous further and complex material-
discursive forces at work in the counselling room, in the lives of counsellors in training, and 
here, in this particular enactment of tears. Once again, I present the poem as a whole, before 








  (i) 
I was aware of my own,  
very aware, of my own needs and vulnerability  
that day that that happened – 
 
that whole overwhelmed,  
hit a brick wall  
just so over it,  
 
just want to fix it,  
want to almost leave the room,  
just walk off the premises, almost.   
 
That was more reflective  
of how things were for me  
on that day – 
 
like that fixing, making it better,  
you know, wanting to cocoon people,  
wrap them up, give them a cuddle.   
 
Yeah, make the pain go away. 
I think it crept up on me very unsuspectingly – 
 
kind of these double whammy situations  
of one client and then directly followed  
by a crisis  
 
of two other girls coming in who’d had a friend  
who’d cut themselves quite badly in the toilet  
and they were overwhelmed  
 
and so I think more, more, more, you know,   
these are teenagers.  
 
I just want to make it better.   
and ultimately I like the fact  
that I have those feelings.   
 
(ii) 
I appreciate that, that sensitivity  
and having spent a day today  
at a suicide workshop,  
 
and that feeling of deep empathy  
and being able to share pain  
and being able to share tears  
 
but knowing that it’s that genuine empathy  
that isn’t transferred on my pain. 
My tears, not because I’m wanting to fix it,  
 
it’s my tears  
because I’m feeling your pain, yep.   
 
When I think of our own world view  
our own values and beliefs  
and how they need to be sitting  
 
so richly side by side,  
keeping very much in touch  
but not impose those  
 
but never lose sight of what they are  
and, it was a real collision for me  
you know (voice breaks).  
 
And yet I know that collision came  
when there was a hell of a lot going on  
for me, you know in my mother role.   
 
And I won’t take that away,  
but just knowing,  
that’s my frailty, but it’s my gift,  
I like to think of it like that.   
 





Reading this poem over and over again, I am struck by the multiplicity of forces, as Kelly says, 
coming together in ‘collision’. I am reading ‘collision’ to be the moment when tears emerge 
for her with a client - ‘being able to share tears’ and ‘it’s my tears / because I’m feeling your 
pain, yep.’ Although writing, both in the poem and here in my analysis, invites a linear telling 
of such a collision, a story of causes and effects, the sense the poem produces is of a much 
more entangled, dynamic, and potentially dis-orient-ed/ing process. Process descriptions such 
as ‘it crept up on me very unsuspectingly’, ‘double whammy situations’, ‘more, more, more’, 
‘it was a real collision for me’ and ‘a hell of a lot going on’ speak to what Kathleen Stewart 
(2007) calls ‘ordinary affects’, which she says “work not through “meanings” per se, but rather 
in the way they pick up density and texture as they move through bodies, dreams, dramas and 
social worldings of all kinds” (p. 3). Kelly’s words, too, speak of a shifting, swerving, lively 
process always in motion, such that collisions are perhaps, unavoidable. These are everyday 
flows and forces “with capacities to affect and be affected” (p. 2) which shift and slide, disperse 
and collide, becoming significant in the “intensities they build and in what thoughts and 
feelings they make possible” (p. 3), such as the emergence of tears.  
Such a way of perceiving the world, as a continual motion of entangled relations and 
emergences, defies traditional conceptualisations of causality, and thus of agency, 
accountability and responsibility as well. Returning to Barad, I am reminded agential realism 
does not figure causal relations as “specific relations between isolated objects” where one 
separate entity modifies, leaves it mark on, or is the cause of the effect on another. It is rather, 
that, in the emergence of the phenomena of tears, causal relations entail specifications that 
enact an agential cut. Cause and effect, in this sense, “emerge though intra-actions” (2007, p. 
176). Particular forces are cut apart, coalesce together, collide, becoming determinable only in 
the enactment, here, of Kelly’s tears. As Barad says “bodies differentially materialize (e.g. 





are enacted” (p. 176). Thus, it is not that Kelly’s needs, vulnerabilities, overwhelm, multiple 
clients, clients’ self-harming, deep empathy, mother subjectivity all acted within a counselling 
space as pre-existent separate entities to cause the effect of her tears, but rather that such 
propertied entities are made intelligible only in their causal intra-active relations in the 
enactment of tears. These material-discursive forces, and others, were cut together-apart, in a 
dynamic and ever-changing topology, in the emergence of Kelly’s tears.   
Agency, in this reconfigured relational causality, becomes a matter of intra-action, rather than 
a human attribute. “Agency is “doing” or being” in its intra-activity” (Barad, 2007, p. 178).  
Kelly’s ‘doing’ or ‘being’ of tears, cannot be read simply as a personal capacity or wilful 
expressiveness (or constraint). Such thinking elicits personal agentic notions which equate tears 
with, for example, failed self-control or purposeful manipulation, which render invisible the 
multiple material-discursive forces intra-actively enacting them in any one moment. Agency 
in an intra-active sense, released from humanist notions of intentionality, can only ever be 
dynamic and relational, with the self’s capacity to act always inseparable from the larger 
material arrangements of which we are a part, and which are embodied in, for example, the 
emergence of tears. Such a conceptualisation of agency as a matter of intra-acting, rather than 
something someone has, or a result of individual will, inevitably raises questions of 
accountability and responsibility, given also intra-action’s non-deterministic (albeit 
constraining) quality present by way of its iterative reconfiguring. In relation to the emergence 
of tears in the counselling room, what accountability does Kelly have? What responsibility can 
she enact in relation to her clients given the multitude of lively forces intra-actively colliding 
in the emergence of her tears? 
Barad (2007) refers to this, in different places, as a post-humanist ethics of knowing, of 
worlding, of mattering, in ways in which, I think, has significance for the ethics of counselling 





on our own, as a result of humanistic qualities such as intentionality and will, we do “participate 
in bringing forth the world in its specificity, including ourselves” (2007, p. 353). This is what 
she means by ‘meeting the universe halfway’, in the title of her book. We move toward, 
participate in, engage with – always in a state of relationality – what comes to matter with 
accountability and responsibility (“the ability to respond to the other” (p. 392)) for our part in 
the world’s differential becoming. Differentiating, in an agential realism framework, is not 
about separating, being other than, but rather is about making connections and commitments.   
Reading Kelly’s words in this poem again and again, I am drawn to several lines which I think 
embody this kind of ethics. Kelly speaks about all of the intra-active forces enacted in the 
emergence of her tears, but states ‘it’s my tears / because I’m feeling your pain, yep’. Her pain 
as inseparable from their pain. It was in that moment in which tears emerged, depicting Barad’s 
notion of matter as being “always already open to, or rather entangled with, the ‘Other’” (Barad, 
2007, p. 393). This is a subtle, but important, distinction from a humanist ethics of intention or 
choice or morals, from one human responding to a different other. It is an ethics which arises 
from the very onto-epistemology of the intra-activity of the agential realist framework which 
rejects the metaphysics of individualism, the foundation of traditional ethical approaches.  
Barad says “(w)e are always already responsible to the others with whom or which we are 
entangled, not through conscious intent but through the various ontological entanglements that 
materiality entails…(e)thics is not about right response to a radically exterior/ized other…” (p. 
393). Rather, it is about responding to the lively relationalities of becoming, as Kelly’s tears 
did, of which we are always, already a part.    
The emergence of sharing tears, as ‘sharing pain’, stands in stark contrast to what Kelly notices, 
at first, is being produced, in relation to the multitude of forces intra-acting in these moments  
– her desire to ‘fix it’, to ultimately ‘make the pain go away’. She speaks of ‘making it better / 





desire ‘to almost leave the room’. These desires are not enacted in practice, rather they are 
intra-active with the multiple other forces and desires and ethics, which ultimately produce the 
emergence of the phenomena of tears, rather than, say, an attempt to exert power over, or take 
action to enact an expert ‘fixing’. This is reflective of Barad’s assertion that “accountability 
and responsibility must be thought of in terms of what matters and what is excluded from 
mattering” (p. 394). What came to matter – tears - was a sharing, a being with, a feeling with, 
which embodied self and other, and an ethics so clearly described by K as ‘our own world view 
/ our own values and beliefs / and how they need to be sitting / so richly side by side, / keeping 
very much in touch / but not impose those’.    
Meeting each moment, as this poem depicts, and being alive to all of its possibilities, is an 
ethical call to intra-act responsibly, to be responsive to the possibilities for flourishing for all.  
For Kelly, this collision becomes just that. Alive to all of the possibilities, embodying her needs 
and vulnerabilities as ‘frailty’, the dense seed of tears finally becomes, also, a ‘gift’. That is not 
to say that they remain so. As Stewart (2007) reminds us, ordinary affects are always in motion, 
in circulation. What happens in the next moment, for the client, for Kelly, is another possibility, 
in the ongoingness of the world’s vitality, which will hold the seed of the tears and will continue 
to morph, and swerve and cut together-apart in relation to the ongoing, intra-activity of their 
subjectivities.   
Temporality and spatiality – ‘it just took me right back’ 
Leaving (but not leaving behind) Kelly, I turn now to poem seven. I am immediately, in a 
diffractive moment, struck by the almost simultaneous co-presence, in this researcher body as 
a space of transit, of both Barad’s words that “(s)patiality and temporality must also be 
accounted for in terms of the dynamics of intra-activity (2007 p. 180) and Basil’s words on 





says, and repeats, ‘it just took me right back. / It just took me back, right back / to that same 
sort of place, and feelings’.  He articulates “multiple temporalities working in the same moment 
as echoes or presences of other spaces” (Juelskaer, 2013 p. 758), and while he says this ‘key 
word’ - ‘abandonment’ ‘just took me ‘boom’ straight back, / it was so curious’, he is also clear 
that ‘I was still there with her / in the counselling room’, ‘I could be alongside her completely’.  
In two places, and times, at once? The whole poem follows, and is presented as a diffractive 
experiment with time and space. It is a long poem. By laying out the parts of the whole poem 
over five pages, with my text laid out alongside each of the parts, I invite the reader to 






























So far, I have talked of tears as moments of 
emergence where the gender, cultural, 
affective and daily politics, ethics and 
subjectivities of the lives of counsellors-in-
training are reconfigured. Tears are not 
mere emotional reactions to the world, but 
embody, and act as, personal-social-
cultural-material-ethical-political forces of 
the world (Gorska, 2016). To stop here, 
though, would not be enough for Barad.  
Agential realism, she says, is not just about 
posing a different set of dynamics and 
conditions for explaining the nature of and 
possibilities for change – “it introduces an 
altogether different understanding of 
dynamics” (2007, p. 179). Necessary to this 
changed – and changing – dynamics of 
causality and agency are matters of time 
and space. Tears, for example, cannot be 
said to emerge, as a material-discursive 
enactment, at a point along a “continuous 
transformation in or through time”, nor take 
place “in a container called space” (p. 179).   
Rather, tears, as a diffractive pattern, are an 
iterative intra-active becoming of  
(i) 
Working with a client – 
a client in white hot rage  
at her mother,  
 
because she was not allowed  
to be angry as a child. 
All those feelings  
 
and vulnerabilities and fears stirred me up,  
and increased my understanding of her world. 
I didn’t reflect to her  
 
what had happened to me  
but it just took me right back.   
It just took me back, right back  
 
to that same sort of place, and feelings  
of abandonment, and the same stuff  
around not being allowed to be angry.  
 
Well I said to her I can, I can, I know it’s –  
no I didn’t say I know exactly how  
you’re feeling – I think I said something like  
 
‘I know what you’ve been through’, sort of 
thing, ‘I’ve been through a similar experience  
but I can’t know exactly – 
 
you know, how painful or difficult it was  
for you’, but just let her know  
that I had been in a similar situation. 
 
It was very difficult, it’s difficult here now.   
It was difficult and she saw that  









spacetimemattering (Barad, 2010). In this 
quantum reconfiguration, everything that 
has been taken for granted under 
Newtonian physics is disrupted, and such 
a radical departure from time as 
continuous, place as the container and 
matter as discrete is a disconcerting, yet 
compelling, one. As Loewen-Walker 
(2014) suggests, drawing on Barad and 
Deleuze, perhaps one of the radical 
potentials of new materialism is primarily 
a philosophy of time. It’s this potential I 
am interested to explore further, in the 
context of this poem and its evidence of 
spacetimemattering, and also ultimately 
for the philosophy and pedagogy of 
change. Such a philosophy is inherent in 
both counsellor education and 
counselling itself, and typically remains 
underpinned by those somewhat invisible 
Newtonian forces and neoliberal 
discourses of agentic forward movement 
and progress, and the existence of a 
present defined by remedying pasts 
and/or anticipating superior futures  
 
(ii) 
It’s about being real for me  
in the counselling session – 
it took me back to that sort of vulnerability  
 
and those emotions  
and that sadness  
and that desolation and abandonment stuff, 
   
all over again. 
It was pretty horrible. 
her rage at her mother – 
 
just at that stage,  
just took me ‘boom’ straight back,  
it was so curious.   
Straight back to that feeling. 
Being kicked out, being abandoned,  
the abandonment, I think,  
 
was the word that got me, 
I’m pretty sure it was – 
that was the key word  
 
that sort of took me back,  
it made sense to me. 
So I think for me at that stage,  
 
it was about being with her in the moment  
and where she was at in her journey, 
and she’s reflected  
 
that’s probably the most useful thing for her  
at the moment – 































(Lowen-Walker, 2014). While, as Lowen-
Walker says, such discourses are not 
entirely problematic, in that hope, 
imagining the new, and holding 
possibilities “for worlds, bodies and 
practices beyond what we can imagine in 
the present” (p. 53) characterize feminist 
possibilities for transforming injustices, 
current conceptualisations of time in 
counsellor education tend to reply on 
linearity and continuity (cf. Goldberg et al., 
2016, who ask “do psychotherapists 
improve with time and experience - which 
they suggest has been a much studied topic 
of interest since the origins of 
psychotherapy research).  
 
In an agential realist framework, what 
comes to matter, what becomes intelligible, 
is instead made of, formed from and cuts-
together apart, different times and spaces, 
which are simultaneously mutually 
transformed. Past, present and future are 
not in a relation of a continuous, linear 
mutating and unfolding, but are iteratively 
(iii) 
difficult rocky journey  
and not trying to sort of spin  
any grand solutions at the moment. 
 
So I think it was just about being real  
and about being with her  
and having some resonance with what she 
 
was going through, that deeply affected me.   
I think it sort of gave me  
an increased understanding  
 
about what she was going through. 
Yes, I mean, I was still there with her  
in the counselling room  
 
and had a much better handle on it  
and a much better perspective on it now  
so that I knew I could identify 
 
where it’d come from  
and what it was associated with – 
was useful actually, so it didn’t take me 
back 
  
and consume me or anything like that.  
It was just, it was just really interesting  
to almost be an observer seeing me  
 
go back to that place as well,  
but I had good control over it, if you like  
it was useful. 
 
It’s interesting it still affects me  
it’s very interesting.   






threaded through one another in a non-
linear, dis/continuous enfolding (Barad, 
2010). Other times and spaces are “alive in 
the thick now of the present”. This is an 
aliveness which exists “not merely as 
subjective personal experience or even only 
as social reality, but ontologically and 
materially” (Barad, 2016, 34:44). Basil’s 
words point toward this aliveness. He 
describes it as being taken back, by a word 
of a client – abandonment - in a moment, 
into a past, which became enlivened in the 
present.  
He says ‘back to that sort of vulnerability / 
and those emotions / and that sadness / and 
that desolation and abandonment stuff / all 
over again’. This is not a subjective 
remembering, rather it is a past as a real and 
present material force, intra-actively 
reconfigured with another present, and with 
multiple other affective-material-discursive 
forces, including those of words 
(‘abandonment’), counsellor, adult, child 
and client subjectivities, a counselling 
room, an ethics of compassion, kindness 
(iv) 
because I could be alongside her 
completely, in her distress really.   
Yeah it is okay – 
  
it’s part of life as I know it so it’s not,  
hasn’t overtaken me or consumed me.   
It’s part of who I am. 
 
(I have of course completely forgiven her  
because we all, we all  
do what best we can at the time 
 
we don't have the benefit of hindsight). 
But it doesn’t make the memory go away  
or any less sharp. 
 
And it can still, it can still come up  
and I need to be,  
I am aware of it of course. 
 
It was more that I could completely 
empathise with where she was at,  
completely understand 
 
what was driving some of her, the stuff  
that was going on for her  
at the moment,  
 
I could completely understand that sort of 
abandonment stuff, and quite a lot  
of the issues that she was dealing with 
 
Because they’ve been part of me as well. 
I really value it actually.   



















and empathy, and so on. The way Basil 
speaks of the occurrence of this moment in 
the counselling room, can be read as an 
intra-active one, an entanglement which 
pulls together a multitude of forces, as 
noted above, of times, spaces and 
subjectivities. It might be easy to initially 
read this experience as one in which he was 
catapulted into the past, overcome with his 
own experience and resulting emotion, 
signalling a need for further ‘personal 
work’. And, indeed, this experience may 
have generated that decision, among others, 
for Basil. However, to simplify the analysis 
of this moment in Basil’s becoming 
counsellor subjectivity to ‘one’ thing would 
be reductive, in the sense of both the 
multitude of actual co-present, embodied 
forces as well as then in the possibilities 
generated from mapping such a 
multiplicity. What else, then, can be seen in 
a mapping drawing from Basil’s words in 
this poem? How are time, space and matter 
reconfigured, threaded through one 
another, in this ‘difficult’ moment, shared 
between counsellor and client?   
(v) 
sort of a number of the issues  
that the clients come with  
that I can identify with quite closely  
 
which in some ways is comfortable,  
sort of familiar  
as familiar to them  
 
as they are to me,  
except that I’ve got a better handle  
on them now.   
 
I believe it has resulted  
in me having deep compassion  
and kindness and empathy  
 
and understanding and acute awareness  
of family of origin issues  
for so many clients. 
 






Barad tells us that “the past is never left behind, never finished once and for all…rather the 
past and the future are enfolded participants in matter’s iterative becoming” (2007, p. 181).  
There is more than one past present, though, in the moment of Basil’s retelling. Basil speaks 
of also having a ‘much better handle on it / and a much better perspective on it’ which meant, 
he says, that the intrusion of the past, and its affect in particular, didn’t ‘consume’ him in that 
present moment. Co-present was an adult subjectivity which had worked with this past to the 
point where Basil says ‘it’s part of life as I know it…/ it’s part of who I am’. In relation to his 
experience of abandonment as a child, he says, as an adult ‘I have of course completely forgiven 
her / because we all, we all / do what best we can at the time’. The co-presence of this adult 
subjectivity acted as ‘an observer’, he says, witnessing the re-turn ‘that place’, but also meant 
he ‘had good control over it’, over what the re-turn generated, affectively, in his body.  This 
adult subjectivity was able to ‘identify / where it’d come from / and what it was associated 
with’, the ‘it’ being the co-presence, the unanticipated emergence of, ‘those emotions…that 
sadness…and that desolation and abandonment stuff’.    
Basil notes ‘it’s interesting it still affects me / it’s very interesting’, and earlier, he notes after 
saying it ‘took me ‘boom’ straight back’, that ‘it was so curious’. Upon mapping this moment 
for himself, here, he notes his own curiosity, interest, and surprise, that this past was so 
affectively, materially present for him in this moment, especially, perhaps, given the time and 
attention he has given to working with these affective memories over the course of his life.  At 
the same time he recognizes that this doesn’t seem to ‘make the memory go away / or any less 
sharp’ with the implication, as a counsellor, that ‘it can still come up’ and he needs to aware 
of this possibility.  
This mapping, and thinking the mapping with Barad’s agential realism, troubles the dominant 
(counselling) discourse of identity and experience being shaped and transformed progressively, 





thought he had left behind, or at least, worked through and transformed. Such a view is 
consistent with traditional humanist notions of an essentialist, linear identity. Counselling, as 
with neoliberalism, is underpinned by “constructions of time as a linear and cumulative 
movement forward” resulting in a fixation on “human agency as the sole means by which we 
can bring about the anticipated future” (Lowen-Walker, 2014, p. 52). Such conceptualisations 
rely on time as chronological with its familiar notions of before and after bound together 
through iterative causes and effects rolling ever onward into unknown but potentially hoped 
for, agentic futures. With this view, it would indeed be surprising to be thrust back, or to find 
oneself co-present with, the material affects of a past time and space, seemingly left behind.    
At the same time, Basil seems to recognise the co-existence, the inevitable coming together of 
both pasts – that the memory doesn’t go away, or become ‘any less sharp’, even with the work 
of forgiveness. These multiple pasts intra-acting with the present – with the counsellor – client 
intra-action - nevertheless do not portray a fixity to these forces. That is, the presence of this 
lively and enlivening past of ‘sadness, desolation, and abandonment stuff’ does not necessarily 
signify a stuck, fixed, troublesome identity which requires further transformational work in 
order that it does not interfere with the work of counselling. This force of the past is intra-active 
with multiple other forces in the production of tears, and of Basil’s counsellor subjectivity. The 
work this force does, or what it produces for Basil’s subjectivity and/or in the counselling 
relationship is relational. In Baradian terms, it is an inseparable part of the entangled 
phenomena emergent with this time and space. Nothing stands separately constituted and 
positioned - practices of knowing and being are always entangled. Connections are always 
reconfigured and boundaries never stand still, including pasts, presents and futures. “Scenes 
never rest but are reconfigured within and are dispersed across and threaded through one 
another. Multiple entanglements, differences cutting through and re-splicing one another 





an inseparable part of the phenomena of tears, then enacting (intra-active with) Basil’s 
subjectivity in the counselling room, in this moment. It is a past intra-active with another past, 
of an adult subjectivity signified by understanding and forgiveness, and a counsellor 
subjectivity holding a desire to be helpful to the client. These multiple forces are also intra-
active with, inseparable from, co-emergent with, the words and experience of the client. As 
Basil says, it was ‘being with her / and having some resonance with what she / was going 
through, that deeply affected me’.  What this intra-action produces, in the tears, in the response 
to the client, cannot be determined through consideration of one of these forces alone. It is only 
in a detailed mapping of the diffractive pattern, that the tears, the counsellor response, become 
intelligible.   
Pasts, in this sense, do not sit still, inertly waiting for attention. Nor can they be wiped away. 
They are hauntings in a thick temporality of a lively present (Lowen-Walker, 2014) with an 
always already possibility of a material ontological co-presence in the ongoing iterative 
reconfiguring of worlds. The co-presence of Basil’s pasts, viewed in this way, give rise to a 
troubling, not only of linear notions of time and emotional/psychological progress, but in turn 
of binary notions of a troubled/untroubled therapist. Maree Adams (2014), concludes from her 
PhD research exploring the personal lives of forty therapists, that “I am now convinced that 
this wonderful term ‘bracketing’ is simply an illusion, a comforting idea that bears no relation 
to reality. We cannot leave our experiences outside the room. Even if not at the foreground of 
our minds, our tensions and pleasures, the rumbling envies and unresolved issues of archaic 
experience are always with us” (p. 2). In this way, she confronts the binary by suggesting the 
existence of the untroubled therapist is a myth, that none of us is ever completely untroubled, 
and that what is important is how we manage and respond to the presence of our struggles, 
particularly in the therapeutic context. Extending this notion, I think, beyond an ongoing 





that we embrace this thick temporality, “recognizing its ability to deepen our accountabilities 
to those pasts and their possible futures.” Such a focus, she says, “becomes a necessary form 
of ethical engagement with the world…from the position of being always already entangled in 
a vital materiality” (2014, p. 56).  
Similarly, drawing on Barad, I am reminded that such accountability and responsibility are an 
inseparable part of what comes to matter.  Responsibility for what comes to matter is not just 
about recognising and managing the ‘personal’ intruding into the professional. It is about an 
attention to the fine detail of entanglements. It is about responding to the inseparability of the 
past, present and future, of the personal and the professional, of troubled and resourced 
subjectivities, and to what comes to matter through their multiple, ongoing, and iterative 
reconfiguring. This is what Basil speaks of when he says ‘but yeah it was okay / because I 
could be alongside her / completely, in her distress really’. He reiterates ‘yeah it is okay’. In 
that moment, where a moment from his childhood past was reconfigured with the present, and 
with his more resourced adult subjectivity and his becoming-counsellor self, what was 
produced for him was not an overwhelm of intrusive affect from the past, but rather tears which 
enacted a ‘deep compassion / and kindness and empathy / and understanding’. For Basil, this 
is an ethical engagement, which holds an accountability and responsibility to the pasts which 
are present – his and his client’s, and to a future yet to come. Only in the cutting-together-apart 
of these multiple times, spaces, subjectivities, and affects was this response of deep compassion 
made possible. 
Through attention to the process of mapping the tear poems, a number of forces entangled in 
the production of tears, have been made visible and explored in this chapter, including gender, 
culture, counselling theory, practice and ethics, and other subjectivities, times and spaces. At 
the same time consideration has been given not just to making such intra-active forces visible, 





ethics and agency in the ongoing configuring of a counsellor-in-training subjectivity. I continue 
to explore this material-discursive enactment of tears in the following interlude and in chapter      






INTERLUDE TWO   
 
The hauntological nature of quantum entanglements:  
ghostly tears and aporias 
 
Tears as a ghostly happening 
Lisa Blackman (2015), in her book chapter titled ‘The Haunted Life of Data’, suggests that in recent 
years the politics of life, and thus of data, opens up questions about what counts as data. She writes 
initially in the context of our engagement across multiple (social) media platforms, where our 
transactions leave traces, becoming lively in ways that may be difficult to see, and thus analyse, but 
nevertheless have real, dynamic and ongoing lives and effects. She draws on the work of Karen Barad 
to conduct her own ‘hauntological’ inquiry, tracking ghostly traces and the ghostly entanglements that 
make such traces visible. Hers is a political project with the aim of reanimating us to the question of 
what gets erased from particular practices of remembering and forgetting. Turning to my project which, 
in the previous chapter, has focused on entanglements producing the happening, or presence, of tears 
for counsellors-in-training, I have become interested here in tears also as a ghostly happening.  
The aim of this interlude and following chapter is to map such ghostly presences and entanglements in 
the data, to animate toward tears as a lively present-absence, in order to speak of something which 
lingers in the shadows (Wyatt, Tamas & Bondi, 2016) as an invisible yet potent force (Tonkin, 2012) in 
counselling relationships and in the subject formation of counsellors-in-training. Particular ghostly tear 
entanglements are mapped below in order to make visible the intra-active forces shaping the phenomena 
of tears as a lurking present-absence, or absent-presence (Wyatt, Tamas & Bondi, 2016). Regardless of 
phrase, it is tears as ghostly matter, as “not-quite-known or not-here-now” (Tamas, 2016, p. 40), yet as 





I use this interlude to return to Barad (2010) in order to understand what might be produced in thinking 
with her descriptions of the hauntological nature of quantum entanglements. Such a recognition that 
every concept is haunted by its mutually constituted excluded other, led me to data that glowed 
(MacLure, 2010) beyond the mere presence of tears. I start this interlude with a diffractive engagement 
with my own mind-body knowing by re-turning to a memory produced, in one of the group sessions, of 
the present-absence of tears for me in a prior counselling encounter. I use this to think into the 
entanglement of tears manifest as absent in their (visible) materiality, yet as potently present in minds 
and bodies. Re-turning then to the data, re-presented in a poem, I am impelled to explore what it means 
to understand, and map, the materiality of tears as phenomena, as a material-discursive practice, when 
they are invisible, ghostly and ineffable. As I follow this line of questioning, I come to see such tears 
an enacting a strongly felt simultaneity of being both okay and not okay in a counselling encounter. I 
explore how this simultaneity might be understood, and what it might produce, by thinking with what 
Barad labels the “indeterminacy principle” (Barad, 2007; 2010), and with Derrida’s notion of the aporia 
(Derrida, 1990; Edgoose, 2001), before proceeding to map the multiple forces intra-actively enacting 
these ghostly tears in chapter eight. 
The im/possibility of tears 
I re-turn to Barad and her quantum theory of agential realism to think with. It was in thinking with 
discursive practices in an agential realist sense that I came to think about the im/possibility of tears, as 
both the presence and the absence of tears. The mattering of tears, as discursive practices, are 
conceptualised as ongoing agential causal intra-actions of the world, through which “part of the world 
becomes determinately bounded and propertied in its emergent intelligibility to another part of the 
world” (Barad, 2007, p. 149). The world articulates itself or becomes intelligible through tears. The 
conditions of possibility are such that tears come to matter; these same conditions are also the 
impossibility for that which is determined to be mutually exclusive – the absence of tears. Focusing on 





individual subjective human experience, invites a reconceptualization of traditional notions of entities 
typically constructed as being mutually exclusive to each other, as having sharp edges and relations of 
absolute exteriority. For Barad, this is the “hauntological nature of quantum entanglements” (2010, p. 
245, italics in original), where entities, such as tears, do not entail a relation of absolute exteriority at 
all.  Rather, the relation of the presence and absence of tears is one of “exteriority within” (2010, p. 93), 
where each is haunted by the existence of the other. This means that the very nature of tears always 
exists “with/in and as part of the phenomenon that includes the cut and what it excludes, and therefore, 
that what is excluded is never really other, not in an absolute sense” (2007, p. 159). Such a recognition 
that every concept is haunted by its mutually constituted excluded other, led me to data that glowed 
(MacLure, 2010; 2013) beyond the mere presence of tears (Barad, 2010). In order to further understand 
and speak of the intelligibility of tears, it seemed I must also explore the conditions of possibility for 
the present-absence, or absent-presence, of tears. As Barad says, “the contingent determination of the 
meaning of any concept (tears) necessarily entails constitutive exclusions. Every concept is haunted by 
its mutually constituted excluded other” (2010, p. 253).  
Recognizing my own body as a space of transit 
I start this exploration with a re-turn to diffractive method in order to bring other times, spaces, 
subjectivities and knowing into visible relation with the words of my participants, to recognise my own 
body as the space of transit (Lenz Taguchi, 2012), for the knowing which will emerge here, in this time 
and space, on this paper. As with the previous chapter, I do this through beginning with a poem (eight) 
that depicts a spacetimemattering of the absent-presence of tears for me, as a counsellor, in relation to 
the counselling encounter. This lively memory was present with me, and my counsellor subjectivity 
came into sharp focus, during the group session in which Maia’s words emerged, as re-constructed 
below in poem nine. In this, Maia speaks of the fears she has held of crying and not being able to ‘handle 
it’ when an experience, too close to one of her own traumatic experiences, arose in the therapy room. I 





multiple times and spaces which diffract and cut together-apart to produce the new knowing emerging 
here.   
  Ghostly matters 
 
A haunting, a ghost, 
typically they appear unexpectedly, 
out of the blue 
in the dead of night 
in the stillness of solitude 
to scare, to fright, 
to make afraid, they 
cut together-apart 
then and now, 
this and that 
here and there, 
a ghostly presence 
a bodily absence, yet 
here he is 
and it’s not even dusk. 
 
No floating white images, 
No candlesticks alight on their own 
or gusts of wind 
to suddenly extinguish 
those burning flames. 
Instead, he makes his appearance 
in the (w)hole of my chest, 
his presence fills the cavity 
and seeps into the room 
he hovers over me, 
and us, and our talking together 






but the slow burn 
of my saturated heart. 
 
No moisture forms 
in places I anticipated, 
as I think of you 
and I think of me 
and gradually he slips away 
and with him those absent tears, 
until it’s just us again 
sitting together on the floor 
cross legged amongst the dolls 
and the brightly coloured pens, 
bringing ghosts to life, 
laying ghosts to rest. 
 


















I use this writing to begin to think into the entanglement of tears manifest as absent in their physical 
form, yet as potently present in minds and bodies. Tonkin (2012) writes about such haunting in the 
context of fantasy children and potential maternal subjectivities for women who are circumstantially 
childless. Like her, I find Avery Gordon’s (2008, p. 17) description of that which appears absent as a 
“seething presence” to be a compelling phrase for the apparent absence of tears. I note my use of words 
here in my researcher diary, such as ‘fearful, breakdown, unpredictable, no control, being overtaken’, 
in relation to the potential emergence of tears in a counselling relationship and how such ideas were 
present with me in my decision-making and eventual work with clients. Having written about the 
Listening to Maia, I was vividly thrust into my own experience today, of soon after my brother died when I  was 
wanting, and feeling ready, to offer counselling again to children and families affected by the earthquakes.  I felt 
I could be useful and I had a strong desire to do something. I had made food during the worst of it for those doing 
the labour, yet now I knew there were so many suffering. I wondered if I was far enough beyond my own 
suffering, my own loss, to not breakdown in the sessions when I heard their loss, their pain. I wondered, actually 
I think that was my biggest fear – my grief was still unpredictable, still is, and I was fearful that it would pop up, 
that I would have no control, because that was what I had learnt about it. Just because I had many good, possibly 
even normal days, did not mean a day would not arrive which was like he had only just departed this life, where 
the loss was raw and the wound was open and I had no control of where or how that would take me. I thought 
that wouldn’t be of much use for my clients.  And I remember then, the decision I made, to take no clients who 
had suffered a human loss in the earthquakes, who were coming to counselling because a family member had 
died. I would help children with worries, fears, anxiety as a result of the earthquakes. I still remember my first 
clients, two young sisters, and their mother telling me their story, a big part of it not to do with the earthquakes, 
but that their uncle had died recently. Immediately, unexpectedly, I was thrust into my children’s experience that 
their uncle, too, had died recently. But I didn’t break down, didn’t cry. I just noticed where I went, what I thought, 
and what I felt, and the compassion I could bring, the understanding I could offer to another family who had 
experienced a tragic loss. So, I connected with Maia in the group and her telling, and with the fear of it, of this 
breaking down, this loss of control, being overtaken by something beyond any rational sensibility. Even though, 
or maybe because, I hadn’t ‘lost it’ I became more open to the possibilities of sitting with my own loss at the 






multiple social and cultural forces enacting the presence of tears in the previous chapter I am now drawn 
to Gordon’s words when she speaks of haunting as being “one way in which abusive systems of power 
make themselves known and their impacts felt in everyday life” (2008, p. xvi). What are the systems of 
power which both equate tears with falling apart, breaking down, and losing control and which instil 
such a fear of this happening into our bodies? I am curious about Gordon’s further ideas of how, through 
such hauntings, “we are notified that what’s been concealed is very much alive and present, interfering 
precisely with those always incomplete forms of containment and repression ceaselessly directed toward 
us” (2008, p. xvi). I follow this thread and consider such forces, of systems of power which necessitate 
concealment, containment and repression of particular states, in particular neoliberalism, in greater 
depth in relation to the words of my participants below. I am curious, too, when she states that hauntings 
interfere with these potentially incomplete systems of power. I thus seek to think further about the 
multiple and mutually transforming intra-active forces at work, beyond poststructural notions of 
materiality solely as an effect or consequence of the discursive. How might such hauntings be 
productive? What might be making itself known, demanding attention, not just in the sense of other 
times and spaces, but in the sense here of tears themselves as undesirable, problematic and requiring 
concealment? Such a haunting, suggests Gordon, is frightening in that it “registers the harm inflicted or 
the loss sustained by a social violence done in the past or the present” (2008, p. xvi). What harm or loss 
or social violence has been enacted here to produce tears as a fearful and haunting presence? I am guided 
by these provocations in mapping the forces enacting the present-absence of tears in the following 
chapter.         
In the previous chapter I have written about the presence of tears as entangled with ethics and discursive 
practices of counselling, among other forces, which co-constitute the emergence of tears as an ethical, 
and potentially therapeutic practice in the context of counselling. Had I left that discussion at that point, 
I believe I would have offered only a partial and limited picture of the social, ethical and political 
possibilities of tears for counsellors-in-training, and forces intra-actively producing their subjectivities. 





reconfigure the enactment of tears, through their present-absence.  For, perhaps, “haunting is one of the 
most important places where meaning— comprehension— and force intersect” (Avery, 2008, p. 194).    
Here then, in thinking with my writing (poem and researcher diary extract) above, I wonder at the forces 
co-constituting tears as a fearful haunting, tears as potentially destructive, at worst, to the therapeutic 
process or, at least, as embarrassing, unhelpful and undesirable. Only by mapping and opening up to the 
forces and practices co-constituting these kinds of tears, along with those we have already explored, are 
counsellors-in-training able to navigate their way around agency, to intra-act, responsibly and with 
accountability, “in and as part of the world’s becoming” (2007, p. 175), in and as part of the therapeutic 
encounter. Tears become neither good nor bad, to be welcomed nor feared. Tears are an entanglement 
and counsellors-in-training can only intra-act responsibly in relation to the multiple material-discursive 
practices enacting them.   
The present-absence of tears – viscerally alive in body-minds 
Turning toward Derrida in theorizing an absent-presence also brought me into contact with the work of 
Lisa Mazzei (2007), and her inspiring theorising and deconstruction of silence as a “haunting 
presence…that spectre that rattles around in the dark, underneath, in between, in front of our acts of 
discourse to subvert, conflict, and at times to make it clear to us our intentions and possibly our actions” 
(p. xi). Thinking similarly, unshed tears as a spectre have been relegated to the dark places, the unseen 
and underneath, the in between of pasts and futures, and yet, their potency to subvert, conflict and bring 
other hauntings to light cannot be underestimated. Tears, in their present-absence, are also silent data, 
unseen and unheard, yet viscerally alive and meaning-full in the body-minds of participants. St. Pierre 
(2009), also in thinking with Derrida, proposes such an analytic intent – to turn to silence - as the 
“overturning of the hegemony of presence” in qualitative research, a provocation I take up and hope to 





entanglement haunted by numerous present-absences23. I do present the poems as longer depictions of 
the entanglements than I have in the previous chapter, in part because of the longer stories and in part, 
through a desire to examine the detail of how haunting might assert itself. I present Maia’s here in whole 
first, before drawing on a particular aspect of it to think with, in this interlude, before returning to further 
map her words in the following chapter. This is another experiment, and again I offer the poem situated 
here, as a diffractive interrupting to my text, as intra-active with the space and time of the reader, of the 
whole thesis, and multiple other forces in the generation of thought, of new knowing.  
Last week I had my first experience  
of a story, that was like my story  
like really, really close to it. 
 
She didn’t just dive straight in and say  
‘Oh, he was trying to kill himself’.   
She was sort of working around it.  
 
I was just thinking  
‘oh my god  
she’s about to tell me’.  
 
I was thinking this man  
was trying to kill himself  
and I just remember thinking  
 
‘oh god, I hope she doesn’t say that’,  
I really didn’t want her to say that. 
I was thinking back to this room - 
                                                          
23 Many intimate details which were included in Maia’s original speaking have been omitted from this final poem in order 
to protect the confidentiality of Maia, her client, and of others implicated in the telling of the particularities of their 
experiences.  Omitting these details was determined not to detract from the data, given the focus on the haunting of 






we talked about would I be okay  
when a really close experience  
comes up?  
 
I did think about that  
and I was like ‘I think I’ll be okay’  
‘I think I’m going to be okay’.  
 
I’m pretty sure that’s what she’s going to say  
but she hasn’t said it yet  
so I was kind of preparing myself for it  
 
and thinking 
I didn’t want to cry (laughs)   
I know it’s okay to cry, but yeah  
 
I just oh I wanted to know  
that I could handle it  
that I’d be okay with it, I guess. 
 
That I can be more present  
for the student   
than caught up in my own world  
 
which I know I spent a long time doing.   
And so it turned out that he was okay?24 
Yep. But the whole time  
 
                                                          





that’s all I wanted to know.   
I carry it with me all the time. 
Keep it down. 
 
I think it was more just  
hearing that story  
it was just hearing the detail.   
 
but I’m better hearing it  
from someone else  
rather than when I hear it  
 
in my own head  
it’s really raw  
it’s still raw  
 
even though it’s 15 years  
or something  
but hearing it from someone else  
 
I can separate me from them. 
it’s familiar but it’s not your story 
Yes. Yes and I think  
 
it sounds bad  
but I was pleased I could do that. 
have some distance from it? 
 
Yeah. I was okay. 
There was definite relief,  






that I was holding it together  
and there was relief that he lived  
So that was two reliefs. 
 
I have students who’ve come in  
who have had friends or dad  
who had committed suicide. 
 
But I didn’t hear the story  
of how it happened. 
I think it was just that whole  
 
(detail) 
and because that’s you know  
essentially what I had to do. 
 
It is very, very close. 
So that’s the difference. 
The exactitude. Yep, yeah. 
 
It brought, you know, that picture  
back into my head. 
It feels good that I know  
 
I can be okay for somebody else  
and I can be there  
for somebody else.   
 
I can still keep my wits about me  
and think clearly  






then if I need to do something for myself  
later on then I can.   
What if you hadn’t though? 
 
Holding it all together - 
is that what is most important? 
I think for me personally it is. 
 
Because that’s what counsellors do? 
No, because that’s what I do - 
because that’s who I am, I guess.   
 
I’m strong and I can hold it together  
I don't think I would let myself  
really lose it.  
 
I have had other stories  
with students  
where there’s been tears in my eyes  
 
and you know that’s all good  
but I don't think it would have been,  
I don't know. (laughs)    
 
I thought I’d be at least welling up  
and it wasn’t, it was just totally,  
this is someone else’s story  
 
and yes it’s really similar to mine  
but it’s okay I think, yeah. 






If anything it just distracted me a little  
but not enough that I wasn’t still there. 
I guess I’m okay with it in my personal life.   
 
I can deal with it there.  
But I don't want it to be part of  
my professional life, because it’s affected  
 
my bloody life so much already  
this is one part of my life  
that I don't want it to. 
(Maia, poem nine) 
 
I sense so much in this poem which speaks of multiple presences for counsellors-in-training in those 
moments and minutes of encounter. Focusing particularly on tears, Maia’s words, ‘I didn’t want to cry’, 
and her subsequent elucidation of the presence of this desire to be able to ‘handle it’, to be ‘okay’ and 
‘holding it together’ as manifest through the absence of tears, initially all start to point to the potency 
of this haunting. While there are multiple other time-spaces present for Maia in this encounter, the thread 
of resisting the appearance of tears appears to be strong, and it is this which I wish to bring to life here, 
in an attempt to animate towards that which is typically erased. Again re-turning to Barad’s agential-
realism I wish to consider such tears, in their present-absence as a material-discursive practice. In the 
previous chapter, tears as a material presence on the faces of the counsellors-in-training, seemed to 
easily lend themselves to a material-discursive analysis. However, what is the materiality I am speaking 
of here when it appears as invisible, ghostly, and ineffable? Can I speak of this absent-presence as 
emotion, as affect, as I did in relation to the presence of tears on and in the bodies of participants, or is 
this something different? Barad tells us that “making sense is after all a material matter, especially if 
materiality isn’t the closed and limited set Newton, or even Marx, had imagined, and meaning isn’t 





is to be found in the inseparability of the material-discursive. A reconceptualization, as Barad offers of 
materiality, sees phenomena as the objective referent, where ““material” is always already material-
discursive – that is what it means to matter” (Barad, 2007, p. 153). Thus, seeing present-absent tears as 
phenomena, as a material-discursive practice, as an agential intra-action, requires a redrawing of 
boundaries and a recognition that the ongoing reconfiguring (mattering/meaning) of tears as present-
absent can only be made intelligible through a mapping of intra-active forces co-constituting particular 
materializations. Tears in this chapter, in their present-absence, rather than being in binary opposition 
to tears as present, in the previous chapter, rather can be seen to be a process of “differentiatings - that 
cut together/apart – that is the hauntological nature of quantum entanglements” (Barad, 2010, p. 245).  
It is this process of differentiating-entangling, of “connectivity through the traces of variously entangled 
threads and of the (re)workings of mutual constitution” (p. 245) which must be mapped.   
I am struck by these words, ‘I didn’t want to cry (laughs) / I know it’s okay to cry, but yeah / I just oh I 
wanted to know / that I could handle it / that I’d be okay with it’. I am trying, at this point, to make sense 
of the particular pattern enacted here, of initially how this present-absence of tears might at first appear.  
Here, there is a desire to ‘not cry’ which is co-present along with a sense that crying can be an okay 
thing to have happen for a counsellor in a counselling context, that it is, at least, not an ethically or 
therapeutically harmful practice. Along with this, is also an expression that not crying equates to 
‘handling it’ and being okay. Again, inviting the opposite in order to make more sense, this suggests 
that tears, in this instance, would have meant not being okay and not handling the particular ‘it’ referred 
to here – even through it is ‘okay’ to cry.  
This seems resonant of Mazzei’s suggestion noted above of the spectre (of tears) and its potency to 
subvert and conflict. Tears, in their present-absence, are simultaneously okay and not okay, and it is this 
presence of simultaneity, which makes their absence so keenly felt. Here, as I believe it was for me in 
my experience described above, there is an added potency to this presence though, constituted by a 





the loss (and associated grief) of brothers, albeit in different ways. That is, this is not a general sense of 
knowing it is okay (possible) to cry, and just not wanting to (impossible). Rather, tears as a haunting 
here, are also produced by, and made potent (more impossible), by other hauntings, of loss and 
consequential breakdown of the functioning subject. It is such histories of being overcome by tears, of 
not holding it together, that I would suggest are an additional lively force in the presence-absence of 
tears as simultaneously okay and not okay, possible and impossible. 
Simultaneity, indeterminacy and aporetic moments      
I would like to inquire further into this simultaneity before proceeding to further map these, and other, 
forces (e)merging here in the co-constitution of the absent-presence of those ghostly tears. In order to 
do this I draw on Bohr’s interpretation of the complementary problem, which Barad labels the 
“indeterminacy principle” (Barad, 2007, p. 295; 2010) and Derrida’s notion of the aporia, in particular 
the “aporia of undecidability” and the “aporia of urgency” (Edgoose25, 2001, p. 129). Barad’s thinking 
in her 2010 paper, on quantum entanglements and hauntological relations, is a diffraction of, among 
other times, spaces and matter, both of these notions and the work of both Bohr and Derrida (1994 in 
Barad, 2010). My diffracting here, now, includes both this 2010 paper, Meeting the Universe Halfway 
(Barad, 2007) as well as educational texts using Derrida’s aporia and the concept of aporetic moments 
(Biesta & Egea-Kuehne, 2001; Edgoose, 2001; Janzen, 2013, Wang, 2005).       
Starting with Barad, I return to the physics to understand what is at stake in determining the identity and 
im/possibility of things. A significant underpinning of Barad’s agential realist theory comes from Bohr’s 
interpretations of quantum mechanics, and then her diffractive readings of these with other theory. One 
important piece of evidence she examines relates to the competing accounts of Bohr and Heisenberg in 
relation to the reciprocal nature of the relationship between complementary notions such as a wave and 
                                                          
25 Edgoose draws on Derrida’s three aporias as outlined in his 1990 paper “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of 
Authority”. Derrida writes of the aporia of suspension, of undecidability and of urgency in relation to conceptualising the 
distinction and tension between the law (universal) and justice (particular).  I draw particularly on Edgoose’s thinking 





particle. For Heisenberg, she says, the explanation for the wave-particle duality is the uncertainty 
principle. That is, “measurements entails disturbances that pose a limit on what we can know” (Barad, 
2007, p. 294). In this case, the electron is said to have an inherent, or pre-existing identity, but any 
attempt to measure this adds a disturbance which limits what and how we can know of its original state, 
thus its identity can only ever be uncertain. In contrast, Bohr argues for a different interpretation, the 
issue of identity is not an epistemic one, but rather should be “understood in terms of the limits of 
semantic and ontic determinacy” (Barad, 2007, p. 294-5).   
The line between physics and metaphysics is undecidable/indeterminate. Heisenberg 
understands measurements as disturbances that place a limit on knowability – that is,   
measurements entail epistemic uncertainties. Whereas, for Bohr, measurement is about the 
conditions for possibility of semantic and ontic determination – that is, indeterminacy. (Barad, 
2010, p. 258). 
 
Barad continues, drawing on physics to argue there is empirical evidence for Bohr’s performative 
understanding of identity – that identity is not inherent, and pre-existent, rather it is performed 
differently given the conditions and circumstances of its intra-action. Thus, indeterminacy, rather than 
uncertainty, premise what is to (be)come. I want to briefly re-turn this idea with the matter of ghostly 
tears, before expanding on it with Derrida and his aporias. In Maia’s, and my, talk of ghostly tears, there 
seems to exist this state of uncertainty, a not knowing of what will come to pass, a relation of 
im/possibility, of tears as both acceptable and possible and unacceptable and hence impossible. There 
is a trying to decide, to make known, to determine which should come to pass, to make known the 
identity of tears before being faced with the conditions which will determine them. As Maia says ‘I was 
kind of preparing myself…/and thinking I didn’t want to cry / I know it’s okay to cry’.  The identity of 
ghostly tears are, as Barad says, “undecidable/indeterminate” because it is only in intra-action, that 
identity is performed. Not knowing, is in reality, a state of indeterminacy. However, what this means, 





to make sense of what was and of what might yet come to be. It is with this in mind that I turn to 
Derrida’s aporias.      
While Bohr argued for and called the wave-particle duality paradox one of indeterminacy, Barad, in 
diffracting Bohr and Derrida, speaks of both undecidability/indeterminacy. Edgoose (2001) writes of 
Derrida’s aporia of undecidability as the second aporia of justice. Justice is at the heart of Barad’s 
agential realist framework. The notion of aporia itself comes from the Greek, indicating the “state of 
impasse, non passage, or logical contradiction that can never be permanently resolved, a state of 
constant dilemma with no general or final solution”. It is the “possibility of the impossible” (Wang, 
2005, p. 45). An aporia comes to be experienced when “contradictory imperatives and opposite gestures 
from both sides are fully awakened and thereby bring pressure for an answer”. The aporia continues as 
an advent of the event, as long as the “experience of crossing the border…remains to come” (p. 46).  
While Derrida wrote on the theme of aporia in different texts and contexts (Wang, 2005), he was clear 
that there is no responsibility (Wang, 2005), no political decision (Derrida, 2001) and no justice 
(Edgoose, 2001) without going through an aporia. “Without conflicting demands, without “the ghost of 
the undecidable,” there is no call for a responsible decision that carries the burden of answering to a 
paradoxical situation” (Wang, 2005, p. 48). Two paradoxical directions are seen at the same time, both 
are possible, yet one creates the impossibility of the other. Taken together, this paradox creates an aporia 
of undecidability.   
I find this notion of aporia helpful in building on Barad’s principle of indeterminacy/undecidability to 
think with the ghostly present-absence of tears. In order for tears to exist as an absent-presence, as a 
haunting, they necessarily take on a paradox of being both present and absent, both possible and 
impossible, both okay and not okay. In this way, they become undecidable and unknowable, and exist 
as an aporia, in a state of impasse. Such an aporia is present, for both myself and Maia, as long as the 
experience of “crossing the border”, to tears or no tears in the counselling room, remains to come (Wang, 





avoidance. Derrida (1990) adds anxiety. Both Maia and I were keen to avoid any potential situations in 
the counselling room so close to our own experiences of loss, that would inevitably, albeit temporarily 
and without closure, resolve the aporia of undecidability. What ultimately makes the aporia decidable 
is the aporia of urgency, where “one must decide” (Edgoose, 2001, p. 129). Derrida (1990) calls this 
instant of decision a madness. It is an “acting in the night of non-knowledge and non-rule” even if “time 
and prudence, the patience of knowledge and the mastery of conditions were hypothetically unlimited” 
(p. 967). This is no calculable deciding. This is a hesitation, a loss of fluency (Edgoose, 2001), a rupture, 
a stutter, a dis/continuity (Barad, 2010). It is an aporetic relation between the universal (norms) and the 
particularity of the moment, which comes for us both, ultimately and unsurprisingly, in the counselling 
encounter, a place of “horizon”, that is “both the opening and the limit” defining “a period of waiting” 
(Derrida, 1990, p. 967).   
Janzen (2013) speaks of undecidable moments in relation to the teaching subject, when she is faced with 
an irreconcilable yet urgent decision. She speaks of how it is, in such a moment, that the subject’s 
responsibility to the other, to itself and to the curriculum come to the fore. Interestingly, Janzen draws 
on one teacher’s encounter with a crying child and the aporetic moment this created for her teaching 
subjectivity – “a momentary disruption that occurred for the subject, an instant in which the normative 
discourses could no longer carry the lesson” (p. 384). Janzen goes on to describe this moment as being 
one in which the subject is “unprepared for the rupture...when the stability of identity is unhinged by 
the face of the crying child” (p. 384). Thus an aporia of undecidability is created, where the normativities 
or universals which have successfully constituted ‘teaching as normal’ so far, fail to provide for the 
particulars of the present moment. Importantly, as Janzen highlights, an aporetic moment is not simply 
about making a decision within the tension of two oscillating possibilities, in her case, of deciding 
between carrying on with a teaching lesson and tending to a crying child. Rather, for Derrida (1990), 
the three aporias (rules, undecidability, urgency) together constitute the conditions of possibility for 





There is no justice, for Derrida, “without this experience, however impossible it may be, of the aporia” 
(1990, p. 947). If one simply applies the rules, conforms with duty, acts within norms, there is no aporia.  
There is only “programmable application or unfolding of a calculable process” (p. 963). It is when one 
is faced with both universality and singularity, with “the other or myself as other, in a unique situation” 
(p. 949) and when one cannot simply enact the rules or norms, that aporia arises and gives way to the 
im/possibility of justice. Thus, in the case of Maia, the possibility for justice and the responsibility which 
regulates it, is enacted in the counselling encounter, in the meeting of the counselling and grieving rules 
and norms with the singularity of the other, the client. And yet, justice always remains “avenir”, to come 
(Derrida, 1990, p. 969), “to the degree that some event is possible (that) exceeds calculation, rules, 
programs, anticipations and so forth” (p. 971). Which is to say, in the hesitation, the stutter, the moment 
before a decision is made, exists the incalculable and the responsibility/possibility for justice, but once 
the decision is made, it slips back into a “discontinuity of undecidability with brush strokes of 
continuity”. The “paralysis of indecision” which gave rise to the transformation of the becoming subject, 
becomes quickly hidden in the narrative of continuity and calculability (Edgoose, 2001, p. 129).            
Hauntological multiplicity 
At this point, while finding Derrida’s notion of the aporia extremely useful with which to conceptualise 
these instances of indeterminacy/undecidability (of the phenomenon of ghostly tears), I wish to re-turn 
to thinking with Barad through her ideas of dis/continuity, of rupturing and reconfiguring these moments 
of encounter, of the previously indeterminate and undecidable. Given the focus in this thesis on thinking 
with agential realism, and given Barad’s drawing on and diffracting with Derrida, among others, it 
would seem to be a step backward, or sideways, to only think with the notion of aporia at this point.  
Thus I am further interested in how Barad conceptualises what she terms “indeterminacy – 
hauntological multiplicity” (2010, p. 263, italics in original) and how this might build on where thinking 





Key to this movement from the aporia of undecidability to Barad’s notion of indeterminacy and 
hauntological multiplicity, I think, is the shift she makes through diffracting quantum physics - to 
conceptualising entanglements not as the “intertwining of separate entities, but rather irreducible 
relations of responsibility” (p. 265). She says: 
Entanglements are not a name for the interconnectedness of all being as one, but rather specific 
material relations of the ongoing differentiating of the world. Entanglements are relations of 
obligation – being bound to the other – enfolded traces of othering. Othering, the constitution of 
an ‘Other’, entails an indebtedness to the ‘Other’, who is irreducibly and materially bound to, 
threaded through, the ‘self’ – a diffraction/dispersion of identity. ‘Otherness’ is an entangled 
relation of difference (différance) (Barad, 2010, p. 265).   
 
Thinking in this way, firstly, enables a shift from interacting individuals toward intra-active phenomena 
– entanglements, and hence the undecidability attributed to individuals becomes rather an 
indeterminability of, in this case, tears. Barad’s theorising also seems to enable thinking beyond the 
incommensurable space of universal law, rules, and norms with the particular, to also include time, 
space and matter in the entanglements. Thus, in the encounter where the norms of tears meet the 
particularity of the Other in the counselling encounter, and thus the aporia of undecidability becomes 
the aporia of urgency, tears become intelligible as phenomena, constituted by mutually transforming 
norms, rules, relations of responsibility, multiple subjectivities of self and other, time, space and matter.  
The performative identity of tears is reconfigured in a dis/continuity, that is, for Maia as a continuity of 
their absence and a discontinuity of their presence. In the previous chapter, we see the reconfiguring of 
tears in the opposite sense, a continuity of presence and a discontinuity of absence. An ongoing 
reconfiguring is always what is at stake with no final knowing or norm or rule able to be articulated.   
As Edgoose states, in the context of education, “no one path or ethical calculus will give (her) the 
guidance that (she) would need to stay comprehensible to (her)self and to all others” (2001, p. 131). As 





it seems essential that we can be attentive to these aporetic moments and to their im/possibilities and 
dis/continuities. In this way, through also recognising that “the constitution of an ‘Other’, entails an 
indebtedness to the ‘Other’, who is irreducibly and materially bound to, threaded through, the ‘self’” 
(Barad, 2010, p. 265) counselling, and becoming a counsellor, then becomes not about rational 
calculations to be performed and decisions to be made. Rather, they are each an ongoing and “iterative 
(re)opening up to, an enabling of responsiveness…through the iterative reworking of im/possibility, an 
ongoing rupturing, a cross-cutting of topological reconfiguring of the space of responsi-bility” (p. 265).  
Having come to think ghostly tears as indeterminate/undecidable, as aporetic, and as a dis/continuity 
through this interlude, I now re-turn to the data, to think further with Maia’s, and others’, words in order 






CHAPTER EIGHT  
 
A diffractive analysis: the present-absence of tears in counselling encounters 
 
Continuing to draw on poems as diffractive analytic devices, I engage in a mapping of these present-
absent tears which requires attention to things less easily visible or tangible, but which nevertheless 
have real and ongoing lives and effects. I start this chapter with an inquiry into the particular affective 
quality of ghostly tears, noting their visceral, strongly felt presence to be a key force in their enactment. 
Fear emerges as having a prominent presence - fear of failure, of failing to hold oneself together, of 
falling apart. I engage in further inquiry with this notion of fear, not as an emotional response, but rather 
as an affective-material-discursive practice, drawing on both Barad (2007) and Wetherell (2015) to 
think with and through fear in the enactment of ghostly tears. Such inquiries produce an extensive 
exploration of the project of neoliberalism, its construing of individuals as rational, calculating 
creatures, its market driven desires for profit and productivity, and its resulting far-reaching material-
discursive effects in relation to the production of tears for counsellors-in-training. I proceed also to 
explore the force of professionalism in the intra-active production of ghostly tears. Finally, in this 
chapter, I revisit Barad’s framework through which we are reminded of the integral role of ethics, as 
“relations of obligation – being bound to the other” (2010, p. 265) and consider how this consideration 
of obligation to the client intra-acts with the aforementioned forces to ultimately produce an 
im/possibility of tears which remain absent.  
Mapping the invisible 
As I noted above, the present-absence of tears for Maia seems to begin with an aporia, with the 
undecidability/indeterminacy of what identity tears will assume, of how they might come to matter in 
the particularity of a ‘really close experience’ arising in the counselling context. Maia had wondered 
about this for quite some time, as noted to her comment ‘I was thinking back to this room – / we talked 
about would I be okay / when a really close experience / comes up?’ However, it was only in the moment 





similar to one of Maia’s own traumatic experiences, that she experiences the aporia of urgency. In this 
moment, she recounts her thoughts as she begins to hear the story from her client, of being ‘pretty sure 
that’s what she’s going to say’ and of ‘kind of preparing myself for it’. She tells us she was thinking, ‘I 
didn’t want to cry’ even though ‘I know it’s okay to cry’. In that moment, she knew there was the 
im/possibility of her tears, and, as is often the case with tears, what would emerge was undecidable and 
indeterminate. Maia was required to endure the not knowing of what was to come – in relation to both 
her client’s story and her own affective response. As the encounter progresses, tears remain a ghostly 
presence, a continuity in their absence, becoming determinate in their intra-active present-absence.  
Maia says ‘I thought I’d be at least welling up / and it wasn’t, it was just totally, / this is someone else’s 
story’.    
At this point, I become curious about two aspects, in particular, of this encounter: both the intra-active 
experience of the undecidability/indeterminacy of tears and the intra-active becoming determinate of 
tears, here as an ongoing present-absence. I start here with exploring ghostly tears as an intra-active, 
entangled aporia, rather than a separate, individual subject simply facing a dilemma of not knowing 
what is to come. For example, what are the forces that contribute to ghostly tears as an aporia, that make 
their undecidability, their ghostly presence, so keenly felt? Such a tracing is inevitably challenging in 
that ghostly presences are generally invisible and erased in the natural order of things, in histories of 
what comes to matter. Constructed narratives created after events, after aporias, typically speak of 
presence rather than absence, of what happened rather than what didn’t. Thus, mapping intra-active 
ghostly entanglements requires attention to things less easily visible, tangible, but which nevertheless 
have real and ongoing lives and effects (Blackman, 2015).   
The affective quality of ghostly tears 
Such thinking, for me, first of all invites questions of the affective quality of ghostly tears. What is it 
that renders the indeterminacy of ghostly tears as such a visceral, strongly felt presence and what are 





discursive and the material, to time and space, in theorising such affective ghostly tears. Drawing on 
Wetherell’s affective-discursive practices again, calls for an alertness to the biographical, too, not in a 
psychoanalytical framing of the “individualistic and universalistic conceptualizations of drives, defence 
mechanisms and the unconscious” (2015, p. 84) but in relational ontologies which recognise the 
personal-social-material entanglements.         
 
‘oh my god / she’s about to tell me /…/ Oh god I hope she doesn’t say that /…/I think I’ll be okay / I 
think I’m going to be okay’.  
 
‘I wanted to know / that I could handle it / that I’d be okay with it’. 
 
‘I was okay. / There was definite relief, / there was relief firstly / that I was holding it together’.   
 
These words expressed by Maia gesture toward a particular affective quality of her embodiment of 
ghostly tears, to the present-absence of tears as exerting a lively presence both prior to and particularly 
strongly at this moment in the counselling encounter. Maia’s use of the phrases ‘oh my god’ and ‘oh 
god’ in conjunction with ‘she’s about to…’ and ‘I hope she doesn’t…’ suggest the presence of fear of 
what might be to come, fear of not being ‘okay’, not ‘handling it’ and not ‘holding it together’, as all to 
be made true should tears emerge and enact their presence with her in this counselling encounter. What 
is it that produces ghostly, aporetic tears as, in part, embodying an affective quality of fear? What other 
forces are intra-active here to produce the affective-material-discursive practice of fear? In this case, 
fear of her counsellor (and perhaps personal) subjectivity coming apart, not holding together, perhaps 
disintegrating, under the public gaze of another. How is it that the emergence of tears, in some ways a 
natural (and cultural) bodily response to a variety of confronting and painful situations, has become 
indicative of a person’s failure to contain their self, failure to hold together, of failure in multiple ways, 





Neoliberalism and fear of falling apart 
A turn to the constitutive role of the discursive is necessary and useful here, in order to attend to and 
recognise “the uptake of ideology through the subjectified body”, the way normative requirements for 
the self, and particularly self-control, intra-act to produce affects of fear and (re)produce subjectivities 
and social relations (McAvoy, 2015, p. 31). McAvoy (2015) draws on the Foucauldian argument of the 
constitutive nature of regimes of knowledges and practices, as discussed in the previous chapter, to 
suggest that contemporary subjects of Western democracies are primarily dominated by the practices of 
neoliberal individualism and the constructs and practices of the psy disciplines. Both of these seem 
pertinent here in thinking through Maia’s desire to enact a contained, held-together subjectivity. I thus 
turn to the project of neoliberalism to map its potential power as co-constitutive of the affective force 
of ghostly tears.     
Under the social and political order of neoliberalism, emerging over the last thirty to forty years in New 
Zealand (and across the Western world), “both government and society have taken up, as their primary 
concern, their relationship with the economy” in contrast with previous concerns which also 
encompassed broader collective, social and societal welfare and well-being (Davies & Bansel, 2007, p. 
249). A significant result of the entrepreneurial and market driven underpinning of neoliberal policies, 
technologies and ideology over this period of time has been a shaping of “docile subjects who are tightly 
governed and who, at the same time, define themselves as free” (Davies & Bansel, p. 249). Subjects are 
produced as free to be able to effect the successes of their own individual lives through rational decision 
making practices. Equivalently, those who are less productive, less successful economic entrepreneurs 
are accorded failure on the basis of their own individual, poor decisions and choices. Schools and 
universities are argued to play significant roles in producing such highly individualised, responsibilized 
citizens (Davies & Bansel, 2007) and, indeed, Davies (1996 in Davies and Bansel, 2007) claims it was 
in schools and the public service that such forms of governmentality were first installed. For those 
coming into counselling training aged in their thirties, as Maia is, this suggests a life lived within only 





Values activated by the neoliberal project are not simply a continuation of those associated with former 
liberal values, such as self-reliance, autonomy, and independence – all seen as the “necessary conditions 
for self-respect, self-esteem, self-worth and self-advancement” (Davies and Bansel, 2007, p. 252). 
Rather, there is more emphasis placed on individual rationality, on calculated choices and acts which 
place emphasis on the capitalisation of existence at the expense of any forms of collective responsibility 
for those more vulnerable and marginalized. Brown (2003) similarly argues that neoliberalism construes 
individuals as “rational, calculating creatures” where moral autonomy, or decision-making, is defined 
by one’s capacity to enact “self-care” – meaning, here, the ability to provide for one’s own needs and 
service one’s own ambitions (p. 5). In this way, Brown says, moral responsibility is equated with 
rational action. Clearly such values are at odds with the presence of emotion, of tears, in a public, 
professional context, albeit a counselling one. A professional counselling subjectivity is, in part, 
constituted by the citizen who has been subject to neoliberal norms, to powerful discourses of rationality 
as moral autonomy, and rationality, rather than emotionality, as self-care. Seeing such discursive 
practices as lively intra-active forces in the shaping of tears, and of counsellor subjectivities, it becomes 
obvious that public displays of emotion would have no place in the workplace, and would rather 
compromise a normative rational, successful, productive professional subjectivity. In this way, tears 
become a thing of fear, to be avoided in places requiring moral decision making. The power of these 
neoliberal discursive practices lies in their invisible yet pervasive ability to at once shape beliefs of 
individual freedom while at the same time restricting access to particular ways of being and becoming, 
e.g. particular affects such as tears. Thus, Maia’s fear of not holding the self together, and thus failing 
at being neoliberalism’s desired rational subject, contrasts with her sense of herself as being free to 
express herself in an emotional way, creating this dilemma or aporia.     
Neoliberalism’s paradox  
Given neoliberalism’s pervasive, invasive and yet often invisible encroachment across multiple spaces 





more of its workings in the lived experience of counsellors-in-training, through the emergence of 
ghostly tears26. What becomes further evident is, in part, its trickiness, its paradoxical shaping of the 
individual as free to desire and create a successful (failing) life yet simultaneously defining and 
restricting what is desirable, available and doable. Ultimately, when individuals (inevitably) fail at what 
becomes an impossible task, neoliberalism once again insists that failure be situated within their own 
free, autonomous, now failing subjectivity. This becomes evident in examining the words of Bailey. As 
this is another long poem, at this point for ease of readability and desire to clearly stay with the potent 
influences of this neoliberal project on counsellor tears and subjectivities, I present her words here in 
parts extracted from the whole poem (see appendix 5 for the poem presented as a whole). I start here 
with her words which resonate with those of Maia, as Bailey talks about her instinct in this particular 
counselling encounter, ‘not to cry’, that crying might have suggested to her client that she ‘couldn’t 
handle her story’, and that she was being ‘unprofessional’. Bailey experiences a similar tension to Maia, 
saying that at the same time, ‘but then it’s not unprofessional / it’s a very confusing place’.  Bailey was 
the youngest member of the group, at 22 years of age.   
 
I was literally just listening to her story  
the whole way through  
and I think that probably helped me  
 
not to cry.  
I just had that gut instinct  
don’t cry in front of the client, don’t.   
 
Why is that?27   
                                                          
26 I will return to Maia’s poem after this discussion to continue to map the intra-active forces at work in shaping the 
present-absence of tears, and her counsellor subjectivity.   





I think I’d be worried that they’d think - 
that I couldn’t handle their story  
 
that they might have upset me.   
maybe I feel unprofessional  
but then it’s not unprofessional - 
 
it’s a very confusing place.  
(Bailey, poem 10) 
 
Bailey’s sense of the possibility of her own tears, tears as a ghostly presence, arose in the context of the 
counselling session, in relation, in part, to listening to the detail of the story she was hearing from her 
client. Bailey talked of how the focus on listening helped her not to cry, suggesting this practice as a 
useful means to her preferred end of not crying. She considered this to be important in order that the 
client didn’t see the tears as signifying a counsellor who, overcome with their own emotion, would not 
be able to also ‘handle’ or respond to, or meet the needs of the client sitting in front of them. Counsellor 
tears here become an emotional thing, a falling apart, a not coping, which are construed as then 
signifying the absence of a (neoliberally desirable) rationality, the absence of any other kind of 
subjectivity which may be of assistance to the client. This is a double whammy – not only are tears 
undesirable due to their emotionality, they are also undesirable because the binary means emotionality 
excludes the possibility of rationality, or any other reasonable response. What actually seems more 
likely to get in the way of responding as one would wish to a client, is the tension created by the required 
resistance toward the emergence of tears, a resistance constituted in part through discursive practices of 
neoliberalism. McAvoy (2015) succinctly captures this very process in her discussion of neoliberalism’s 
effects, especially in her identification of anxiety-ridden subjects as being always on the boundaries of 






…the realisation of the idealised neoliberal self, with a self-made body and a self responsible 
for shaping one’s own affective experiences, can only ever be a partial, unfinished 
accomplishment. Neoliberalism, with its emphasis on the making of particular kinds of selves, 
and its acquisition and imposition of psy knowledges, creates the conditions for precarious, 
anxiety-ridden subjects understanding themselves as always on the boundaries of failure and 
ultimately responsible for providing their own solutions to, or repairs to that failure (p. 26).  
 
McAvoy’s subsequent affective-discursive approach to analysis of particular emotionality generated in 
the data of one interview, taken from research on success and failure amongst women in midlife, 
identifies a similar finding and thinking in relation to ghostly tears. McAvoy describes her research 
participant gesturing toward her face as tears begun to emerge, and says she was warning that she was 
“going to get emotional” (p. 29). This need to warn suggests the materiality of tears, and tears as an 
emotion “might need to be warned against; if it is a warning, it implies that emotion (as materially 
evident) is understood as a breach in the normal routine” (p. 29, italics in original). I would suggest this 
is not an uncommon experience in many facets of life - it is not restricted to formal interviews or 
counselling rooms. I frequently encounter people who warn about tears to come, apologise for the 
emergence of their tears, and seek to mop up the physical signs of them as quickly as possible28. Indeed, 
a recent beginning counsellor education class saw evidence of all of these. An allowing of tears takes 
practice, courage and resistance to neoliberal forms of subjection. What this speaks to, and what must 
be attended to in our thinking through of the intra-activity of tears and subjectivities, is the actual 
invoking of an ideal (neoliberal) subject and the ongoing marking of selves as “failing (painfully) 
against it” (McAvoy, p. 30).  
                                                          
28 The materiality of tissues is another interesting phenomena to map in relation to tears and bodies. While I do not have 
room here for an analysis which can do justice to tracing the multiple forces enacted in mapping ‘tissues’ I think it is 
nevertheless useful to identify their part in co-constituting tears as a disruption to the performance of the ideal 
neoliberal subject. Tissues can perhaps be imagined to perform the role of mopping up, getting rid of and cleaning away 
the messiness of tears. Tissues may communicate the undesirability of such messiness, and the necessity of containing 
and wiping them away as soon as they appear. Tissues in a counselling space may embody the contradictory meaning of 
tears as expected but also as requiring containment. It is also interesting to note how bodies intra-act with tissues and 
tears, and how an immediate offering of tissues on the appearance of tears can indicate, be seen to embody again, 





This is not to encourage or state that the presence of tears for counsellors-in-training should conversely 
always be welcomed, as a defiance to, or overcoming of, neoliberalism. It is to say, however, that when 
it appears that neoliberal discourses are restricting the range of available responses we might consider 
in relation to our clients, and when they are a potent force acting to co-constitute a dilemma, or tension, 
(that we may not even initially be aware of) we ought to take them, and their effects, into consideration 
in our reflective/reflexive/diffractive practices29. Given neoliberalism’s power to work in such a way 
“that it seems natural and makes us blind to its effects” making such forces (re)visible seems ever more 
urgent (Davies, Brown, Gannon, Honan & Somerville, 2005, p. 345). This is perhaps especially so in 
the field of counselling, where I would suggest neoliberalism’s effects have been under explored, and 
also given counselling’s history with the ‘Psy’ traditions, which have been interpreted as “inherently 
individualising, psychologising, and de-politicising”, generating potentially similar subjective effects 
as at least liberalism, if not neoliberalism (Bondi, 2005, p. 497). However, I also pay heed to Davies et 
al. (2005) who caution against the misleading binary of positioning one discourse as bad and oppressive 
against another that is good and liberating, and to Bondi (2005) who reminds us of the many who argue 
for psychotherapeutic practices that contain politically subversive possibilities. Both of these 
considerations lead us back to Barad’s theory of agential realism and to the intra-active nature of 
identity, to the multiple forces co-constituting subjectivity at any one time, and hence the importance of 
detailed mapping in order to make visible not just the discursive in a fixed and one dimensional sense, 
but the dynamic intra-activity of the material-discursive. It is my intention to return to the influence of 
professionalism, but for now I wish to continue with neoliberalism’s particular appearances within 
Bailey’s words, ghostly tears and counsellor subjectivity.  
 
  
                                                          





Powerlessness, overwhelm, and survival under neoliberalism 
The following extract from Bailey’s poem tells us more about how she experienced, and what 
constituted, this sense of ‘almost’ wanting to cry. For her, these ghostly tears embodied an empathic 
and compassionate response to the multiple and especially difficult challenges of her client’s home life. 
This can be seen in many of Bailey’s words, including, ‘I just felt so sad for her’, ‘It really hit me then 
/…how it was making her feel. I think that really / wrenched at me a bit’, and ‘I just felt so, so much 
compassion / for her, that I was drawn in so much/…/I was thinking I can totally understand / why you 
feel that – 100%’.  Of particular interest here however, Bailey’s ghostly tears can also be seen to embody 
her own sense of being ‘a little bit powerless’ to ‘fix people’s problems’ in combination with a 
seemingly endless unmet need and overwhelm produced by days in a school counselling office that ‘are 
so flat out’. The following extracts (from the whole poem) speak more about this in Bailey’s words:  
 
I had quite a tight chest.   
I felt like I almost wanted  
to cry a couple of times, like  
 
the things she was telling me…  
I just felt so sad for her.   
Yeah it was strange.  
 
I haven’t quite experienced  
that in the room before  
with any clients. 
 
I almost wanted to cry  
because I thought how on earth  






It was like shock  
of hearing everything  
she was saying, and it was also  
 
what can I do - 
because my days are so flat out,   
seeing between five and eight  
 
or nine kids a day?  
I know that I have to slow down  
and it’s not like the school’s  
 
telling me to do it.  
It’s like I’ve got this thing in me  
where I keep thinking I need to 
 
because they’re all lining up  
outside my door,  
I need to be there for them, and  
 
I need to give them the space  
and time. I’ve got this kind of  
overwhelming want to fix things 
 
or try and make things better.   
So I was really conscious about that  
in the room at that moment -  
 
‘you’re not going to be able to fix this’.   
I think that really highlighted it for me -   






and what I can do is so limited  
in the scheme of their big life.  
So I felt a little bit powerless.  
(Bailey, poem 10) 
 
I suggest there at least three ways in which neoliberalism is operating in this counselling encounter to 
intra-actively produce the nearness of tears for her counsellor subjectivity.  Neoliberalism’s ideology is 
recognisable as being alive in her body (‘it’s like I’ve got this thing in me’) in the powerlessness that 
results from her overwhelming sense of individual responsibility for the job of ‘fixing’ the problems of 
the students she works with, while at the same time knowing she cannot effect the ‘fixes’ she might 
wish to see. It is recognisable in the flat out days of seeing between five and eight or nine kids in a day, 
in the increasing demands to be more productive in less time, and in the inevitable individual 
responsibility she feels to meet (or fail to meet) those demands due to the invisibility of neoliberalism’s 
grip on our workplaces and our lives (Davies & Bansel, 2007; Mountz et al., 2015). It is recognisable 
in the increasing and particular demands placed on her as a school counsellor from working with 
students faced with the effects of living, and surviving, in the challenges of today’s world, including 
especially those of neoliberalism (Wasson, 2014). These effects can all be said to be potentially 
heightened firstly though neoliberalism’s wide reaching influence into the context and curriculum of 
High Schools (as early targets of neoliberal ideology (Davies & Bansel, 2007)), and secondly, by 
operating through the discipline of counselling, which, as a psychotherapy, can be included as a 
technology of subjectivity seen to “most fully epitomise the logic of neoliberal subjectivity.” Through 
their focus on “individual liberty” “psychotherapeutic discourses therefore constitute influential 
vehicles through which neoliberal governance is dispersed and achieved” (Bondi, 2005, p. 500, drawing 
on the work of Nikolas Rose, 1990, one of the most widely cited Foucauldian writers on 
governmentality and who explores in particular detail the role of the ‘psy’ disciplines in dispersing it).  
It is the intra-active co-constitution of these neoliberal forces in enacting ghostly tears in Bailey’s 





As I state above, Bailey’s words - ‘it’s like I’ve got this thing in me’ seem to speak directly to what 
McAvoy (2015) describes as “the uptake of ideology through the subjectified body…, the reproductions 
of macro ideologies in local, relational, intersubjective interaction” (p. 31).  But, what is this ‘thing’ and 
how is its force enacted in Bailey’s subjectified body? Bailey suggests that it produces a number of 
compulsions, including a ‘need to be there’ for the students lining up outside her door, ‘seeing between 
five and eight / or nine kids a day’, combined with an ‘overwhelming want to fix things / or try and 
make them better’. She locates this thing, this need, this force, as situated inside of her, absolving the 
school in which she is situated from any responsibility due to what she sees as the absence of any explicit 
direction from them. ‘It’s not like the school’s / telling me to do it’, she says. Thus, the only resolution 
for managing such overwhelm, inevitably comes also to be situated within the realm of her own 
individual action – ‘I know that I have to slow down’. Failing to manage, failing to slow down, failing 
to meet the overwhelming need, in what is actually an unmanageable environment, and what are 
‘unfixable’ - by one individual - social, economic and cultural problems, results in Bailey’s sense of 
individual powerlessness, in knowing ‘you’re not going to be able to fix this’.             
While such uptakes of neoliberal ideology have been widely discussed in relation to education contexts 
(e.g. Davies & Bansel, 2007; Davies & Saltmarsh, 2007; Mountz et al. 2015; Watkins, 2007), there 
appears to have been much less consideration of neoliberal forces in the changing contexts of 
counselling and counsellor subjectivity in particular. However, drawing on literature from both 
disciplines, especially given Bailey’s placement within a school counselling context, is useful in 
attempting to understand neoliberalism as a force in the production of this simultaneous overwhelm and 
powerlessness enacted in her ghostly tears, and ultimately her counsellor subjectivity. Mountz et al. 
(2015) discuss such effects in relation to the “neoliberal university” environment with its requirements 
for “high productivity in compressed time frames” (p. 1236). They state, in what can be recognised also 






…our concern is not the difficulty juggling the standard academic triad of research, teaching, 
and service…Rather, our concern involves the ever-increasing demands of academic life: the 
acceleration of time in which we are expected to do more and more…We find that these often 
overwhelming demands exact an isolating psychic and physical toll that is neither reasonable 
nor sustainable” (p. 1237).  
 
Such an acceleration of time works in concert with a shift from “content to counting”, underpinned by 
guiding principles of “efficiency, productivity and excellence” (p. 1241). Such foci can be seen in 
Bailey’s words when she speaks of already feeling that she is working at a ‘flat out’ pace, by the high 
‘numbers’ of students she sees, and in her need to be more productive by getting through the students 
lining up outside her door. In typical neoliberal style, we see the shift in her language to metric based 
self-evaluations of success, where such “counting culture leads to intense, insidious forms of (..) 
shaming, subject-making, and self-surveillance” (p. 1243). Bailey becomes trapped in this vicious, 
individualising, and pervasive, yet hidden, ideology which will continue to subject her to more demands 
than time will allow for, and yet will constitute her as entirely responsible for meeting these ever 
increasing, presenting needs, and finally as a failure for inevitably being unable to do so. Scarily and 
worryingly, as Mountz et al. refer to in relation to the neoliberal university, the effects of such regimes 
are written on the body. For those in their article, such effects include sleep deprivation, neglected 
physical well-being, substance abuse, illness, and disappearing altogether from workplaces30. Andrew 
& Krupa (2012) discuss this in a similar way in writing on the politics of self-care for counsellors and 
psychotherapists. They consider the intense pressures therapists are under in contemporary workplaces 
including funding cuts, mandating short-term counselling, accountability measures, evidence-based 
practice expectations, and general expectations to do more with fewer resources in less time (Osborn, 
2004), and how these pressures interact with other professional and corporate forces and with self-care’s 
                                                          
30 In a subsequent group session Bailey discussed such effects on her and her health in more detail and ultimately, with 
support, left this context.  Without the collective input from the group in reconfiguring Bailey’s experiences, it is possible 
she may have continued to pathologise herself and embody this self-responsibility for overcoming the much larger 





implied individual focus and responsibility to produce a generation of professionals stretched, stressed 
and on the edge of burnout. Significantly, and in order to resist neoliberalism’s insidious hold, Andrew 
and Krupa (2012) say:  
In order to maintain a degree of sanity and to protect ourselves from the dangerous illusion of 
self-blame, we need to wrestle with the social construction of our predicament. Continuing to 
embrace the madness that we can each find our own healthy path through economic rationalism 
only serves to strengthen a system that is harming us. Instead, we need to work together (p. 46).         
 
For Mountz et al. (2015) as well, resistance to the grip of neoliberalism comes in the form of collective 
action. However, theirs is also a particular response to the challenges of accelerated time in the “fast-
paced, metric-oriented neoliberal university” in the form of a call to “slow down and claim time for 
slow scholarship” (p. 1236) in ways which “foreground collaborative, collective, communal ways 
forward” (p. 1237). For them, slow scholarship embodies more than an opportunity to challenge 
neoliberalism’s metrics and efficiencies and take more time for themselves and their work. It is tied also 
to understandings of labour and class and gender, and expresses an attention to foregrounding and 
transforming “the interpersonal and collective conditions that underpin knowledge production” (p. 
1254).   
Given Bailey’s comment, ‘I know I need to slow down’, it seemed apt to introduce above the response 
of Mountz et al. to neoliberalism’s effects in the university, of slow scholarship. Enacted in Bailey’s 
ghostly tears, along with overwhelm and powerlessness, also seems to be a knowing, a desire, a need to 
do this work differently. Bailey’s sense is that one part of this is slowing down. She doesn’t identify 
what slowing down might look like although given her talk of numbers one could assume fewer clients 
in a day might be somewhere she would start. This seems a simple thing, yet I have already shown 
above neoliberalism’s potency and liveliness in compelling individuals to speed up and do more in this 
“stupefying modern obsession with productivity” (Mountz et al., 2015, p. 1246). This, when combined 
with a number of other working conditions, acts as a strong counter to any one individual’s desire to 





(not dissimilar to New Zealand), state “(t)here is no union for our profession. No ideal client ratios, no 
ideal working day, no great attention paid to our occupational health and safety…Our member 
organisations function in large part to protect the public from harm from us, with little time devoted to 
protecting us from public, corporate or self harm” (p. 44).  
Indeed, while New Zealand’s membership organisation, NZAC’s objectives as listed on their website 
(http://www.nzac.org.nz/objectives.cfm), include “Promote satisfactory conditions of employment for 
counsellors” this is one of eleven objectives which also include “Assist clients to obtain services 
adequate to their needs”. Much of the site appears to be aimed at assisting clients in making informed 
choices about counselling including the processes for raising concerns or making complaints, although 
there is a secure member’s only area. Given the potential dual aims of the organisation, to both assist 
and protect potential clients and to promote working conditions for counsellors, it is difficult to not see 
this as a potential conflict of interest, compromising what limited attention might be given to promoting 
collective working conditions for counsellors. Indeed, there is a great disparity amongst counsellors 
working in schools, community agencies and private businesses and practices in relation to expectations 
for face to face hours of counselling per day, with seven face to face hours not an uncommon 
expectation. As Osborn (2004) comments, “(i)n today’s cost-conscious environment, mental health 
practitioners are challenged to do more with less… In addition, accrediting bodies and funding sources 
are demanding increased accountability and productivity (i.e., positive client outcomes) across practice 
settings (e.g., schools)” (p. 320). It is no wonder then, Bailey’s desire to slow down is present, albeit in 
the face of ever increasing demands to speed up, and with a seeming lack of any obvious, explicit, 
collective action toward doing things any other way. Bailey’s ghostly tears, and emerging counsellor 
subjectivity, cannot be seen as separate from the realities of a market driven regime of neoliberalism 
and its effects on individuals, working conditions, institutions, and the very fabric of societies which 







Neoliberalism’s reconfiguring of time 
Thinking with Barad’s concept of spacetimemattering, it becomes clear how time is reconfigured in this 
material-discursive practice, although not in a disrupting of the linearity of past-present-future, as 
outlined in the previous chapter. Rather, the reconfiguring of time becomes an essential component of 
the way neoliberalism comes to matter in the production of ghostly tears, and counsellor bodies in the 
making. Neoliberalism’s insistence on individual productivity, on outcomes, on metrics and on 
constituting the economic and the social as binary opposites, “with the economic in the ascendant and 
the social representing all that good economics is not” (Davies and Bansel, 2007, p. 252) is a strong 
force enacting a shift in the configuration of time. Time intra-acting with neoliberalism is felt differently 
in bodies. It speeds up and the effects of this have (are having) potentially dangerous effects for the 
counselling profession – both for counsellors and clients. Bailey speaks of needing to give the long line 
of clients wanting to see her ‘space and time’. But where does this time come from when in the same 
moments she needs to slow down, move more slowly through time? Time is reconfigured as being 
scarce in a school counselling office with potentially endless and increasing need, situated in an 
institution and a society permeated by values of productivity measured in metrics – the more clients you 
are able to see the more productive you are being. And yet, productivity requires measurable outcomes 
- as Bailey says a requirement ‘to fix things’. Time is reconfigured as a scarce resource and at the same 
time as extremely valuable. Every minute counts and must be made to count. Neoliberal time, as an 
intra-active force here, is potent, and its effects in producing subjects on the edge of tears, on the edge 
of failure, are apparent. The possibilities for ‘slowing down’, for reconfiguring time beyond neoliberal 
time, would appear to be both challenging and necessary.          
The stark realities of life lived under neoliberalism 
Finally, in this section I want to consider neoliberalism’s potential effects on the lives and experiences 
of student-clients Bailey is working with and, in turn, the intra-active effects in relation to ghostly tears, 






I almost wanted to cry  
because I thought how on earth  
did she deal with this,  
 
how is she even at school today,  
how does she cope,  
how does she get through it? 
 
It was kind of like unease.   
It was almost like - 
‘what’s she going to say next?’ - 
 
‘it can’t get any worse than this’ 
and everything was actually  
getting worse.  
(Bailey, poem 10) 
 
Osborn, writing in the U.S. back in 2004, claimed that, at a time when resources for mental health 
services appear scarce, the complexity and severity of client needs have increased. In New Zealand, in 
recent times, evidence suggests both of these points to be equally true. A 2017 report written by 
Marianne Elliot of New Zealand not-for-profit organisation, Action Station (an organisation designed 
to take collective action in New Zealand on issues that matter to its members), titled The People’s 
Mental Health Review collected over 500 stories from individuals, or family members of individuals, 
using or trying to access mental health services and working in mental health services. Key themes in 
the report highlighted difficulty accessing appropriate and timely mental health services, lack of 
appropriate treatment options, and an under resourced, over-worked and stressed mental health 
workforce, with mental health and wellbeing in New Zealand undermined by social and economic 





et al., 2013a; Clark et al., 2013b), a series of cross-sectional, self-administered, comprehensive health 
and well-being surveys conducted with representative samples of secondary school students throughout 
New Zealand in 2001, 2007 and 2012 give some indication of the changing mental health needs and 
contexts of young people. The most recent research (Clark et al., 2013a, b) comparing the findings, 
highlights some improvements for students since 2001, including in aspects of their school life and 
reductions in health-compromising behaviours. However, results show areas of health and well-being 
where students report no change. These include students reporting significant depressive symptoms. 
Certain areas are also reported to have significantly worsened over time, including parents worrying 
about having enough money for food and lack of access to a family doctor. In addition, in the 2012 
survey, deliberate self-harm among students was described as “fairly common” (p. 22) with 29% of 
female students and 18% of males students reporting they had deliberately harmed themselves in the 
previous 12 months. Alongside this, 21% of female students and 10% of male students had seriously 
thought about suicide, with 6% of female students and 2% of male students reporting they had made a 
suicide attempt in the same period (Clark et al., 2013a). As Dr Peter Watson, instigator of the Youth2000 
survey, states in the foreword to this report, “(w)orryingly, New Zealand continues to have high 
numbers of young people who are emotionally distressed…” (p. 3). For Bailey, it wasn’t that she was 
reacting to the surprise or uncommonness of the distress of young people. As she said: 
 
I’ve had a few clients come in  
and talk about some pretty heavy things  
like self-harm and suicide attempts. 
 
Rather, she says: 
 
It’s hard to describe it. 
It seemed like her story -  






I just thought  
how can you keep going  
with all these waves  
 
knocking you over?   
 
She describes her client’s story as ‘one massive thing after another’. Her client eventually says toward 
the end of the session ‘I don’t feel like I want to be / in this world anymore’. Both descriptions are 
consistent with the reports above describing the realities facing a significant number of young people. 
The very real material, embodied and increasingly worsening personal, familial, and cultural 
experiences young people are faced with must be seen as an intra-active force in the production of 
ghostly tears, in the overwhelm and powerlessness experienced in the face of students’ increasing and 
worsening stress and distress as a result of the complex and vulnerable contexts in which they are living.  
Such painful lived experiences for our young people can in part be seen to be the constitutive effects of 
neoliberalism’s market led philosophy with its “desire for profit over the needs of community”, its 
production of a “Darwinian nightmare world of all against all ‘survival of the fittest’ (Springer, 2016, 
p. 288), and the reconstitution of the Welfare State “as an economically and socially costly obstacle to 
the economic performance” of “society” (Davies and Bansel, 2007, p. 249). Yet again, I suggest the 
intra-active nature of Bailey’s ghostly tears, of her counsellor subjectivity in-the-making are inseparable 
from the material-discursive force of neoliberalism.   
Neoliberalism and the High School Context 
The space of the High School in which Bailey is practising also becomes an intra-active force. Much 
has been written on neoliberalism’s influence in education. Indeed, Davies and Bansel (2007), writing 
in a special issue on Neoliberalism and Education for the International Journal of Qualitative Studies 
in Education, claim that neoliberalism has been installed in schools in New Zealand and Australia in a 





reconfigured to produce the highly individualised, responsibilized, subjects” constituted as economic 
entrepreneurs across all aspects of their lives (p. 248). In the context of schools this encompasses, at 
least, teaching, counselling and learning subjects. Bailey, interestingly, refers to the school only in the 
sense of its absence in giving her any directive to be more productive. She says ‘it’s not like the school’s 
/ telling me to do it’. As I state above, this is neoliberalism’s canny trick - a “diffuse and largely invisible 
installation” of technologies producing “docile subjects who are tightly governed and who, at the same 
time, define themselves as free” (p. 249). The question arises then, as to how the school, as a material-
discursive space, intra-acts to shape the possibilities for Bailey of how and who she can be(come) as a 
counsellor in-the-making, particularly in relation to its seeming innocuous presence in her talk of 
ghostly tears and counselling encounters.  
Such invisibility is of course not unusual when it comes to neoliberal technologies; as Davies and Bansel 
(2007) state, it takes a great deal of analytic work to open up and make visible the constitutive forces of 
neoliberalism. Thus, whilst Bailey’s words as data don’t necessarily speak to the wider material-
discursive forces operating for her, and for counsellors in general, in High School contexts, recent 
writing on this is useful for thinking about how neoliberal forces work through schools to shape both 
her and her client’s subjectivities in the counselling encounter.  
Wasson (2014) writes a particularly compelling, and seemingly unique, analysis of the key 
competencies in the New Zealand Curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007) as a conduit of neoliberal 
humanist ontology both into young people’s lives and into their descriptions of themselves in the 
counselling room. She writes this partly in response to an article in a recent issue of the New Zealand 
Journal of Counselling (Hughes, Burke, Graham, Crocket & Kotzé, 2013) which made the case for 
counselling work with students as contributing directly to the core mission of schools as expressed in 
the key competencies and values of The New Zealand Curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007). 
Hughes and colleagues concluded that these competencies were the core business of schools, with 





places the onus on counselling work in schools to “help students practice, develop and grow in the use 
of the key competencies” (Hughes et al., 2013, p. 6), in order that they will fulfil the mission of the New 
Zealand Curriculum (Ministry of Education, 2007) to become “confident, connected, and successful 
21st Century global citizens” (Wasson, 2014, p. 34).  
Wasson theorizes that actually, because of the implicit and ideal, autonomous and free, “humanist-
neoliberal citizen-subject” embodied in the key competencies of The New Zealand Curriculum, “young 
people’s futile yet compulsory attempts to achieve the impossible produce their consequent, inevitable 
subjective/embodied experiences of failure” (2014, p. 45). She suggests students’ experience of 
neoliberal failure and self-blame is compounded by the toxic culture created by the implementation of 
neoliberal educational policies “obsessed with criteria of success” and equating individual academic 
achievement with “neoliberal hopes, dreams, and fears for “liveable lives”” (p. 45). If the counselling 
room is perpetuated as a space for furthering such “impossible yet compulsory expectations and 
requirements” (p. 46), espoused by and through educational policies and documents, while the real 
effects themselves remain invisible, such policies are likely to have at least similar debilitating effects 
on those attempting to realise their vision. That is, debilitating effects on teachers and counsellors, as 
much as on the students themselves. Thus, Bailey’s ‘overwhelming want to fix things / or try to make 
things better’, (which is antithetical to the non-expert stance of the Solution-focused approach 
underpinning her training) and her resulting ‘powerlessness’ in the face of the actual complex, 
interconnected and interdependent problems of young people can be seen to be an effect of the embodied 
liveliness of such neoliberal educational regimes permeating the aims and goals of High School 
counselling spaces.         
At this point, having spent a significant amount of time thinking with neoliberalism’s constitutive, and 
real, debilitating effects in reconfiguring time, space, and matter, I wish to return to the words of Davies 
et al. (2005) and Bondi (2005), who caution us against the good-bad binary in relation to the discursive. 





transformative nature of the material-discursive. Whilst making visible the powerful work of neoliberal 
regimes is essential, in order to make them revisable, and in order to fully map the complexity of intra-
active forces, there is more at work here in the production of ghostly tears for both Bailey and Maia, 
and thus in the enacting of their counsellor subjectivities. In this final section of this chapter I turn to 
explore the intra-action with the professional counsellor, and finally return to Barad’s framework though 
which we are reminded of the integral role of ethics, of “responsi-bility”, and of entanglements as 
“relations of obligation – being bound to the other” (2010, p. 265)                    
Professionalism and the good and appropriate counsellor 
I have spoken about ghostly tears as embodying the neoliberal subject’s desire to not be deemed a 
failure. Also present here is the professional counselling subject and her desire not to be deemed 
inappropriate. As Davies (2006) states, in writing about the processes of subjectification in education, 
“(s)tudents work very hard to embody themselves as appropriate and appropriated subjects, and losing 
their footing - being seen to be incompetent or inappropriate - can be very painful” (p. 433). However, 
this is not an easy process. Already there are multiple other forces – times, spaces, matters, affects – in 
intra-action in enacting the present-absence of tears. Here, in Bailey’s words, we are presented with the 
way professionalism also acts as a confusing force in enacting her subjectivity:       
 
I think I’d be worried that they’d think  
that I couldn’t handle their story  
 
that they might have upset me.   
maybe I feel unprofessional  
but then it’s not unprofessional - 
 






Whilst I have talked about the personal-professional binary, and professional discourses of counselling 
in the previous chapter in relation to tears, here I am interested in thinking through professionalism and 
its power in shaping “the thing they see that they must become” for counsellors-in-training as it has 
arisen here in the data (Davies, 2006, p. 433). For Bailey, the absent-presence of her own tears holds 
the possibility of her client feeling that she cannot ‘handle’ her story or thinking that she had upset 
Bailey – both very real possibilities challenging the ethical imperative for counsellors to consider 
counselling a “professional relationship” designed to “assist clients” and certainly to “avoid doing harm 
in all of their professional work” (NZAC Code of Ethics, 2016). This concerns Bailey, that a tearful 
response on her part may cause harm to the counselling relationship. And yet, the ghostly tears also hold 
an aporetic indeterminacy/undecidability with the possibility that maybe tears are not ‘unprofessional’, 
or that maybe they could be both. In this space of undecidability, Bailey’s subjectivity can be seen to 
be, in part, co-constituted by (material-discursive) practices of professionalism. I suggest that this 
tension enacted at the micro-level of ghostly tears for Bailey can be seen to embody tensions being 
enacted at the larger macro level with regard to “the evolving nature of the professional identities of 
counsellors” (Rogers, 2012, p.192) and organisational challenges and “attempts to professionalize 
counselling” (Miller, 2014, p 100) in New Zealand31.   
Miller has written extensively on the history of counselling and the processes of professionalization of 
counselling in New Zealand (2001; 2004; 2011, 2014). In reading her work in particular, it is clear that 
the counsellor-in-the-making subjectivity is inseparable from the wider professional debates which are 
informing the ways counsellors are expected to be practicing and ways in which such practice might be 
regulated. Miller (2012, 2014) usefully draws on sociological literature to focus on the different ways 
in which the ideology of professionalism manifests for New Zealand counsellors, in particular 
distinguishing between occupational and organisational professionalism and the views and tensions 
                                                          
31 Whilst I discuss the particular local context I recognise that processes of the professionalization of counselling and 
counsellors are not unique to New Zealand, with debates about professionalization and statutory regulation common to 





represented by these two discourses. This is particularly evident in debates about the issue of statutory 
registration within the New Zealand Association of Counsellors, resulting in “divisiveness among the 
membership and confusion about the best direction to take (Miller, 2012, p. 187). Such challenges 
appear to lie in the potential effects of new and evolving forms of regulation. Miller (2014) highlights 
how, on the one hand increasing professionalism through a registration agenda promotes protection of 
clients from non-registered practitioners, a stronger occupational identity, and the knowledge that all 
members are trustworthy and competent to practice counselling in an ethical manner. On the other hand, 
the restrictive standards and measurements such a process inevitably requires likely means 
marginalizing and excluding particular, potentially local, ways of practicing. Rodgers (2012), in 
discussing the challenges inherent in practices of statutory regulation suggests that such struggles lie in 
the attempt to “squeeze a diverse set of adaptive practices into a ‘one size fits all’ prescription of 
counselling and guidance theories and practice” (p. 192). Professional bodies which adopt such ‘top-
down’ prescriptions of identity, enculturate members into practices consistent with “modernist notions 
of a single, static, homogeneous and unified epistemology” (p. 192). Rodgers suggests that drawing on 
a more post-modern, and hence locally responsive, construction of identity would engender “freer, more 
creative and dynamic processes of forming identities”, leading to diversity rather than enforced 
congruence (p. 192).  
Given then this notion of professional status, and membership of a profession, as a “technology for 
governing” practitioners and recruiting them into particular modes of action (Bondi, 2005, p. 501), I 
suggest that the conflict being played out at this macro professional level is evident at the micro level 
of Bailey’s practice. In a broad, macro, professional sense, guided by the Code of Ethics (NZAC, 2016) 
and likely her counsellor education, Bailey can be seen to submit to the disciplinary forces which warn 
against counsellor tears. Counsellor tears, under this ‘single, static, homogeneous epistemology’, of 
professionalism, hold the potential for damaging the counselling relationship due to their focus on the 
counsellor’s, rather than the client’s emotional experience and, as stated above, can be seen to work 





However, at the local, micro level, Bailey is compelled to be responsive to a multiplicity of other forces, 
in a dynamic process. Hence, the professional tension enacted in her ghostly tears, and in her counsellor 
subjectivity, could be said to be one embodying such macro-micro, universal–local, professional–
pragmatic, binary tensions being played out in the ideological tensions of professionalism currently at 
work in the New Zealand counselling context. The challenge for the accomplishment of mastery, or of 
oneself as an appropriate subject, according to Davies, involves “both an imaginative capacity to form 
themselves out of the not-yet-known, and a set of culturally sanctioned signifiers of the thing they see 
that they must become” (2006, p. 433). As Barad reminds us with the notion of intra-action, these are 
never separate requirements. As we can see from mapping the present-absent tears of Bailey and Maia, 
the material-discursive practices of the ‘not-yet-known’ and of culturally sanctioned signifiers’ are 
intra-actively alive and potent in the moments of counselling encounters.          
Intra-acting responsibly from within and as part of the world 
With a significant focus in this chapter on the action of discursive forces of neoliberalism and 
professionalism on the becoming counsellor, it could be easy to slip into the binary of individual 
freedom/will of liberal humanism versus determinism’s subjects who are “passively and inevitably 
shaped according to one set of discursive practices within moral order” (Davies, 2006, p. 426). That is, 
we could be left wondering about the subject’s possibilities for agency and autonomy, or in this case, 
Bailey or Maia’s movement through the undecidability/indeterminacy of the aporia of ghostly tears.  
Returning to Barad, however, invites a move beyond the binary into intra-action and subsequently 
invites different questions, about who and what comes to matter, and about how we come to understand 
our part in the dynamic and iterative processes of spacetimemattering (Davies, 2014b). How can we “be 
open and alive to each meeting, each intra-action, so that we might use our ability to respond, our 
responsibility, to help awaken, to breathe life into ever new possibilities for living justly?” (Barad, 2007, 
p. x). As Barad says, there is only intra-acting responsibly from within and as part of the world in its 





are always a part and being responsive to their possibilities. I have mapped many of the intra-active 
forces co-constituting the emergence of ghostly tears for Bailey and Maia and finally here, I explore 
how they are both responsive to such possibilities. This is an agential-realist sense, where there is “no 
discrete “I” that precedes its actions”, “no “I” separate from the intra-active becoming of the world” but 
rather where “(c)ausality is an entangled affair” (Barad, 2007, p. 394). That is, speaking of what comes 
to matter for Bailey and Maia in the enactment of ghostly tears, and thus in their becoming counsellor 
subjectivities, of what becomes intelligible, can only be seen to be in intra-active relation to all that has 
been mapped thus far, and more. 
Being responsive to the possibilities for what comes to matter is an ethical call. As I discussed in the 
previous chapter on the presence of tears, such an ethicality is not a “commitment that a subject chooses 
but rather an incarnate relation that precedes the intentionality of consciousness” and which 
encompasses “having-the-other-in-one’s-skin” where the other is non-human and human (Barad, 2007, 
p. 392). What ultimately comes to matter in relation with all of the human and non-human forces 
mapped, and in relation with the client sitting across from them, is tears that remain absent. For Bailey, 
the possibilities for her client to become negatively impacted by her counsellor tears intra-acts with all 
of the other forces so that the only ethical response she can make in this moment is to not cry.  For Maia, 
the desire to keep her wits about her, to think clearly, to be present for the client she is with, to not have 
what has been so consuming in her personal life overtake her professional life, intra-acts with the other 
forces mapped here so that the only ethical response becomes, also, not to cry.  
These are clearly not rational or emotional, individual or deterministic actions, but rather intra-active, 
responsive and ethical agential-realist (intra-)actions for counsellors-in-the-making. What is cut 
together-apart here are potent, complex, and far reaching forces, including neoliberalism and 
professionalism, which produce and enact ghostly tears. These are forces which are therefore present in 
the counselling encounters, and are constituting counsellor-in-training subjectivities, through their intra-





absent, cannot be described as just one individual’s emotional response, rather they might be better 
described to be responsive, intra-active enactments of ethical, social, material, affective, discursive and 
political relations.          







SUMMARY –  
The intra-active production of present/absent tears for counsellors-in-training   
 
A central aim of this project has been to explore what might be produced in thinking beyond the limits 
of predominantly available humanist conceptualisations of the lived experience and developing identity 
of counsellors-in-training, as outlined in chapter one. Whilst drawing attention to the particular personal 
and professional challenges and processes counsellors-in-training are subjected to, this body of literature 
holds significant limitations in light of contemporary theorisations of identity. Instead of identity as 
belonging to that rational, self-contained, individual, I have explored identity formation as a contingent, 
ongoing, material-discursive, intra-active reconfiguring, through the mapping of counsellor-in-training 
tears (present and ghostly). 
In the previous data analysis chapters I have been able to think with, in particular, Barad’s agential 
realist framework in order to produce knowledge differently and thus produce different knowledge in 
relation to the ongoing reconfiguring of a counsellor-in-training subjectivity. As I highlighted in chapter 
six, this intra-active research process began with initial challenges for me to recognise my own post-
structural and social constructionist biases in thinking with the data and attempting to ‘do’ data analysis.  
This chapter outlined a useful and interesting process which enabled me to begin a diffractive research 
process with data and theory (and my researcher subjectivity) which generated different knowing-in-
being in relation to working with the data. By drawing on, in particular, three empirical articles 
(Højgaard & Søndergaard, 2011; Juelskjaer, 2013; Søndergaard, 2016) with a focus on relating Barad’s 
agential realism and post-structural feminist thinking to processes of subjectification, I was able to 
generate new, post-humanist, ways back into the data.   
Drawing also on the new materialist and post-humanist research of Hohti (2016) and Maclure’s (2010, 
2013) concept of wonder, I returned to the data with a significantly different set of premises. In 





enacting of intra-active processes (material-discursive practices), which both enact the subjectivities of 
counsellors-in-training and are enacted by them, in a complex and iterative reconfiguring. With a desire 
to also enact wonder’s intensity and embodied felt sense of ‘data that glow’ (Maclure, 2010, 2013), I 
re-turned to the collective biography group data ready to embark on a process I conceptualised as data-
researcher-wonder-theory-space-time-material-discursive-affective entangled knowledges in the 
making.       
The subsequent data analysis chapters explore and document this process and the resulting entangled 
knowledges. What came to matter in surprising and multiple ways were counsellor-in-training tears, 
conceptualised, in Barad’s agential realist terms, as material-discursive practices or phenomena (Barad, 
2007). Exploring counsellor-in-training tears as an object/subject led to an extensive analysis of the 
multiple forces and encounters enacting these particular tears. Such analysis enabled me to bring forth 
not just the complex and intra-active material-discursive forces at work in the materialisation of tears, 
but through tears, the forces at work then, also, in the ongoing and iterative (re)(con)figuring of 
counsellor-in-training subjectivities. This detailed mapping of the presence and the present-absence of 
tears has both opened up a multiplicity of otherwise invisible material, relational, social and cultural 
forces intra-acting to produce tears, as well as enabled a detailed charting of the agential-realist 
processes by which tears are produced and counsellor-in-training subjectivities are enacted.   
In staying with the diffractive aims and practices of this work, where matter and meaning are mutually 
co-constituted and where “knowing is a material practice of engagement as part of the world in its 
differential becoming” (Barad, 2007, p. 89) I offer the following poem and word art as tear diffraction 
patterns. Such patterns perform, rather than represent, intra-active knowledge summarising the 
phenomena of tears as they have become intelligible through the dynamic, diffractive practices of data 
analysis detailed throughout the previous chapters. Following these summaries of the multiple, 





following, and final, chapter to consider the implications of this reconfiguration for the educative subject 
of counsellor education, for counsellor education, and for counsellor educators.          
Tear reconfigured 
I am translucent entanglement 
formed of multiple histories  
and futures-yet-to-come 
colliding in the eye of a storm. 
 
I am surprise, intensity, flow,  
abject outcast made to matter 
in the dark, the secret, the private,   
the under-ground space of a profession. 
 
I am nature-culture, matter and meaning 
you and her, an inseparable we 
made of genuineness and empathy, 
of the other - in, on and under one skin.  
 
I am losing control, irrational, non-white 
neurotic female vulnerability. 
I am man to man, turned inside-out,  
brave and strong and good. 
 
I am ethics - listening, hearing, relating. 
I am ordinary fragments, cut together-apart,  
unanticipated, world in seed, taking root  






I am non-chronos, a point of time,  
sadness, desolation,  abandonment, 
inseparably spliced through, entangled with 
forgiveness, hope, compassion.  
 
I am piwakawaka and monarch, a re-turn 
to place of beginning that marks 
the present. I am embodied alterity  
made visible. I refuse to rest.   
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
I am ghostly matter made real, 
a potent presence of  
a figure marked by its absence. 
I nevertheless, demand your attention. 
 
I am im/possibility, energetic entanglement. 
I inhabit the subterranean, a rhizome - 
thick with loss, pain, powerlessness and fear  
of breaking down, apart, of becoming, uncontained. 
 
I am handling it, I am okay, I am relief.  
I am you, me, them and us,   
a gazed upon, subjectified body, formed    
of ideologies, normativities, and imagined ideals. 
 
I am a rational calculating creature, 





I am undesirable, uninvited, bordering on failure. 
I am paradox.  
 
I am large and small, ideology and subjectivity, 
an intra-active montage threatening to leak, seep  
and leach beyond my borders 
into foreign terrains. 
 
I am time accelerated, a compulsion 
to speed up and slow down, 
a simultaneity of overwhelm and powerlessness 
to independently do either.  
 
I am counselling space, High School space  
professional space and always the space between,  
a conduit of networks, of appropriated subjects  
making materializations of the not-yet-known.  
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
This is not all. This does not end. 
Porous and responsive, an iterative ethics,  
one tear dissolving into ocean, reconfigured  
and reconfiguring an unending of im/possibilities.    
 
 























PART FOUR  
 
 








Methodology as pedagogy: implications for counsellor education and 
counsellor educators 
 
I think of these groups  
as we’ve all got the same camera,  
all of us, that we’re given  
and that we’re all taking different photos  
and I think of when we come here  
we share those photos. 
 
All those photos are of the same thing  
but from a different angle,  
and from a different time of the day  
and different season. 
 
So what do I get from it?   
I get that sense of a shared experience  
Yeah I get satisfaction, kind of…  
I don't know what it is.  
What do I get from sharing these?   
I don't know,  






Early on in the meeting of the groups there was discussion about what participating in the groups did 
for the group members. Group members knew they liked coming along, both because they wished to 
contribute to the research, but also because meeting, talking, and listening with their peers was somehow 
enjoyable and satisfying, even (especially) when there was a sharing of pain and struggle. As is 
expressed by Claudia above, it was something which was difficult to put into words. In attempting to 





experienced in, and from, the group, Claudia struggled to find any reasonable or satisfactory 
explanations, beyond a ‘satisfaction’ from ‘a sense of shared experience’. Repeating the question ‘what 
do I get..?’ and repeating ‘I don’t know’, Claudia eventually gave up her search for an adequate 
explanation, saying ‘I’ll have to come back to you on that’. I, too, was intrigued as to what was 
happening for, and with, these counsellors-in-training through their participation in the groups? What 
kind of group or research or pedagogical process (or all three) was enabling these experiences and 
changes to occur?  In this chapter I turn to these questions by re-turning to the methodology of collective 
biography, to diffraction as a (material-discursive) practice, and to the data generated with the 
participants, which articulates our sense of some of the happenings produced in these groups. I then re-
consider the possibilities of reflective practice in counselling (as outlined in chapter one) and propose 
we re-think this instead as diffractive practice. Finally I turn to consider implications for counsellor 
educators. This chapter marks a turn toward pedagogical matters (Snaza, Sonu, Truman, & Zaliwska, 
2016) and the ethico-onto-epistemological implications for counsellor education of experimenting with 
a post-humanist reconfiguring of the counsellor-in-training subject. That is, if the educative subject of 
counsellor education is configured as a posthuman, intra-active becoming, where becoming is a “non-
linear enfolding” of nature and culture, matter and meaning, space and time, all “threaded through one 
another”, how might counsellor education, and counsellor educators (need to) respond (Barad, 2010, p. 
244)?  
In many ways, this is a return to where I started, with questions about the relationship between identity 
and education, between being and becoming, and between individual and relational processes of change.  
Teaching on a counsellor education programme which espouses a social constructionist model of change 
in the counselling relationship, I was initially confronted by the lack of research and literature 
articulating similar processes for the developing - not in an internal, linear unfolding sense – counsellor-
in-training. Indeed, as outlined in chapter one, the predominant theories in the counselling literature 
advocate stage/phase models of identity development (e.g. Dollarhide et al. 2013; Rønnestad & 





psychological, linear, individual, universal and altogether non-discursive. Such developmental, 
psychological theories necessitate judgements of progress as normal or lacking in accordance with the 
dominant and universal standards and expectations (Lenz Taguchi, 2010). Even when there has been a 
turn to constructivist learning theory involving a consideration of the cultural contexts, through which 
counsellors-in-training learn and emerge, there remains taken for granted assumptions of the 
separability of material and discursive realities, of individuals and of internal processes of identity 
formation. With the counselling literature also just beginning to consider what it means to take up the 
call to reconfigure the nature of identity for clients as intersections of “social locations and cultural 
factors (i.e., dis/ability, affectional orientation, ethnicity, race, gender identity and expression, 
spirituality and religion, residency in a country or educational program, and many other identities that 
are not mentioned and yet are important)” (Peters, 2017, p. 178), there seems further impetus to start 
with the reconceptualization of counsellors-in-training own identities and processes of formation. To 
not do so perpetuates a theoretical and practical disconnect for counsellors-in-training who are working 
with understandings of identity beyond the universal, self-contained notions perpetuated under 
humanism, at least in relation to their clients32. A posthumanist pedagogy, which ultimately further 
develops this reconceptualization, “works with and makes use of – rather than working against – 
differences, diversities and increased complexities of learning and knowing” (Lenz Taguchi, 2010, p. 
9).     
A reconfigured, posthumanist, educative subject – initial pedagogical considerations 
The previous data analysis chapters (and interludes) in this thesis have experimented with mapping a 
counsellor-in-training subjectivity as an intra-action of mutually constituted, entangled agencies 
(Davies et al., 2013). As outlined in chapter three (ethico-onto-epistemology) this goes beyond humanist 
                                                          
32 Of course, inviting counsellors-in-training into a posthumanist reconceptualisation of their own lived experience in 
becoming counsellors, ultimately raises the question of a posthumanist approach to counselling, beyond the scope of 





and social constructionist conceptualisations to break down nature/culture binaries and reimagine 
identity instead as a relational, dynamic and iterative process of spacetimemattering, of enfolding and 
embodying nature and culture, matter and meaning, space and time. Thinking identity and agency as 
intra-active processes, in agential realist terms, has implications also for rethinking the educative subject 
of counsellor education, processes of teaching and learning, and indeed, demands attention to theoretical 
and expanded understandings of curriculum and pedagogy. As Snaza et al. (2016) state in one of the 
few contemporary texts experimenting with curriculum and pedagogical matters and new 
materialisms/post-humanism, “new materialisms demand not merely a move “beyond” the human but 
charges curriculum studies with particular ethical, aesthetic and political tasks…” (pxviii). “Accounting 
for more-than-human agencies means that we have to begin to consider how non-human actors directly 
participate in educational encounters” (p. xx). New materialism and posthumanism compel us to 
consider the “inter-connectedness between bodies, matter, space, theory, rational thinking and the 
bodily senses: and practicing teaching and learning in ways that go beyond the theory/practice divide” 
(Lenz Taguchi, 2010, p. 3).  
Such thinking challenges the general trend in education toward “learnification”, so-called, and 
problematized, by Gert Biesta (2009) due to its individualistic definition of learning, and the ‘learner’, 
and its disconnection from education’s broader purposes. A new materialist onto-epistemology requires 
a dramatic shift in how we conceive of the ends and aims of education (Snaza et al., 2016). In a 
neoliberal era increasingly, and reductively, focused on individual outcomes, measurement, and 
universal standards (Biesta, 2009; Lenz Taguchi, 2010), both the complexities of, and the possibilities 
for, teaching and learning, are greatly reduced. This, combined with the neoliberalism of universities, 
as sites of counsellor education, that have “arguably been reconfigured to produce highly individualised, 
responsibilized” and entrepreneurial subjects (Davies & Bansel, 2007, p. 248) becomes especially 
problematic for education if it looks to respond to the reality of an increasingly complex, unequal and 






In effect, this can be seen too, in humanistic accounts of counsellor development where the language 
and phases of the models suggest the privileging of individual, predetermined, universalistic ideas, in 
relation to, for example, identity achievement, professional selves, and master and senior professional 
therapists (Jennings & Skovholt, 1999; Orlinksky, 1999; Rønnestad & Skovholt, 2003; Skovholt, 2012).  
Humanistically oriented counsellor education in this sense would be seen to work backwards with such 
ends in mind, focused on developing the skills and knowledge of the student novice counsellor as 
‘learner’ (Biesta, 2009), developing in cognitive maturity, toward predetermined, individual ends. This 
is evident even in constructivist counsellor education texts where learners are first situated within 
Rønnestad and Skovholt’s (2003) phases of counsellor development so that counsellor educators can 
“match their work to counsellors’ evolving learning needs”, as predetermined by the stages (McAuliffe, 
2011, p. 49). In contrast, Snaza et al (2016) suggest a “new materialist pedagogy is open ended, 
processual, and attentive to the aleatory nature of encounter” (p. xxii). It is challenging to imagine what 
such a pedagogy might look like, in relation to the demands of teaching a core set of skills and domain 
of knowledge, in requiring safe and ethical practice from practitioners, and with a focus on developing 
specific practitioner competencies. Educational questions need to be asked though, not just about the 
competencies or outcomes we are looking to produce in individual practitioners, but about what 
counsellor education is for. What are its aims and purposes? Biesta, who reminds us to ask these 
questions of education, suggests that sometimes those educational strategies not necessarily deemed 
‘effective’, in times of evidence based practice, “can be more desirable than those that effectively 
proceed toward a pre-specified end…because they provide opportunities for students to explore their 
own ways of thinking, doing and being” (2009, p. 36).  When we recognize the diverse ways of knowing, 
being, and learning, and the complexity and multiplicity of factors impacting on how and what we can 
come to know, we can see that teaching and learning needs to be thought about in other ways (Lenz 






The notion of the posthuman is proposed as a response to “growing public awareness of fast-moving 
technological advances and also of contemporary political developments linked to the limitations of 
economic gloabalization” (Braidotti, 2016, p. 13), requiring us to “think harder about the status of 
human subjectivity”, given the complexity of our times. Such rapid shifts have direct impacts on 
counselling, clients, the complexity of the problems they bring and the processes which must be engaged 
in to engender more hopeful futures. Counsellor education must keep pace with and do justice to the 
rapidly changing world and its effects on human subjectivity. Today’s teens, for example, labelled iGen 
by researcher and author, Jean Twenge, as the first generation to spend their entire adolescence in the 
age of the smartphone, are reported to be experiencing unprecedented levels of anxiety, depression, and 
loneliness (Twenge, 2017). However, Twenge notes the cultural and economic changes they have 
experienced have also impacted in a myriad of other ways, including socializing and behaving in 
completely new ways, and changed attitudes to religion, sexuality and politics. Perhaps now, more than 
ever, human subjectivity cannot be separated from the rapid political, technological, and cultural 
shifting landscapes. Counsellor education needs to offer adequate conceptualisations of this posthuman 
subject, and adequate conceptual tools and maps, to equip counsellors-in-training to attend to both their 
own and their clients’ intra-active processes of ongoing subjectification in an increasingly complex and 
changing world.                
It is my intention, in what follows, to begin to imagine what new materialist/post-humanist thinking 
might have to offer in working with these challenges in counsellor education. Before I turn to this I want 
to briefly follow on from the data analysis summary of counsellor-in-training tears in the previous 
chapter in order to summarise this post-humanist counsellor-in-training subject. Once we come to see 
the self as “emergent multiplicities” (Davies, 2014a, p. 9), as “the inseparability of meaning, matter and 







Reconfiguring the (posthuman) educative subject of counsellor education    
Drawing on new materialisms and post-humanism in general, and Barad’s framework of agential 
realism in particular, I am arguing for a reconceptualization of a posthuman subject of counsellor 
education. As outlined in chapter one, current, predominant literature which offers students, and 
educators, frameworks within which to theorise their lived experience, and education practices, draw 
primarily on humanistic, developmental, psychological stage/phase models and conceptualise the 
educative subject in universalistic, humanist terms (Skovholt, 2012; Rønnestad & Skovholt, 2013).  
Limitations have been outlined in chapter one and include, in particular what gets left out or made 
invisible when the “individualised subject”, that “singular, self-contained human individual” (Davies, 
2010, p. 54) is given fundamental status. I have noted the significant exception to these dominant 
humanistic models in the form of the post-structural/social constructionist theorising of student storying 
of professional identity in counsellor education (Crocket & Kotzé, 2011; Winslade, 2002), and the 
attention to post-structural identities as socially and culturally produced. This in turn influences a co-
construction of the curriculum and pedagogical practices through which attention is given to power 
relations, exploration of cultural narratives and commitments to social justice (Crocket & Kotzé, 2011).   
Drawing on postmodernism, social constructionism and post-structuralism, the counselling theories of 
Narrative Therapy and Solution-focused therapy significantly shifted the possibilities within the 
counselling landscape from its previously dominant psychological and humanistic underpinnings.  Now, 
however, there is another turn afoot. Whilst this thesis originally set out to explore counsellor identity 
and education from a post-structural, discursive theoretical orientation, it was impossible to ignore the 
emergence of exciting post-humanist and new materialist thinking taking place across academic fields 
within the humanities. As Braidotti (2016) states, “(w)e are experiencing at present an explosion of 
scholarship on nonhuman, inhuman and posthuman issues…(T)he posthuman predicament enforces the 
necessity to think again and to think harder about the status of human subjectivity and the ethical 
relations, norms and values that may be worthy of the complexity of our times” (p.13). This entails 






My focus on the field of counsellor education in this thesis, and my engagement with this posthuman 
turn, has led to a necessary rethinking, reconceptualising or reconfiguring the posthuman counsellor-in-
training-subject formation. This thesis argues for a posthuman, performative account of a counsellor-
in-training educative subject, through drawing primarily on Barad’s (2007) agential realist framework. 
This goes far beyond humanist and positivist notions of ‘technical rationality’ where the counsellor-in-
training is reduced to the level of a technician trained to impart a set of skills and procedures (Schön, 
1987; Thompson & Pascal, 2012), and beyond too, the counsellor-in-training subject as socially and 
culturally constituted and thus positioned to co-construct and re-story evolving identities. I have 
examined the posthuman, emerging counsellor-in-training subject through the matter(ing) of tears. 
Tears as a material-discursive practice, themselves a relational, mutually co-constituted, entanglement 
of forces of matter and meaning, nature and culture, are articulated as in turn co-constituting the 
emerging counsellor-in-training’s performative identity33. Tears enact the subject. Mapping the 
multiple, intra-active material-discursive forces enacting tears begins to make visible the same forces 
through which an entangled, counsellor-in-training, posthuman subject is enacted. Such forces are 
visibly depicted in figure 3, in the previous chapter summary. In this way, a counsellor-in-training 
identity, in a posthuman sense, is inseparable from, and mutually transformative of, matter and meaning, 
such as tears, professionalism, ethics, values, neoliberalism, counselling theories, clients, multiple other 
identities, time, space, objects, and multiple other material-discursive practices including gender, 
ethnicity, emotion, age and culture.  
“Human subjectivity in this complex field of forces has to be re-defined as an expanded relational self”, 
according to Braidotti (2016), who describes this new ontology as “a re-grounding of subjects in the 
radical immanence of their embodied and embedded locations” (p. 22). This complex vision is of a 
subject produced “within a materialist process ontology that sustains an open, relational, self-other 
                                                          





entity…with special emphasis on the embedded and embodied, affective and relational structure of 
subjectivity” (p. 23). As Barad (2007) and Braidotti remind us, this is also an ethical posthuman 
becoming. Braidotti (2016) describes a posthuman ethical imagination in the form of “ontological 
relationality, which stresses an enlarged sense of inter-connection between self and others” (p. 25). This 
is Barad’s intra-action and responsibility, which rejects self-centred individualism and hierarchical 
dichotomies. In this way, a counsellor-in-training subjectivity is an ethical, vital, moving embodiment 
of multiple affective-material-discursive relations, it is an enactment of “unfolding the self onto the 
world, while enfolding the world within” (Braidotti, 2016, p. 26).         
This is a radical shifting of the ontology of self which ultimately calls for a commensurate shift in 
practices, i.e. counsellor education, committed to the making of particular kinds of selves, i.e. 
counsellors. Opening up what is yet possible for who and how counsellors-in-training can become 
brings significant implications not only for thinking the lived experience of counsellors-in-training, but 
also for the counselling encounters they are engaged in. With this in mind, I turn now to imagine a 
posthuman pedagogy in light of the particular experience of the participants with-in the time and space 
of this research. Specifically, I consider how the collective biography research groups, if underpinned 
by Barad’s posthumanist theoretical concepts, might become “pedagogical inspiration” (Kuby & Christ, 
2017, p. 1) for rethinking counsellor education practices, in particular reflective practice, when such 
practices are aimed at students be(com)ing counsellors “through knowing/being/doing in a material 
world of humans and nonhumans intra-acting” (p. 2). I turn first to the collective biography groups, 
reconceptualised with posthumanist underpinnings, with a focus on emergent listening and diffraction 
as pedagogical practices, before moving to re-consider the significant role of reflective practice 
currently in counsellor education by proposing a posthuman shift to diffractive practice.     
Collective Biography as method – from post-structural to posthumanist conceptualisations 
As outlined in chapter two, Davies, Gannon and colleagues began using and developing collective 





Davies & Gannon, 2006a). These earlier iterations of the method drew primarily on feminist post-
structural theory and the work of Butler and Foucault for conceptual inspiration (Davies & Gannon, 
2012). Collaborative practices generated in the collective biography workshops were aimed at mapping 
the traces of power and knowledge in embodied memories (Davies et al., 2002), and exploring the ways 
in which discursive practices “shape selves, shape worlds, shape desire” in order to open “up the 
possibility of re-shaping, re-writing, re-visioning desire” (Davies et al., 1997, p. 62). It was with these 
conceptualisations in mind that I drew on the methodology of collective biography for this project, as a 
method to engage my participants in an exploration of the discursive production and (re)positioning of 
their counsellor-in-training selves34.   
More recently, however, Davies and Gannon and others using collective biography have turned more 
explicitly to the work of Deleuze and Barad in a “radical move away from subjection as the key to 
understanding how we come to be what we are” toward a focus on processes of ongoing emergence, 
becoming and differenciation (Davies et al., 2013, p. 681; Davies & Gannon, 2012; de Schauwer et al., 
2016, 2017; Gannon et al., 2012; Zabrodska, Linnell, Laws, & Davies, 2011). I draw on this more recent 
writing, along with some of the new writing emerging on new materialism and pedagogy (Davies, 
2014a; Hickey-Moody, Palmer & Sayers, 2016; Hinton & Treusch, 2015; Kuby & Christ, 2017; Lenz 
Taguchi, 2010; Snaza et al., 2016), to theorise what happened in the groups and, more particularly, to 
imagine the “disruptive and generative potential” of diffractive pedagogical practices (Hickey-Moody 
et al., 2016, p. 213). With Barad’s ethico-onto-epistemology, with her agential realist framework, at the 
centre of this, I particularly draw on the concept-practices of emergent listening (Davies, 2014a) and 
diffraction – both recently used to articulate the methodology of collective biography. I use these 
concept-practices to think with the data from the groups, to re-imagine what such practices might 
produce for counsellor education and for the dynamic, intra-active teaching-learning processes of 
counsellors-in-training. 
                                                          





Collective biography as posthumanist pedagogy: emergent listening  
She is listening so keenly  
and she is actually there  
and that is the key ingredient  
that was very important. 
It’s so professional,  
it’s so non-judgemental. 
 
The talking,  
listening that’s a biggie,  
the questioning,  
the sense in meaning making. 
 
I guess for the first time in my life  
I felt within this group  
that I was truly cared about  
and was being listened to  
and that it was genuine,  
that there was genuine care  
that I felt in the group  
which I’ve not ever felt before  
and I think that might be about the history  
and about that feeling of trust and safety.     
(multiple participant voices) 
 
The words in the above poem, spoken by participants in the groups, about the groups, refer to listening 
as a key, if not the key, practice in facilitating the process for individuals, and the group. The 
significance of listening is, of course, not new in the field of counselling. Though, given the words 
spoken above, it seems something new did occur for these participants, in the group context, in relation 
to being listened to. One participant says, ‘for the first time in my life / I felt within this group / that I 
was truly cared about / and was being listened to’.  Another says ‘she is listening so keenly / and she is 





experienced as occurring in relation with, or co-constituted with, or inseparable from, non-judgement, 
genuineness, professionalism, questioning, genuine care, trust, and safety. Such listening, which I 
conceptualise as a material-discursive practice, is both co-emergent with, as well as productive of, these 
concepts/experiences (care, genuineness and so on) for the participants. I want to distinguish my use of 
these concepts from how they are most commonly understood within humanistic counselling and 
listening practices, such as Rogerian notions of care, genuineness, and acceptance (non-judgement) 
(Rogers, 2007), and the associated humanistic pedagogical practices, such as person-centred education, 
drawing also on Rogers notions of empathy, warmth and genuineness (Cornelius-White, Hoey, 
Cornelius-White, Motschnig-Pitrik, & Figl, 2003; Rogers, 1969). I wish to highlight this as a clear 
distinction from humanism’s unfolding self, or individual, to be clear that I am not imagining such 
practices of listening to be aimed at facilitating “constructive personality change” (Rogers, 2007, p. 
240) or “broad-actualisation of individuals” (Cornelius-White et al., 2003, p. 1). I wish also to 
distinguish such practices, theoretically, from the discursive teaching practices shaped by a commitment 
to an ‘ethic of care’, enacted through speaking and acting in relation with the power relations of the 
everyday and with systems of knowledge (Crocket et al., 2007). Instead, listening, care, genuineness, 
trust, and so on, are conceptualised here, not as human-based capacities of self-contained individuals, 
or as only discursive practices, but as material-discursive entanglements, as relational, dynamic, intra-
active articulations of the ongoing performance of the world, or group, in which we all participate. 
(Barad, 2007).  
This changes, among other things, the question from one of how I might go about ‘enacting’ or ‘doing’ 
listening or care or trust, to instead asking how listening, or care, is enacted, or made, and how I am an 
intra-active participant in its enactment. Kuby and Christ (2017), for example, in deploying Barad’s 
posthumanist theoretical concepts as pedagogical inspiration for an introductory qualitative research 
course, ask questions about trust. They write “(h)ow does trust fit into spacetimemattering? How does 
spacetimemattering fit into trust? Is trust space? Is trust matter? Trust matters; trust does matter. Trust 





pedagogical concepts and practices which are made and remade with-in the intra-active time and space 
of encounters, with/between/among students and teachers, past/present/futures and in relation with 
multiple other material-discursive practices.   
Conceptualised in this way, listening as a material-discursive practice also embodies an alternative 
concept of selves and their possibilities. It is this practice, one of emergent listening (Davies, 2014a), 
which I want to explore further here and put forward as a posthumanist pedagogical practice, as 
necessary, if counsellor education, is to take up the implications of a posthumanist reconceptualization 
of identity. I draw here on Davies (2014) work in particular with the concept of emergent listening in 
early childhood pedagogical encounters, and as put to work in more recent posthumanist 
conceptualisations of collective biography methodology (e.g. Davies et al., 2017).  
Emergent listening, as a material-discursive practice, embodies a concept of selves as emergent, not in 
a humanistic, linear unfolding sense, but as an ongoing, entangled, dynamic, intra-active and iterative 
becoming. “Intra-action recognises that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, 
their intra-action” (Barad, 2007, p. 33). Selves, counsellor-in-training subjects, emerge in and with the 
moments of encounter, as outlined through tears as constitutive of counsellor-in-training selves in the 
counselling encounters of the previous chapters. However, they also emerge and are continually 
reconfigured in the space afforded by pedagogical encounters, such as the pedagogical encounters 
within the space of the groups. This emergence, a “mutually constitutive act of becoming” in a 
“Deleuzian/Baradian framing”, affords a recognition as a (counsellor) subject, and it is through this 
“ongoing entanglement of mutual agencies (that) life/art/being (identity) is generated in each present 
moment (Davies et al., 2013, p. 682). Within post-structural and posthumanist frameworks, such 
pedagogical opportunities are necessary for the possibilities they can offer of disrupting, dislodging and 
expanding habitual ways of being, particularly those which create “a liberatory movement against 
normative, constitutive forces of discourse” (Davies & Gannon, 2012, p. 359). Posthuman, 





of poststructural (e.g. Butlerian) frameworks. Davies and colleagues (2013) identity that a Baradian 
focus is on the “encounters through which we may become different – a diffractive unfolding or 
differenciation” rather than an emphasis on the vulnerability of individual subjects to “the citational 
chains through which they are recognized and made recognizable” (p. 683).  It is in relation to Baradian 
conceptualisation of selves as emergent that I expand on the practice, and necessity, of emergent 
listening in a posthuman pedagogy.     
Davies writes initially about open listening (2011) which transforms into emergent listening (2014), 
where she draws particularly on the Reggio Emilia approach to early childhood education and Bergson’s 
(1998) notion of creative evolution. It is this practice of emergent listening which is taken up in 
collective biography as methodology (e.g. Davies et al., 2017) and which I suggest is necessary to the 
pedagogical encounters oriented to posthumanist pedagogical practices for counsellors-in-training. In 
order to examine the practice of listening in more detail, and consider how it might look pedagogically, 
I return to collective biography as method, and as initially laid out for the counsellor-in-training 
participants in this research.    
Collective biography as method works with individual and collaborative speaking, writing, and listening 
to memory stories on a particular topic. Through close attention to sensory, affective and embodied 
detail, through listening to and questioning each other, the group works together to set aside long 
explanations and clichéd repetitions (Gannon et al., 2012; Zabrodska et al., 2011). The initial material 
given to participants in the groups of this project (see appendix 3) invited a focus on this kind of 
listening: 
“Each participant listens carefully to the others’ memory stories.  They question the storyteller 
when, as listener, they find they cannot imagine what happened.  They listen in order to allow the 
memory, in its embodied, affective detail, to become imaginable, to be virtually real in their minds 






This kind of listening, is not a humanistic one of reflecting an individual’s thoughts or feelings, as if 
they belong only to an individual, where such reflecting is aimed at increasing self-awareness and 
facilitating personal knowledge and growth. As evident above, this is listening to memories, or stories, 
or, I would now add, entanglements, in order to flesh out, to make visible, the co-constitutive detail - 
affective, material and discursive. It is an embodied, and relational listening, which invites an 
attention not only to the words of the teller, but to the space where the words land, and meet the minds 
and bodies of the listeners.         
 
“The participants listen openly and with care...when they can’t enter the other’s story at any point, 
they make a note of where the words did not open up a space that they could imagine, and the 
written story is discussed in light of these blank spots. In this flow of talk the listeners offer insights 
from their own take-up of the story as it resonates in their bodies, asking ‘is this how it was?’ 
Sometimes the listeners tell some of their own memories as a way of opening up a different entry 
point to the moment that they cannot find a way into” (appendix 3) 
 
“Through listening and questioning each other on the remembered, embodied, affective detail, each 
story becomes imaginable with/in the minds/bodies of everyone...” (appendix 3) 
 
This is the kind of listening group members were invited to participate in. In collective biography as a 
posthumanist methodology, this is done, not in order to make re-visible the cultural storylines through 
which subjects are constituted, but rather individuals are de-centred and new possibilities are opened up 
for meaning and matter to intra-act such that what comes to matter is always emergent. This is an 
embodied, intra-active listening, where listening takes places in minds and bodies, includes listening to 
the other and the self, and attending to all manner of matter which is emergent through the listening and 
telling encounters of group members.   
As Davies and Gannon (2012) explain, “(i)n Barad’s terms, the collective biography workshops can be 
said to explore the entanglements of matter and meaning through which we are co-implicated in the 





self, among other matters, is made and remade in intra-action, is this concept and practice of emergent 
listening. Listening, in these workshops, in the groups which generated data for this project, and I argue 
in posthumanist pedagogical practices, is central to the processes which facilitate emergent, intra-active, 
intra-corporeal becomings. Emergent listening becomes a tool, or a force, which enables thinking 
differently and opening up what it is yet possible to become (De Schauwer et al., 2016).  Davies (2014) 
contrasts dominant ways of thinking about listening, as listening “in order to fit what we hear into what 
we already know” with emergent listening which “means opening up to the ongoing possibility of 
coming to see life, and one’s relation to it, in new and surprising ways” (p. 21).   
Such listening, she says, requires opening yourself to others, a predisposition toward change, and a 
letting go of the status quo in order to transgress boundaries, to be transgressive. This is not an easy 
listening, and not a Rogerian, humanistic listening encompassing reflection and empathy aimed at 
personal, individual growth or “constructive personality change” (Rogers, 2007, p. 240). In fact, it could 
be said that emergent listening exists in tension with this kind of listening if its (humanistic listening’s) 
aim is to name, classify, and consolidate a coherent sense of identity. Emergent listening is demanding 
and requires active curiosity about what is not apparent, known or believed; it is always being open to 
being affected by the other in an openness to the not-yet-known, where the subject is conceptualised as 
an intra-active becoming, rather than as having a “hearable, recognisable identity” (Davies, 2014a, p. 
34). In this way emergent listening is an inevitable struggle, situated within the tension of “the 
predictable patterns of life-as-usual…out of which difference might emerge” (p. 32).       
As I suggest above, emergent listening within the groups in this project, and pedagogically, can be 
theorised as a material-discursive practice, a relational, intra-active and intra-corporeal force, not 
situated in individual minds but in relational, collective entanglements. This kind of listening correlates 
with a listening to and for the intensities of forces working on and through us, forces which are 
themselves emergent, intra-active and productive of the making of ongoing difference (Davies, et al. 





“document categories of difference into which we can each be sorted” (Davies et al., 2016, p. 4, italics 
in original). This kind of listening typically finds subjects as wanting, as at risk of falling short of, yet 
nevertheless striving toward, the (unattainable) ideals of identity categories. Listening in this sense gets 
stuck at focusing on what is already known, already imagined, with will, intentionality and repetition 
seen as the tools with which to move selves toward these predetermined ends. Emergent listening as 
receptiveness to the not-yet-known and to the possibilities this opens up necessarily “requires constant 
work against the seductions of the lines of descent that require no effort, that confirm who one is and 
how the world works…, against the normative force of language, and everyday practice. It is a 
continuous struggle” (Davies, 2014a, p. 36). This is essential to the understanding of emergent listening 
lest it be portrayed as some easy, utopian form of practice. Such a practice of listening, not to affirm 
what is already known, but listening for what is known and for what might be different, for an openness 
to the not-yet-known, as multiple forces, human and non-human, intra-act, has the potential to be 
incredibly pedagogically productive in a discipline which requires a constant openness to encountering 
the not-yet-known.  
Finally in this section, I think again with Barad in further conceptualising emergent listening as a 
posthumanist, performative, material-discursive, pedagogical practice. Listening can be likened to 
Barad’s notion of “meeting each moment, being alive to the possibilities of becoming” (2007, p. 396), 
in mutually transformative ways. Evident in the participants’ descriptions of, and necessary to, this kind 
of meeting, as outlined above, is a sense of genuine care, of being listened to, and of trust and safety. 
Whilst such terms invite their own material-discursive cartography, I see these practices of emergent 
listening as reflective of what Barad (2007) describes as justice. Justice, she says, “entails 
acknowledgment, recognition, and loving attention” (p. x). Such practices of listening are about using 
“our ability to respond, our responsibility, to help awaken, to breathe life into ever new possibilities for 
living justly” (Barad, 2007, p. x). I draw here, too, on Haraway (2016) and her term, ‘response-ability’, 
to mean cultivating a capacity to respond, to “stay… with the trouble, in order to nurture wellbeing…” 





of our ordinary stories, and our ordinary becoming “involved in each other’s lives” which are not tales 
of heroes but “tales of the ongoing” (p. 76). It is this way of being responsive in and to the ordinary and 
everyday stories of living, in and to the intra-active, collective making of new worlds, which breathes 
life into the possibilities of living more justly, of flourishing and wellbeing for all, that is embodied in 
the practice of emergent listening. Basil’s words below exemplify this as he speaks about listening to, 
and being affected by, others’ stories in the groups.  
I think it’s being part of something greater,  
being affected by the stories of others  
and their subjective view of reality.   
Their memories intersected with some of mine,  
increased cross connections  
with shared experience.   
We’re all on this journey of change  
and made stronger at the broken places. 
(Basil) 
 
He connects this ‘being affected’ to ‘being part of something greater’, and to being ‘made stronger at 
the broken places’ through this collective process of ‘increased cross connections’, similar to Haraway’s 
notion of cultivating a capacity to respond by becoming involved in each other’s lives. It is through this 
emergent listening amongst collective bodies that intersections occur, cross connections are increased, 
and new possibilities are shaped. In the next section I expand on this, exploring how these collective 
processes of telling (e.g. writing, speaking, making), listening, and being open to the not-yet known, 
can be conceptualised as diffractive practices.        
 
Collective biography as posthumanist pedagogy: diffractive practice 
Actually having a group of people  
has been an amazing process for me  
to get my head around everything.   
it feels kind of more co-constructed - 





from everywhere  
and it’s kind of making  
a new experience for me. 
(Bailey) 
 
Above I have spoken about the necessity of listening, as a process involving a radical openness to selves 
which are co-emergent with unknown, and potentially infinite, possibilities. Whilst not necessarily 
always an easy undertaking, this is a foundation required from a posthumanist, diffractive practice. 
Bailey, in talking about her experience in the groups, describes what can happen when this kind of 
emergent listening is present: ‘it’s like I’m taking in bits / from everywhere / and it’s kind of making / a 
new experience for me’. Without knowing it, Bailey’s words epitomise the possibilities of a diffractive 
pedagogical practice, where diffraction is understood as a material-discursive practice (Barad, 2007). 
The making of Bailey’s ‘new experience’, or knowing which emerges, is an embodied, enfolded, 
dynamic, intra-active, articulation of ‘bits from everywhere’, where ‘bits’ are the matter, meaning, times, 
spaces and bodies co-present in the group, and cut-together-apart to produce ongoing, new, 
configurations of knowing-in-being.  
Building on earlier theorising, collective biography has been conceptualised as a diffractive 
methodology (Davies et al., 2016; De Schauwer, 2017; Zabrodska et al, 2011), as an intra-active process 
where subjects explore the entanglements of matter and meaning (Davies & Gannon, 2012). As I have 
articulated in the previous data analysis chapters, collective biography as method enabled the generation 
of data on the matter and meaning co-constituting the lived experience of counsellors-in-training. In a 
diffractive pedagogical process, this exploration, through writing, telling and/or making, listening, 
imagining and responding, in relation with the entangled, material-discursive forces intra-actively co-
constituting their lived experience, remains the focus. However, what is interesting in thinking this 
process as a diffractive pedagogical process, is how it is productive for the participants themselves.  In 
a collective, diffractive pedagogical process, an intra-active, diffractive process occurs whereby 





diffractive encounter with the time and space of the group, with each other’s memories, with each 
other’s embodied presence, with other people, times and spaces involved in the stories, and so on (De 
Schauwer et al., 2016, p. 6).   
This process, as methodological or pedagogical, is productive of an “entangled phenomenon of 
collective, embodied, biographical becoming” with-in the spacetimemattering of the group/workshop 
(De Schauwer et., 2017, p. 278).  This can be understood in this project, through the collective enacting 
of ‘tear’ stories and memories, as a multiplicity of entangled forces continually reconfigured in each 
intra-active telling and listening, producing a diffractive, reconfiguring at the same time, of the ‘tear’ 
possibilities for each counsellor-in-training present. The words and stories of one are diffracted with the 
responses of another, as listening invites particular questions, smiles and nods of encouragement occur, 
tears of recognition appear, and what continues to emerge becomes true in the moments of the encounter.  
Tears as an ever expanding multiplicity of entangled material-discursive forces, are embodied, singly 
and collectively, through the iterative, collective, diffractive group processes. The tearful possibilities 
for what and how they come to matter for a counsellor-in-training subject are reconfigured. Such 
possibilities will of course continue to be reconfigured in ongoing encounters. Why does this matter? I 
return to the participants’ words in explaining their experience of the groups, in order to both expand 
on this concept of diffractive practice as well as address what diffractive pedagogical practice might be 
productive of in counsellor education. 
Although as a group we did not work directly with these concepts, many of the comments made by 
group members seem to describe their experiences of being in the group as diffractive, as Bailey’s 
comment above, and below, suggest. 
I kind of felt I was stuck in this loop. 
just over and over again,  
so coming to the group was a way  
for me to unknot that loop, I guess  





I can understand from  
so many different perspectives  
and go away, like I’d be driving home  
and I’d be like, ‘Yip, that makes sense now. 
‘Now I get it’. And then 
I’d go home and have a think about it 
and maybe draw something 
and come to a different understanding. 
I wouldn’t have had that  
if I didn’t have the group.  
I feel I could have been stuck  
in a lot of loops that didn’t shift  
without everyone else’s contribution. 
(Bailey) 
Bailey’s description of being stuck in loops that didn’t shift is consistent with ideas of the habitual and 
normative (Mazzei, 2014), the taken-for-granted habits of thought and action (Lenz Taguchi, 2010), and 
stereotypical reproductions of identity (Hickey-Moody et al., 2016) which posthumanist pedagogies 
aim to challenge, disrupt, and re-make in unpredictable and productive ways. Bailey describes this 
process of first of all unknotting the loop, then understanding it from ‘so many different perspectives’ 
from intra-action with the group members, and through further spacetimematterings – driving home and 
drawing – coming to different understandings again. Such a description is exemplative of an iterative 
process of knowing-in-being (Barad, 2007).       
 
Bailey speaks further about this process, about what she terms a ‘shift’ for her which was produced 
through the intra-active process of the group members talking about tears in their counselling 
encounters:  
 
The point around like crying  
in response to what a client’s saying - 
it hasn’t come up for me at all,  






Hearing how other people deal with that  
I feel a lot more comfortable now  
if I do get to that point again  
I feel a lot more comfortable  
actually showing a client  
that’s how it’s affected me  
and that their story really resonates with me  
and that it actually might be helpful  
for them to see that.   
 
So that’s kind of shifted me  
into that place  
so it’s quite interesting for me  
that this is where I have done the processing for it.   
Actually having a group of people  
has been an amazing process for me  
to get my head around everything. 
(Bailey)   
 
The focus here is on the matter of tears – ‘the point around crying’ - and through a diffractive process 
where tears become multiple in the possibilities for their mattering, tears are similarly reconfigured for 
Bailey, as counsellor in a future yet to come. Bailey’s habitual response in a counselling encounter at 
this stage was one of no tears, which embodied a taken for granted assumption of this being the ‘right’ 
practice as a counsellor. Talking and listening with a group of other counsellors-in-training, whose focus 
was not on ‘getting it right’, but on exploring and mapping the diverse material-discursive enactments 
of tears, opened up the possibilities for Bailey in relation to tears, and in relation with the diverse 
material-discursive forces enacting them, in previously unknown and unthought-of ways. “Collecting 
an increasingly vaster body of experience” in this way, makes it easier and more likely for counsellors-





stories, matter and environments that are ingoing intra-action with each other in counselling encounters 
(Lenz Taguchi, 2010, p. 50).          
Not only was Bailey able to collect a vaster body of experience through the diffractive group process, 
but through the embodied mapping of her own experience, in relation with the time, space, and bodies 
of the group, her own knowing-in-being shifted. In the poem below, she speaks about seeing ‘that there 
is a lot more that’s been going on’ for her in relation to her experiences described in the previous chapter 
of ghostly tears. Her words describe this diffractive, relational process of “seeing the lines of force at 
play” through which new possibilities for being are opened up (De Schauwer et al., p. 4). She says, 
speaking about what came after the group for her: 
…getting into this trap  
I mean there’s part of me  
that has contributed to it,  
but I’m not just seeing it as  
me and my fault  
me and self-doubt.  
I can see that there is a lot more  
that’s been going on. 
 
I actually, from that point forward,  
I started putting myself first,  
which I haven’t been doing… 
I’ve been looking after myself. 
Now that I was able to deal with that  
in the group, I feel like I can say to myself,  
‘It’s ok, you can look after yourself now’. 
(Bailey) 
 
A diffractive process, in this sense, is productive of an ongoing process of transformation, for each 
member of the group. This is not a linear process of transformation, rather a counsellor-in-training 





iterative, diffractive process of the spacetimemattering of the group, and beyond. Bailey speaks of the 
shift which occurred for her in relation to ‘self-doubt’ and ‘self-blame’ through the opening up of and 
mapping of these concepts/practices within the group process. Bailey’s self-doubt and self-blame 
emerged as the product of the binary, created by neoliberalism’s ideology, of personal success/failure. 
Such a binary makes invisible the other forces enacting the possibilities for one to succeed or fail, and 
thus produces individuals who, when they experience failure to be as productive as is required, 
inevitability turn to self-blame and self-doubt. A diffractive process breaks apart binaries and provides 
space to for group members to dislodge themselves from fixed categories. In the process of mapping 
the multiple forces enacting success or failure, both success and failure, as fixed categories, became 
different and space was opened up for different agential possibilities for Bailey – to put herself first.   
As I have stated previously, in thinking of diffraction’s methodological aims, I now think of here in 
relation to a diffractive pedagogy - diffraction’s project, then, becomes about queering binaries, 
challenging notions of (fixed) identity, and rethinking how and what differences comes to matter. This 
is in order that we might responsibly and responsively engage in the ongoing work of the re-opening, 
unsettling and re-configuring “of what might yet be, of what was, and what comes to be” (Barad, 2010, 
p264).   
If diffraction is about “making a difference in the world, about taking responsibility for the fact that our 
practices matter, (and that) the world is materialized differently through different practices” (Barad, 
2007, p. 89), then participating in such group processes as outlined here appears a useful (diffractive) 
way to take Barad’s argument seriously. Through diffracting sameness and difference, through an 
‘absorption’ of the multiplicity of practices, such as tears, participants emerge with more expansive 
‘knowing in being’ about how the world is materialized differently through different practices, and so 
the possibilities for making a difference in the world are opened up. This process of ‘being affected by’ 
the stories of others, seemed to start with this sense of shared, common experience of becoming a 





the stories of others. However, what became evident as being significant to the ongoing practices of 
becoming-counsellor was actually difference. Barad speaks about her approach as being one of placing 
“the understandings that are generated from different (inter)disciplinary practices in conversation with 
one another”. Her method is  
to engage aspects of each in dynamic relationality to the other, being attentive to the iterative 
production of boundaries…and questions of accountability and responsibility for the 
reconfigurings of which we are a part. That is, the diffractive methodology that I use in thinking 
insights from different disciplines (and interdisciplinary approaches) through one another is 
attentive to the relational ontology that is at the core of agential realism. (Barad, 2007, p. 93) 
 
This is how I conceptualise what happened for participants within the groups as they generated 
understandings, participated in entangled, dynamic relationality and questions of accountability and 
responsibility, through their practices of writing, talking, listening and sharing difference with-in the 
spacetimemattering of the group. This ongoing differenciation, of concepts, practices and selves, 
emerged from the cutting together-apart of their different material-discursive insights, practice, and 
theory, and their embodied, nature-culture differences of, at least, gender, age, race, ethnicity, which 
are themselves not fixed categories but ongoing material-discursive practices. Kelly speaks of this in 
the last poem below, in relation to difference for her and remarks too, how it is not always an easy 
process, highlighting the necessity of the presence also of the emergent listening practices outlined 
above.     
You know how we talked about  
this is a common thing  
but it’s actually the differences  
that heightens that appreciation,  
when I think about you  
when you say that you like…  
I just think gosh that’s, that’s cool  
that you’re like that.   





So you know I find some of that  
sort of quite hard  
but it’s great listening to that,  
it’s not about you’ve got to be one  
or the other. 
(Kelly) 
 
Conceptualising this group process and experience as a diffractive pedagogy, underpinned by practices 
of emergent listening, has significant possibilities for counsellor education, in responding to the diverse 
and complex needs and identities of both counsellors-in-training and of those individuals, groups and 
systems they will encounter within their practice. I continue to explore these possibilities in the next 
section where I turn toward the already established processes of reflective practice in counsellor 
education, in order to rethink this in light of the reconceptualizing work this thesis has engaged in.   
From reflective to diffractive practice in counsellor education 
In this section I want to continue with Barad’s notion of thinking insights diffractively in order to 
consider what might be produced in thinking insights from reflective practice together with diffraction 
as it is outlined above as a pedagogical process. In this way I hope not to discount the value and long 
history of reflection in education generally (e.g. Dewey, 1998; Schön, 1983, 1987), and reflective 
practice in counselling in particular, nor to suggest we create a reflective-diffractive binary as somehow 
a linear and fixed representation of how we might understand our engagement with the world. I draw 
here on van der Tuin (2011) who argues that 
the diffractive method allows us to affirm links between seemingly opposite schools of thought, 
thus breaking through a politics of negation. At the same time, it allows us to affirm and 
strengthen links between schools of thought or scholars that only apparently work toward the 
same goals. Diffraction, then, is the strategy with which new concepts or traditions, new 






It is my hope that new concepts or traditions for reflecting on/diffracting with counselling practice might 
be generated through diffracting insights from both schools of thought. It is my intention here to offer 
a beginning to such possibilities by thinking through the implications generated from this research. In 
particular, I will draw on, or think through insights generated from, methodological shifts from 
reflexivity to diffraction (as outlined in chapter four), insights generated above from exploring the group 
process in this project as diffractive, and current literature on reflective practice in counselling and 
counsellor education. Having already outlined the first two above, I re-turn briefly to reflective practice 
as a pedagogical practice in counselling, as outlined in chapter one, in order to further consider its 
conceptual limitations and affordances for re-thinking its potential as diffractive practice in counsellor 
education.   
In chapter one, I drew on two main texts of reflective practice in counselling – Stedmon and Dallos’ 
(2009b) book Reflective Practice in Counselling and Psychotherapy and Bager-Charleson’s (2010) 
book by the same name, to outline the current practice in counsellor education. I recounted the aims of 
such practices to develop practitioners’ abilities to be “self-critical and ethical” (Dallos & Stedmon, 
2009), to examine and assess their own experiences in order to become more aware of the processes, 
values, assumptions and theories informing their counselling practice, with the intention of transforming  
learning and practice (Bager-Charleson, 2010). In addition, professional identities are intimately 
connected to the ways in which reflective practice is performed (Stedmon & Dallos, 2009a).  
As I note in chapter one, it is clear that the tradition of reflective practice has become a rich and valuable 
one for the field of counselling and psychotherapy, however it is not without its limitations. Already 
identified by Stedmon & Dallos (2009a), are its limits in terms of vision, whereby ‘reflection’ 
illuminates only that which has come to be defined as ‘seeable’, resulting in a “metaphor of infinite 
regression” (p. 191). I now want to re-turn to these notions of reflection and reflexivity. I re-turn the 
reader to chapter four in order to consider both the theoretical limitations of our concepts of reflection 





summarise those insights from chapter four in relation to methodological practices in order to re-
consider how they are equally relevant in matters here of reflective practice. As I note in that chapter, 
Haraway (1988) was led to the term diffraction through attention to the limiting vision offered by even 
critical reflexivity. As she says, and as I quote in chapter four,  
 
Vision is always a question of the power to see (p. 585)… How to see? Where to see from? What 
limits to vision? What to see for? Whom to see with? Who gets to have more than one point of 
view? Who gets blinded? Who wears blinders? Who interprets the visual field? What other 
sensory powers do we wish to cultivate besides vision? (Haraway, 1988, p. 587). 
   
Applying this now to reflexive practice in counselling and psychotherapy, and to Stedmon and Dallos’ 
identification of a similar paradox inherent in a vision which just reflects back the image of the see-er, 
I am led to seek better visual and sensory systems for the ongoing work of attending to and transforming 
our counselling practices, and counsellor subjectivities. As Barad has outlined, diffraction, even in a 
classical sense, lends itself to thinking beyond the optics of reflection to waves which bend, overlap, 
interfere with, interrupt, and produce different patterns to the original (Barad, 2007). A quantum 
understanding of diffraction, as has been applied throughout the thesis would offer a wholly different 
onto-epistemological underpinning for the ways students engaged with thinking about their practice.  
They would not be ‘reflecting on’ what was, rather they would be intra-actively participating in the 
ongoing and entangled practice of making the world anew, with accountability and responsibility for 
their part in mapping what came/comes to matter, how and for whom. The aim of reflective practices 
in counselling, to prompt an iterative and recursive process of further discovery as a way of “nurturing 
our development as therapists and sustaining our practice-based learning” (Dallos & Stedmon, 2009, p. 
1) would take on a different aim as diffractive practice. Rather, perhaps we could say diffractive practice 
invites counselling practitioners to responsibly and responsively engage in the ongoing work of the re-
opening, unsettling and re-configuring “of what might yet be, of what was, and what comes to be” 






In addition to identifying the limits of reflection as a way of seeing, thinking through the limits of 
reflexivity also brings us full circle to the question of who is doing the looking.  As I outline in chapter 
four this question has led researchers to identify deep tensions and ambivalence within methodological 
practices of reflexivity (Davies et al. 2004; Pillow, 2003; MacBeth, 2001).  In a similar way, we can ask 
who is the ‘I’ that looks back on encounters in their counselling practice, in an attempt to reflexively 
examine the theory, context, constructed self, cultural and political influences impacting on the events 
which took place in the past, in order to change one’s behaviour in the future? As Davies et al. (2004) 
identify, we are left again with a pre-discursive, real, unified, knowing subject, who engages in the 
looking, leaving us again in a place of ambivalence, working both within and against the dominant 
language of humanism which reflexive practices attempt to overcome. Methodologically, recognising 
these inherent tensions has led many to abandon reflexivity altogether (Davies & Gannon, 2012; Davies, 
2014a; Lenz Taguchi, 2012, Mazzei, 2014) and leads me to agree in proposing diffraction, as “a 
mapping of interference, not of replication, reflection or reproduction” as a more useful concept and 
practice in counsellor education (Haraway, 2004, p. 70). I see it as a productive way of both returning 
to address some of counselling’s original aims and of responding to contemporary understandings of 
the intersectional, intra-active and contingent nature of identities. In relation to counselling’s original 
aims I refer to its initial development as a social intervention at the individual level concerned with the 
promotion of values of social justice (Cornforth, 2006). Despite these aims, counselling has gone on to 
endure criticism as a mechanism for maintaining the status quo (Cornforth, 2006). Diffraction, in 
Haraway’s words, offers a way to not only “get at how worlds are made and unmade” but “to participate 
in the processes, in order to foster some forms of life and not others (1994, p. 62). This is an ethico-
political commitment to making a difference, to interfering with and reconfiguring possibilities for who 






In proposing diffractive practice as a rethinking of reflective practice in counsellor education I draw 
also on the group process as outlined earlier in this chapter. Much of the writing on reflective practice 
proposes reflection as an individual process. That is, an individual reflecting on their experience may 
do so in relation with a supervisor, or through a writing or creative exercise. Others may offer questions 
or comments, with the intended aim of encouraging further analysis of the individual’s own experience.  
Diffraction however, decentres the notion of the individual. Instead, the posthuman subject can be seen 
as an intra-active entanglement, co-constituted, at least, by the time, space and matter enacting the 
moments of reflection/diffraction. The counsellor is always in-the-making in the very moments of 
reflection/diffraction – not just as a result of the new knowledge/learning which comes to light through 
the process. The counsellor-in-training’s body can be seen as a “space of transit, a series of open-ended 
systems in interaction with the material-discursive ‘environment’” (Lenz Taguchi, 2012, p. 265), just 
as my researcher body was. It makes sense then to expand the possibilities for intra-action during this 
process, to introduce multiple and diverse interferences in order to diffract new knowing, particularly if 
one agrees with counselling’s, and Barad’s, ethico-political calls for justice. It was through intra-action 
in the groups with other bodies, with other stories, genders, cultures, ages, times, spaces and matter that 
new knowing emerged, that tears, concepts and practices, and counsellor-in-training subjects were 
reconfigured. This moves the possibilities for reflective practice far beyond an individual’s reflection 
on a wider range of models or theories in order to expand their vision. Diffractive practice goes beyond 
reflecting on theory and culture as fixed categories to diffracting with multiple space-time-matters in 
the production of bodies, knowledges and practices always in the making. As Davies says of the 
diffractive research encounter, I suggest becomes true pedagogically for diffractive practice in 
counsellor education: 
“it is an emergent process, in which subjects and objects become different in the encounters 
through which they emerge and go on emerging differently…through what Barad calls the world 







Implications for counsellor educators 
Having considered the pedagogical possibilities of re-imagining reflective practice as diffractive 
practice in counsellor education, and the implications in relation to the always evolving counsellor-in-
training, I am aware that such a rethinking inevitably has implications for reconceptualising what it 
means to be an educator in a posthuman educational landscape. Just as I have reconceptualised the 
individual counsellor-in-training subject, emerging in intra-active, entangled relations, so too I must 
reconfigure the counsellor educator. I re-turn to Barad, who says, 
 
(t)o be entangled is not simply to be intertwined with another, as in the joining of separate 
entities, but to lack an independent, self-contained existence. Existence is not an individual 
affair. Individuals do not pre-exist their interactions; rather, individuals emerge through and as 
part of their entangled intra-relating (2007, p. ix). 
 
In order to consider what this means for (me as) a counsellor educator - to be emergent within these 
same entangled intra-actions - I re-turn again to the methodology of the collective biography groups, 
drawing on my research journal from that time to think with current literature theorising the posthuman 
educator subject. In doing this, I notice a shift already which has taken place over the course of this 
project.  I ‘see’ the world in entanglements and intra-actions now, as ongoing intra-active flows, rather 
than separate, static, individuals and objects shaping and being shaped by each other. I have become 
more interested in the shape and contour of what is emerging, rather than what is pre-existing, both in 
relation to my own identities and that of my students. I sense my educator self to be more decentred, a 
part of an intra-active becoming in relation with the time, space, matter and bodies of students in the 
room. Being less self-contained brings challenges and possibilities for educators, particularly in relation 
with the neoliberal, outcome focused climates of education. I aim to outline an initial consideration of 






I am prompted to begin with a consideration of the nonhuman in the intra-active entanglement of the 
‘classroom’, the space where teaching and learning typically occurs, as I am struck by the consideration 
I gave this aspect at the beginning of my research. Having already worked with these students (my 
participants), as a lecturer, for at least a year, I wanted to disrupt the lecturer-student relationship as I 
embarked on a research relationship. Due to particular constraints, the room we ended up using for the 
groups was the same space we had previously used for much of the teaching-learning over the previous 
year. Already attuned to the potential for space and environments to shape encounters, I was anxious 
about the negative impacts using this teaching-learning space might have on my hopes for co-
constructing new relationships within the research encounters. Reflecting on the first research group, I 
wrote,  
 
‘I tried to make it less formal. I took food – crackers, hummus, chocolate and encouraged them to bring food. I 
took a cushion, a scarf to lay over the table in an attempt to change the ambience. I sat us in a different place, a 
different corner, away from where I had mainly taught them last year, in a different part of the room, away from 
the whiteboard, near the windows.  It didn’t feel like enough and I didn’t really know what difference it would 
make…did make. I asked them and they (mostly) said it felt fine… I was surprised to hear most of them say being 
here was actually good, they felt safe and comfortable, because of the work we did together last year.’  
(Research journal) 
 
In thinking now, with new materialisms and posthuman pedagogy, I can see a shift in my thinking about 
the non-human objects and spaces of our teaching-learning environments. Robbins (2016) captures this 
when she says “rather than viewing the nonhuman objects in our classroom as a backdrop against which 
teaching and learning occur, it may be helpful to consider the ways in which objects are part of the intra-
actions that shape the classrooms entanglement” (p. 156). While I clearly considered the significance 
of these objects and the room as shaping the experience of the students, I also saw them as separate 
from the individuals in the room, and as having a more generalised, backdrop, effect. Robbins suggests, 
as educators, we pay more attention to the agency and ability of non-living objects and physical spaces 





classroom space are intra-active forces acting in relation with student-participants’ pasts and presents, 
my lecturer-researcher pasts and presents, co-producing the agential possibilities for who and what 
comes to matter in an ongoing way.   
Pedagogically, this requires an ongoing attention to the entangled flows of intra-action as selves - 
educators and learners – emerge continually. Such a process is never complete. Interestingly, Robbins 
(2016) points out, in tracing the intra-active agency of a sweater in her classroom, the role of the teacher 
does not have to be occupied by one individual. While she acknowledges that within a classroom she 
was the only one who could hold this role at the institutional level (i.e. assigning grades), she suggests 
that the teacher role is “produced through a distribution of power that occurs within entangled intra-
actions”, rather than being owned by one individual (p. 159). Such a view has implications for both 
students and educators who must remain open, and able to be responsive, to the always shifting and 
emerging nature of roles, responsibilities and power in entangled, material-discursive, intra-actions. 
This poses a challenge to those – both students and educators - who align more strongly with particular 
hierarchical views of an educator as possessing a fixed identity, and acting as an authoritative knower, 
imparting and offering wisdom and knowledge. For counsellor educators, who often come into this 
teaching identity with a history (and current practice) as a counsellor, this experience combined with 
the common desire of students to ‘gain access to’ this wisdom and experience, can work against the 
more fluid, emergent, shifting nature of students and educators collaboratively occupying multiple roles 
in intra-active teaching-learning entanglements.  
This grappling with the shifting nature of roles was something I noticed, and wrote about, early on in 
the meeting of the group, as I tried to make sense of my role within the group.  
‘A’s discussion connected with me. I felt from her description what it was like to be young, trying to be the 
professional, being judged. It took me back to when I started, at the same age, and then brought me full circle to 
this beginning again, as an academic.  I felt a connection to each story, to each picture, and could see myself in 
all of them.  It’s a strange place to be and I wonder how it would feel being in a different physical space. I don’t 
feel like the lecturer now but I still feel in a position of responsibility, wanting to ensure this is a useful experience 





who haven’t had a chance to share, or who are choosing not to. I am aware of my desire to make it ok for 
everyone, yet I can’t.  I notice a calming over the three hours, as I relax my grip on responsibility and trust others 
to get what they need for themselves. I am moved by K’s story, her expression of feeling of being in the struggle. 
I am aware of wanting to let her know that, of wondering what is appropriate, of questioning my role as 
researcher, lecturer, counsellor, supervisor and simply as a woman connecting with another woman’s 
experience’.   
(Research journal) 
 
Of course, it makes sense to me now, to notice what inevitably emerges for me through the entangled 
intra-relating with the group, and in that space. I see the intra-active emergence, in relation with the 
other bodies and multiple space-time-matters of the group, of multiple, contingent, identities for me - 
of woman, teacher, supervisor, beginning counsellor, beginning academic, mother, and so on.  
Pedagogically, it becomes a process of mutual engagement and transformation where none of us can be 
reduced to any one thing, such as learner or educator. What this also means, and what I observe in my 
notes, is the always unpredictable nature of what is yet to come. Lenz Taguchi suggests that, for these 
reasons, “we have to view ourselves in a constant and mutual state of responsibility for what happens 
in the multiple intra-actions emerging in the learning event, as we affect and are being affected by 
everything else”. She says that “(t)he flow of events thus becomes a collective responsibility…(where) 
(r)esponsibility is thus built into the immanent relationship between all matter and organisms” (2010, 
p. 176). This shift towards a collective responsibility took place in the groups, as I relinquished control, 
and also voiced this concern with group members thus making explicit this personal-collective 
responsibility for teaching-learning-becoming through the intra-active group process. Robbins (2016) 
notices a similar desire to control and to organise in her role as a teacher, however notes too, that as 
power in her classroom shifted, her role became to be present within the intra-actions, rather than to 






Connected to this letting go of responsibility, for me, was a desire also not to let go of all of my knowing, 
to become somehow passive in the contributions I could make to the becoming-learning of the group, 
and yet a confusion of how to do both of these – know and not-know at the same time.   
‘I find myself more comfortable as a counsellor-supervisor/facilitator – trying to share some of my 
feelings/thoughts more openly than I would perhaps in my lecturing role. But I realise too, that my experience 
feels different now, beyond theirs. I have recollections of traversing their path, but I am no longer in it.  I wonder 
how to both bring myself into the group, whether I should, and act to hold the process at the same time.  It feels 
hard to take up space, when the time is limited already.  I want to prioritise the space for their words, and I am 
especially mindful of the unsaid, of making space for all of their voices. I want to challenge too, as an educator, 
to offer and invite considerations beyond these humanistic conceptualisations of their experiences’.  
(Research journal)   
 
In an intra-active pedagogy, underpinned by an ethico-onto-epistemology of knowing-in-being, Lenz 
Taguchi clearly argues that as teachers, our focus “should not be with what we think is the right or 
correct thing to do in relation to…norms or truths” and that we should not be “exclusively fixated with 
learning-goals and outcomes” (2010, p. 177). My temptation was to offer my experience/truth to the 
group when I (thought I) had traversed a similar path, in order perhaps to enlighten them though the 
sense I had already made. I, at times, wanted to challenge, and disrupt, the knowing-in-being which was 
emerging, but without colonizing their knowing with my own. I also didn’t want to pre-determine what 
knowing could and would emerge, and to open up to other ways of knowing at the same time. This 
seems a tenuous line to hold, and yet is what is necessary if we are committed to the possibilities of a 
posthumanist pedagogy. Lenz Taguchi suggests, within such a pedagogy, we should make ourselves 
aware of what is happening, in a material-discursive sense, in the events of the present, while looking 
for “what might be possible, what emerges, and what can become” (2010, p. 177). This suggests 
embodying an orientation toward not-knowing what is to come, or what knowing will emerge, whilst 
immersing oneself in the immanence of the present. Whilst Lenz Taguchi talks about teaching children, 
her ideas are nevertheless equally relevant in alternate teaching contexts. She suggests, “we should learn 





how the intra-activities between the material conditions and the actions of the children (counsellors-in-
training) alter their understandings and strategies”. Thus, as an educator enacting a posthumanist 
pedagogy, I become curious about meaning and matter in the entangled events being described, as well 
as about the different understandings, knowledge, and constructs emerging through the diffractive 
process at work.  
Such a process is neither easy nor fast. It requires a collective, detailed attention to the affective, 
material, social, discursive, and political in relation with memories, moments, and events, and in relation 
with the diffraction patterns emerging in the time and space of the flow of the learning event. Speeding 
toward predetermined outcomes by focusing only on what is lacking, by judging performance against 
already existent, narrow criteria, works against an onto-epistemology of immanence, where we (human 
and non-human) are all in a state of inter-dependence and interconnection with each other as 
performative agents (Lenz Taguchi, 2010). Accepting such an ontology, means accepting 
unpredictability as an educator in this continuous flow of intra-active forces and intensities, and being 
open to both the habitual and the creative and inventive possibilities and potentialities of change, 
knowing, and becoming.  
Seeing oneself as an inherent part of this diffractive process, as participating in it, rather than merely 
observing, evaluating, and facilitating, also necessitates certain kinds of pedagogical work. This is work 
which is attentive to the bodily, affective, and intimate forces as lively, active, participatory agents, both 
with-in the moments and memories described by students, as well as those occurring with-in the learning 
encounters (Mulcahy, 2012). In a relational onto-epistemology, the affective, bodily and intimate aren’t 
seen to exist within any one person, but to emerge relationally. In this sense, often unpredictable, 
feelings which pass through our (students and educators) bodies should be regarded with curiosity as to 
their production and productive potential. Yet in a neoliberal context where rationality is prized, 
combined with an educational context with a traditional emphasis on the cognitive realm, attentiveness 





Clearly, there are challenges in adopting diffractive, onto-epistemological pedagogical practices in the 
current neoliberal climate of education. Such practices require resistance to neoliberalism’s, often 
invisible, demands. They require an emphasis on making time and slowing down, and an educative 
orientation to affective, bodily matter as relational and productive in pedagogical encounters. I have 
highlighted the effects of neoliberalism on shaping the present-absent tears of Bailey in chapter eight, 
in particular in producing the embodied sense of needing to be more productive in less time, in relation 
to never ending, and ever-increasing demands. Similarly, “the neoliberal university requires high 
productivity in compressed time frames” (Mountz et al. 2015, p. 1236). For educators, working within 
such pressures has produced a range of isolating and debilitating embodied effects, which are “felt more 
by some bodies than others, tracking broader power structures within and outside of the academy” (p. 
1245). Taking up the practices I have outlined here, becomes doubly difficult for bodies already under 
intense pressure, and yet therefore even more important, as ways of disrupting and generating alternate, 
more responsive, just practices in counselling, and counsellor education.           
Challenges arise too, for educators, not just in working against neoliberalism’s grasp on institutions, 
bodies and minds, but in conveying and enacting onto-epistemological shifts in the purposes of 
counsellor education. Traditional ideas of training counsellors see the training of, more or less 
interchangeable, individuals in an efficacious set of methods, techniques, or procedures (Orlinksky et 
al., 2005). Such training models are underpinned by “instrumental or teacher-centred approaches” where 
learners are encouraged to “represent the pre-existing world… As a learner you reproduce these 
representing language constructs from books, lecturer or other learning materials” (Lenz Taguchi, 2010, 
p. 44, italics in original). Other, more recent, constructivist approaches to counsellor education 
recognise the active role of the learner in this process and suggest that learning is thought of a process 
whereby the learner progresses from lower to high degrees of cognitive complexity and abstraction. 
This is similar to the stage models of counsellor development outlined in chapter one. These 
perspectives of learning are “built on an idea of reproduction of knowledge constructs and skills” (p. 





knowledge, inside the individual learner’s mind/intellect as an inner, or social process.  Biesta describes 
this rise in the language of ‘learning’ and individual ‘learners’, as “learnification” (2010, p. 18). While 
such a shift has had some benefits, Biesta highlights the individualistic nature of learnification as 
problematic, given the relationality which actually underpins education. In addition, he highlights the 
limited possibilities a focus on ‘learning’ and ‘learners’ offers for incorporating education’s broader 
aims and purposes, beyond training for a profession or qualification. Typically the end result of such 
constructivist, developmental approaches to learning includes a reduction of differences and 
complexities, with a focus on developing mastery of skills in order to reproduce already existing models 
and knowledge, in order to then assimilate, or be socialised into, existent professional systems (Lenz 
Taguchi, 2010). The problem is, such systems appear to work against education’s ultimate aims of 
inclusion and justice, and of educating practitioners capable of working with the actual realities of 
complexity, diversity, ongoing change, and the always not-yet-known.         
Enacting the onto-epistemological turn in counsellor education, requires counsellor educators, and 
students, to work against this current dominant notion of ‘learnification’, and even the still used 
language of ‘training’, whereby students and curriculum focus on the language of mastery and 
reproduction of available skills and knowledges, and where individuals desire the knowledge and skills 
necessary to reproduce themselves and propel them into their chosen professions. Counsellor education, 
as opposed to training, has been charged with offering “relevant, progressive and future-oriented 
instruction” (Brotherton, 1996, p. 84), with contributing to the “generation of new knowledges – in 
response to changing socio-political conditions and new populations of students” (Crocket et al., 2011, 
p. 134), and with educating graduates as “skeptics…practitioners who can question their own 
foundations for knowing” (McAuliffe, 2011, p. 12). A posthumanist pedagogy offers the potential to 
meet these still relevant challenges, to enact teaching-learning practices capable of producing 
counsellors worthy of responding to the technological, environmental, political and social conditions of 






I am alert once more to the need to warn against this as a linear move, as a leaving behind of other 
practices and ways of knowing. Such an onto-epistemological shift invites educators and students, to 
begin by, and proceed with, unpacking the theories and tools they are thinking with. It requires a 
recognition of the breaking down of binaries, recognising the inseparability of, for instance, theory and 
practice, of teacher-learner, and of knowing emerging from intra-active being. In slowly introducing 
similar onto-epistemological changes into an early childhood teacher education programme, Lenz 
Taguchi recounts that this work is not about replacing new methods with old ones, but rather “opening 
up toolboxes we carry, which are already filled with theoretical and methodological tools, to be able to 
look inside of them, temporarily un-pack them, investigate the tools inside, de-code them, re-code them 
and invent new ones” (2010, p. 22). In this continuous process of un-packing and re-packing, 
experimenting and re-inventing, something new emerges, and the inseparability and interdependence of 
theory and practice come to life. This is the hard and discombobulating work which educators and 
learners engage in together in a posthumanist pedagogy. In counsellor education, the already established 
importance of reflective practice in counsellor education lends itself as a site for beginning to 
reconfigure such practices, educators and learners, in a posthumanist, ethico-onto-epistemological 
direction, where ethics, knowing and being are inseparable.    
Conclusion and future directions 
I have used this chapter to think through the implications for counsellor education, and educators, of 
rethinking the educative subject in a posthumanist sense. If the counsellor-in-training subject at the 
centre of education continually emerges through intra-active practices of knowing-in-being, then it 
matters how we conceptualise and configure those practices. If the educative subject is not a self-
contained, individual learner, working to understand and master pre-determined skills and knowledge, 
but rather a posthuman subject enfolding and embodying a shifting entanglement of relations – human 
and non-human, then pedagogical practice requires attention to these human and non-human matters. I 





concept-practices of emergent listening and diffraction, as counsellors-in-training collectively work, 
with educators, not to reflect on the world, but to share and listen, unpack and remake, experiment and 
re-invent, tools, practices, and identities. This is practice as always inseparable from theory, identities 
as material-discursive, made of matter and meaning, and as always relational, dynamic, and emergent. 
Such processes must necessarily work against and with already established rational and individualistic 
material-discursive practices constituting institutions and pedagogy, including those of neoliberalism, 
training and learnification.  
This ethico-onto-epistemological work is potentially hard, slow and discombobulating for educators 
and learners alike. It demands commitment, presence and sustained practices of care and attention. 
However, if we are to continue to task counsellor education with the aim of producing graduates capable 
of participating in, ethically and responsibly, the reconfiguring of the “material-social relations of the 
world” (Barad, 2007, p. 35) and of those in it, of being responsive to the possibilities that might help 
all, human and non-human, to flourish, then there is no question of not proceeding. Barad tells us “(t)he 
world and its possibilities for becoming are remade with each moment” (2007, p. 396). Each 
(pedagogical) moment matters, and there are no individual agents of change. What comes to matter, and 
what is excluded, for counsellors-in-training, for counsellor educators, and for counsellor education is 
an entangled affair. Recognising this demands an active turning away from the dominant individualistic, 
“reductive and simplifying and limiting forces in education” (Lenz Taguchi, 2010, p. 178). To instead 
turn toward an ethico-onto-epistemology of “immanence and potentiality” (p. 177) takes us beyond 
current educative divides such as theory/practice, body/mind, and rational/emotional into experimental 
and emergent spaces. It is by placing our attention on the entangled events we are a part of, in processes 
of collaborative, collective, diffractive experimentation, that inventive potentialities and transformative 
capacities to act open up. Just as my knowing-in-being has emerged through participation in this project, 
so too, I know it will continue to emerge, and new and inventive possibilities will come to matter, as I 
attempt to enact the knowing produced on these pages in my ongoing intra-active practices as a 
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APPENDIX 1: Information letter and consent form: 
Telephone: 364 2987 ext 3839 
Email: shanee.barraclough@canterbury.ac.nz  
 
25 March 2013 
Towards Embodiment of a Counsellor Identity: Possibilities and Challenges for 
Trainee Counsellors 
 
Information Sheet for Participants 
 
I am a PhD student and a lecturer in Counsellor Education at the College of Education, University of 
Canterbury.  I have worked as a psychologist and a counsellor for many years, and this work, 
combined more recently with my roles in Counsellor Education, has lead to my research interest in 
counsellor identities.  I am particularly interested in the lived experiences of trainee counsellors in 
relation to developing professional identities, both the challenges and the possibilities encountered in 
their journey of becoming counsellors.  
 
I would like to invite you to participate in my study.  If you agree to take part you will be asked to do 
the following: 
 
 Take part in an initial interview with me, reflecting on your trainee counsellor journey up to 
this point. This will take approximately 45 minutes to one hour.  This will be audio or video 
recorded. 
 
 Take part in a collective biography group (see below for a brief summary of this process) 
which will meet on a regular basis for up to one year.  The group will comprise between four 
and eight trainee counsellors undertaking their Counselling Practicum at Canterbury 
University.  The group will aim to meet for two to three hours every six weeks, however exact 
timings will be determined by the group.  The group will thus aim to meet on a minimum of 
eight occasions over twelve months.  This group will be facilitated by me, and will be videoed.   
 
 Keep a journal in between the group meetings, recording any critical incidents (see below for a 
definition).   
 
 Take part in a final interview with me, at the end of the collective biography group process. 
This will include your reflection on your involvement in the collective biography process.  
This will take approximately one hour. 
 
Please note that participation in this study is voluntary. If you do participate, you have the right to 
withdraw from the study at any time without penalty.  I will do my best to remove any information 
relating to you, providing this is practically achievable.  
 
It has been important to consider any ethical implications due to the dual relationships I, as a lecturer 
and a PhD student, may have with you as a student in the Counsellor Education Programme and as a 






that I will have no part in your assessment, during, or subsequent to, your participation in this 
research.   
 
Associate Professor Miller is also a co-supervisor for this research.  In order to address her dual role 
as your assessor/my supervisor, we have decided that her supervision will be at 30% (with Dr 
Kathleen Quinlivan as the primary supervisor at 70%).  This 30% will not involve direct 
access/viewing of any data collected.  Her role will focus on the proposal, methodology and write-up.   
 
I will take particular care to ensure the confidentiality of all data gathered for this study.  I will also 
take care to ensure your anonymity in presentations and publications of the findings.  However, full 
individual anonymity cannot be guaranteed because those participating in the group will be known to 
one another.  In order to minimize this risk, participants will be asked to maintain group 
confidentiality, and to not disclose any identifying details of participants in publications and 
presentations of the findings.  
 
Video recordings will be viewed, transcribed and analysed by me, and group excerpts may be brought 
back to the group for viewing.  It may be necessary for my supervisor, Dr Quinlivan, to view some 
video recordings for supervision purposes.  All of the data will be securely stored in password 
protected facilities and locked storage at the University of Canterbury for 5 years following the study. 
It will then be destroyed.   
 
The results of this research may be used to provide new understandings for trainee counsellors, and 
potentially others on similar professional journeys, about navigating the development of new 
professional identities.  Ultimately the results may be used to inform Counsellor Education 
Programmes.  The results will also be reported nationally and internationally at conferences and in 
journals. All participants will receive a report on the study.  
 
If you have any questions about the study at any stage please contact me (details above).  This project 
has received ethical approval from the University of Canterbury Educational Research Human Ethics 
Committee.   If you have any concerns or complaints about the study you may contact either my 
primary supervisor, Dr Kathleen Quinlivan (Kathleen.quinlivan@canterbury.ac.nz) or the Chair, 
Educational Research Human Ethics Committee, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, 
Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz). 
 
If you agree to participate in this study please complete the attached consent form and return it to me 
in the envelope provided by 17 April 2013. 
 













Collective biography is a research practice, involving the coming together of a small group of participants 
interested in sharing and examining individual and collective experiences around a particular theme or topic.  
Central to this method is a focus on remembered moments of experiences and encounters, which participants 
work with, through the shared work of telling, writing (drawing), listening, and re-writing.  In doing this work 
the aim is to re-member the deeply felt sensory, embodied detail of those lived experiences.  Through 
collectively asking questions of each particular moment, participants aim to write and rewrite the experience 
until the ‘precise detailed moment (becomes) imaginable in a lived bodily sense’ (Davies & Gannon, 2006, 
p173).   
 
Critical Incidents: 
Critical incidents have been deemed important in the development of counsellors-in-training in so far as they 
influence the personal and professional development of counsellors. Critical incidents are described as ‘events 
that are catalysts for change’ (Furr & Carroll, 2003, p484) and ‘significant learning moments, turning points, or 
moments of realization’ identified as making a significant contribution to professional growth (Howard, Inman, 
& Altman, 2006, p88).   
 
References: 
Davies, B., & Gannon, S. (2006). Doing collective biography. Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press. 
Furr, S. R., & Carroll, J. J. (2003). Critical Incidents in Student Counselor Development. Journal of Counseling & 
Development, 81(4), 483-489. doi: 10.1002/j.1556-6678.2003.tb00275.x 
Howard, E. E., Inman, A. G., & Altman, A. N. (2006). Critical Incidents Among Novice Counselor Trainees. 












Telephone: 364 2987 ext 3839 
Email: shanee.barraclough@canterbury.ac.nz  
4 March 2013 
 
Towards Embodiment of a Counsellor Identity: Possibilities and Challenges for 
Trainee Counsellors 
 
Consent Form for Participants 
I have been given a full explanation of this project and have been given an opportunity to ask 
questions. 
 
I understand what will be required of me if I agree to take part in this project. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any stage without penalty. 
 
I understand that any information or opinions I provide will be kept confidential to the researcher, and 
her primary supervisor, and that any published or reported results will not identify me. 
 
I understand that all data collected for this study will be kept in locked and secure facilities at the 
University of Canterbury and will be destroyed after 5 years.   
 
I understand that I will receive a report on the findings of the study.  I have provided my email details 
below for that.   
 
I understand that if I require further information, I can contact the researcher, Shanee Barraclough.  If I have 
any concerns or complaints I can contact either Dr Kathleen Quinlivan, primary supervisor of the research 
(Kathleen.quinlivan@canterbury.ac.nz) or the Chair of the University of Canterbury Educational Research 
Human Ethics Committee.  
 













APPENDIX 2: Interview schedule 
Interview 
 
1. What it means to be a counsellor 
What are your ideas/images of what it means to be a counsellor? 
What does a counsellor look like? What qualities do they possess? How do they behave?  
How do you fit/not fit with these ideas?  
What does it mean for you to be a counsellor? What is happening when you know you are ‘being a 
counsellor’? How do/will you know when are being a counsellor?   
What kind of counsellor are you/will you be? 
2. Deciding to become a counsellor 
Why did you decide to become a counsellor?  
How does that fit with other aspects of yourself that are important to you?  
3. The process of becoming a counsellor 
How do you understand the process of becoming a counsellor? 
- theoretically, cognitively, affectively 
What were your expectations around what the process would be like? 
What has the process been like? Smooth, simple, straightforward? 
- uncomfortable, destabilizing, moments of discomfort?  
What have your affective experiences been like, in this process? 
What factors have impacted on your experience?  
What has challenged you, constrained you? 
What has opened up possibilities for becoming (a counsellor)? 
How would you describe the process of change, of becoming a counsellor, for you over the last year? 
Draw? Metaphor? Words? 
How would you describe where you are now in this process? Draw? Metaphor? Words? 
What are your thoughts/ideas about your continuing process of becoming a counsellor, over the 
next year, and beyond? Draw, metaphor? Words? 
What else do you think is important about what it is to become a counsellor? (picture?)  
(Begin the group with sharing the drawing/words/metaphor from above – something personal for 







APPENDIX 3: Notes on collective biography for research participants 
MEMORY WORK/COLLECTIVE BIOGRAPHY GROUP – EXPERIENCES OF BECOMING COUNSELLOR 
From individual identity to ‘everyone and anyone’s stories’ 
Collective biography is a research strategy...working at the bodily level of knowledge and affect, and of 
moving beyond individualised versions of a person, toward persons-in-relation, persons-in-process...  
Memory work is intimately bound up with the uncovering of the processes of the construction of self.  
Within the workshops, through developing the skills of listening and attending to the minute bodily details of 
being, it becomes possible for each story to become a collective story.  
“It is a sense of empathy, a closeness that creates bonds, that enables each group member to recognize the 
other and to recognize him/herself in the other”.35  
The purpose of telling our individual stories is not to reveal individual identities but to gain insight into the 
ways in which life, in all its multiplicity is generated and lived.  The stories are in this sense everyone’s stories, 
and anyone’s ‘stories so far’.  
Writing/telling/re-writing the remembered moment 
The written stories focus on one pivotal moment.  The memories are written without clichés and 
explanations, and without the moralistic judgements or commentaries that intrude on the pure intensity of 
the remembered moment...focusing on finding the words to evoke the remembered moment of being, 
searching... for the details that will bring the memory most vividly to life.  
When the stories are long and complex we find a key moment to focus on, and write only about that moment.  
The focus on the moment and the body helps us also to resist the effects of narrative structures that are 
inclined towards linearity, causality and closure.  As a rule of thumb, the memory should take place in one or 
two minutes.  If the explanation seems crucial to comprehending the moment, we write them as separate to 
the memory36.   
Writing provides a discipline to the memory group work; talking is far more likely to invite self-presentation – 
it is difficult not to get caught up in interpretation and justification.  Writing encourages description, and 
discourages interpretation37.  
In the writing and reading, in the discussion about... each storyteller works to express the very ‘this-ness’...of 
the remembered moment – an immersion in the present moment, in time and in place, that often eludes us in 
the process of normative expectations, of habitual thoughts and practices, and of submissions to the 
dominant, often clichéd codes that make up the existing order (dominant discourses). 
The Listening 
The relationship between the participants and the written texts, and memories evoked in the workshop 
space, is developed through a particular kind of close attention to each other’s stories.  Through listening and 
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questioning each other on the remembered, embodied, affective detail, each story becomes imaginable 
with/in the minds/bodies of everyone...  
Participating in collective biography extends the capacity for listening and develops a new understanding and 
practice of relationality... Such listening begins with ‘the capacity to abandon yourself to the conviction that 
our being is just a small part of a broader knowledge; listening is a metaphor for listening to others, sensitivity 
to listen and be listened to, with all your senses...behind each act of listening there is desire, emotion, and 
openness to differences, to different values and different points of view...Learning how to listen is a difficult 
undertaking; you have to open yourself to others...competent listening creates a deep opening and 
predisposition toward change’38  
Each participant listens carefully to the others’ memory stories.  They question the storyteller when, as 
listener, they find they cannot imagine what happened.  They listen in order to allow the memory, in its 
embodied, affective detail, to become imaginable, to be virtually real in their minds and bodies39.  
The participants listen openly and with care...when they can’t enter the other’s story at any point, they make 
a note of where the words did not open up a space that they could imagine, and the written story is discussed 
in light of these blank spots.  In this flow of talk the listeners offer insights from their own take-up of the story 
as it resonates in their bodies, asking ‘is this how it was?’ Sometimes the listeners tell some of their own 
memories as a way of opening up a different entry point to the moment that they cannot find a way into40 
Journals 
Reflective journals are used for drafting memory stories and for recording other thoughts of the collaborative 
discussions about each other’s memories and thoughts about what occurred during and in response to the 
workshops.  ‘The close work of writing and rewriting, the struggle to find the language to evoke the memory, 
and the sensibility of each moment of being, can be traced through the multiple drafts and fragments of text 
in the journals’4 
It’s important to know... 
‘This remembering is difficult, provocative, challenging, funny, sad, and pleasurable, evoking laughter and 
tears and a lot of intense questioning about what actually happened: how did it feel, how did it look, what 
were the embodied details of this remembered event?’5   
‘This ruthless pursuit can only work where a profound level of trust and mutual commitment has already been 
established among the workshop participants’41.  
How and what?42 
1. Write a memory of a particular episode, action, event, moment, encounter (about 1-2 min episode) 
2. Write it in the 3rd person (take a ‘bird’s eye view’ – describe what you see) 
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3. Write in as much detail as possible – key image, sound, taste, smell, touch, even ‘inconsequential’ 
detail  
4. Write without interpretation, explanation, meaning making, justification  
5. Share your story 
Everyone (see listening above) - identify clichés, generalisations, contradictions, cultural imperatives, 
metaphor...what is not written.   
Engage in analysis – uncover the common sense, the common understandings contained in them.  It is 
important not to individualise, e.g. not why did she do this, but what does this say about ‘counsellors in 
training’ and what they might experience and why?   
One aim is to uncover social meanings embodied in the actions described, and to uncover the processes 
whereby the meanings – both then and now - are arrived at.  The taken for granted of everyday life is 
uncovered.  Generate and reflect on multiple meanings possible  
What does this episode mean to us? (The person who wrote it and then others)  
Why did we recall this one?  
What does it tell us about the social construction of counsellor identities?    
6. Rewrite your story in your journal 
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APPENDIX 5 – Whole tear poem (Bailey) from chapter eight 
I had quite a tight chest.   
I felt like I almost wanted  
to cry a couple of times, like  
 
the things she was telling me…  
I just felt so sad for her.   
Yeah it was strange.  
 
I haven’t quite experienced  
that in the room before  
with any clients. 
 
I almost wanted to cry  
because I thought how on earth  
did she deal with this,  
 
how is she even at school today,  
how does she cope,  
how does she get through it? 
 
It was kind of like unease.   
It was almost like - 
‘what’s she going to say next?’ - 
 
‘it can’t get any worse than this’ 
and everything was actually  
getting worse.  
 
I felt like my stomach was up here.   





in the room. I felt, you know, tense.   
 
It’s hard to describe it. 
It seemed like her story -  
one massive thing after another.  
 
I just thought  
how can you keep going  
with all these waves  
 
knocking you over?   
I thought it was absolutely amazing  
she just gets out of bed every morning. 
 
this girl,  
she’s not even sixteen yet 
she has been shipped around  
all over the place  
her whole entire life. 
 
I’ve had a few clients come in  
and talk about some pretty heavy things  
like self-harm and suicide attempts  
 
and things, but this one really, really  
struck me for some reason,  
more so than any other client has.   
 
Was she crying? 
 
No she wasn’t,  





very matter-of-factly.  
 
It was like shock  
of hearing everything  
she was saying, and it was also  
 
what can I do - 
because my days are so flat out,   
seeing between five and eight  
 
or nine kids a day?  
I know that I have to slow down  
and it’s not like the school’s  
 
telling me to do it.  
It’s like I’ve got this thing in me  
where I keep thinking I need to 
 
because they’re all lining up  
outside my door,  
I need to be there for them, and  
 
I need to give them the space  
and time. I’ve got this kind of  
overwhelming want to fix things 
 
or try and make things better.   
So I was really conscious about that  
in the room at that moment -  
 
‘you’re not going to be able to fix this’.   





you can’t fix people’s problems  
 
and what I can do is so limited  
in the scheme of their big life.  
So I felt a little bit powerless  
 
and then towards the end of our session  
she started saying things like  
I don’t really want to be a part of  
 
this world any more  
but I have to keep going  
and I want to keep going.   
 
It really hit me then  
when she started talking a bit more  
about the emotions  
 
and how it was making her feel.   
I think that really  
wrenched at me a bit. 
 
I just felt so, so much compassion  
for her, that I was drawn in so much,  
when she said - 
 
‘I don't feel like I want to be  
in this world any more’ -  
I was thinking I can totally understand  
 
why you feel that - 100%,  





with clients before this.   
 
I think I got too deep into it. 
It was like a switch going off - 
don’t cry. 
 
I did feel a switch kind of go  
but it was only for a few seconds  
and I managed to switch it off pretty fast.  
 
I was literally just listening to her story  
the whole way through  
and I think that probably helped me  
 
not to cry.  
I just had that gut instinct  
don’t cry in front of the client, don’t.   
 
Why is that?   
I think I’d be worried that they’d think - 
that I couldn’t handle their story  
 
that they might have upset me.   
maybe I feel unprofessional  
but then it’s not unprofessional - 
 
it’s a very confusing place.  
I think with me  
why it struck me so much  
 
it really got at my core values  





and how I would be a parent  
 
I started having all these feelings  
it made me really think about  
wanting to be, like, a foster parent  
 
and if that girl came along to me  
I would be her foster mum  
I had all of these things coming up for me  
 
which was quite surprising  
because I’m so young.   
And I think it really tugged at some real  
 
core values and beliefs that I hold  
and I was so angry  
that someone had done this to her.  
 
